냪ꗟꩆ뗘ꑪ뻇ꗸ띾뫞뉺곣ꡳ꧒ 뫓ꑨ뷗ꓥ 뻉뇐뇂ꅇꩌ뽯ꫢ돕ꑨ 꾬륄꩑돕ꑨ 뻷멣룪ꑈ뭐ꕾ뎡뢳맯낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓뱶암꒧곣ꡳ The Effect of Institutional Investors and Outside Directors on CEO Compensation 곣ꡳꗍꅇ맹ꑀꚨ ?꒤뗘ꗁ냪ꑅꑑꕼ꙾꒻ꓫ?
교쇂쏣 셠뫢걏놺꣬ꑆꕩꕈ뱧교쇂쏣ꪺ껉귔ꑆꅁ낣ꑆ뙽ꓟꅁꑝ녡뗛둘떷ꪺ띔뫼ꅁ낣ꑆꙝ결덯ꕎꫭ뗛꣢꙾ꪺꫡ붬ꡄ뻇랳ꓫꅁ꣬ꚹ둎굮볈ꝩ떲ꟴꅆ덳쓲꫱ꑇꑑ꙾ꪺ뻇ꗍꗍ뉐ꑝ꣬ꚹ굮릺ꑕꗰꓮ닅ꅃ녎ꗃ뮷쏸ꕈꟑ끏Ꙣꑪꑳ뭐싅ꓑ샴ꧪꑕꅁꞹꚨꑆꡄ뻇ꗍ뉐ꪺ돌ꯡ껉ꗺꅃ ꚹ뵧뷗ꓥ꿠냷ꞹꚨꅁ궺ꗽ굮띐쇂 ꩌ뽯ꫢ뇐뇂ꅃ녱뒻낲뙽ꥬꅁꛑ깶둎녡뗛릳ꑀ낦끧룴꿌ꛏꪺꅁ녱빜얪ꓥ쑭뙽ꥬꅁ덶몥둍꣬뷗ꓥꪺꓨꙖꅁꑝ쏸ꕈꟑ끏ꡃ귓걐듁셠걏녡뗛ꟙ띖꺣쓟ꪺꓟ놡뙩ꑊꛑ깶곣ꡳꯇꅁ꒣뫞꙰꛳ꅁꛑ깶셠걏ꥍ썃꺮ꛢꪺ결뒣쉉ꕘꛛꑶꯤ뱻꒣ꥐꪺꙡꓨꅃꙢ뷗ꓥ벶뱧ꯡ듁ꅁꛑ깶곆ꛜ뭐Ꙣ곣ꡳꯇ륱룜꒤끑뷗뷗ꓥ꣬뉠ꅆ덯ꑀ룴ꢫ꣓ꅁꛑ깶셠걏꿠엽Ꙣꯜꙷꓟ뭐녡쉉삣ꑏꪺꪬꩰꑕꅁ꣏ꭏ꯹삳ꚳꪺ덴ꯗꅁꞹꚨ덯걱껈땻ꅃꙢꚹꅁ꽓ꝏ띐쇂 꾬륄꩑뇐뇂뭐꒤뾳륱냓꧒ ꛳ꯘ륆뇐뇂맯꧳ꖻ뷗ꓥꪺ꒣ꝛꖿꅁ꣏ꖻ뷗ꓥ꿠ꟳ뾲ꞹ떽ꅃꑝ굮띐쇂돬ꩶ뗘늱륹ꑪ뻇ꪺ Sok-Hyon Kang뇐뇂ꅁ떹꒩Ꙣꓥ쑭띪뚰ꑗꯜꑪꪺ산ꝕꅃ 맯꧳ꡃꑀꛬ뎭꛱ꯗ륌곣ꡳ꧒ꗍ뉐ꪺꙐ뺫ꅁꑰ싎ꅂ?ꫥꅂꡱ뗓ꅂ?뒼ꅂ껙ꅂꭈ럗ꅁ쇙ꚳ때ꩫꙢ덯료ꑀꑀ룔ꙃꕘ꣓ꪺ꣤ꕌꙐ뻇ꅁ띐쇂ꝁ귌Ꙣ놡ꥍ뷒띾ꑗꪺꓤ꯹ꅁ엽ꚳ쑾쓲ꢫꑕꕨꪺ냊ꑏꅆ룪껆뭠뚰뻣뉺룪껆ꅁ뻇ꥦ퇧둀Ꙣ산ꑆꯜꑪꪺꚣꅁ덯ꗷ뷗ꓥꪺꞹꚨꚳꥰꪺꑀ뎡ꗷꅆꡱ꙰ꅁ띐쇂ꥰꙢꓥ뎹벶뱧ꗎ꙲ꑗꪺꣳꝕꅃ뻇ꥮ뇡껙ꅂ깸쓁ꅂꑰ뮨ꅂ꧉ꙷꅁ쇂쇂ꝁ귌Ꙣ곣ꡳ꧒ꗍ뉐꒤면ꪺ믢룴ꑈꢤꛢꅁ꣏ꟳ꿠뚶ꝑꪺ놴꿁곣ꡳꪺ냳뛸ꅃ덯꣢꙾꣓뒿롧ꑗ륌ꝕ뇐뷒ꪺ뻇ꗍꅁꑝꗑ끊띐뽅ꅁ쇂쇂ꝁ귌Ꙣ때볆귓뉍뇡뭐ꖿꅁꕝ깥ꑀ귓ꑪꡫꗍꙢ솿ꕸꑗ맪뉻ꕌꑪ뻇ꕈ꣓ꪺ맚띑ꅁ쇶땍꒣끏녯ꡃꑀ귓ꑈꪺꙗ꙲ꅁ걏녎곃놤뭐ꗃ뮷쏸ꟑ뭐ꝁ귌Ꙣꑀ끟ꪺ껉ꗺꅁꛓꕂ뉠ꭈꝁ귌녡떹ꪺꅁ돓꧳꧒꿠떹ꝁ귌ꪺꅃꕸꑪꪺꗧꓨꅁꩆ껼ꪺ컮뚲ꅂꪾ뇓ꅂꑰꟅꅂꑰ뢯ꅁ쇙ꚳꑪ뻇껉ꪺꯇꅁ뻥믯ꅂꓥ낶ꅂ꥟띺ꅂ냪깰ꅁ띐쇂ꝁ귌ꑀ룴꣓ꪺ곛꛱ꅁ쇶땍ꕩ꿠때ꩫ녠녠곛ꢣꅁ걏ꯜ뱹ꦯꙢꚨꪺ룴ꑗꚳꝁ귌ꪺ냑뭐ꅃꑝ굮쇂쇂ꪺ륱뢣ꅁ덯꣢꙾꣓뎣ꯜ꣄ꅁ낣ꑆ궫쓩ꑀꚸꅁ뎣ꡓ꒰믲ꑪ냝썄ꅃ쇙
ꚳ꣢ꛬ돌ꕩ띒ꪺ냳ꥦꅁꓟ러뭐러ꅁꗑ끊띐쇂ꝁ귌Ꙣꕨꕸꕟ룪껆껉ꅁ둮땍엽볈ꛭꥰ귌ꪺꑰ뫛ꑀꢤꅁꣃ산귗굱굞ꓥ멋굮ꅃ럭땍ꅁꙢ궵볖ꑗꪺꩂꅁBob DylanꅂNeil YoungꅂKurt CobainꅂMorrisseyꅂIan CurtisꅂElliott SmithꅂRyan Adam?ꅁ뭐ꗦꑵꅁ쇂쇂ꝁ귌뎭꛱ꯗ륌돌멇뫱ꪺ꙾뮴랳ꓫꅃ ††ꛓ꿠ꑀ룴뚶ꝑꪺꞹꚨ뻇띾ꅁ깡ꑈꪺ산ꝕꓰ맧걏돌ꪽ놵ꪺꓤ꯹ꅃ쇂쇂Ꝃꓷ?빈쁳ꗽꗍꅂꝂꗀ?뛀굞ꑫꑨꅁ꣢ꛬꥮꥮ?빈럧뗓ꅂ빈럧ꫡꅁꙝ결ꝁ귌ꪺ쏶띒뭐꽫놤ꅁꑾ꿠ꑀ룴ꚨꅁ띑굮뮡ꅁ꒣뷗꙰꛳ꅁ꒣뫞Ꙩꑛꅁꝁ귌뎣걏돌뿋띒뭐꽫놤ꪺ깡ꑈꅃ쇙ꚳ돌띑꧀돌띑꧀ꪺꟓ귴귴ꅁ쇶땍ꝁ떥꒣꣬늦띾ꅁ떥꒣꣬럭Ꝍꅂ끨ꗮꅂꑵꝀꅁ귌ꑝꡓꚳ뿬ꩫꑀ끟ꖴ쑸뉹ꑆꅁꕩ걏ꝁ녎ꑀꪽ겡Ꙣꓟ료ꅆ결ꑆꝁꅁꑝ결ꑆꛛꑶꅁ라ꕛ궿Ꝗꑏꪺ겡ꑕꕨꅃ?† Ꙣ돌ꯡꅁ굮ꛬ롭꽤떹ꑇꑑ빬꙾꣓뱶암돌뉠ꪺꑈꅃ쇂쇂ꓷ뿋 맹뙑뚯ꗽꗍꅁꗀ뿋 뱂뉑둄ꑫꑨꅁꪺꥦꥦ꧉뙶ꅁꥍLuckyꅁ쇂쇂ꝁ귌닕슴ꑆꑀ귓과몡ꪺ깡깸ꅁ엽꿠Ꙣꡓꚳ낣뷒띾ꕈꕾꪺ꣤ꕌꭕ냈ꑺ쉚ꑕꅁ뚶ꝑꪺꞹꚨ뻇띾ꅃ꙰ꩇ꒵ꓑꚳꑀ쉉ꑰꑰꪺꚨ둎ꅁꢺ뎣걏ꝁ귌꧒뷡꒩ꪺꅃ Ᶎ뇦꿠귉ꗎNeil Youngꪺ멱뗼럭Ꝁꖻ쇂쏣ꪺ떲ꟴꅁꑝ꭪쁹ꛛꑶꕈꚹ뫫꾫궱맯ꖼ꣓녎비륊ꪺ꧒ꚳ걄뻔ꅇꅵIt's better to burn out than to fade awayꅶꅃ 싔ꕈꚹꓥ쑭떹깡ꑈꅂ꺦깶ꅂꩂꅁ뭐꧒ꚳ쏶ꓟꪺꑈ ????†††††††††††††††††††††††††††맹ꑀꚨ?싔교?†††††††††††††††††††††††††††㈰〵꙾까꧳붬ꑔ?
