（职业经理培训）免费普拉
哈拉德 CKP哈默尔 GH公司
的核心竞争力
普拉哈拉德 公司的核心竞争力
1990年普拉哈拉德()和哈默尔()在哈佛商业评论上发表《企业核心竞争
力》(TheCoreCompetenceoftheCorporation)
很多公司仍在苦苦寻找在全球竞争中克敌制胜的最有效方式。20世纪80年代，
人们评价某个高管有没有才能，主要看这个人能否重组公司、拨乱反正和精简层
级。然而，进入 20世纪 90年代后，人们评价高管时，将看他们有没有能力识别、
培育和利用公司的核心竞争力(corecompetence，也称核心能力)，为公司的成长
找到新的途径。看来，高管们该重新思考一下公司这个概念本身了。
让我们首先以美国的 GTE*和日本的 NEC**两家公司为例，探讨十年来它们各
自的发展轨迹。20世纪 80年代初期，信息技术已初显欣欣向荣的景象，GTE凭借
自己的地位，极有希望成为该行业的主力军。这家公司在电信业非常活跃，其业
务横跨多个领域，包括电话、交换与传输系统、数字化专用自动小交换机(PABX)、
半导体、分组交换、卫星、国防系统以及照明产品等等。此外，GTE旗下的娱乐产
品集团(EntertainmentProductsGroup)，也就是喜万年(Sylvania)彩电的制造者，
在相关的显示器技术领域也占有一席之地。1980年，GTE的销售额为 99．8亿美
元，净现金流 17．3亿美元。与之相比，NEC当时还只是一个小字辈，销售收入仅
为 38亿美元。尽管拥有与 GTE不相上下的技术基础和计算机业务，但 NEC在电信
领域尚无任何经验。
然而，到了 1988年，NEC却后来者居上，销售额达到 218．9亿美元，远远高
于 GTE公司的 164．6亿美元。这时，GTE实际上已经沦为一家以经营电话业务为
主的公司，尽管它在国防和照明产品方面仍占有一席之地。这家公司的其他业务
从全球的角度看已经变得很小。在过去的几年中，GTE公司已经把喜万年电视机和
Telenet业务剥离了出去，把交换机、传输设备和数字 PABX等产品转交给合资公
司生产，而半导体业务则已关张大吉。在这个过程中，GTE公司的国际地位一路下
滑。1980到 1988年间 GTE在美国以外地区的销售收入从过去占总收入的 20％降到
了 15％。
相比之下，NEC却一跃成为世界半导体工业的领导者，并且在电信产品和计算
机领域也跻身一流企业。它巩固了自己在大型计算机方面的领先地位，还跨出了
公用交换和传输领域，把触角伸到了手机、传真机和手提电脑等所谓的生活时尚
产品(1ifestyleproducts)领域，在电信和办公自动化之间架起了桥梁。NEC成为
惟一一家在电信、半导体、大型计算机三个领域的全球销售收入均名列前五位的
公司。为什么这两家在起步时业务组合基本相近的公司，在几年后的表现却如此
悬殊?主要是因为 NEC能够从“核心竞争力”的角度考虑企业问题，而 GTEZ却没
有。
对公司的重新思考
经营多元化公司曾经是一项很简单的工作，总部只需指示其业务单位把注意
力放到某个特定的最终产品市场，并督促它们成为该领域的世界领先者即可。然
而，随着市场边界的变化越来越快，目标开始变得飘忽不定，对目标市场的占领
顶多只是暂时性的。但也有几家公司属于长袖善舞的一类，它们善于创造新市场，
能够快速打入新兴市场并且在业已成熟的市场中大力改变客户的选择模式。这些
公司自然成为大家效仿和学习的对象。对于公司的管理层来说，关键任务就是使
自己的组织能够在产品中加入令人无法抗拒的功能，或者更高明一些，创造出消
费者需要但是还未曾想到过的产品。
这项任务的艰巨性超乎我们的想像。最终，只有从根本上改变大型公司的管
理才能完成这项任务。首先，西方企业的高层领导需要为竞争力的下降承担责任。
人们或许会把竞争力下降归咎于高利率、日本的保护主义、过时的反托位斯法、
爱闹事的工会以及缺乏耐性的投资者。但是，另一方面，人们却较难意识到或者
羞于承认这样一个事实：政治上或者宏观经济上的“救济”并不会给公司提供多
少动力。其实是西方管理的理论和实践在拖我们的后腿，真正需要改革的是我们
在管理中遵循的原则。
像许多其他的对比案例一样，NEC与 GTE之间的比较可以给我们很多启迪。我
们旨在通过这些对比分析来了解争夺全球领先地位所依靠的基础发生了什么变化。
早在 20世纪 70年代初期，NEC公司的管理层就清楚地阐明了把计算机与通信技术
相融合的战略意图(strategicintent)，即所谓的
“C&C”(Computer&Communication，计算机与通信)。NEC公司的领导认为，这一
战略成功与否关键在于能否获得必要的核心竞争力，尤其是在半导体领域的核心
竞争力。该公司的管理层采纳了一个合适的战略架构(strategicarchitecture)，
将其简称为 C&C，然后在 70年代中期将其意图传达给了整个组织以及外界人士。
NEC公司成立了一个由高层经理组成的“计算机与通信委员会”，以指导核心
产品与核心竞争力的开发。此外，NEC还打破了各项业务的利益界限，建立了一些
协调小组和协调委员会。按照其战略架构，NEC把大量的资源调配到元件和中央处
理器项目上，以加强公司在该领域的地位。它通过相互协作方式使得公司的内部
资源成倍增长，借此积累起了多方面的核心竞争力。
NEC仔细地辨明了三种相互关联的技术和市场发展潮流。管理层认为，计算技
术将从大型主机架构向分布式处理转变，元件将从简单的集成电路(1C)发展为“超
大规模集成电路”(VLSl)，通信方面则从机械式纵横交换机演化为复杂的数字传
输系统，即我们所说的 ISDN(综合业务数字网)。随着形势进一步发展，NEC认为，
计算、通信和元件业务将逐渐重叠和交织在一起，以至于最后很难将它们区分开
来。如果一家公司具备了服务于这三个市场的核心竞争力，那么到那时，必然会
获得巨大的商机。
NEC的高层领导决定把半导体列为公司最重要的“核心产品”(coreproduct)。
它随后与很多公司结成了战略联盟，到 1987年联盟数量已达到 100多个，其目的
就是为了以低成本快速构建企业的核心竞争力。在大型主机领域，NEC最著名的合
作伙伴是美国的霍尼韦尔公司(Honeywell)与法国的 Bull公司。在半导体元件领
域，几乎所有的合作项目都是以获取技术为目的。在结盟时，NEC的运营经理对合
作动机和目的非常明确：吸收和消化合作伙伴的技能。NEC的研发总监曾这样总结
20世纪 70年代和 80年代获取技能的经历：“从投资角度分析，这种方式使我们
能够以更低的成本迅速掌握国外技术。我们没有必要自己开发新的创意。”
而 GTE似乎并没有如此明确的战略意图和战略架构。尽管高层决策者也曾讨
论过信息技术的发展将带来怎样的影响，但对于在信息技术行业竞争将需要什么
样的能力(competencies)，并没有形成一致的观点，更谈不上将其在公司中广泛
传播了。虽然公司做了大量工作来确认关键技术，但高层业务经理依然我行我素，
仿佛他们经营的业务单元与别的单元毫不相干。权力分散导致公司无法集中发展
核心竞争力。相反，各业务单元越来越依靠外面的公司来获得关键技能，而对外
合作则成了一种分阶段退出的途径。今天，在新的管理层上台后，GTE已重新定位，
要把自己的能力应用于电信服务领域的新兴市场。
竞争优势的根源
NEC和 GTE两家公司的差别在于，前者把自己看成是一些能力的组合，而后者
则把自己视为一些业务的组合。这类情形在很多行业屡见不鲜。从 1980年到 1988
年，日本的佳能公司(Canon)增长了 264％，本田公司(Honda)增长了 200％。相比
之下，美国的施乐(xerox)与克莱斯勒(Chrysler)则落了下风，如果说西方的经理
们以前是为日本进口货的价廉质高而忧心忡忡，那么他们现在恐怕要为对手在创
造新市场、发明新产品和改进提高方面的惊人速度而慨叹了。佳能公司推出了个
人复印机，本田把业务从摩托车扩展到了四轮越野车，索尼(Sony)开发出了 8毫
米的摄像机，雅玛哈(Yamaha)推出了数字钢琴，小松公司(Komatsu)研制了水下遥
控推土机，而卡西欧(Casio)的最新产品则是一种小屏幕彩色液晶电视机。谁曾预
料得到会演化出这样一些前卫产品市场?