뷗ꓥꙗ뫙ꅇ뻷멣룪ꑈ뭐ꕾ뎡뢳맯낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓뱶암꒧곣ꡳ? 궶볆ꅇ75 껕ꅝ끼ꅞ꧒닕ꝏꅇ냪ꗟꩆ뗘ꑪ뻇ꗸ띾뫞뉺곣ꡳ꧒ 늦띾껉뚡뒣굮ꝏꅇꑅꑑꑔ뻇꙾ꯗ 닄ꑇ뻇듁 뫓ꑨ뻇ꛬ뷗ꓥ뒣굮 곣ꡳꗍꅇ맹ꑀꚨ 뻉뇐뇂ꅇꩌ뽯ꫢ돕ꑨ 꾬륄꩑돕ꑨ 쏶쇤꙲ꅇ뻷멣룪ꑈꅂꕾ뎡뢳ꅂ낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꅂꕎ뉺냝썄 뷗ꓥ뒣굮꒺깥ꅇ 륌ꕨ맯낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓뭐꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꪺ곣ꡳ꒤ꅁꙨ녎뫞뉺셾륓뭐꒽ꕱ셚껄낵덳떲ꕈ룑ꡍ꙳Ꙣ꧒ꚳꑈ뭐ꕎ뉺ꑈ뚡ꪺꅵꕎ뉺냝썄ꅶꅃꚹ뫘Ꝁꩫ깥꧶덹ꚨ꒽ꕱꕎ뉺ꑈꚨꖻꪺ때궭뾱뗈ꅁꕂꭐ꣏낪뚥뫞뉺뛈ꩠ궫꒽ꕱ땵듁셚껄ꅁꛓꦿ늤듁땯깩ꅃ걇ꖻ곣ꡳ녎꫱꣓Ꙣ꧒ꚳ앶ꖫ돵뭐뢳라떲멣꒤ꑗ띕궫굮ꪺ뻷멣룪ꑈ뭐ꕾ뎡뢳꣢뫘뻷꣮ꕛꑊꅁ뗸꣢맯꒽ꕱ낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꪺ뱶암ꅃ뒫ꕹ룜뮡ꅁ싇ꗑ샋엧뻷멣룪ꑈꪺ꒶ꑊ뭐ꕾ뎡뢳ꪺ뽗ꗟ꧊걏ꝟꕩꕈ륆꣬ꟳꙮꪺ낪뚥뫞뉺뫊놱ꥍꟳꙮꪺ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꅁ뙩ꛓ맯꒽ꕱꪺ셚껄늣ꗍꖿ궱뱶암ꅃ 꽓ꝏꪺ걏ꅁꖻ곣ꡳ뭻결ꣃꭄ꧒ꚳ뻷멣룪ꑈ곒꿠늣ꗍ뫊놱껄ꩇꅆ륷듁뻷멣뫊놱ꪺ녪ꯗꕩ꿠꣼꒽ꕱ룪닕Ꙙꪺ걹냊꧊ꅂꕎ뉺ꑈ덤ꗴꅂ꒽ꕱ뚡ꪺ볧Ꙣ냓띾쏶ꭙꅂ걏띦ꭋꢮ냝썄꧒뱶암ꅁꙝ결덯ꗳ녎라땯ꗍ썂ꕾꪺ뫊놱ꚨꖻꅃꖻ곣ꡳꕈ뻷멣룪ꑈꪺ걹냊꧊낵냏꓀ꅁ걹냊꧊룻ꑪꪺ뻷멣룪ꑈ결ꅵꕄ냊ꅶꅁ걹냊꧊룻ꑰꪺ뻷멣룪ꑈ결ꅵ덑냊ꅶꅁꅵꕄ냊뻷멣룪ꑈꅶ맯꧳낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓꣣ꚳ룻낪ꪺ뫊놱껄ꩇꅁꅵ덑냊뻷멣룪ꑈꅶꭨ때ꚹ뉻뙈ꅃ ꖻ곣ꡳꕈ2002뭐2003꙾ꯗꪺꕸ왗쏒꣩ꖫ돵ꑗꖫ꒽ꕱ결볋ꖻ꣓랽ꅁꝒꕨ뿄ꭏ쁉쏒꣩띾ꅂ꙳끕뻌쏒ꅂ륂뿩띾ꅂꛊ덦띾ꅂ?Ꙙ띾떥늣띾ꅁ뇆낣ꖼ뒦앓롧뉺ꑈ셾륓롧뉺ꑈ셾륓결륳꒧꒽ꕱꅃ셠Ꙁ녯꣬1142귓볋ꖻ룪껆ꅃ 곣ꡳ떲ꩇ땯뉻ꅁꙢꥷ꒽ꕱ덗볒ꅂ곣땯녋ꯗꅂ곕빬엜늧꧊ꥍ셚껄ꪺ놡ꩰꑕꅁꕄ냊뻷멣앶뚰꒤ꯗꥍ낪뚥뫞뉺셚껄셾륓뇓띐ꯗꚨꖿꓱꅁ뭐셾륓ꓴ럇ꚨꓱꅆ 덑냊뻷멣룪ꑈꭨ때ꚹ뉻뙈ꅃꕾ뎡뢳맯꧳낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓뚡ꭨ때ꧨ뒫쏶ꭙꅃ
덯뫘떲ꩇ엣ꗜꅁꕄ냊뻷멣룪ꑈ면뭐낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꑀ끟꣏ꗎꅂꕈ듮뮴ꕎ뉺냝썄ꪺ뵷ꥍꢤꛢꅃꛓꕂꅁ싇ꗑꕄ냊뻷멣룪ꑈ맯꧳꒽ꕱ낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓떲멣ꪺ꽓껭낾ꙮꅁꑝ라뱶암낪뚥뫞뉺ꪺ셾륓ꓴ럇뭐닕ꚨꅁ걏덯뱶암녎라쁈뗛뻷멣룪ꑈ앶걹냊ꯗꪺ궰ꝃꛓ듮깺ꅃ
Title: The Effect of Institutional Investors and Outside Directors on CEO Compensation Author: Liao, Yi-Chen Advisor: Lin, Ying-Fen; Zhu, Dauw-Song Key word: Institutional Investors, Outside Directors, CEO Compensation, Agency Problem Month/Year: June 2005 Abstract: In the past researches about CEO compensation and corporate governance, most studies link CEO compensation and corporate performance to solve the “agency problem” existing between principals and agents. But this mechanism is easy to create infinite inflation in agent cost, and urges CEO to draw attention to short-term performance instead of the long-term development of the company. Therefore, this research takes two mechanisms-institutional investors and outside directors into consideration, which nearly get more and more important in equity market and board structure, trying to see the effect between two mechanisms and CEO compensation. In other words, by examining the intervention of institutional investors and the independence of outside directors to see if the company can attain more effective CEO monitoring and better corporate governance systems. Moreover, it could have the positive effect on corporate performance as well. Specifically, we don’t think in this paper that all institutional investors have monitoring effect on corporate governance. Expectation of the intensity of institutions’ monitoring can be limited by the liquidity of their portfolios, fiduciary duties, potential business relations with the firm, or the free-rider problem that appears due to the private cost of monitoring. In this research, we divide institutional
investors into two groups by liquidity. The institutional investors with high liquid are “active”, while with low liquid are “passive”. “Active institutional investors” have greater monitoring effect on CEO compensation significantly, while the passive ones don’t. We got 1142 samples from Taiwanese listed companies between 2002-2003, except banks, insurance, security, depositary receipt, transportation, retail and miscellaneous industry. The companies didn’t disclosure CEO compensation or CEO compensation is zero are also removed from the samples. In conclusion, we find that active institutional ownership concentration is positively related to the pay-for-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation, and negatively related to the level of CEO compensation, even after controlling for firm size, R&D intensity, earnings variability and performance; passive institutional ownership concentration don’t have this relation. Besides, the level of outside directors is not related to the level of CEO compensation. These results suggest that the active institutions that work with CEO compensation play a role as a moderation of the agency problem between shareholders and managers. Additionally, institutions also influence CEO compensation level and composition through their preferences, but the influences will decrease as the liquidity is low.