在较为成熟的市场上，日本公司的挑战也同样令人不安。它们掀起了一场改
进产品特点和功能的风暴，把尖端的技术引入到了人们的日用品中。比如，日本
汽车制造商率先尝试了四轮驱动、每缸四汽阀发动机，车内导航系统以及尖端的
电子引擎管理系统。佳能凭借其产品的性能，在传真机、台式激光打印机甚至半
导体生产设备等市场都谋得了一席之地。
在短期内，一个公司的竞争优势源于现有产品的性价比特性。但是在第一轮
全球竞争中存活下来的企业，无论是西方公司还是日本公司，现在都已趋向于采
用相似的严格的产品成本和质量标准。达到这些标准实际上已经成为继续留在竞
争队伍中的最低要求，它们对于形成差异化优势的重要性已越来越小。从长期来
看，竞争优势将取决于企业能否以比对手更低的成本和更快的速度构建核心竞争
力，这些核心竞争力将为公司催生出意想不到的产品。管理层有能力把整个公司
的技术和生产技能整合成核心竞争力，使各项业务能够及时把握不断变化的机遇，
这才是优势的真正所在。
有些高层经理宣称他们无法打造核心竞争力，因为业务单元的自主性是不可
侵犯的，或者因为他们被紧张的季度预算束缚住了手脚。这些人应该反省。在很
多西方企业中，问题并不是领导层在能力上逊于日本同行，或者企业的技术能力
比日本公司差一大截，而是这些企业的管理层死抱着一个陈旧的公司概念。这个
陈旧的概念，限制了业务部门的能力，使它们无法充分利用很多欧美公司所拥有
的技术能力宝藏。
多元化公司就好比一棵大树，树干和几个主要枝杈是核心产品，较纤细的树
枝则是业务单元，叶、花与果实则属于最终产品。为大树提供养分和起支撑固定
作用的根系就是公司的核心竞争力。如果你只通过看最终产品来评价竞争对手的
实力，你就会看走眼，好比你只看树叶来判断树的强壮程度一样。
核心竞争力是组织内的集体学习能力，尤其是如何协调各种生产技能并且把
多种技术整合在一起的能力。索尼的微型化能力和飞利浦(Philips)的光介质专长
就是两种核心竞争力。虽然在理论上可以把收音机组装在一个芯片上，但这种理
论知识并不能确保公司有能力生产出如名片般大小的微型收音机。为了把设想变
为现实，卡西欧必须把公司在微型化、微处理器设计、材料科学和超薄精密封装
等方面的技术专长融为一体，这些也正是它在微型名片式计算器、袖珍电视机以
及数字手表中所采用的技术。
核心竞争力不仅仅是整合各种技术，同时它还意味着对工作进行组织和提供
价值。索尼公司的核心竞争力之一是微型化。为了使产品实现微型化，索尼必须
保证技术专家、工程师和市场营销人员对客户需求达成共识，并了解技术上的可
能性。核心竞争力的作用不仅在制造业中表现明显，在服务业中也是。花旗集团
(Citicorp)率先投资了一套运营系统，这套系统使它能够全天 24小时介入全世界
的市场，由此带来的核心竞争力使花旗脱颖而出，把很多金融服务公司甩在身后。
核心竞争力是沟通，是参与，是对跨越组织界限协同工作的深度承诺。它涉
及所有职能部门和很多级别的员工。世界级的研究项目，比如激光或陶瓷的研发
工作，能够在公司的实验室中开展，但是不会对公司的任何业务部门产生影响。
因此，组合在一起构成公司核心竞争力的各种技能，必定是汇集在思维开阔的人
身上。如果目光狭窄的话，人们就不会意识到他们有机会把别人的专长以新颖的
方式与自己的专长结合到一起。
核心竞争力并不会随着使用的增多而减少。有形资产会随着时间的流逝而减
损，但核心竞争力却会随着应用和共享的增多而增强。但是，核心竞争力也需要
培养和保护，因为知识不用就会消亡。核心竞争力是把现有业务维系在一起的黏
合剂。它们也是新业务开发的动力。多元化经营和进军新市场或许也要以它们为
依据，而不仅仅是看市场的吸引力。
以 3M公司的黏性胶带业务为例。在规划多元化业务(包括报事贴、磁带、照
相胶卷、压敏胶带和砂带)的过程中，该公司运用了在基底、涂层以及黏合剂等产
品中广泛共享的技术能力，并设计了各种方法来组合它们。实际上，3M公司对这
些技术的投资一直没有间断过。尽管它的业务组合看起来极为分散，但是繁杂表
象的背后却是少数几项共享的核心竞争力。
对比之下，有些大公司虽然具有打造核心竞争力的潜能，却没有成功，因为
高层管理者仅把公司看做互不相干的业务集合。美国的通用电气公司(GE)把很大
一部分电子消费品业务卖给了法国的汤姆森公司(Thomson)，声称在该领域中保持
竞争优势已经日益艰难。事实的确如此，然而，令人不解的是，通用电气为这几
项关键业务相中的买主竟然是几家在核心竞争力方面早已成了领袖的竞争对手
——例如生产小型电机的百得公司(Black&Decker)和电子厂商汤姆森公司，后者
正急于在微电子领域建立自己的核心竞争力，并且在日本公司的启发下，认识到
在电子消费晶领域确立地位是打造这种核心竞争力的关键。
那些陷入战略事业部(strategicbusinessunit，SBU)思维模式的管理者们几
乎无一例外地发现，公司中的各个业务部门已经离不开外部供应商所提供的必要
元件，比如发动机和压缩机。但公司不能把这些产品仅仅看成是普通元件，而应
该将其视为能够给各种最终产品带来竞争力的核心产品，它们是核心竞争力的具
体体现。
核心竞争力不是什么
如今，各大公司都在竞相构筑自己的核心竞争力，以赢得国际领先地位，成
功的公司已经不再把自己视为各个产品事业部的集合。从表面上看，佳能、本田、
卡西欧以及 NEC的各项业务似乎跨度很大，并且这些业务在客户、分销渠道以及
营销策略上毫不相关。确实，有时候它们拥有的业务组合看起来是比较特异，比
如，NEC公司是世界上惟一在计算机、电信和半导体三个领域中销售额均名列前茅
的公司，同时它的电子消费晶业务也经营得有声有色。
然而，表面现象往往具有欺骗性。其实，在 NEC，数字技术，尤其是超大规模
集成和系统集成技术是其根本。貌似散乱的业务在公司的核心竞争力中找到了统
一的支点。同样，本田在汽车、摩托车、割草机以及发电机领域具有独特的竞争
优势，是因为它具有在发动机和动力传动系统方面的核心竞争力。佳能在光学、
影像与微处理器控制领域的核心竞争力，使它可以顺利进入甚至垄断复印机、激
光打印机、照相机以及图像扫描仪等诸多市场。飞利浦公司为了完善其光介质技
术(激光视盘)几乎花费了 15年的时间，而 JVC为了在录像机领域取得领先地位也
投入了大量的精力。其他可列入核心竞争力的还有机电工程(把机械工程与电子工
程结合在一起)、视频显示技术、生物工程以及微电子技术等。在建立核心竞争力
的早期阶段，飞利浦当时也不曾预料到在光介质的核心竞争力上可以派生出如此
多的产品。同样，JVC在着手开发录像带技术时也未曾想到，最终的产品会有微型
摄像机。
与争夺全球领先地位的品牌之战不同的是，打造世界一流的核心竞争力是一
场无形的战斗。前者在世界各地的广播电视和平面媒体中随处可见，其目的是争
夺全球性的“头脑份额”(share ofmind)，而后者则是无形的，除非有意寻找。
西方公司的高层领导经常跟踪竞争对手产品的成本和质量，然而，他们之中有多
少人理清过日本人为了以低成本获得核心竞争力而编织成的联盟网络?西方公司都
想成为国际上的领先者，但是又有多少个董事会曾就相关的核心竞争力达成过明
确一致的意见?又有多少高层领导曾经讨论过业务单元层面和总公司层面竞争战略
的关键不同之处?
让我们明确一点，培养核心竞争力并不是说必须在研发投入上超过对手。以
销售数量计，1983年，佳能复印机在全球市场上的份额超过了施乐，但佳能在复
印技术上的研发预算却只占施乐的很小一部分。过去 20年来，NEC的研发开支占
其销售收入的比例几乎比每个欧美同行都少。
核心竞争力也不是指成本分摊(shared costs)，即让两个以上的战略事业部
共用同一设施——工厂、服务设施或者销售队伍，或者采用同样的元件。成本分
摊的确会产生很大的效益，但成本分摊是在业务单位已经出现后，为了合理组织
生产而采取的事后行动。建立核心竞争力则要事先规划，然后才会衍生出业务单
位。
此外，建立核心竞争力也与纵向一体化不同，前者的目标更加远大。通常，
经理人在做自造还是购买(make orbuy)决定之前，都要先从最终产品出发，对上
游的供应链效率、下游的分销渠道以及客户进行分析。他们并不需要列出一张技
能清单，并展望着以非常规的方式运用这些技能。(当然，打造核心竞争力确实为
纵向一体化提供了理由。拿佳能来说，虽然它的复印机业务并不是特别的纵向一
体化，但是在垂直供应链中的某些方面，由于对核心竞争力有支持作用，佳能也
会采取一些纵向一体化的措施)。
核心竞争力的确定与丧失
至少有三种检验方法可以用来确定公司的核心竞争力。首先，核心竞争力能
够为公司进入多个市场提供方便。举例来说，显示器系统方面的核心竞争力能够
使一家公司涉足计算器、微型电视机、手提电脑显示屏以及汽车仪表盘等广泛的
业务领域，这就是卡西欧公司进军手持式电视机市场不足为奇的原因。第二，核
心竞争力应当对最终产品为客户带来的可感知价值有重大贡献。显然，本田公司
的发动机专长满足了这个条件。
最后一点，核心竞争力应当是竞争对手难以模仿的。如果核心竞争力是各项
技术和生产技能的复杂的融合，那么这项能力就难以被竞争对手模仿。竞争对手
或许能够获得核心竞争力中的几种技术，但是要复制其内部协调与学习的整体模
式却非常困难。在 20世纪 60年代初期，JVC决定致力于录像带技术方面的核心竞
争力，这个核心竞争力就通过了我们上述的三项检验。20世纪 70年代末美国的 RCA
公司决心开发以唱针为基础的视频转动式系统，这个项目则不能通过上述三项检
验。
几乎没有公司能够打造 5到 6种世界一流的基本核心竞争力。如果一家公司
列出 20到 30种能力(capa•bilities)，那么它列出的很可能就不是核心竞
争力。当然，列出这样一个清单并且把这些技能视为构建核心竞争力的基础不失
为一种好的做法。接下来，你可以通过签订许可协议和建立联盟来获得核心竞争
力中缺少的组成部分，这会使你的成本大大降低。
大多数西方企业几乎从未从这些方面考虑竞争力，现在该是这些公司认真研
究这样做有何风险的时候了。倘若主要根据最终产品的性价比来判断自己或者对
手的竞争力，实质上会破坏自己的核心竞争力，或者说对于增强自己的核心竞争
力几乎没有帮助。要知道，能够催生出下一代有竞争力产品的基本技能，不能通
过外包和贴牌生产(OEM)“租进来”。照我们看，很多公司舍弃“成本中心”，转
向外部供应商以便削减内部投资的举动非常不明智，它们这样做实际上是把自己
的核心竞争力拱手送给了别人。
以克莱斯勒为例，与本田不同，它把发动机和动力传动系统仅仅视为普通元