ꗘ뿽?닄ꑀ뎹 뫼뷗………………………………………………………………………… 1 닄ꑀ론?곣ꡳ굉뒺뭐냊뻷………………………………………………………1 닄ꑇ론?곣ꡳꗘꪺ………………………………………………………………4 닄ꑔ론?곣ꡳ걹땻………………………………………………………………5 닄ꑇ뎹 ꓥ쑭놴끑……………………………………………………………………. 7 닄ꑀ론?꒽ꕱꩶ뉺………………………………………………………………7 닄ꑇ론?뻷멣룪ꑈ…………………………………………………………..15 닄ꑔ론?낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓…………………….……………………………… 23 닄ꕼ론?뻷멣룪ꑈ뭐낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꪺ쏶ꭙ……………………………..26 닄꒭론?ꕾ뎡뢳뭐낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꪺ쏶ꭙ………………………………..31 닄ꑔ뎹 곣ꡳꓨꩫ……………………………………………………………………35 닄ꑀ론?곣ꡳ낲덝……………………………………………………………..35 닄ꑇ론?엜볆ꥷ롱뭐뿅뙱.…………………………………………………… 38 닄ꑔ론?곣ꡳ듁뚡ꅂ곣ꡳ볋ꖻ뭐룪껆랽…..………………………………… 44 닄ꕼ론?맪쏒볒ꮬ……………………………………………………………..46 닄꒭론?꓀꩒ꓨꩫ…………….……………………………………………… 49 닄ꕼ뎹?맪쏒떲ꩇ뭐꓀꩒……………………………………………………………51 닄ꑀ론 뇔굺꧊닎군…………………………………………………………..51 닄ꑇ론?곛쏶꧊꓀꩒…………………………………………………………..55 닄ꑔ론?뻷멣룪ꑈ뭐ꕾ뎡뢳맯낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꪺ뱶암………………..57 닄ꕼ론?뻷멣룪ꑈ맯낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓셚껄뇓띐ꯗꪺ뱶암………………..60 닄꒭뎹 떲뷗뭐ꯘ쒳…………………………………………………………………62 닄ꑀ론 곣ꡳ떲뷗뭐ꯘ쒳……………………………………………………..62 닄ꑇ론?ꯡ쓲곣ꡳꯘ쒳뭐곣ꡳ궭꣮…………………………………………..66 냑ꛒꓥ쑭……………………………………………………………………………..68 ꑀꅂ꒤ꓥ뎡ꗷ……………………………………………………………………68 ꑇꅂ굞ꓥ뎡꓀……………………………………………………………………69
맏ꗘ뿽 맏1-1 곣ꡳ걹땻맏..…………..………………………………………………………6 맏2-1 ꕀ곉믈ꛦ뒣ꕘ꒧꒽ꕱꩶ뉺걛멣…...…………………………………………12 맏4-1 볋ꖻ늣띾꓀ꝇ뛪믦맏………………………………………………………...53 ꫭꗘ뿽 ꫭ2-1 뻷멣룪ꑈ뭐뫞뉺셾륓쏶ꭙ꒧ꓥ쑭뻣뉺..…………………………..…...29 ꫭ2-2 ꕾ뎡뢳뭐낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓쏶ꭙ꒧ꓥ쑭뻣뉺..…………………………….33 ꫭ3-1 ꖻ곣ꡳ꒧곣ꡳ낲덝띊뻣……………………………………………………...37 ꫭ3-2 ꖻ곣ꡳ꒧곣ꡳ엜볆띊뻣……………………………………………………...43 ꫭ3-3 볋ꖻ뽺뿯륌땻띊뻣……………………………………………………...........45 ꫭ4-1 볋ꖻ늣띾꓀ꝇ띊뻣……………………………………………………..........52 ꫭ??㈠ꙕ엜볆꒧뇔굺꧊닎군……………………………………………………......54 ꫭ??㌠곛쏶ꭙ볆꽸끽……………………………………………………..................56 ꫭ??㐠ꕄ냊뭐덑냊뻷멣룪ꑈ맯낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓뱶암꒧맪쏒떲ꩇ…..................59 ꫭ??㔠ꕄ냊뭐덑냊뻷멣룪ꑈ맯낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓셚껄뇓띐ꯗ뱶암꒧맪쏒떲ꩇ..61 ꫭ5-1 ꖻ곣ꡳ꒧곣ꡳ낲덝맪쏒떲ꩇ띊뻣…………………………………...............64
닄ꑀ뎹 뫼뷗 ꖻ뎹ꗽ놴끑ꖻ곣ꡳꕄ썄ꅁ뻷멣룪ꑈꅂꕾ뎡뢳뭐낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꑔꙢ뉻ꕎ샴맒꒤ꪺ굉뒺뭐뉻ꩰꅁꥍꓞ땯곣ꡳ곣ꡳ냊뻷ꪺ귬ꙝꅃ놵뗛ꅁꙁ맯ꖻ곣ꡳ뇽륆꣬꒧곣ꡳꗘꪺ낵놴끑뭐귉뛕ꅃ돌ꯡꅁꭨ걏뇔굺뙽깩ꖻꓥꪺ곣ꡳ걹땻ꅃ 닄ꑀ론 곣ꡳ굉뒺뭐냊뻷 Ꙣ뉻ꕎꪺꗸ띾볒ꚡꑕꅁ꙳Ꙣ뗛ꗸ띾낪뚥뫞뉺ꅝꕎ뉺ꑈꅞꥍꩆꅝ꧒ꚳꑈꅞ뚡ꙝꗘ볐꒣ꑀ교덹ꚨꪺꅵꕎ뉺냝썄ꅶꅁꕩ꿠뻉교낪뚥뫞뉺ꅝManagementꅞꛛꑶꝑ꽱ꪺ랥ꑪ꓆ꅁꛓꭄ꒽ꕱ믹귈랥ꑪ꓆ꪺ륄뱷ꙍ쁉ꅝmoral hazardꅞꅃ꣒꙰걷Ꙣ1997꙾ꪺ뿄궷볉ꅁ2001ꛜ2002꙾뚡ꪺ과냪ꙷ뚩ꅝEnronꅞꅂꕀ곉덱끔ꅝWorldComꅞꅂ샴뉹륱끔ꅝGlobal Crossingꅞꥍ뵵ꑗ껉ꕎ뗘꿇ꅝAOL Time Warnerꅞꅁꥍ2004꙾ꕸ왗땯ꗍꪺ돕륆ꅂ뷃륄ꅂ끔뫐ꅂ굚꪿ꥍꓓ륱껗ꅁ뱨ꕘ꒣뵡ꪺꗸ띾뭒맺ꗳ곒뭐ꅵꕎ뉺냝썄ꅶꚳ쏶ꅃꛓ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꅝcorporate governanceꅞꪺ껖ꓟ냝썄둎걏꙰꛳덂뉺ꩆꥍ롧뉺꒧뚡ꪺ쏶ꭙꅝShleifer and Vishny, 1997ꅞꅁꑝ둎걏덂뉺룑ꡍꕎ뉺냝썄ꪺ뻷꣮ꅃ 륌ꕨꅵꕎ뉺뉺뷗ꅶ꒤뭻결ꅁ덺륌셾륓ꅝcompensationꅞ꣮ꯗ뭐ꗸ띾셚껄뿅뙱덳떲ꪺꓨꚡꅁꕩꕈ꣏ꕎ뉺ꑈ뭐꧒ꚳꑈꪺꗘ볐ꑀ교ꅁ궰ꝃ뫞뉺ꑈ귻ꙍ깠ꩆ앶꽱ꪺꛦ결ꅃꛓꕂ셚껄삳룓걏ꡍꥷ셾륓돌ꑪꪺꙝ꿀ꅁ꣤ꕌ꒽ꕱ꽓꧊ꅁ꙰덗볒ꅂ꧒ꚳ앶꽓뷨ꅂ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺땻ꯗ떥곒ꭄꡍꥷ낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꓴ럇ꪺ궫굮ꙝ꿀ꅃ덜Ꙩꓥ쑭ꅝFama, 1980; Antle and Smith, 1986; Lippert and Porter, 1997; Petroni and Safieddine, 1999; Indjejikian, 1999; 뙤곮ꯌꅁ1997; 독쇩꒯ꅂ볚뙩ꑨ뭐녩쑟ꗺꅁ2000ꅞꑝꑷꗽꯡ엧쏒셾륓뭐셚껄뚡뵔맪꙳ꙢꖿꙖ쏶ꭙꅃ 걏Ꙣ뭐셚껄덳떲ꪺ셾륓냲슦ꑕꅁ꒣뷗걏뇄ꗎ라군셚껄걏ꖫ돵셚껄ꅁ낪뚥뫞뉺ꅝꕎ뉺ꑈꅞ라ꛛ땍늣ꗍ궷쁉쇍쇗ꪺ뉻뙈ꅝGomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana and Makri, 2003ꅞꅁ깥꧶덹ꚨ낪뚥뫞뉺ꕵꩠ궫땵듁셚껄ꅁꦿ늤ꗸ띾듁떦늤ꪺ꣮ꥷꅁ 1
ꕂ낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꪺ때궭뾱뗈ꅁꑝꚳ륈꒽ꕱꩶ뉺걏끬ꡄ꒽ꕱ믹귈랥ꑪꪺꗘ볐ꅁ맯꒽ꕱꪺ앶꽱곛쏶ꑈꅝstakeholdersꅞꚳ꒣ꪺ뱶암ꅃꛓꕂꚳ곣ꡳ떲ꩇ엣ꗜꅁ셚껄뭐낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓뚡ꅁ뛈ꚳ띌깺ꪺꖿꙖ쏶ꭙꅁ곆ꛜꚳ걏Ꙗ쏶ꭙꅁꚹ뭐ꕎ뉺뉺뷗ꪺ륷듁곛ꅝBushman, Indjejikian and Smith, 1996; Conyon, 1997; Firth, Tam and Tang, 1999ꅞꅃꗑꚹꕩꢣꅁ뭐셚껄덳떲ꪺ셾륓냲슦걏ꝟ라뱶암꒽ꕱ셚껄ꪺ떲뷗쇙꒣ꑀ교ꅝGomez-Mejia, 1994ꅞꅃ 걇걙뻇뙽ꥬꙢꅵ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꅶ걛멣꒤ꅁ곣ꡳꙢ셾륓꒧ꕾꪺ놱꣮뻷꣮ꅃ롧ꗑꓥ쑭ꅝFama, 1985; Agrawal and Mandelker, 1990; Hartzell and Starks, 2003ꅞ맪쏒땯뉻ꅁꅵ뻷멣룪ꑈꅶꅝinstitutional investorsꅞꪺ꒶ꑊꕩꕈ륆꣬ꟳꙮꪺ낪뚥뫞뉺뫊놱ꥍꟳꙮꪺ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꅁꑝꕩꕈ꣮셚껄냲슦셾륓꣮ꯗꑕ맯ꗸ띾덹ꚨꪺꅵꕾ뎡꧊ꅶꅁ늣ꗍꟳꙨꚳꝑꪺ믹껦룪룻ꝃꪺ뫊놱ꚨꖻꅁ뙩ꛓ맯꒽ꕱꪺ셚껄늣ꗍ뱶암ꅃꙢ맪냈곉ꅁ럧ꑨꙁꭏ쁉뚰많ꅝSwiss Reꅞ뢳Peter Forstmoserꑝ뒿뷍꣬ꅇꅵ뻷멣룪ꑈꅁ꙰끨ꗰ냲ꅂ룪ꭈ끕냲떥ꑪꮬꩫꑈꩆꅁ녠녠ꕩꕈ륆꣬맯꒽ꕱ1ꉈ꣬2ꉈꪺ꯹ꅁ꒣뫢ꑪꩆꅁ걏ꑏ뙱ꑓ꒣ꑰꅃ……ꚳꑀꑪꮬꩫꑈ라ꡰꑕ꒬곛덳떸……Ꙣ볚걷ꑷꚳꯜꙨ덯쏾ꪺꅹꩆꛦ냊겡냊ꅺꕘ뉻ꅃ꙰ꩇ셰Ꙙ끟꣓꯹륆꣬10ꉈꅁ떴맯ꕩꕈ뱶암꒽ꕱꡍ떦ꅃꅶꅝ굊꫶쒫ꅁ㈰〴ꅞ ꕸ왗녱1989꙾뙽꧱뫮Ꙙ쏒꣩냓ꚨꗟꛛ샧뎡ꅂ1990꙾뙽꧱ꕾ냪녍띾룪뻷멣꣓ꕸ룪ꅁꕈ꧳1993꙾덱륌ꑑꑀ깡띳쏒꣩룪ꭈ끕꒽ꕱꪺꗓ뷐ꅁꑀꡂꡂꪺ꧱뱥뻷멣룪ꑈꙢ꒽뙽ꖫ돵룪ꪺꓱ꣒ꅃꕸ왗ꪺ뻷멣룪ꑈꗦ꧶ꖫ돵ꓱ궫ꑝꗑ1992꙾ꪺꉈ뱗ꛜ2001꙾ꪺ16ꉈꅁꕩꢣ뻷멣룪ꑈꙢꖫ돵ꑗꪺ뱶암ꑏꚳ띕몥뱗ꕛꪺ쇍뛕ꅃ ꒣ꕵꕸ왗ꅁ뻷멣룪ꑈꙢ냪믚ꑗꕄ굮ꪺ꒽뙽ꗦ꧶ꖫ돵ꪺꙡꛬꑝ띕궫굮ꅃꙢ과냪ꅁ뻷멣룪ꑈ녱1950꙾셠ꥍ앶꽱꧒ꚳ앶ꪺꉈ꣬1999꙾50ꉈꅝBoard of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2000ꅞꅃ90꙾ꕎ꒤ꅁ굞냪뻷멣룪ꑈ꧒ꚳꙢꕾ걹덱앶ꪺꉈꅁꩫ냪ꉈꅁ뱷냪39ꉈꅁ덯냪깡ꪺ뻷멣룪늣Ꙣ1990-1995덯걱듁뚡뎣ꚨꑆ뙗륌50ꉈꅝConference Board, 1998ꅞꅃ 2
걏뻷멣룪ꑈ꒶ꑊ맯꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꪺ뱶암ꅝꖿꙖ굴Ꙗꅞ꒴ꖼꚳꥷ뷗ꅝPozen, 1994; Bushhee, 1998ꅞꅁ뎡꓀뻇ꅝBrickley, Lease and Smith,1988; Almazam, Hartzell and Starks, 2004ꅞꙝꚹ뒣ꕘꅁ뻷멣룪ꑈꪺ꽓꧊ꑾ걏뱶암꣤뫊놱ꑏꪺ쏶쇤ꙝ꿀ꪺ띑ꩫꅁꙢ맪쏒ꑗꑝ샲녯ꑆ뵔뭻ꅃ ꕸ왗뻇곉륌ꕨ맯뻷멣룪ꑈꙢꅵ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꅶꑗ면ꢤꛢꪺ놴끑쇶땍꒣ꓖꅁ뎣걏놴끑뻷멣룪ꑈ뱶암꒽ꕱ곕빬뫞뉺ꅝ덜ꥐꗾꅁ2000ꅆꝦ뽯ꅁ2002ꅆ둞걆쁁ꅁ2002ꅞꅂ낪뚥뫞뉺땵뗸ꛦ결ꅝꩌ릩돳ꅁ2002ꅞꪺ쏶ꭙꅁ걏놴끑뻷멣룪ꑈ뿯떦늤뭐꒽ꕱ셚껄뚡ꪺ쏶셰꧊ꅝ낪ꥧ?ꅁ1999ꅞꅁ쇙ꖼꚳ놴끑뻷멣룪ꑈ맯낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꪺ곣ꡳꅁ놴끑뻷멣룪ꑈ꽓꧊깴늧ꪺ곣ꡳꑝꯜꓖꢣꅁꓞ땯곣ꡳ맯ꚹ쒳썄ꪺ쏶ꩠꅃ 낣ꑆ뻷멣룪ꑈꅁ뢳라떲멣꽓꧊ꗧ뱶암낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꪺ꣮ꥷꅁꙮꪺ뢳라떲멣ꕩꕈꕎꫭ꧒ꚳꑈ결맯낪뚥뫞뉺ꛦ결Ꝁꙮ뫊럾ꅁ궰ꝃꕎ뉺ꚨꖻꅃꓗ꣤걏꫱꙾꣓ꅁꕾ뎡뢳ꅝoutside directorsꅞꪺ덝롭걏꒽ꕱꩶ뉺쒳썄꒤볶ꪺ쒳썄ꅃꕸ왗맯꧳ꕾ뎡뢳ꪺ곛쏶곣ꡳꅁ덜Ꙩ걏끷맯ꕾ뎡뢳ꪺ덝롭맯꧳꒽ꕱ셚껄ꪺ뱶암ꅁ꒴룻ꓖ놴끑ꕾ뎡뢳뭐낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓뚡ꪺ쏶ꭙꅁ걇ꕾ뎡뢳ꪺ깵ꛬ뭐꯹ꚳ볆걏ꝟ꿠ꚨ결ꕴꑀ놱꣮낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓볐걏ꖻ곣ꡳ쏶ꩠꪺꕴꎸ땊쉉ꅃ굙ꕾ뎡뢳때ꩫꚨ결놱꣮낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꪺꚳ껄ꑵ꣣ꅁ꣤꒺Ꙣ귬ꙝ결꛳ꅈ맯꧳ꕸ왗ꖼ꣓뢳라떲멣꒧쇍Ꙗꅁꖻ곣ꡳ듁뇦꿠뒣꣑ꑀ냑ꛒ뻚ꅃ 3
닄ꑇ론 곣ꡳꗘꪺ ꖻ곣ꡳ꒧곣ꡳꗘꪺꚳꑕꙃ꣢뚵ꅇ ꑀꅂꕄ냊뭐덑냊뻷멣룪ꑈ꒶ꑊ맯낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꪺ뱶암ꅇ ꙝ결ꅵꕎ뉺뉺뷗ꅶ꒤ꅁ셾륓맯셚껄ꪺꖿꙖ뱶암ꖼꚳꑀ교ꪺꥷ뷗ꅁꖻ곣ꡳ샋듺 덺륌뻷멣룪ꑈ뻷꣮ꅁ걏ꝟ꿠맯뫞뉺셾륓늣ꗍ뫊놱꧊ꅁꕂ뙩ꑀꡂ늣ꗍ룑ꡍꕎ뉺냝썄꒧ꕜ꿠ꅃꕂꖻ곣ꡳꕈ뻷멣룪ꑈ꽓꧊낵꓀쏾ꅁ뗸ꅵꕄ냊ꅶꅝactiveꅞ뭐ꅵ덑냊ꅶꅝpassiveꅞ뻷멣룪ꑈꪺ뫊놱걏ꝟꚳ꧒깴늧ꅃ ꑇꅂꕾ뎡뢳맯낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꪺ뱶암ꅇ ꕾ뎡뢳ꅝoutside directorsꅞꙢ륌ꕨꓥ쑭꒤ꑝ꿠륆꣬룑ꡍꕎ뉺냝썄꒧ꕜ껄ꅁ걇ꖻ곣ꡳ녎듺룕ꕾ뎡뢳걏ꝟ꣣ꚳ뫞뉺뫊놱ꪺ껄ꩇꅁꚨ결뫞뉺셾륓ꕾꪺꕎ뉺냝썄듀ꕎ뻷꣮ꅃ 4