件。这家公司现在变得日益依靠三菱(Mitsubishi)与现代(Hyundai)。1985年
—1987年，它外包的发动机从 252，000台增加到了 382,000台。想像一下，换了
本田，它会轻易把如此关键的汽车部件拱手让给他人去生产吗?更不必说设计工作
了。这就是为什么本田对一级方程式赛车如此投入的原因。虽然本田的研发预算
少于通用汽车(GM)以及丰田(Toyota)，但是它能够把各种与发动机相关的技术整
合到一起，并且将它们充分地转化为整个公司的核心竞争力，从而开发出世界上
首屈一指的产品。
当然，完全有可能的是，一家在核心竞争力开发方面不及别人的公司也会暂
时拥有竞争力强的产品线。比如，如果一家公司现在欲进入复印机市场，它会发
现将有十几家日本公司等在那里，迫不及待地要为它从事贴牌生产。然而，一旦
基础技术发生变化，或者它的供应商也决定直接进军该市场并成为它的强劲对手，
那么这家公司的产品线，及其在市场和分销渠道上所做的投资就将变得岌岌可危。
虽然外包能迅速使你获得竞争力强的产品，但是它对于打造有助于保持产品领先
地位的内在技能却贡献甚微。
同样，如果一家公司尚未决定在哪个方面打造核心竞争力，它就不可能制定
出明智的联盟或者采购战略。显然，日本公司已经从联盟中获益。它们通过联盟
的方式从西方合作伙伴那里学到了很多，这些西方公司显然没有尽心尽力去保护
自己的核心竞争力。正如我们以前曾经谈到过的，在联盟中学习需要公司积极地
投入一系列资源，包括差旅、一群敬业的员工、试验性设备、消化和验证所学内
容需要的时间。如果一家公司没有建设核心竞争力的明确目标，它也许不会做出
这样的投入。
此外，如果公司在现有业务中估计达到了 40％，但是其最终产品的品牌份额，
不管是空调还是冰箱，都非常小。
由于全球竞争在不同的层面上遵循的规则不同，争夺的利益也不同，所以分
清核心竞争力、核心产品以及最终产品非常重要。为了长期建立或者巩固领先地
位，公司很可能要在各个层面都成为胜利者。在核心竞争力层面，公司的目标是
在某个具体类别的产品功能的设计和开发方面谋取世界领先地位，比如在光盘数
据的存储和检索(比如飞利浦的光介质技术能力)，或者体积的紧凑性和使用的方
便性(比如索尼的微型发动机和微处理器控制装置)方面领先全球。
为了保住核心竞争力的领先地位，这些公司都力图使核心产品在世界上的制
造份额达到最大。核心产品往往拥有各种各样的内部和外部客户，从事核心产品
制造带来的销售收入和市场反馈至少部分地决定了核心竞争力改进和扩展的速度。
正是出于这种考虑，20世纪 70年代中期，JVC决定与欧美领先的电子消费品公司
建立录像机的供货关系。在为法国的汤姆森公司、英国的索恩公司，德国的德律
风根公司(Telefunken)，以及美国的合作伙伴供货的过程中，JVC获得了现金并积
累了多方面的市场经验，这使得 JVC最终超过了竞争对手飞利浦与索尼。(虽然飞
利浦与 JVC同时开发了录像带技术，但由于它没有建立世界性的 OEM网络，所以
无法通过销售核心产品来加快录像带技术能力的改进和完善)
JVC的成功之道为韩国公司所效仿，像金星(Goldstar)、三星(Samsung)、起
亚(Kia)以及大宇(Daewoo)等韩国制造商也是通过与欧美公司签订 OEM合同来建立
自己在显示器、半导体以及汽车发动机等各种核心产品领域的领先地位。它们对
外公开宣称自己的目标是把投资项目从潜在竞争对手，多半是美国公司手中夺过
来。这种做法使它们能够在掏空对手的同时，加快核心竞争力的建设。亚洲公司
通过专注于核心竞争力的建设并且把它们注入到核心产品中，在元件市场上已经
积累了优势。接着，它们又利用优越的核心产品向下游进军，以谋得自己的品牌
份额。它们不大可能永远只停留在做低成本供应商上。随着品牌声誉的提升，它
们的价格也可能会提升。本田的豪华车 Acura就已经证明了这一点，其他的日本
汽车制造商也在打同样的牌。
控制核心产品如此关键还有其他的原因。如果一家公司在核心产品市场占据
了主导地位，它就有能力影响相关应用领域与最终产品的发展。诸如数据驱动器、
激光器之类与 CD相关的核心产品，就使得索尼和飞利浦能够影响计算机光存储外
设的发展。随着核心产品向更多的应用领域挺进，公司在新产品开发上能够不断
减少成本、缩短时间和降低风险。简而言之，定位准确的核心产品可以带来规模
经济和范围经济(economiesofscope)。
战略事业部的专制
如果我们拘泥于 20年前设计的用来管理多元化公司的分析工具，是无法理解
新竞争态势下出现的新概念和新术语的。当时的竞争基本上是在国内展开(比如，
通用电气对西屋，通用汽车对福特等)，所有的主要竞争对手说的都是来自同一批
商学院和咨询公司的语言。但是，老药方会有潜在的毒副作用。那些把战略事业
部作为惟一组织形式的公司尤其需要新的思维方式。副栏“两种公司概念：战略
事业部或者核心竞争力”总结了两种公司概念的含义。
显然，多元化企业拥有一系列的产品组合和业务组合。但是，我们认为企业
也应被视为能力的组合。美国企业并不缺少用来打造核心竞争力的技术资源，但
是美国企业的管理层常常缺乏打造核心竞争力的远见，并且缺少有效的管理手段
来整合分散在多个业务部门的资源。一旦管理层转变了工作重心，那么多元化的
模式、技能的准备和调用、资源的分配以及联盟和外包的方式都不可避免地会受
到影响。
我们谈到过全球竞争的三个层面：核心竞争力、核心产品以及最终产品。企
业必须了解自己在每个层面上的输赢状况。仅仅通过加大投资力度，一家企业也
许会在某些基础科学技术上领先对手。尽管如此，它或许仍然会输掉争夺核心竞
争力领导地位的竞赛。相反，如果一家企业能够在打造核心竞争力方面赢得竞赛，
而不是在少数几项技术上领先，它几乎必定会在新业务开发上胜过对手。如果企
业的核心产品在世界上的制造份额能够领先对手，那么它很有可能在提高产品的
功能和性价比上胜过对手。
由于产品的市场份额未必能反映公司内在的多种竞争力，所以我们很难通过
这类指标来确定公司在最终产品的竞争中到底是赢还是输。事实上，如果企业试
图依靠别人的竞争力来获得市场份额，而不愿意把力气花在核心竞争力和核心产
品的开发上，那么就好比踩在危险的流沙上。在全球品牌大战中，3M、百得、佳
能、本田、NEC以及花旗集团等通过从核心竞争力中派生出来的各种产品，为自己
撑起了全球性的品牌伞(brandumbrella)。这使它们下辖的各个事业部能够树立产
品形象、赢得客户忠诚并顺利进入分销渠道。
当你重新思考公司的概念时，目前一统天下的战略事业部——这个曾经影响
了一代人的组织结构教条，显然已不合时宜。在战略事业部已成信条的地方，任
何人对分权稍有异议都会被斥为异端。在很多公司，狭隘的战略事业部观点意味
着高层管理人员只能看到全球竞争的一个层面，那就是争取把具有竞争力的产品
今天就放到货架上。这种扭曲的认识会造成怎样的后果?
核心竞争力和核心产品的开发投入严重不足。当组织被视为战略事业部的集
合时，其中任何一个事业部都不会独自承担起做强做大核心产品的职责，也无法
提出充足的理由获得必要的投资来打造某种世界领先的核心竞争力。由于总部管
理层不能把更为全面的视角传达到战略事业部，事业部的经理倾向于少投资。最
近，柯达和飞利浦等公司已经意识到这个问题，并开始寻找新的组织形式，以使
它们能够为内外客户开发和生产核心产品。
在欧美企业中，战略事业部的经理们看竞争对手的方式与看自己的方式是一
样的。总的来讲，他们没有意识到亚洲企业对谋取核心产品领先地位的重视，或
者不知道在制造业中保持世界领先地位与维持核心竞争力的开发速度之间存在着
重要联系。他们既没有把握代工生产的机会，也没有在自己的各产品分部之间寻
找协调整合的机会。
资源受到禁锢。随着战略事业部的发展，它会逐渐积累起自己独特的能力。
一般而言，蕴涵这些能力的员工会被看做该事业部独有的资产。其他事业部的经
理如果想借用这些人员很可能会碰钉子。事业部的经理们不仅不愿意把怀揣独特
能力的人才外借出去，也许还要把他们隐藏起来，防止公司在开发新业务时把他
们调走，这好比不发达地区的居民把大部分现金藏到床垫下一样。核心竞争力与
货币一样，其效用的大小不仅取决于公司有多少存量，还取决于其流通速度。
在技能储备方面，西方企业通常都具有优势。但它们是否能够快速地重新配
置这些技能以响应新的机遇呢?虽然日本的佳能，NEC和本田在构成核心竞争力的
技术和人才储备上逊色于欧美企业，但是它们却能以更快的速度把资源在事业部
之间调进调出。公司总部的研发支出不能完全反映佳能的核心竞争力储备规模。
并且，如果不仔细观察，你也根本无从判断佳能调动核心竞争力以把握商机的速
度有多快。
一旦能力被禁锢，掌握着关键能力的员工就无法参加充满机遇的项目，而他
们的技能也就逐渐退化和萎缩。只有充分利用核心竞争力，像佳能这样的小型公
司才能与施乐这样的行业巨头相抗衡。令人奇怪的是，在制订公司预算时全力争
夺资金的战略事业部经理，却不情愿争夺人才这种公司最宝贵的资产。我们看到
公司的高层领导往往倾注大量的精力做资本预算，但是对于分配人力资源似乎漠
不关心，殊不知后者才是核心竞争力的真正体现。企业高管中几乎没有人能够走
下四五个职级，去发现具有关键能力的人才，并跨越组织界限调配他们。
创新受到限制。在没有找出核心竞争力的情况下，各战略事业部只会追求手
边的创新机会，比如，没有多少新意的产品线延伸或者地理上的扩张。而那些属
于混合业务的机会，比如传真机、手提电脑、手持式电视机和便携式键盘乐器等
等就会被忽视，除非经理们摘掉他们的事业部眼罩。记住，当佳能准备进军复印
机市场大展身手时，它给外界的印象是经营照相机业务的公司。显然，从核心竞
争力的角度对企业进行思考，能够拓宽创新的领域。
战略架构的制定
在一家多元化公司中，如果信息系统、沟通模式、职业发展道路、管理层报
酬以及战略制定流程都受制于战略事业部的组织界限，那么其核心竞争力就必然
是支离破碎的。因此，我们认为，高层管理人员应该把大量时间放在制定公司战
略架构上，从而确定打造核心竞争力的目标。战略架构是未来的路线图，它指明
需要培养哪些核心竞争力以及这些核心竞争力是由哪些相关技术组成的。
战略架构可以激励组织不断从联盟关系中学习新的知识和技能，并且帮助组
织确定内部开发的重点，因此公司为获得未来市场领先地位所需要的投资就可以
大幅节省。NEC的计算机与通信战略架构就是一例。如果一家公司不清楚应当培育
怎样的核心竞争力，或者不知道哪些核心竞争力应该严加保护以免被无意转移，
它怎么可能明智地选择合作伙伴?
当然，所有这些都应当归结为设计什么样的战略架构这个问题。答案因公司
而异。回到我们前面提到的那个树的比喻，公司是围绕核心产品而最终是围绕核
心竞争力来组织的，为了根系的足够强壮，公司必须回答一些最基本的问题：如
果不能有效地控制这种核心竞争力，我们能够在多长时间内保持我们的竞争优势?
这种核心竞争力对客户能够感知到的产品价值有什么重大意义?假如失去这种核心
竞争力，我们将会在未来丧失哪些商机?
战略架构为产品和市场的多元化提供了理由。战略事业部经理必须面对这样
的问题：新的市场机会是否会有助于实现公司的总体目标——成为世界一流企业?
它是否利用或者增强了公司的核心竞争力?比如在威格士(Vickers)公司，在判断
有关多元化的选择决定时，要考虑这个决定是否有助于使该公司成为世界上最好
的动力和运动控制公司。(参见副栏“威格士公司体会到战略架构的价值”)
战略架构必须把资源分配的优先顺序清清楚楚地摆在整个组织的面前。它为
最高管理层提供了一个资源分配决策的模板。它可以帮助级别较低的经理们理解
为何要确立这样的资源分配主次关系，同时对高层管理者也有约束作用——使他
威格士公司体会到战略架构的价值在大多数美国公司中，高层管理人员应当为获
取和配置核心竞争力而制定公司战略的想法还属于比较新的观念。但也有例外。
Trinova是总部设在俄亥俄州托雷多(Toledo)的一家公司，在动力和运动控制器以
及工程塑料的全球市场上占有重要地位。威格士公司是其最主要的业务单元之一，
它是生产液压元件的一流厂家，其产品包括阀门、泵、作动器以及过滤器等器具，
分别应用于航空、航海、国防、汽车。土方机械以及工业市场等。
威格士公司意识到．如果把电子学科领域的应用与自己的传统技术相结合，
那么自己的传统业务很可能会发生巨大的转变。公司的目标是“确保技术领域的
变革不会导致客户抛弃威格士”。可见，这一举动的初衷是自我防御。威格士意
识到，如果不获取新的技能就不能保护现有的市场，也不能抓住新的增长机遇。
威格士公司的经理们试着把思考的重点放在以下三个方面的演化上：
(1)与动力和运动控制业务相关的技术，(2)能够满足客户新需求的功能，(3)
创造性地管理“技术+客户需求”所需的核心竞争力。
尽管面临短期赢利压力，最高管理层还是做了一个 10-15年的长期规划，其
中涉及可能出现的新的客户需求、不断变化的技术，以及使二者匹配所需的核心
竞争力。它的口号是“迈向 21世纪”。威格士公司目前的主营业务是液压动力元
件。而战略架构图又确认了另外两种核心竞争力：电力元件和电子控制。把硬件、
软件以及服务结合起来的系统整合能力也是公司的开发目标。
战略架构并不只是对某种具体产品或者具体技术的预测，而是一种更宏观的
规划，它揭示了客户对功能的要求、潜在技术与核心竞争力这三者之间不断发展
的关系。这种战略架构隐含的一个假设是，我们不可能对产品和系统的未来进行
明确的界定，然而，要想在开发新市场方面先发制人，竞争者必须及早建设核心
竞争力。威格士公司所制定的战略架构不仅从核心竞争力角度对未来进行了描述，
而且也为当下的各种决策(重点产品、收购、联盟和招聘)奠定了基础。
从 1986年起，威格士公司进行了十多次目标明确的收购，每次收购对准的都
是总体战略架构中所缺少的某种元件或技术。该架构也是公司内部开发新核心竞
争力的基础。与此同时，威格士公司还进行了组织结构的重组，以方便电子电气
能力和机械能力的整合。威格士公司不仅要制定战略架构图，还要向所有的员工、
客户和投资者广泛宣传这一架构，同时建立与这个架构相应的管理系统。我们相
信，再花两到三年的时间，威格士公司就能从这项投入中获得收益。们的决策保
持一致。简单地讲，战略架构对公司及其市场都进行了定义。在这一点上，3M、
威格士、NEC、佳能和本田都做得相当成功。当本田进军汽车市场时，它知道自己
在利用从摩托车业务中所学到的东西——如何制造转速高、运转顺畅、重量轻的
发动机。创建一个战略架构可迫使组织确定和发展跨事业部的技术联系和生产联
系，而这些联系将为组织提供一种独特的竞争优势。
正是由于资源分配的一致性和与之相应的管理体系的建立，战略架构才变得
具有活力，并且能创造出良好的管理文化、团队合作精神、变革能力，形成资源
共享、专有技能受保护和长远思考的氛围。这也就是为什么特定的战略架构不可
能轻易被竞争对手模仿的原因。战略架构同样也是公司与客户、与其他外部利益
相关者沟通的工具。它在揭示大方向的同时，指明了具体的行动步骤。
人员的重新部署
如果公司的核心竞争力是其关键资源，并且最高管理层必须保证拥有核心竞
争力的人才不被某个业务部所把持，那么自然而然地可以得出这样的结论：战略
事业部必须像争取资金预算一样争取核心竞争力。我们曾经略微地谈过这个问题，
鉴于这个问题非常重要，我们要谈得更加深入一些。
一旦最高管理层(在分部经理和战略事业部经理的协助下)确认了最为重要的
核心竞争力，它就必须要求业务部门确认与这些能力密切相关的项目和人员。总
部的管理者还应当指导相关部门对这些代表核心竞争力的人员做一次审核，确定
他们的所在地、数量以及素质。
这就给中层经理们发出了一个重要信号：核心竞争力是整个公司的资源，理
应由公司总部管理层重新进行调配。任何员工都不为某一个业务部门所独自占有。
要把某些人才留在战略事业部发挥作用，该部门的经理必须证明这样做能够使公
司对员工技能的投资获得最大的回报。如果在每年的战略规划或预算编制过程中，
事业部经理必须给出合理的理由才能把这些拥有核心竞争力的人才保留在本部门
中，那么公司实际上是在进一步强化这个信号。
佳能在光学技术上的核心竞争力分散在多个业务领域，包括照相机、复印机
以及半导体光刻设备(参见副栏“佳能的核心竞争力”)。当佳能发现数字激光打
印机市场大有可为时，它授权该事业部的经理到其他事业部搜罗人才，以便建立
业务所需的人才库。当佳能的复印产品部着手开发由微处理器控制的复印机时，
它自然而然地向照相产品部门求助，因为后者曾经开发了世界上第一台由微处理
器控制的照相机。
然而，如果公司的奖酬体系仅仅以产品线的业绩为依据，或者职业发展的道
路仅仅局限在事业部内部，那么各事业部经理的行为模式就会朝着破坏性竞争的
方向发展。在 NEC公司，下一代的核心竞争力是由各个业务分部的经理共同确定
的。他们共同决定开发未来的每项核心竞争力需要多少投资，以及每个部门需要
贡献多少资金和提供多少人力支持。这里还有一种公平交换的意味。也许会有某
个分部比别的分部付出的更多或者得到的更少，但这种不公平只是暂时的，长期
内终究会达成一种平衡。
还有，战略事业部经理的积极贡献应当在公司内部广为宣传。要知道，一个
事业部经理不可能为了让其化事业的获得好处（或者让作为晋升对手的其他事业
部总经理受益)就同意把关键人才调出。有合作态度的事业部经理应该得到表扬，
要肯定他们的团队精神。只要优先顺序是明晰的，人才的调动就不会被人们视为
只是出于个人喜好或者政治考虑。
公司必须把这种为了打造核心竞争力而进行的人员调动记录存档，并予以肯
定和重视。在部门的核心人才被调去开发其他领域的商机之后，有些业务部门的
竞争力可能会暂时下降。如果因为业绩下降而立即遭到指责，那么下一次它们就
不太可能再拱手交出宝贵的人才。
最后，公司可以采取一些措施消除骨干员工脑海中“我永远属于某个业务部”
的认识。在职业发展的早期阶段，公司可以仔细安排一个轮岗计划，让员工接触
多种不同的业务。在佳能，关键人才会定期在照相机部和复印机部之间，以及复
印机部和专业光学产品部之间流动。而在职业发展的中期阶段，就需要让这些关
键人才定期到跨业务部门的项目小组中工作，一方面是为了传播核心竞争力，另
一方面是为了防止员工与某个业务部门的联系过于紧密，导致他们无视别处有更
吸引人的前景。这些拥有核心竞争力的员工应当知道，他们的职业发展是由公司
总部的人力资源专家来跟踪和指导的。在 20世纪 80年代初期，佳能公司中所有 30
岁以下的工程师都曾收到邀请，让他们申请成为一个 7人委员会的成员，该委员
会将用两年的时间为佳能绘制未来的发展轨迹，其中包括战略架构。
所有具备核心竞争力的员工都应当定期聚集在一起，分享彼此的心得和体会。
这样做的目的是为了在他们之间建立一种强烈的社区归属感。应该让他们忠诚于
他们所代表的整个公司的核心竞争力，而不是某个特别的业务部。通过经常旅行、
与客户交谈以及与同事会面，核心人才也许会受到鼓励去发现新的市场机遇。
核心竞争力是新业务开发的源泉。它们应当构成公司总部的战略重点。经理
们必须在核心产品的制造方面赢得领先地位，同时通过旨在利用范围经济的晶牌
建设计划获取全球份额。只有在企业被视为由核心竞争力、核心产品和专注于市
场的业务单元这多个层面构成的组织时，它才适于战斗。
就最高管理层而言，他们不能只满足于成为最高级别的财务核算与汇总中心
——尽管在权力高度分散的组织中这种情况经常会出现。公司高管人员应当通过
阐明战略架构来创造增加值，而战略架构将为公司谋求竞争力提供指导。我们相
信，热衷于核心竞争力的建设，将是 20世纪 90年代全球竞争胜利者的一个重要
特点，重新思考公司的概念刻不容缓。
作者：pioupiou 回复日期：2005-10-3 10:53:18
The Core Competence
Of the Corporation
by . Prahalad and Gary Hamel
C. K. Prahalad is professor of corporate strategy and
inter¬national business at the University of Michigan. Gary Hamel
is lecturer in business policy and management at the London Business
School. Their most recent HBR arti¬cle, "Strategic Intent" (May
June 1989), won the 1989 McKinsey Award for excellence. This article
is based on research funded by the Gatsby Charitable Foundation.