닄ꑔ론 곣ꡳ걹땻 ꖻ뷗ꓥꙀ꓀ꚨꑕ궱꒭귓뎹론ꅇ 닄ꑀ뎹ꅂ뫼뷗ꅁ뮡ꧺꖻꓥꪺ곣ꡳ굉뒺뭐냊뻷ꅂꗘꪺ뷗ꓥ걛멣ꅃ 닄ꑇ뎹ꅂꓥ쑭놴끑ꅁ궺ꗽꙞ압꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꪺꥷ롱뭐곛쏶뉺뷗땯깩ꅁ놵뗛Ꟈ맯뻷멣룪ꑈꅂ낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꅂ뻷멣룪ꑈ뭐셾륓ꪺ쏶ꭙꅂꕾ뎡뢳뭐낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꪺ쏶ꭙꅁ끷맯곛쏶ꓥ쑭꓀ꝏ놴끑ꅃ 닄ꑔ뎹ꅂ곣ꡳ덝군ꅁ껚뻚닄ꑇ뎹ꓥ쑭놴끑꣓땯깩곣ꡳ낲뮡ꅁꣃ맯곣ꡳ엜볆뙩ꛦ뻞Ꝁ꧊ꥷ롱ꅁ뮡ꧺꖻꓥ뽺뿯볋ꖻ꒧꣓랽뭐륌땻ꅁꕈ덝군맪뗽꓀꩒ꓨꩫꅃ 닄ꕼ뎹ꅂ맪뗽떲ꩇ뭐꓀꩒ꅁ둹굺ꙕ뚵룪껆뇔굺꧊닎군ꪺ떲ꩇꕈ꣤꧒ꕩ꿠쇴ꝴꪺ띎롱ꅁꣃ끑뷗볒ꮬ맪뗽ꪺ떲ꩇꅁ샋뗸낲뮡걏ꝟꚨꗟꅃ 닄꒭뎹ꅂ곣ꡳ떲뷗뭐궭꣮ꅁ셠떲쉫꿇곣ꡳ떲ꩇꅁ곣ꡳ궭꣮ꅁꣃ맯ꯡ쓲곣ꡳ뒣ꕘꖼ꣓곣ꡳꓨꙖꪺꯘ쒳ꅃ ꖻ뷗ꓥꪺ곣ꡳ걹땻꙰맏1- 1ꅃ 5
곣ꡳ굉뒺뭐냊뻷? 곣ꡳꗘꪺ?곣ꡳꓨꩫ? ꓥ쑭놴끑??땯깩곣ꡳ낲뮡? 엜볆ꥷ롱뭐볋ꖻ곉ꥷ? 맪쏒꓀꩒? 떲뷗뭐ꯘ쒳?? 맏1- 1 곣ꡳ걹땻맏 6
닄ꑇ뎹 ꓥ쑭놴끑 ꖻ곣ꡳꕄ굮놴끑뻷멣룪ꑈ뭐ꕾ뎡뢳맯ꗸ띾낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓뱶암ꅁ뭐셾륓셚껄뇓띐ꯗ뚡쏶ꭙꅃꙝꚹꅁꖻ뎹녎맯곛쏶ꪺꓥ쑭ꝀꑀꙞ압꧊ꪺ놴끑ꅁꯡ쓲뎹론결ꅇ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꅂ뻷멣룪ꑈꅂ낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꅂ뻷멣룪ꑈ뭐낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꪺ쏶ꭙꅂꕾ뎡뢳뭐낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꪺ쏶ꭙꅃ 닄ꑀ론 ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺 ꙝ결ꅵ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꅶꅝcorporate governanceꅞ뻷꣮ꪺ꒣낷ꗾꅁ녱ꑗꕀ곶ꖽꪺꩆ뿄궷볉ꅁꛜ띳ꕀ곶ꫬꥬꅁ과냪ꪺꙷ뚩껗ꅂꕀ곉덱끔껗ꅁꥍꕸ왗ꪺ돕륆ꅂ끔뿒껗떥ꅁ때꒣덹ꚨ꒽ꕱꪺꝑ깠쏶ꭙꑈ앶꽱닶ꑪꪺ띬깠ꅃ걇꒽ꕱꩶ뉺쒳썄Ꙣꗾ뉹꓆ꪺ롧샙샴맒ꑕꅁ꣼꣬낪ꯗꪺ쏶ꩠꅁꅵ냪믚뚡맯꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꪺ솿ꡄ떴ꭄ꒭꓀쓁볶ꯗꅁꚳꓟ쑶덶냪믚ꪺꗸ띾ꅁ삳녎꒽ꕱꩶ뉺뗸결껚뉠뢦ꪺ귬ꭨꅃꅶ?ꅝꥐ뱺꙰ꅁ㈰〴ꅞꅁꕩꢣ꣤궫굮꧊ꅃ놵ꑕ꣓ꖻ곣ꡳ녎ꕈ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꪺ끟랽ꅂꥷ롱ꅂ놱꣮뻷꣮ꥍꙕ냪꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꪺ땯깩낵뉠ꑊ놴끑ꅃ ꑀꅂ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꪺ끟랽 Ꙣ뛇닎ꪺ냓띾겡냊꒤ꅁꙝ꧒믝ꪺ덗볒ꅂ덎뭐룪ꖻ곒꒣ꑪꅁ롧샧샴맒ꑝ룻결돦꿂ꅁ꧒ꚳ앶곒둸뒤꧳ꓖ볆ꑈꓢ꒤ꅁꕂ꧒ꚳ곒뿋ꢭ냑뭐꒽ꕱ롧샧ꅃꙢ뉻ꕎꪺ꒽ꕱ꣮ꯗ꒤ꅁꦹꦹ믝굮낪ꯗꪺ룪ꖻ뭐덎ꪺ끴Ꙙꅁ꧒믝굮ꪺ룪ꖻ썂ꑝꭄꑀꑈꓖ볆둘ꑈ꿠굴뻡ꅁ결ꑆꙝ삳륤썂룪ꥍ녍띾꓀ꑵꪺ믝ꡄꅁBerle and Meansꅝ1933ꅞ뒣ꕘꅵ꧒ꚳ앶뭐롧샧앶곛꓀싷ꅶꪺ랧꧀ꅁꕌ귌ꕘꅁꙢꑪꙨ볆과냪ꑪ꒽ꕱ꒤ꅁꩆꑷ롧꒣ꛛꑶ롧샧ꗸ띾ꑆꅁ꽵ꖿ놱꣮ꗸ띾ꪺ걏돌낪뱨ꪺ롧뉺ꑈ귻ꅃ땍ꛓꅁꗑ꧳롧뉺ꑈꅝꕎ뉺ꑈꅞ뭐꒽ꕱꗷ꧒ꚳꑈꅝꕄ뉺ꑈꅞꪺꗘ볐꒣ꑀꥷ곛Ꙑꅁ냲꧳ꛛꝑ냊뻷ꅁ ??롧샙ꙘꝀ멛땯깩닕슴ꅝ佅䍄ꅞ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꑰ닕ꕄ깵䵡瑳⁉獫獳潮꧳㈰〴⼱ㄯ?Ꙣꕸꕟ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺뷗뻂ꪺ면뮡멋뿽ꅃ? 7
낪뚥뫞뉺라라끬ꡄ꣤ꛛꢭ돌ꑪꪺꝑ꽱ꅁꙝꛓꦿ늤꧱뇳끬ꡄ꒽ꕱ믹귈ꩆ끝둉믹귈랥ꑪ꓆ꪺꗘ볐ꅁ덹ꚨꩆ앶꽱꣼띬ꅃ ꚹ뫘ꙝꕄ뉺ꑈꥍꕎ뉺ꑈ뚡ꪺ볧Ꙣꝑ꽱뷄곰ꅝconflict of interestꅞꅁ뫙결ꅵꕎ뉺냝썄ꅶꅃꕎ뉺냝썄덱녠끟ꙝ꧳ꑕꙃ꣢뫘ꙝ꿀ꅇ닄ꑀꅁ꒣Ꙑꪺ냑뭐ꚳ꒣Ꙑꪺꗘ볐뭐낾ꙮꅆ닄ꑇꅁꙝ결ꡃ귓냑뭐ꪺ냑뭐겡냊ꅂꪾ쏑ꥍ낾ꙮ꒣Ꙑꅁ꧒ꕈꡃ귓냑뭐꧒녯룪끔ꑝ꒣ꞹ뻣ꅝGillan and Starks, 2001ꅞꅃꛓ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꪺ껖ꓟ냝썄둎걏꙰꛳덂뉺ꩆꥍ롧뉺꒧뚡ꪺ쏶ꭙꅝShleifer and Vishny, 1997ꅞꅁꑝ둎걏덂뉺룑ꡍꕎ뉺냝썄ꪺ뻷꣮ꅃꛓꕂꅁ귈녯ꩠ띎ꪺ걏ꅁ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺맯꧳뉻꒵꒽ꕱꪺ궫굮꧊ꑷꭄ뛈뻚ꕎ뉺뉺뷗ꕩ돦꿂룑쓀ꅁꙝ결셡꣏롧샧ꛊ꓀꒧ꛊ꯹ꚳ꒽ꕱ앶ꅁꗧꝙꗸ띾롧샧뭐꧒ꚳꞹꗾ떲Ꙙꪺ놡ꩰꑕꅁꗧ믝굮꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꅁꚹꑄ랽꧳꒴ꚳ꣤ꕌ뛅앶ꑈꅂ껸뙏꣤ꕌꝑ깠쏶ꭙꑈ꒧ꝑ꽱믝굮ꭏ믙ꅁꕂ낪뚥뫞뉺ꛦ냊땍꣼꣬뢳라걆떦ꅂ돒룪ꣳ쒳ꅂ냪깡ꩫ덗ꅂ뻷멣맯믹ꪺ곝ꩫꅁꥍ꣤쑶ꪧ샴맒꧒뱶암ꅁꕩꢣ꒣Ꙑ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺꣮ꯗꪺ뱶암ꑷ롧걏끝냈ꥍ롧샙믢냬ꪺꑀ귓궫굮쒳썄ꅝStarks, 2000ꅞꅃ ꑇꅂ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꪺꥷ롱 ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꪺꥷ롱뭐뵤돲곛럭뱳꩸ꅁ곣ꡳ링룕ꕈꩫ덗ꅂ롧샙뭐끝냈ꅂ뫞뉺걹땻ꪺ왛쉉꣓맯꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꪺꥷ롱낵놴끑ꅃ 녱ꩫ덗ꪺ왛쉉꣓곝ꅁ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺뗛늴꧳ꗸ띾꧒ꚳ뭐ꗸ띾롧샧꓀싷ꪾ뉻ꕎ꒽ꕱ닕슴엩꡴ꑕꅁ꙰꛳덺륌ꩫꯟꪺ꣮뿅뫞놱덝군ꅁꚳ껄뫊럾ꗸ띾ꪺ닕슴겡냊ꅁꕈ걏꙰꛳낷ꗾꗸ띾닕슴륂Ꝁꅁꢾꓮ닦ꩫꛦ결꒧롧샧맺뫝ꅝ뎯녱롴ꅁ2003ꅞꅃGillan and Starksꅝ1998ꅞꥷ롱꒽ꕱꩶ뉺결ꅵ꣮ꯗꪺꩫꭨꅂ덗뎹ꅁꥍ놱꣮꒽ꕱ겡냊ꪺ굮꿀ꅶꅁ꣤뭻결꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꪺ궫쉉ꝙꙢ꣤뒣꣑궭꣮꒽ꕱ겡냊ꪺ떲멣ꅃShleifer and Vishnyꅝ1997ꅞꑝ녎꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꥷ롱뗛궫Ꙣ쏶ꭙꑈꪺ롧샙ꝑ꽱ꑗꅇꅵ……꒽ꕱꪺ끝냈꣑떹결뵔ꭏ룪돸륓ꛓ뇄ꛦꪺꓨꚡꅶꅃZinglaesꅝ1998ꅞ뒣ꕘꑀ곛ꪺꥷ롱ꅇꅵ……뛬꒽ꕱ꒤럇꾲ꗦ꧶ꪺ궭꣮닕ꚨꅶꅃꚹ왛쉉ꑝ둎걏녎꒽ꕱꩶ뉺꽕롱ꙡꥷ롱Ꙣ꧒ꚳ뭐놱꣮꓀싷ꪺ놡ꩰꑕꅁ룪뭐꒽ꕱ꒧뚡ꪺꝑ꽱꓀끴ꥍ놱꣮쏶ꭙꅃ 8
녱롧샙뭐끝냈뫞뉺ꪺ왛쉉꣓곝ꅁ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꑝ걏ꑀ뫘녎ꕾ뎡꧊돌ꑰ꓆ꪺ뻷꣮ꅆꭏ앀ꩆꭏ앀ꑰꩆꪺ앶꽱둎띎ꣽ뗛녎ꭉꗇ늣ꗍꪺꚨꖻ꒺뎡꓆ꅁ꣏ꕾ뎡꧊듮ꓖ꣬돌ꝃ궭ꯗꅃꙮꪺ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺삳럭걏Ꙣ뱩ꛦ꒽ꕱꪺ끝냈ꅂꩫꯟꥍ꣤ꕌꙘꙐ롱냈ꪺꭥ뒣ꑕ꣏꒽ꕱ믹귈돌ꑪ꓆ꅝꝤ띱ꅁ2004ꅞꅃCadburyꅝ1999ꅞ뒣꣬ꅁ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺꒧궫굮꧊ꕄ굮ꭙꗾ뉹꓆ꖫ돵ꪺ땯깩ꅁꭐ꣏뻷멣룪ꑈ띕꣓띕쏶ꓟ꒽ꕱꪺ롧샧셚껄ꅁ곩굮녎꒽ꕱ룪끔ꕒ꓀뒦앓꒩ꡃ귓룪ꅁꝙ걏귓ꙮꪺ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺뻷꣮ꅃ뢭Ꙋ껉ꅝ2000ꅞ뭻결꒽ꕱꩶ뉺둎걏꙰꛳꣏녯꒽ꕱ룪ꥍꙕꝑ꽱곛쏶뎣녯꣬Ꙙ뉺ꅂ꒽ꖭꪺ맯ꯝꅁꕈ뵔ꭏꙕ룪ꑈꪺꭈꗴꅃꕀ곉믈ꛦꅝ1999ꅞꑝ뭻결꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꭙ꒽ꕱꙢ닅Ꙙꩫꯟ뭐ꮴ곹ꪺ덗뵤꒤ꅁ꙰꛳ꯘꗟ뻷꣮ꭐꚨ꒽ꕱ믹귈ꪺ랥ꑪ꓆ꅃ셠떲ꛓꢥꅁꚹ왛쉉뱳롱ꙡ뭻결꒽ꕱꩶ뉺걏ꕈ꒽ꕱ믹귈돌ꑪ꓆결ꗘ볐ꪺꑀ뻣깍곹ꟴ뽅쁹ꓢ걱ꥍ꣮뿅뻷꣮ꅝꝤ띱ꅁ2004ꅞꅃ ꚳꥷ롱ꭨ링룕녱꒽ꕱꪺ뫞뉺뻷꣮ꥍ걹땻ꪺ왛쉉꓁ꑊꅁ꙰과냪꒽뙽꒽ꕱ라군뫊럾ꥥ귻라ꅝPublic company Accounting Oversight Board, PCAOBꅞꕄ깵ꪺ뮡ꩫꅇꅵ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺둎걏ꗸ띾낪뚥ꪺ뫞뉺궷껦ꅃꅶ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꑪ깶과냪MITꕶ뚩뫞뉺뻇끼멡앁끼ꯂ띇.썥꿷ꅝWilliam F. Poundsꅞꟳ뉍랡ꙡꕘꅁ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꕄ굮쎴꧳꒽ꕱ뢳라ꪺ닕ꚨꅂꕜ꿠뭐셚껄ꅁ뢳라ꕎꫭꪺꖿ걏ꗸ띾꧒ꚳꑈꅁ굮굴끟ꗸ띾롧샧ꪺ돌닗덤ꗴꅝꝤ띱ꅁ2004ꅞꅃTrickerꅝ1984ꅞ뭻결꒽ꕱꩶ뉺걏ꑀ뫘뫞뉺ꅂ놱꣮ꥍ굴덤꒽ꕱ걹땻ꪺ꡴닎떲멣ꅃCadbury Reportꅝ1992ꅞꑝ녎꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꥷ롱결꒽ꕱ뫞뉺ꥍ놱꣮ꪺ꡴닎ꅃNeubauer and Lankꅝ1998ꅞ뭻결꒽ꕱꩶ뉺걏뵔ꭏ롧샙ꕩꛦ꧊ꅝviabilityꅞꥍ꒽ꕱꙘꩫ꧊ꅝlegitimacyꅞꪺ떲멣ꥍ걹땻꡴닎ꅁꅵ꒽ꕱ맯꣤쏶ꭙꑈ앶ꑏꥍ듁뇦꧒굴덤ꗴꪺ륌땻ꅶꅝDemb and Neubauer, 1992ꅞꅃ볐럇뒶몸녎ꅵ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꅶ꓀ꚨꕼꑪ뎡ꗷꅇ꒽ꕱꪺ꧒ꚳ앶걛멣뭐꣤맯꒽ꕱ롧샧ꪺ뱶암ꅂ꒽ꕱ뭐ꩆꪺ쏶ꭙꅂ꒽ꕱ끝냈룪끔뒦앓ꪺ땻ꯗꅂꕈ꒽ꕱ뢳라ꪺ닕슴걛멣뭐륂Ꝁꅁꕝ걁걏ꝟ뻖ꚳꕾ뎡뢳떥ꅃ냪믚꒺뎡뵝껖ꣳ라(The Institute of International AuditorsꅁIIA)ꟳ결뻷멣ꥷ롱ꕼ귓ꩶ뉺걹땻ꅁ뻷멣뇄ꛦꙕ뫘꒣Ꙑꪺꩫꯟꚡꅂ떲멣ꅂ떦늤땻Ꟈꕈ뵔ꭏꅇꅝ1ꅞ뿭ꙵꫀ라ꩫꕏꅃꅝ2ꅞ몡ꢬꑀ꿫꒽뭻ꪺ샧띾볐럇ꅁ륄뱷끖뇸ꫀ라듁뇦ꅃꅝ3ꅞ 9
뒣꣑ꫀ라ꑀ꿫ꝑ꽱뱗뙩꽓ꥷꝑ깠쏶ꭙꑈ땵듁앶꽱ꅃꅝ4ꅞꕒ꓀ꕂ꽵맪Ꙗ꧒ꚳꅂ낪뚥뫞뉺뻷쏶ꅂ꣤ꕌꝑ깠쏶ꭙꑈꑀ꿫ꑪ늳돸ꝩꅁꕈꭏ쏒맯꣤ꡍ떦ꅂꛦ냊ꅂꛦ결셚껄굴덤ꅝꝤ띱ꅁ2004ꅞꅃ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꪺ놱꣮뻷꣮냝썄녎라Ꙣꑕꑀ론낵룔굺ꅃ슲ꛓꢥ꒧ꅁ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺Ꙣ뫞뉺뻷꣮ꥍ걹땻왛쉉ꑕꅁ걏ꅵ꒽ꕱ맯꣤쏶ꭙꑈ앶ꑏꥍ듁뇦꧒굴덤ꗴꪺ륌땻ꅶꅝDemb and Neubauer, 1992ꅞꅃ 뢭믈뗘ꅂꟵ꙳귗ꅂ걟꧓꺦ꅝ2002ꅞ뒣ꕘꑀ룻결ꗾ궱꧊ꪺ왛쉉ꅁ뭻결꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꕜ꿠꓀결뾳ꝑ뭐낣맺ꑇ귓멣궱ꅁ둎뾳ꝑꛓꢥꅁ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꕩꕈ뱗녪떦늤뫞뉺껄꿠ꅁ꙰뱗녪꒽ꕱ쑶ꪧꑏ뭐ꗾ뉹꓆롧샧꿠ꑏꅁ뵔ꭏ꒽ꕱ떦늤ꦹꖿ뵔ꪺꓨꙖ뙩ꛦꅆ둎낣맺ꛓꢥꅁ덝롭뽗ꗟ뢳뭐뫊맮ꑈ덺ꧺ꓆ꪺꝙ껉룪끔꣓뫊럾낪뚥뫞뉺ꅁ뵔ꭏꕾ뎡ꩆ뭐뛅앶ꑈ샲녯삳ꚳ꒧돸륓ꅁꙁꅁ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꛜꓖ삳ꭏ믙꣤ꕌꝑ깠쏶ꭙꑈꩫꯟ꧒뷡꒩ꪺ앶꽱ꅁꕝ걁귻ꑵꅂ꣑삳냓ꅃ 뫮ꑗ꧒굺ꅁ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺걏ꑀ뫘뻉뭐뫞뉺ꪺ뻷꣮ꅁꕈ뢨맪꒽ꕱ롧샧덤ꗴ결ꗘꪺꅁꙢ귝압꣤ꕌꝑ깠쏶ꭙꑈꝑ꽱ꑕꅁ싇ꗑꕛ녪꒽ꕱ셚껄ꅁꭏ믙ꩆ앶꽱ꅃ ꑔꅂ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺뻷꣮ 결룑ꡍꙢ뉻ꕎ꒽ꕱ꣮ꯗꑕꅁ꧒ꚳ앶뭐롧샧앶꓀싷구ꗍꕘꪺꅵꕎ뉺냝썄ꅶꅁꯘ멣뭐뫻꯹ꑀ귓ꙮꪺ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺뻷꣮Ꙣ돐덹꒽ꕱ믹귈돌ꑪ꓆ꑗꅁ면ꑆꑀ귓랥결궫굮ꪺꢤꛢꅃꚹ뎡꓀ꝙ걏맯꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꪺ곛쏶뻷꣮낵ꑀꙞ압ꅃ 덺륌꒣Ꙑꪺ뻷꣮꙰꛳맯꒽ꕱꩶ뉺늣ꗍ꒬곛ꪺ뱶암걏귓쏶쇤ꪺ냝썄ꅁ때뷗덯뻷꣮뚡꒬결듀ꕎꭾ꒬룉ꭾꅃMorck, Shleifer and Vishnyꅝ1989ꅞ걏닄ꑀ귓녎놱꣮뻷꣮꓀ꚨ꒺ꅂꕾ뎡꣓곝ꪺ곣ꡳꅇꕾ뎡뻷꣮ꕝ걁ꖫꅂꑈꑾ신뒫믝ꡄꅂꩫꕏ꣮ꯗꅁꥍ냓ꭾꖫ돵ꅁAnderson and Campbellꅝ2003ꅞꟳ녎ꕾ뎡ꩶ뉺겡냊뱳꩸ꙡꥷ롱결ꕝ걁ꗾ뎡꧒ꚳ앶놱꣮앶ꪺ엜ꅆꛓ꒺뎡뻷꣮ꕝ걁뢳라ꅂ뻷멣ꩆꅂꑪꩆꅂ뿄룪뻷멣ꅁꥍ귻ꑵꅃ Jensen and Mecklingꅝ1993ꅞ뭻결덯뻷꣮라ꙀꙐꝀꗎꕈ결륆ꚨ꒽ꕱꪺ놱꣮ꅃPoundꅝ1992ꅞ뭻결럭꣤꒤ꑀ귓ꙝ꿀때ꩫꝀꗎ껉ꅁꕴꑀ귓ꙝ꿀라끟ꛓ듀ꕎ꒧ꅃ 10