The most powerful way to prevail in global compe¬tition is
still invisible to many companies. During the 1980s, top executives
were judged on their ability to restructure, declutter, and delayer
their corpora¬tions. In the 1990s, they'll be judged on their
ability to identify, cultivate, and exploit the core competencies that
make growth possible indeed, they'll have to rethink the concept of
the corporation itself.
Consider the last ten years of GTE and NEC. In the early 1980s,
GTE was well positioned to become a major player in the evolving
information technology industry. It was active in telecommunications.
Its op¬erations spanned a variety of businesses including
telephones, switching and transmission systems, digital PABX,
semiconductors, packet switching, sat¬ellites, defense systems,
and lighting products. And GTE's Entertainment Products Group, which
produced Sylvania color TVs, had a position in related display
technologies. In 1980, GTE's sales were $ billion, and net cash
flow was $ billion. NEC, in contrast, was much smaller, at $
billion in sales. It had a comparable technological base and computer
businesses, but it had no experience as an operating
telecommunications company.
Yet look at the positions of GTE and NEC in 1988. GTE's 1988 sales
were $ billion, and NEC’s sales were considerably higher at
$ billion. GTE has, in effect, become a telephone operating
company with a position in defense and lighting products. GTE's other
businesses are small in global terms. GTE has divested Sylvania TV and
Telenet, put switching, transmission, and digital PABX into joint
ventures, and closed down semiconductors. As a re¬sult, the
international position of GTE has eroded. Non . revenue as a
percent of total revenue dropped from 20% to 15% between 1980 and 1988.
NEC has emerged as the world leader in semicon¬ductors and as
a first tier player in telecommunica¬tions products and computers.
It has consolidated its position in mainframe computers. It has moved
be¬yond public switching and transmission to include such
lifestyle products as mobile telephones, fac¬simile machines, and
laptop computers bridging the gap between telecommunications and
office automation. NEC is the only company in the world to be in the
top five in revenue in telecommuni¬cations, semiconductors, and
mainframes. Why did these two companies, starting with comparable
business portfolios, perform so differently? Largely because NEC
conceived of itself in terms of "core competencies," and GTE did not.
Rethinking the Corporation
Once, the diversified corporation could simply point its business
units at particular end product markets and admonish them to become
world lead¬ers. But with market boundaries changing ever more
quickly, targets are elusive and capture is at best tem¬porary. A
few companies have proven themselves adept at inventing new markets,
quickly entering emerging markets, and dramatically shifting
pat¬terns of customer choice in established markets. These are the
ones to emulate. The critical task for management is to create an
organization capable of infusing products with irresistible
functionality or, better yet, creating products that customers need
but have not yet even imagined)
This is a deceptively difficult task. Ultimately, it requires
radical change in the management of major companies. It means, first
of all, that top manage¬ments of Western companies must assume
responsi¬bility for competitive decline. Everyone knows about high
interest rates, Japanese protectionism, outdated antitrust laws,
obstreperous unions, and impatient investors. What is harder to see,
or harder to ac¬knowledge, is how little added momentum
compa¬nies actually get from political or macroeconomic "relief."
Both the theory and practice of Western management have created a drag
on our forward motion. It is the principles of management that are in
need of reform.
NEC versus GTE, again, is instructive and only one of many such
comparative cases we analyzed to understand the changing basis for
global leader¬ship. Early in the 1970s, NEC articulated a
strategic intent to exploit the convergence of computing and
communications, what it called "C&C" Success, top management reckoned,
would hinge on acquir¬ing competencies, particularly in
semiconductors. Management adopted an appropriate "strategic
architecture," summarized by C&C, and then com¬municated its
intent to the whole organization and the outside world during the mid
1970s.
NEC constituted a "C&C Committee" of top managers to oversee the
development of core products and core competencies. NEC put in place
coordi¬nation groups and committees that cut across the interests
of individual businesses. Consistent with its strategic architecture,
NEC shifted enormous re¬sources to strengthen its position in
components and central processors. By using collaborative arrangements
to multiply internal resources, NEC was able to accumulate a broad
array of core competencies.
NEC carefully identified three interrelated streams of
technological and market evolution. Top management determined that
computing would evolve from large mainframes to distributed processing,
components from simple ICs to VLSI, and communications from mechanical
cross bar exchange to complex digital systems we now call ISDN. As
things evolved further, NEC reasoned, the computing, communications,
and components businesses would so overlap that it would be very hard
to distinguish among them, and that there would be enormous
opportunities for any company that had built the competencies needed
to serve all three markets.
NEC top management determined that semicon¬ductors would be
the company's most important "core product." It entered into myriad
strategic alliances over 100 as of 1987 aimed at building competencies
rapidly and at low cost. In mainframe computers, its most noted
relationship was with Honeywell and Bull. Almost all the collaborative
arrangements in the semiconductor component field were oriented toward
technology access. As they en¬tered collaborative arrangements,
NEC’s operating managers understood the rationale for these
alli¬ances and the goal of internalizing partner skills. NEC's
director of research summed up its compe¬tence acquisition during
the 1970s and 1980s this way: "From an investment standpoint, it was
much quicker and cheaper to use foreign technology. There wasn't a
need for us to develop new ideas.”
No such clarity of strategic intent and strategic architecture
appeared to exist at GTE. Although senior executives discussed the
implications of the evolv¬ing information technology industry, no
commonly accepted view of which competencies would be required to
compete in that industry were communi¬cated widely. While
significant staff work was done to identify key technologies, senior
line managers continued to act as if they were managing
inde¬pendent business units. Decentralization made it difficult to
focus on core competencies. Instead, in¬dividual businesses became
increasingly dependent on outsiders for critical skills, and
collaboration be¬came a route to staged exits. Today, with a new
man¬agement team in place, GTE has repositioned itself to apply
its competencies to emerging markets in telecommunications services.
The Roots of Competitive Advantage
The distinction we observed in the way NEC and GTE conceived of
themselves a portfolio of compe¬tencies versus a portfolio of
businesses was re¬peated across many industries. From 1980 to 1988,
Canon grew by 264%, Honda by 200%. Compare that with Xerox and
Chrysler. And if Western managers were once anxious about the low cost
and high quality of Japanese imports, they are now over¬whelmed by
the pace at which Japanese rivals are inventing new markets, creating
new products, and enhancing them. Canon has given us personal copiers;
Honda has moved from motorcycles to four wheel off road buggies. Sony
developed the 8mm camcorder, Yamaha, the digital piano. Ko¬matsu
developed an underwater remote controlled bulldozer, while Casio's
latest gambit is a small screen color LCD televi¬sion. Who would
have anticipated the evolution of these vanguard markets?
In more established markets, the Japanese challenge has been just
as disquieting. Japanese companies are generating a bliz¬zard of
features and functional enhancements that bring tech¬nological
sophistication to every¬day products. Japanese car pro¬ducers
have been pioneering four wheel steering, four valve¬-per cylinder
engines, in car navi¬gation systems, and sophisticated electronic
engine management systems. On the strength of its product features,
Canon is now a player in facsimile transmission ma¬chines, desktop
laser printers, even semiconductor manufacturing equipment.
In the short run, a company's competitiveness de¬rives from
the price/performance attributes of cur¬rent products. But the
survivors of the first wave of global competition, Western and
Japanese alike, are all converging on similar and formidable standards
for product cost and quality minimum hurdles for continued competition,
but less and less important as sources of differential advantage. In
the long run, competitiveness derives from an ability to build, at
lower cost and more speedily than competitors, the core competencies
that spawn unanticipated prod¬ucts. The real sources of advantage
are to be found in management's ability to consolidate corporatewide
technologies and production skills into competen¬cies that empower
individual businesses to adapt quickly to changing opportunities.
Senior executives who claim that they cannot build core
competencies either because they feel the autonomy of business units
is sacrosanct or because their feet are held to the quarterly budget
fire should think again. The problem in many Western compa¬nies is
not that their senior executives are any less capable than those in
Japan nor that Japanese companies possess greater technical
capabilities. In¬stead, it is their adherence to a concept of the
corpo¬ration that unnecessarily limits the ability of
in¬dividual businesses to fully exploit the deep reser¬voir of
technological capability that many American and European companies
possess.
The diversified corporation is a large tree. The trunk and major
limbs are core products, the smaller branches are business units; the
leaves, flowers, and fruit are end products. The root system that
provides nourishment, sustenance, and stability is the core competence.
You can miss the strength of competi¬tors by looking only at their
end products, in the same way you miss the strength of a tree if you
look only at its leaves. (See the chart "Competencies: The Roots of
Competitiveness.”)
Core competencies are the collective learning in the organization,
especially how to coordinate di¬verse production skills and
integrate multiple streams of technologies. Consider Sony's capacity
to miniaturize or Philips's optical media expertise. The theoretical
knowledge to put a radio on a chip does not in itself assure a company
the skill to produce a miniature radio no bigger than a business card.
To bring off this feat, Casio must harmonize know how in
miniaturization, microprocessor design, material science, and
ultrathin precision casing the same skills it applies in its miniature
card calculators, pocket TVs, and digital watches.
If core competence is about harmonizing streams of technology, it
is also about the organization of work and the delivery of value.