Ꙣ과냪ꅁ맯꧳ꕾ뎡놱꣮뻷꣮ꥍ꒺뎡놱꣮뻷꣮뚡듀ꕎ쏶ꭙꪺꪧ쒳ꅁꑷꚳ륌덜Ꙩ맪쏒ꅆMikkelson and Partchꅝ1997ꅞꥍHadlock and Lumerꅝ1997ꅞ뭻결꒺뎡ꥍꕾ뎡놱꣮뻷꣮뚡때ꩫ꒬곛듀ꕎꅃ땍ꛓꅁ덯곣ꡳ떲ꩇꪺ깴늧ꕩ꿠걏ꙝ결곣ꡳ껉뚡륌땵걏꒽ꕱ꒺뎡ꩶ뉺걛멣뭐뉻ꩰ깴늧ꛓ늣ꗍꅃHuson, Parrino and Starksꅝ2000ꅞꙢ껉뚡ꪺ곣ꡳ꒤ꅁ뭻결꒺뎡뭐ꕾ뎡뫊놱뻷꣮뵔맪ꕩ꒬곛뗸결듀ꕎꭾꅝStarks, 2000ꅞꅃ 덺륌ꩫ덗뻷꣮ꪺꯘꗟꕩꕈ곛럭땻ꯗꙡ산ꝕ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺뻷꣮ꪺꯘꗟꅃ덱녠ꅁ냪깡ꩫꕏꥍ뿄꡴닎뚡깴늧뻉교꒣Ꙑꪺ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺꡴닎ꅃ럭ꩫꕏ꣮ꯗ걏ꯘꗟꙢ뒶덱ꩫꪺ냲슦ꑗ껉ꅁ룪ꭏ앀ꥍ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺룻결ꞹ떽ꅃꛓꕂ맯ꩆꪺꭏ앀ꑝ라뱶암꒽ꕱ뱗룪ꪺ꿠ꑏꅃ럭냲믝ꡄ뱗ꕛꅁꕾ냪뻷멣녎굮ꡄꟳꞹ떽ꪺꩫꕏꭏ앀ꥍ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꅃꛓꕂꅁ뿄ꛛꗑ꓆ꅂ끨ꗰ꣮ꯗꪺ땯깩뭐꣤ꕌ냪깡뻷멣룪떥ꙝ꿀뎣걏ꩫꕏꭏ앀ꥍ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺떽ꪺ뛊꓆뺯ꅃ꙰ꑗ꧒ꢥꅁꩆꇐꓗ꣤걏ꓖ볆ꩆꪺꭏ앀ꅁ맯꒽ꕱꩶ뉺걏궫굮ꪺꅁꕂ엽꒽ꕱꚳ쑾쓲샲녯ꕾ뎡룪ꪺ꿠ꑏꅝLa Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishy, 1997ꅞꅃ Jensenꅝ1993ꅞ녎ꅵ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺뻷꣮ꅶ쉫꿇결꒺뎡놱꣮뻷꣮ꅂꕾ뎡놱꣮뻷꣮ꅂꩫ덗뻷꣮ꥍ늣ꭾꖫ돵쑶ꪧꅃ늣ꭾꖫ돵쑶ꪧ뻷꣮륆ꚨꪺ떲ꩇ덱녠땯ꗍ뵷멃ꅃ맯꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꛓꢥꅁ걏귓껄삳뿰뵷ꪺꑵ꣣ꅃ ꕀ곉믈ꛦ결꒽ꕱꩶ뉺뒣ꕘꞹ뻣걛멣ꅁ녎꒽ꕱꩶ뉺꓀결꒺뎡뻷꣮뭐ꕾ뎡뻷꣮ꅁꕘ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺믝빡꒺뎡뻷꣮뭐ꕾ뎡뻷꣮곛꒬끴Ꙙꅁꑾ꿠땯뒧꣤ꚳ껄꧊ꅁꕈ뱗뙩꧒ꚳꝑ깠쏶ꭙꑈꪺꝑ꽱뭐꒽ꕱ믹귈ꅁ룔닓걛멣꙰맏2-1ꅃ 11
꒺ 뎡 ꕾ 뎡 ꗁ뚡ꅝ많엩ꅞ 덗뵤ꅝ뻷꣮ꅞ 녍띾볐럇?ꩆꑪ라?ꝑ깠쏶ꭙꑈ?ꩫꯟ?ꛦ걆덗뵤?뢳라?셮앁뻷멣?룪뎡?ꅝ녍띾뻷멣ꅞ?n 뛅냈?돸ꝩꗴꥒꅂ n 라군깶?n 앶꽱? 뫊럾 n ꯟ깶?n ꭈ뗻뻷멣?뫞뉺럭ꞽ?n 룪믈ꛦ?n 끝롧둃엩?ꖫ돵뻷꣮?뫞뉺ꅂ n 룪압냝?n 쑶ꪧꙝ꿀뭐늣롧샧 n 곣ꡳ뻷멣?ꭾꭾ뷨?꒤뱨ꕜ꿠n ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺n ꕾ냪ꪽ놵룪??꓀꩒ꑈ귻??껖ꓟꕜ꿠n ꒽ꕱ놱꣮앶??? 맏2-1 ꕀ곉믈ꛦ뒣ꕘ꒧꒽ꕱꩶ뉺걛멣 ꅝ룪껆꣓랽ꅇ뢭믈뗘ꅂꟵ꙳귗ꅂ걟꧓꺦ꅁ2002ꅁ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺뗻떥꡴닎ꅞ ꕼꅂꙕ냪꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꪺ땯깩 ꗘꭥꗽ뙩냪깡꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꪺ닕슴떲멣ꚳ꣢뫘ꕄ굮쏾ꮬꅇ뱷냪쏾ꮬꥍ굞과쏾ꮬꅃꖦ귌꒧뚡ꪺꕄ굮깴ꝏ걏ꅇ ꅝꑀꅞ뱷냪쏾ꮬꪺ꒽ꕱ뗛궫꧳꒺뎡ꩶ뉺ꅁꕄ굮덱륌ꩆꑪ라ꇐ뫊라ꇐ냵ꛦ뻷멣떥꒺뎡ꚳ닕슴꣓ꯘꗟ꧒ꚳꥍ롧샧꒧뚡ꪺ꣮뿅쏶ꭙꅃꚹ뫘뻷꣮돌ꑪꪺ꿊쉉냵ꛦꑈ귻ꪺ셚껄ꯜ쏸ꪽ놵뿅뙱ꅃ결룑ꡍ덯ꑀ쏸썄ꅁ굞과쏾ꮬꪺ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺떲 12
멣꒣륂ꗎꑗ굺꒺뎡ꚳ닕슴ꅁ쇙Ꙣꯜꑪ땻ꯗꑗ빡쏒꣩ꖫ돵맪뉻맯ꕄ굮냵ꛦꑈ귻ꪺ뫊럾ꥍ뽅쁹ꅁ뙩ꛦꕾ뎡ꩶ뉺ꅃ ꅝꑇꅞ굞과꒽ꕱ맪ꛦꑀ뱨떲멣뢳라ꅁ뢳라ꗑ뢳닕ꚨꅁ뢳ꗑ낪뚥뫞뉺ꭄ낪뚥뫞뉺닕ꚨꅆ뱷냪결ꕎꫭꪺ걙꒤ꕟ볚냪깡맪ꛦꑇ뱨떲멣뢳라ꅁ뢳라ꕝ걁뢳ꥍ뫊맮ꑈꅁ뢳걏낪뚥뫞뉺ꅁ뫊맮ꑈ걏ꭄ낪뚥뫞뉺ꅃ ꅝꑔꅞ뱷냪꒽ꕱ맪ꛦꅵ귻ꑵ냑뭐ꡍꥷ꣮ꯗꅶꅁꕄ굮ꚳ꣢ꓨ궱ꪺ꒺깥ꅇꑀ걏맯ꚳ쏶귻ꑵꝑ꽱ꪺ냝썄냑뭐ꡍꥷꅁꑇ걏맯ꗸ띾궫ꑪ롧샧ꡍ떦ꪺ냑뭐ꡍꥷꅝꝤ띱ꅁ2004ꅞꅃ 쇶땍ꅁꙢꭥꓥ뒣ꅁ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꪺ껖ꓟ냝썄걏꙰꛳덂뉺ꩆꅝ꧒ꚳꑈꅞꥍ롧뉺ꅝꕎ뉺ꑈꅞ꒧뚡ꪺ쏶ꭙꅝShiefler and Vishny, 1997ꅞꅁꙢꙢ덜Ꙩ롧샙엩ꅁꕄ굮ꪺꕎ뉺냝썄놱꣮걏궭꣮꣣놱꣮ꑏꩆ맯ꚸ굮ꩆꪺ앶ꚬ쇊ꅁꛓꭄ궭꣮슾띾롧뉺ꑈ맯ꩆꪺ때덤ꗴꛦ결ꅝLa Porta et al., 1997ꅞꅃꙝ결ꚳ덜Ꙩ냪깡ꪺ꧒ꚳ앶결ꑪꩆ꧒놱꣮ꅁ꙰뒼ꝑ돌ꑪ꒽ꕱꪺ돌ꑪꩆ꯹ꚳ40ꉈ앶ꥍ뱷냪22ꉈꅃꚹ뭐과냪ꗷ꯹ꚳ룻꓀뒲ꪺ놡곛ꇐ돌ꑪꩆ덱녠뛈놱꣮5ꉈꪺ늼앶ꅃ ꛨ볚ꑝꚳ쏾ꪺ놡ꅆꙢ덯냪깡꒤ꅁ꒤ꮬ꒽ꕱꪺ돌ꑪꩆ늼앶뙗륌50ꉈꅃꙢ볚걷ꑪ뎰ꅁꑪꩆ맯꒽ꕱꪺ놱꣮ꑏ뙗륌낪뚥뫞뉺ꅃ셠꒧ꅁꛨ볚ꪺꕎ뉺냝썄걏끟ꙝ꧳꣣놱꣮ꝑꩆꥍꚸ굮ꩆ뚡ꪺꝑ꽱뷄곰ꅁꛓꭄꙝꑰꩆꥍ슾띾롧뉺ꑈꛓ끟ꅁ꙰과냪ꅝBecht and Roell, 1999ꅞꅃ Ꙣꓩꖻꅁꙝ결ꖫ돵뻷꣮ꪺ꒽ꕱ놱꣮곛맯덑냊ꅁ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꑪꙨ덺륌꒺뎡ꑵ꣣륆ꚨꅝKaplan, 1997ꅞꅃ꒺뎡ꩶ뉺ꑵ꣣ꕝ걁뢳라ꪺ뫞뉺뫊럾ꥍ맯때껄뉶ꑈ귻ꪺ룑뚱ꯂ꿙ꅃ Djankovꅝ2000ꅞꥍFrydman, Gray and Rapaczynskiꅝ1999ꅞꙢ돬ꩶꅂꮢ싄ꝊꅂꙎ몸Ꙏ뒵ꅂ벯몸Ꙩꗋꅂꭘ쎹뒵ꅂ꽑Ꝋ쓵ꅂ놶Ꝋꅂꙉꓺꝑꥍꩩ쓵떥신ꮬ롧샙엩ꪺ곣ꡳꅁꭨ땯뉻걆ꦲꙢ덯띳뾳ꖫ돵ꪺ덜Ꙩ꒽ꕱ뎣ꚳ궫굮뱶암ꑏꅃXu and Wangꅝ1997ꅞꙢ꒤냪ꑝ녯꣬쏾ꪺ떲ꩇꅇ띳뾳ꖫ돵ꪺ꒽ꕱ놱꣮앶곛럭뚰꒤ꅁꕾ냪룪륷듁녎꯹쓲Ꙣ띳뾳ꖫ돵ꥍꙢꚹꖫ돵ꗦ꧶ꪺ꒽ꕱ늣ꗍ궫굮뱶암ꅃꖦ귌덺륌ꪽ뗳ꑺ 13