Among Sony's com¬petencies is miniaturization. To bring
miniaturiza¬tion to its products, Sony must ensure that
tech¬nologists, engineers, and marketers have a shared
understanding of customer needs and of technologi¬cal
possibilities. The force of core competence is felt as decisively in
services as in manufacturing. Citi¬corp was ahead of others
investing in an operating system that allowed it to participate in
world markets 24 hours a day. Its competence in provided the company
the means to differentiate itself from many financial service
institutions.
Core competence is communication, involvement, and a deep
commitment to working across organizational boundaries. It involves
many levels of people and all functions. World class research in, for
example, lasers or ceramics can take place in corporate laboratories
without having an impact on any of the businesses of the company. The
skills that to¬gether constitute core competence must coalesce
around individuals whose efforts are not so narrowly focused that they
cannot recognize the opportunities for blending their functional
expertise with those of others in new and interesting ways.
Core competence does not diminish with use. Un¬like physical
assets, which do deteriorate over time, competencies are enhanced as
they are applied and shared. But competencies still need to be
nurtured and protected; knowledge fades if it is not used.
Com¬petencies are the glue that binds existing businesses. They
are also the engine for new business develop¬ment. Patterns of
diversification and market entry may be guided by them, not just by
the attractiveness of markets.
Consider 3M's competence with sticky tape. in dreaming up
businesses as diverse as "Post it" notes, magnetic tape, photographic
film, pressure sensitive tapes, and coated abrasives, the company has
brought to bear widely shared competencies in substrates, coatings,
and adhesives and devised various ways to combine them. Indeed, 3M has
invested consistently in them. What seems to be an extremely
diversified portfolio of businesses belies a few shared core
com¬petencies.
In contrast, there are major companies that have had the potential
to build core competencies but failed to do so because top management
was unable to conceive of the company as anything other than a
collection of discrete businesses. GE sold much of its consumer
electronics business to Thomson of France, arguing that it was
becoming increasingly difficult to maintain its competitiveness in
this sec¬tor. That was undoubtedly so, but it is ironic that it
sold several key businesses to competitors who were already competence
leaders Black & Decker in small electrical motors, and Thomson, which
was eager to build its competence in microelectronics and had learned
from the Japanese that a position in consumer electronics was vital to
this challenge.
Management trapped in the strategic business unit (SBU) mind set
almost inevitably finds its individual businesses dependent on
external sources for critical components, such as motors or
compressors. But these are not just components. They are core products
that contribute to the competitiveness of a wide range of end products.
They are the physical embodiments of core competencies.
How Not to Think of Competence
Since companies are in a race to build the compe¬tencies that
determine global leadership, successful companies have stopped
imagining themselves as bundles of businesses making products. Canon,
Honda, Casio, or NEC may seem to preside over port¬folios of
businesses unrelated in terms of customers, distribution channels, and
merchandising strategy. Indeed, they have portfolios that may seem
idiosyn¬cratic at times: NEC is the only global company to be
among leaders in computing, telecommunica¬tions, and
semiconductors and to have a thriving consumer electronics business.
But looks are deceiving. In NEC, digital technol¬ogy,
especially VLSI and systems integration skills, is fundamental. In the
core competencies underlying them, disparate businesses become
coherent. It is Honda's core competence in engines and power trains
that gives it a distinctive advantage in car, motorcycle, lawn mower,
and generator businesses. Canon's core competencies in optics, imaging,
and microprocessor controls have enabled it to enter, even dominate,
markets as seemingly diverse as copi¬ers, laser printers, cameras,
and image scanners. Philips worked for more than 15 years to perfect
its optical media (laser disc) competence, as did JVC in building a
leading position in video recording. Other examples of core
competencies might include me¬chantronics (the ability to marry
mechanical and electronic engineering), video displays,
bioengineer¬ing, and microelectronics. In the early stages of its
competence building, Philips could not have imag¬ined all the
products that would be spawned by its optical media competence, nor
could JVC have antic¬ipated miniature camcorders when it first
began ex¬ploring videotape technologies.
Unlike the battle for global brand dominance, which is visible in
the world's broadcast and print media and is aimed at building global
"share of mind,” the battle to build world class competencies is
invisible to people who aren't deliberately looking for it. Top
management often tracks the cost and quality of competitors' products,
yet how many man¬agers untangle the web of alliances their
Japanese competitors have constructed to acquire competen¬cies at
low cost? In how many Western boardrooms is there an explicit, shared
understanding of the compe¬tencies the company must build for
world leader¬ship? Indeed, how many senior executives discuss the
crucial distinction between competitive strategy at the level of a
business and competitive strategy at the level of an entire company?
Let us be clear. Cultivating core competence does not mean
outspending rivals on research and devel¬opment. In 1983, when
Canon surpassed Xerox in worldwide unit market share in the copier
business, its R&D budget in reprographics was but a small
frac¬tion of Xerox's. Over the past 20 years, NEC has spent less
on R&D as a percentage of sales than almost all of its American and
European competitors.
Nor does core competence mean shared costs, as when two or more
SBUs use a common facility a plant, service facility, or sales force
or share a com¬mon component. The gains of sharing may be
sub¬stantial, but the search for shared costs is typically a post
hoc effort to rationalize production across exist¬ing businesses,
not a premeditated effort to build the competencies out of which the
businesses them¬selves grow.
. Building core competencies is more ambitious and different than
integrating vertically, moreover. Man¬agers deciding whether to
make or buy will start with end products and look upstream to the
efficien¬cies of the supply chain and downstream toward
dis¬tribution and customers. They do not take inventory of skills
and look forward to applying them in nontra¬ditional ways. (Of
course, decisions about competen¬cies do provide a logic for
vertical integration. Canon is not particularly integrated in its
copier business, except in those aspects of the vertical chain that
Sup¬port the competencies it regards as critical.)
Identifying Core Competencies And Losing Them
At least three tests can be applied to identify core competencies
in a company. First, a core competence provides potential access to a
wide variety of mar¬kets. Competence in display systems, for
example, enables a company to participate in such diverse businesses
as calculators, miniature TV sets, monitors for laptop computers, and
automotive dash¬boards which is why Casio's entry into the
hand¬held TV market was predictable. Second, a core competence
should make a significant contribution to the perceived customer
benefits of the end prod¬uct. Clearly, Honda's engine expertise
fills this bill.
Finally, a core competence should be difficult for competitors to
imitate. And it will be difficult if it is a complex harmonization of
individual technologies and production skills. A rival might acquire
some of the technologies that comprise the core competence, but it
will find it more difficult to duplicate the more or less
comprehensive pattern of internal coordina¬tion and learning.
JVC’s decision in the early 1960s to pursue the development of a
videotape competence passed the three tests outlined here. RCA’s
decision in the late 1970s to develop a stylus based video
turn¬table system did not.
Few companies are likely to build world leadership in more than
five or six fundamental competencies. A company that compiles a list
of 20 to 30 capabili¬ties has probably not produced a list of core
compe¬tencies. Still, it is probably a good discipline to generate
a list of this sort and to see aggregate capa¬bilities as building
blocks. This tends to prompt the search for licensing deals and
alliances through which the company may acquire, at low cost, the
missing pieces.
Most Western companies hardly think about com¬petitiveness in
these terms at all. It is time to take a tough minded look at the
risks they are running. Companies that judge competitiveness, their
own and their competitors', primarily in terms of the
price/performance of end products are courting the erosion of core
competencies – or making too little effort to enhance them. The
embedded skills that give rise to the next generation of competitive
prod¬ucts cannot be "rented in" by outsourcing and OEM¬-supply
relationships. In our view, too many companies have unwittingly
surrendered core competen¬cies when they cut internal investment
in what they mistakenly thought were just "cost centers" in favor of
outside suppliers.
Consider Chrysler. Unlike Honda, it has tended to view engines and
power trains as simply one more component. Chrysler is becoming
increasingly de¬pendent on Mitsubishi and Hyundai: between 1985
and 1987, the number of outsourced engines went from 252,000 to
382,000. It is difficult to imagine Honda yielding manufacturing
responsibility, much less design, of so critical a part of a car's
function to an outside company which is why Honda has made such an
enormous commitment to Formula One auto racing. Honda has been able to
pool its engine¬related technologies; it has parlayed these into a
corporatewide competency from which it develops world beating products,
despite R&D budgets small¬er than those of GM and Toyota.
Of course, it is perfectly possible for a company to have a
competitive product line up but be a laggard in developing core
competencies at least for a while. If a company wanted to enter the
copier business today, it would find a dozen Japanese companies more
than willing to supply copiers on the basis of an OEM pri¬vate
label. But when fundamental technologies changed or if its supplier
decided to enter the market directly and become a competitor, that
company's product line, along with all of its investments in marketing
and distribution, could be vulnerable. Outsourcing can provide a
shortcut to a more com¬petitive product, but it typically
contributes little to building the people embodied skills that are
needed to sustain product leadership.
Nor is it possible for a company to have an intelligent alliance
or sourcing strategy if it has not made a choice about where it will
build competence leader¬ship. Clearly, Japanese companies have
benefited from alliances. They've used them to learn from Western
partners who were not fully committed to preserving core competencies
of their own. As we've argued in these pages before, learning within
an alli¬ance takes a positive commitment of resources¬- travel,
a pool of dedicated people, test bed facilities, time to internalize
and test what has been learned. A company may not make this effort if
it doesn't have clear goals for competence building.
Another way of losing is forgoing opportunities to establish
competencies that are evolving in existing businesses. In the 1970s
and 1980s, many American and European companies like GE, Motorola, GTE,
Thom, and GEC chose to exit the color television business, which they
regarded as mature. If by "ma¬ture" they meant that they had run
out of new prod¬uct ideas at precisely the moment global rivals
had targeted the TV business for entry, then yes, the in¬dustry
was mature. But it certainly wasn't mature in the sense that all
opportunities to enhance and ap¬ply video based competencies had
been exhausted.
In ridding themselves of their television busi¬nesses, these
companies failed to distinguish between divesting the business and
destroying their video media based competencies. They not only got out
of the TV business but they also closed the door on a whole stream of
future opportunities reliant on video based competencies. The
television industry, considered by many . companies in the 1970s to
be unattractive, is today the focus of a fierce public policy debate
about the inability of . corporations to benefit from the $20
billion a year opportunity that HDTV will represent in the mid to late
1990s. Ironically, the . government is being asked to fund a
massive research project in effect, to compensate . companies for
their failure to preserve critical core competencies when they had the
chance.
In contrast, one can see a company like Sony reducing its emphasis
on VCRs (where it has not been very successful and where Korean
companies now threaten), without reducing its commitment to video
related competencies. Sony's Betamax led to a debacle. But it emerged
with its videotape recording competencies intact and is currently
challenging Matsushita in the 8mm camcorder market.
There are two clear lessons here. First, the costs of losing a
core competence can be only partly calcu¬lated in advance. The
baby may be thrown out with the bath water in divestment decisions.
Second, since core competencies are built through a process of
con¬tinuous improvement and enhancement that may span a decade or
longer, a company that has failed to invest in core competence
building will find it very difficult to, enter an emerging market,
unless, of course, it will be content simply to serve as a
distri¬bution channel.
American semiconductor companies like Mo¬torola learned this
painful lesson when they elected to forgo direct participation in the
256k generation of DRAM chips. Having skipped this round, Motorola,
like most of its American competitors, needed a large infusion of
technical help from Japanese part¬ners to rejoin the battle in the
1 megabyte genera¬tion. When it comes to core competencies, it is
dif¬ficult to get off the train, walk to the next station, and
then reboard.
From Core Competencies to Core Products
The tangible link between identified core compe¬tencies and
end products is what we call the core products- the physical
embodiments of one or more core competencies. Honda's engines, for
example, are core products, linchpins between design and
develop¬ment skills that ultimately lead to a proliferation of end
products. Core products are the components or subassemblies that
actually contribute to the value of the end products. Thinking in
terms of core prod¬ucts forces a company to distinguish between
the brand share it achieves in end product markets (for example, 40%
of the . refrigerator market) and the manufacturing share it
achieves in any particular core product (for example, 5% of the world
share of compressor output).
Canon is reputed to have an 84% world manufac¬turing share in
desktop laser printer "engines," even though its brand share in the
laser printer business is minuscule. Similarly, Matsushita has a world
manu¬facturing share of about 45% in key VCR compo¬nents, far
in excess of its brandshare (Panasonic, JVC, and others) of 20%. And
Matsushita has a command¬ing core product share in compressors
worldwide, estimated at 40%, even though its brand share in both the
air conditioning and refrigerator businesses is quite small.
It is essential to make this distinction between core competencies,
core products, and end products because global competition is played
out by different rules and for different stakes at each level. To
build or defend leadership over the long term, a corporation will
probably be a winner at each level. At the level of core competence,
the goal is to build world leader¬ship in the design and
development of a particular class of product functionality be it
compact data storage and retrieval, as with Philips's optical media
competence, or compactness and ease of use, as with Sony's micromotors
and microprocessor controls.
To sustain leadership in their chosen core compe¬tence areas,
these companies seek to maximize their world manufacturing share in
core products. The manufacture of core products for a wide variety of
ex¬ternal (and internal) customers yields the revenue and market
feedback that, at least partly, determines the pace at which core
competencies can be en¬hanced and extended. This thinking was
behind JVC's decision in the mid 1970s to establish VCR supply
relationships with leading national consumer electronics companies in
Europe and the United States. In supplying Thomson, Thorn, and
Tele¬funken (all independent companies at that time) as well as
. partners, JVC was able to gain the cash and the diversity of
market experience that ulti¬mately enabled it to outpace Philips
and Sony. (Phil¬ips developed videotape competencies in parallel
with JVC, but it failed to build a worldwide network of OEM
relationships that would have allowed it to accelerate the refinement
of its videotape compe¬tence through the sale of core products.)
JVC's success has not been lost on Korean compa¬mes like
Goldstar, Sam Sung, Kia, and Daewoo, who are building core product
leadership in areas as di¬verse as displays, semiconductors, and
automotive engines through their OEM supply contracts with Western
companies. Their avowed goal is to capture investment initiative away
from potential competi¬tors, often . companies. In doing so,
they accel¬erate their competence building efforts while
"hollowing out" their competitors. By focusing on competence and
embedding it in core products, Asian competitors have built up
advantages in com¬ponent markets first and have then leveraged off
their superior products to move downstream to build brand share. And
they are not likely to remain the low cost suppliers forever. As their
reputation for brand leadership is consolidated, they may well gain
price leadership. Honda has proven this with its Acura line, and other
Japanese car makers are fol¬lowing suit.
Control over core products is critical for other rea¬sons. A
dominant position in core products allows a company to shape the
evolution of applications and end markets. Such compact audio disc
related core products as data drives and lasers have enabled Sony and
Philips to influence the evolution of the computer peripheral business
in optical media stor¬age. As a company multiplies the number of
applica¬tion arenas for its core products, it can consistently
reduce the cost, time, and risk in new product devel¬opment. In
short, well targeted core products can lead to economies of scale and
scope.
Two Concepts of the Corporation:
SBU or Core Competence
SBU Core Competence
Basis for competition Competitiveness
of today’s products Interfirm competition
to build competencies
Corporate structure Portfolio of businesses related in
product-market terms Portfolio of competencies, core products, and
businesses
Status of the business unit Autonomy is sacrosanct; the SBU
“owns” all resources other than cash SBU is a potential reservoir of
core competencies
Resource allocation Discrete businesses are the unit of analysis,
capital is allocated business by business Businesses and competencies
are the unit of analysis: top management allocates capital and talent
Value added of top management Optimizing corporate returns through
capital allocation trade-offs among businesses Enunciating strategic
architecture and building competencies to secure the future
The Tyranny of the SBU
The new terms of competitive engagement cannot be understood using
analytical tools devised to man¬age the diversified corporation of
20 years ago, when competition was primarily domestic (GE versus
Wes¬tinghouse, General Motors versus Ford) and all the key players
were speaking the language of the same business schools and
consultancies. Old prescrip¬tions have potentially toxic side
effects. The need for new principles is most obvious in companies the
corporation are summarized in "Two Concepts of the Corpora¬tion:
SBU or Core Competence.”
Obviously, diversified corpora¬tions have a portfolio of
products and a portfolio of businesses. But we believe in a view of
the com¬pany as a portfolio of competen¬cies as well. .
companies do not lack the technical resources to build competencies,
but their top management often lacks the vision to build them and the
administrative means for assem¬bling resources spread across
multiple businesses. A shift in commitment will inevitably
in¬fluence patterns of diversifica¬tion, skill deployment,
resource allocation priorities, and ap¬proaches to alliances and
out¬sourcing.
We have described the three dif¬ferent planes on which battles
for global leadership are waged core competence, core products, and
end products. A corporation has to know whether it is winning or
losing on each plane. By sheer weight of investment, a company might
be able to beat its rivals to blue sky technolo¬gies yet still
lose the race to build core competence leadership. If a company is
winning the race to build core competencies (as opposed to building
leadership in a few technologies), it will almost certainly
out¬pace rivals in new business development. If a com¬pany is
winning the race to capture world manufac¬turing share in core
products, it will probably out¬pace rivals in improving product
features and the price/performance ratio.
Determining whether one is winning or losing end product battles
is more difficult because measures of product market share do not
necessarily reflect various companies' underlying competitiveness.
In¬deed, companies that attempt to build market share by relying
on the competitiveness of others, rather than investing in core
competencies and world core¬-product leadership, may be treading
on quicksand. In the race for global brand dominance, companies like
3M, Black & Decker, Canon, Honda, NEC, and Citi¬corp have built
global brand umbrellas by proliferat¬ing products out of their
core competencies. This has allowed their individual businesses to
build image, customer loyalty, and access to distribution channels.
When you think about this reconceptualization of the corporation,
the primacy of the SBU an organi¬zational dogma for a generation
is now clearly an anachronism. Where the SBU is an article of faith,
re¬sistance to the seductions of decentralization can seem
heretical. In many companies, the SBU prism means that only one plane
of the global competitive battle, the battle to put competitive
products on the shelf today, is visible to top management. What are
the costs of this distortion?
Underinvestment in Developing Core Competen¬cies and Core
Products. When the organization is conceived of as a multiplicity of
SBUs, no single business may feel responsible for maintaining a
vi¬able position in core products nor be able to justify the
investment required to build world leadership in some core competence.
In the absence of a more com¬prehensive view imposed by corporate
management, SBU managers will tend to underinvest. Recently, companies
such as Kodak and Philips have recog¬nized this as a potential
problem and have begun searching for new organizational forms that
will al¬low them to develop and manufacture core products for both
internal and external customers.
SBU managers have traditionally conceived of competitors in the
same way they've seen them¬selves. On the whole, they've failed to
note the em¬phasis Asian competitors were placing on building
leadership in core products or to understand the critical linkage
between world manufacturing leadership and the ability to sustain
development pace core competence. They've failed to pursue OEM supply
opportunities or to look across their various product divisions in an
attempt to identify opportunities for coordinated initiatives.
Imprisoned Resources. As an SBU evolves, it often develops unique
competencies. Typically, the people who embody this competence are
seen as the sole property of the business in which they grew up. The
manager of another SBU who asks to borrow talented people is likely to
get a cold rebuff. SBU managers are not only unwilling to lend their
competence carriers but they may actually hide talent to prevent its
rede¬ployment in the pursuit of new opportunities. This may be
compared to residents of an underdeveloped country hiding most of
their cash under their mattresses. The benefits of competencies, like
the benefits of the money supply, depend on the velocity of their
circulation as well as on the size of the stock the company holds.
Western companies have traditionally had an ad¬vantage in the
stock of skills they possess. But, have they been able to reconfigure
them quickly to respond to new opportunities? Canon, NEC, and Honda
have had a lesser stock of the people and tech¬nologies that
compose core competencies but could move them much quicker from one
business unit to another. Corporate R&D spending at Canon is not fully
indicative of the size of Canon's core compe¬tence stock and tells
the casual observer nothing about the velocity with which Canon is
able to move core competencies to exploit opportunities.
When competencies become imprisoned, the peo¬ple who carry the
competencies do not get assigned to the most exciting opportunities,
and their skills begin to atrophy. Only by fully leveraging core
com¬petencies can small companies like Canon afford to compete
with industry giants like Xerox. How strange that SBU managers, who
are perfectly willing to compete for cash in the capital budgeting
process, are unwilling to compete for people the company's most
precious asset. We find it ironic that top man¬agement devotes so
much attention to the capital budgeting process yet typically has no
comparable mechanism for allocating the human skills that embody core
competencies. Top managers are seldom able to look four or five levels
down into the or¬ganization, identify the people who embody
critical competencies, and move them across organizational I
boundaries.
Bounded Innovation. If core competencies are not recognized,
individual SBUs will pursue only those innovation opportunities that
are close at hand marginal product line extensions or geographic
ex¬pansions. Hybrid opportunities like fax machines, laptop
computers, hand held televisions, or portable music keyboards will
emerge only when managers take off their SBU blinkers. Remember, Canon
ap¬peared to be in the camera business at the time it was
preparing to become a world leader in copiers. Con¬ceiving of the
corporation in terms of core competen¬cies widens the domain of
innovation.
Developing Strategic Architecture
The fragmentation of core competencies becomes inevitable when a
diversified company's information systems, patterns of communication,
career paths, managerial rewards, and processes of strategy
de¬velopment do not transcend SBU lines. We believe that senior
management should spend a signifi¬cant amount of its time
developing a corporatewide strategic architecture that establishes
objectives for competence building. A strategic architecture is a road
map of the future that identifies which core competencies to build and
their constituent technologies.
By providing an impetus for learning from alli¬ances and a
focus for internal development efforts, a strategic architecture like
NEC’s C&C can dramati¬cally reduce the investment needed to
secure future market leadership. How can a company make
part¬nerships intelligently without a clear understanding of the
core competencies it is trying to build and those it is attempting to
prevent from being uninten¬tionally transferred?
Of course, all of this begs the question of what a strategic
architecture should look like. The answer will be different for every
company. But it is helpful to think again of that tree, of the
corporation orga¬nized around core products and, ultimately core
com¬petencies. To sink sufficiently strong roots, a com¬pany
must answer some fundamental questions: How long could we preserve our
competitiveness in this business if we did not control this particular
core competence? How central is this core compe¬tence to perceived
customer benefits? What future opportunities would be foreclosed if we
were to lose this particular competence?
The architecture provides a logic for product and market
diversification, moreover. An SBU manager would be asked: Does the new
market opportunity add to the overall goal of becoming the best player
in the world? Does it exploit or add to the core compe¬tence? At
Vickers, for example, diversification op¬tions have been judged in
the context of becoming the best power and motion control company in
the world (see the insert "Vickers Learns the Value of Strategic
Architecture").
The strategic architecture should make resource allocation
priorities transparent to the entire organi¬zation. It provides a
template for allocation decisions by top management. It helps lower
level managers understand the logic of allocation priorities and
dis¬ciplines senior management to maintain consis¬tency. In
short, it yields a definition of the company and the markets it serves.
3M, Vickers, NEC, Canon, and Honda all qualify on this score. Honda
knew it was exploiting what it had learned from motor¬cycles how
to make high revving, smooth run¬ning, lightweight engines when it
entered the car business. The task of creating a strategic
architecture forces the organization to identify and commit to the
technical and production linkages across SBUs that will provide a
distinct competitive advantage.
It is consistency of resource allocation and the de¬velopment
of an administrative infrastructure ap¬propriate to it that
breathes life into a strategic architecture and creates a managerial
culture, team¬work, a capacity to change, and a willingness to
share resources, to protect proprietary skills, and to think long term.
That is also the reason the specific architecture cannot be copied
easily or overnight by competitors. Strategic architecture is a tool
for communicating with customers and other external constituents. It
reveals the broad direction without giving away every step.
Redeploying to Exploit Competencies
If the company's core competencies are its critical resource and
if top management must ensure that competence carriers are not held
hostage by some particular business, then it follows that SBUs should
bid for core competencies in the same way they bid for capital. We've
made this point glancingly. It is important enough to consider more
deeply.
Once top management (with the help of division¬al and SBU
managers) has identified overarching competencies, it must ask
businesses to identify the projects and people closely connected with
them. Corporate officers should direct an audit of the loca¬tion,
number, and quality of the people who embody competence.
This sends an important signal to middle manag¬ers: core
competencies are corporate resources and may be reallocated by
corporate management. An individual business doesn't own anybody. SBUs
are entitled to the services of individual employees so long as it is
pursuing yields the highest possible pay off on the investment in
their skills. This message is further underlined if each year in the
strategic plan¬ning or budgeting process, unit managers must
justify their hold on the people who carry the com¬pany's core
competencies.
Elements of Canon's core com¬petence in optics are spread
across businesses as diverse as cam¬eras, copiers, and
semiconductor lithographic equipment and are shown in "Core
Competencies at Canon.” When Canon identified an opportunity in
digital laser printers, it gave SBU managers the right to raid other
SBUS to pull together the required pool of talent. When Canon's
repro¬graphics products division under¬took to develop
microprocessor¬-controlled copiers, it turned to the photo
products group, which had developed the world's first microprocessor
controlled camera.
Also, reward systems that focus only on product line results and
career paths that seldom cross SBU boundaries engender pat¬terns
of behavior among unit managers that are destructively competitive. At
NEC, divisional managers come together to identify next generation
competencies. Together they de¬cide how much investment needs to
be made to build up each future competency and the contribution in
capital and staff support that each division will need to make. There
is also a sense of equitable exchange. One division may make a
disproportionate contri¬bution or may benefit less from the
progress made, but such short term inequalities will balance out over
the long term.
Incidentally, the positive contribution of the SBU manager should
be made visible across the company. An SBU manager is unlikely to
surrender key people if only the other business (or the general
manager of that business who may be a competitor for promotion) is
going to benefit from the redeployment. Cooperative SBU managers
should be celebrated as team players. Where priorities are clear,
transfers are less likely to be seen as idiosyncratic and politically
motivated.
Transfers for the sake of building core competence must be
recorded and appreciated in the corporate memory. It is reasonable to
expect a business that has surrendered core skills on behalf of
corporate oppor¬tunities in other areas to lose, for a time, some
of its competitiveness. If these losses in performance bring immediate
censure, SBUs will be unlikely to assent to skills transfers next time.
Finally, there are ways to wean key employees off the idea that
they belong in perpetuity to any particu¬lar business. Early in
their careers, people may be ex¬posed to a variety of businesses
through a carefully planned rotation program. At Canon, critical
people move regularly between the camera business and the copier
business and between the copier business and the professional optical
products business. In mid¬career, periodic assignments to cross
divisional proj¬ect teams may be necessary both for diffusing core
competencies and for loosening the bonds that might tie an individual
to one business even when brighter opportunities beckon elsewhere.
Those who embody critical core competencies should know that their
careers are tracked and guided by corporate human resource
professionals. In the early 1980s at Canon, all engineers under 30
were invited to apply for membership on a seven person com¬mittee
that was to spend two years plotting Canon's future direction,
including its strategic architecture.
Competence carriers should be regularly brought together from
across the corporation to trade notes and ideas. The goal is to build
a strong feeling of com¬munity among these people. To a great
extent, their loyalty should be to the integrity of the core
compe¬tence area they represent and not just to particular
businesses. In traveling regularly, talking frequently to customers,
and meeting with peers, competence carriers may be encouraged to
discover new market opportunities.
Core competencies are the wellspring of new busi¬ness
development. They should constitute the focus for strategy at the
corporate level. Managers have to win manufacturing leadership in core
products and capture global share through brand building pro¬grams
aimed at exploiting economies of scope. Only if the company is
conceived of as a hierarchy of core competencies, core products, and
market focused business units will it be fit to fight.
Nor can top management be just another layer of accounting
consolidation, which it often is in a re¬gime of radical
decentralization. Top management must add value by enunciating the
strategic architec¬ture that guides the competence acquisition
process. We believe an obsession with competence building will
characterize the global winners of the 1990s. With the decade underway,
the time for rethinking the concept of the corporation is already
overdue.
Vickers Looms the Value of Strategic Architecture
The idea that top management should develop a cor¬porate
strategy for acquiring and deploying core competencies is relatively
new in most . companies. There are a few exceptions. An early
convert was Trinova (previously Libbey Owens Ford), a Toledo based
corporation, which enjoys a worldwide position in power and motion
controls and engi¬neered plastics. One of its major divisions is
Vickers, a premier supplier of hydraul¬ics components like valves,
pumps, actua¬tors, and filtration de¬vices to aerospace,
marine, defense, auto¬motive, earth mov¬ing, and industrial
markets.
Vickers saw the po¬tential for a trans¬formation of its
tra¬ditional business with the application of electronics
disci¬plines in combination with its traditional technologies. The
goal was "to ensure that change in tech¬nology does not
dis¬place Vickers from its customers.” This, to be sure, was
initial¬ly a defensive move: Vickers recognized that unless it
acquired new skills, it could not protect existing markets or
capitalize on new growth opportunities. Managers at Vickers attempted
to conceptual¬ize the likely evolution of (a) technologies
relevant to the power and motion control business, (b)
functionali¬ties that would satisfy emerging customer needs, and
(c) new competencies needed to creatively manage the marriage of
technology and customer needs.
Despite pressure for short term earnings, top man¬agement
looked to a 10 to 15 year time horizon in developing a map of emerging
customer needs, changing technologies, and the core competencies that
would be necessary to bridge the gap between the two. Its slogan was
"Into the 21st Century." (A simplified version of the overall
architecture developed is shown here.)
Vickers is currently in fluid power components. The architecture
identifies two additional competencies, electric power components and
electronic controls. A systems integration capability that would unite
hardware, software, and service was also targeted for development.
The strategic architecture, as illustrated by the Vickers example,
is not a forecast of specific products or specific technologies but a
broad map the evolving linkages between customer functionality
requirements, potential technologies, and core competencies. It
assumes that products and systems cannot be defined with certainty for
the future by the preempting competitors in the development of new
markets requires an early start to building core competencies. The
strategic architecture developed by Vickers, while describing the
future in competence terms, also provides the basis for making “here
and now” decisions about product priorities, acquisitions, alliances,
and recruitment.
Since 1986, Vickers has made more than ten clearly targeted
acquisitions, each one a specific component or technology gap
identified in the overall architecture. The architecture is also the
basis for internal development of new competencies Vickers has
undertaken, in parallel, a reorganization to enable the integration of
electronics and electrical capabilities with mechanical based
competencies. We believe that it will take another two to three years
before Vickers reaps the total benefits from developing the strategic
architecture, communicating it widely to all its employees, customers,
and investors and building administrative systems consistent with the
architecture.