륷뚡놵꣑믝껄삳뱶암꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꅃ ꒤냪ꙷꗾ덗뵤ꥥ귻라ꪺ낪꿅압냝Anthony Neohꫭꗜ꒤냪ꖲ뚷굮Ꙣꗸ띾ꪺ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꑗꚳ꧒뙩ꡂꅁꅵ귌ꑷꯘꗟꢾ앀ꥍꡡ깠놱꣮뻷꣮ꅁꙝ결ꚳ낪뚥뫞뉺라룕맏쇴싃ꕌꪺꛦ결ꅶꅝDeutsche Presse-Agentur, 2001ꅞꅃ땍ꛓꅁꙢꑀꖫ돵ꅁ꒴녎Ꝭꓞꥍꭏ꽤룪ꖻꪺ뚶Ꟈ쁵ꗽ꧳꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꪺ뒶ꅃꩶ뉺덗뵤ꪺ땯깩녯꣬ꩫꕏꓤ꯹ꪺ놡녠뛈궭꧳Ꙣ뙽땯꒤ꥍꑷ뙽땯냪깡꒤땯ꗍꅃ ꕴꑀ귓맯꒽ꕱꩶ뉺떲멣늣ꗍ뚡놵뱶암ꪺ꣒ꑬ걏냪믚꒽ꕱꩶ뉺뗻믹ꩁ냈ꪺ뾳끟ꅃꙢ볚걷ꅁDeminorꑷ롧ꯘꗟꑀꕝꝴ17귓냪깡300뚡꒽ꕱꪺ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺뗻믹ꩁ냈ꅃDeminor뗻믹걏뻚꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꪺꕼ귓믢냬ꅇꩆꪺ앶ꝑ뭐롱냈ꅂ꿊ꕆ쑾ꗴꪺꭏ앀ꅂ뒦앓ꥍ뢳라떲멣ꅝGillan and Starks, 2001ꅞꅃ 곛ꪺ뗻믹뻷꣮ꑝ꙳Ꙣ꧳꣤ꕌꙡꓨꅁ꣒꙰ꭘ쎹뒵ꪺ꒽ꕱꩫ꣮ꥍ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꣳ라뇄꣺ꕝ걁냪꒺꒽ꕱꩶ뉺껄뉶뗻ꥷꥍ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺뗻믹꡴닎떥겡냊ꅃ볐럇뒶몸꒽ꕱꑷ땯깩ꑀ귓끷맯띳뾳ꖫ돵ꪺ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺뗻믹꡴닎ꅃ돌ꯡꅁꩫ냪ꢽ꧹ꭈ뙕믈ꛦ걷꓀ꛦ띳뾳ꖫ돵뎡ꑷ땯ꫭꑀꗷꕝ걁495깡꒽ꕱ25귓냪깡ꪺ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺뇆ꙗꅃ덯ꩁ냈ꪺ꙳Ꙣ삳뻷멣믝굮쏾룪끔낵룪ꡍ떦ꪺ믝ꡄꅝGillan and Starks, 2001ꅞꅃ 14
닄ꑇ론 뻷멣룪ꑈ 뻷멣룪ꑈꅝinstitutional investorsꅞꓩ쇍ꚨꅁ맯뫊놱꒽ꕱꛦ결ꪺ궫굮꧊ꑝ뭐ꓩ귑뱗ꅃDavid, Kochhar, and Levitasꅝ1998ꅞ녎뻷멣룪ꑈ꓀결꒽Ꙁ끨ꗰ냲ꅝpublic pension fundsꅞꅂ꒬둦냲ꅝmutual fundsꅞꅂꭏ쁉냲ꅝinsurance fundsꅞꅂ믈ꛦꅝbanksꅞꅂꭄ믈ꛦꭈ끕ꅝnonbank trustsꅞꅁꥍ꒽ꕱ끨ꗰ냲ꅝcorporate pension fundsꅞ떥ꅃCrutchley, Jensen, Jahera and Raymondꅝ1999ꅞ맯뻷멣룪ꑈ꯹ꪺꥷ롱결끨ꗰ냲ꅂꙀꙐ냲뭐꣤ꕌ냲꯹ꚳ꒽ꕱ볆ꪺ셠ꥍꅃCDA Spectrum룪껆깷뻖ꚳ뻷멣룪ꑈ꧒꯹ꚳꪺ꧒ꚳ룪닕Ꙙꅁ꣤녎뻷멣룪ꑈ꓀결꒭쏾ꅇ룪꒽ꕱꅂ뽗ꗟ룪압냝ꅂ믈ꛦꭈ끕뎡ꅂꭏ쁉꒽ꕱ뭐꣤ꕌꅃꕸ왗ꖫ꒤뻷멣룪ꑈꕝ걁ꅇ쏒꣩ꛛ샧냓ꅂ룪ꭈ끕꒽ꕱꅂ믈ꛦ띾ꅂ맘쁉띾ꅂ걆ꦲ뻷멣룪냲ꅂ뙬뛗ꞽ냲ꅂ꣤ꕌ꒽ꕱꩫꑈ꫱꙾ꑪ둔ꚨꪺꕾ냪녍띾뻷멣ꅝQFIIꅞꅆ곹ꕩ닊꓀결ꕾ룪ꅂ쏒꣩룪ꭈ끕꒽ꕱ뭐쏒꣩ꛛ샧냓ꅁꑝ둎걏ꭕ뫙ꪺꅵꑔꑪꩫꑈꅶꅃꙝ결뻷멣룪ꑈ덱녠뻖ꚳꓱꑀ꿫룪ꑈ룻낪ꪺꗷꅁ맯꧳꒽ꕱꚳ룻낪ꪺ뫊놱꿠ꑏꅁꛓꕂ뻷멣룪ꑈ맯꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꪺ멁ꯗ뱶암덑룪꒽ꕱꪺꗸ띾롧샧볒ꚡꅁ걇ꙢMorck et al.ꅝ1989ꅞꥍꕀ곉믈ꛦꪺ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺뻷꣮걛멣꒤ꅁ뻷멣룪ꑈ곒덑뗸결꒺뎡놱꣮뻷꣮ꪺꑀ뎡꓀ꅁꕩꪾ꣤Ꙣꩶ뉺ꢤꛢ꒧궫굮꧊ꅃ놵ꑕ꣓꓀ꝏ맯뻷멣룪ꑈꗦ꧶덹ꚨꪺ뱶암ꅂꙢ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺꒤ꪺꢤꛢ꓀ꝏ낵끑뷗ꅃ ꑀꅂ뻷멣룪ꑈꗦ꧶ꪺ뱶암 Ꙣ덜Ꙩ냪깡ꅁ뻷멣룪ꑈꑷꙢ뿄ꖫ돵ꚳ궫굮ꙡꛬꅃꙢ과냪ꅁ뻷멣룪녱1950꙾셠ꥍ앶꽱꧒ꚳ앶ꪺꉈ꣬1999꙾50ꉈꅝBoard of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2000ꅞꅃ과냪뻷멣꧒ꚳ앶ꪺ꧊뷨ꑝꚳ꧒신엜ꅃ륌ꕨ걏ꕈ믈ꛦꭈ뙕뎡ꅂ끨ꗰ냲ꅂꙀꙐ냲ꅂꭏ쁉꒽ꕱꅁꥍ꺽쏘냲떥결ꕄꅃ꒵ꓩ뽗ꗟ룪압냝ꥍ믈ꛦꭈ뙕뎡결닕ꚨ뻷멣룪늣ꪺꕄ굮꒸꿀ꅃ Ꙣ꣤ꕌ냪깡뿄ꖫ돵꒤ꅁ뻷멣룪ꑈ꧒꯹ꚳꪺ룪늣ꑝꙢ덶꙾뱗ꕛꅃ1990꙾ 15
ꕎ꒤ꅁ굞냪뻷멣룪ꑈ꧒ꚳꙢꕾ걹덱앶ꪺꉈꅁꩫ냪ꉈꅁ뱷냪 39ꉈꅁ덯냪깡ꪺ뻷멣룪늣Ꙣ1990꣬1995덯걱듁뚡뎣ꚨꑆ뙗륌50ꉈꅝConference Board, 1998ꅞꅃꙢ꒤과걷ꅁ끨ꗰ냲Ꙣ뿄ꖫ돵ꑝ꣣ꚳ궫굮뱶암ꑏꅃ1999꙾Ꙣ뒼ꝑꅁ끨ꗰ냲ꥍ맘쁉꒽ꕱ꯹ꚳ뙗륌셠쁸뭗썂ꪺ10ꉈꅝIglesias, 2000ꅞꅃ껚ꟊꥍ꾦빼ꑝꚳ곛놡ꅁ쇶땍꣤뻷멣꯹ꚳꓱ뉶ꖼ룻뒼ꝑ낪ꅃꕸ왗ꪺ뻷멣룪ꑈꗦ꧶ꖫ돵ꓱ궫ꑝꗑ1992꙾ꪺꉈ뱗ꛜ2001꙾ꪺ16ꉈꅃ 낣ꑆ걏ꕄ굮ꪺ앶꽱뻖ꚳꅁ뻷멣룪ꑈꙢ앶꽱ꖫ돵ꑝꚳꑪ뙱ꪺꗦ꧶썂ꅃ꣒꙰ꅁ뻷멣룪ꑈꙢ꿃곹쏒ꗦ꧒ꗦ꧶썂ꅝNYSEꅞ셠볆ꪺ50ꉈꅝConference Board, 1998ꅞꅃꙢSias and Starksꅝ1997ꅞꪺ곣ꡳ꒤ꅁ뻷멣룪ꑈꪺ럭ꓩꗦ꧶썂셠볆ꪺ80ꉈꅃ맪ꑗꅁ뻷멣룪ꑈꪺꙢꗦ꧶썂ꑗꪺ궫굮꧊ꣃꭄꙝ꣤꯹ꚳꑪ뙱ꪺ늼ꅃꙢ곣ꡳ볋ꖻ꒤ꅁ땯뉻앶꯹ꚳ돌ꑰꅝ꯹ꚳ꒽ꕱꉈꗷꅞꪺ뻷멣룪ꑈ꒴ꚳ40ꉈꪺ앶ꗦ꧶뙱ꅃ ꙝ결뻷멣꧒ꚳ앶ꥍꗦ꧶꙰ꚹ궫굮뱶암ꅁ꧒ꕈ뻷멣룪ꑈ꿠ꝑꗎ덜Ꙩꙝ꿀뱶암늼돸륓뉶ꅃ꣒꙰ꅁ룻Ꙩ앶꯹ꚳꪺ뻷멣룪ꑈꚳ룻ꑪꪺ돸륓ꛛ곛쏶꧊ꥍ룻ꑪꪺ뙧ꑀ껄삳ꅝSias and Starks, 1995, 1997ꅞꅃꑝꚳ쏒뻚엣ꗜ뻷멣룪ꑈ라ꚳ녱늳ꛦ결ꥍꙝꚹ늣ꗍꖿꙖꙞꗦ꧶ꅁ꒴ꖼ꿠쏒맪녱늳ꛦ결맯뿄ꖫ돵라늣ꗍ굴궱ꪺ떲ꩇꅃ 뻷멣룪ꑈ꧒ꚳ앶ꑝ덑땯뉻뭐걙꒽ꕱ꽓꧊ꚳ쏶ꅁ꙰믹엜늧꧊ꅝSias, 1996 ꅞꥍ룻ꞹ뻣ꪺ룪끔샴맒ꅝFalkenstein, 1996ꅞꅃGompers and Metrickꅝ2001ꅞ뭻결ꅁꙢ과냪ꅁ꧒ꚳ앶ꪺ닕ꚨꗑ귓ꑈ신ꛜꕈ뻷멣결ꕄ녎뱶암믹ꅁꙝ결뻷멣낾ꙮ꯹ꚳꑪ뙱늼뭐룪ꑪꮬ꒽ꕱꅃ 낣ꑆ뻷멣룪ꑈꙢ과냪ꖫ돵ꪺ뱶암ꅁꑝꚳ곣ꡳꙢ꣤ꕌ냪깡낵맪쏒ꅃWalker and Leforꅝt1999ꅞ땯뉻뒼ꝑ뻷멣룪ꪺꚨ라녡꣓ꟳꑪꪺꖫ돵엜늧꧊ꅃIihara, Kato and Tokunagaꅝ1999ꅞ뭻결ꓩꖻ냪꒺뻷멣룪ꑈꑝꚳ녱늳ꛦ결ꅁ꒣꙰ꕾ냪뻷멣ꪺ땻ꯗ낪ꅃGriblatt and Keloharjuꅝ2000ꅞ땯뉻Ꙣꫢ쓵ꅁꕾ냪뻷멣녠뇄꣺냊멁ꗦ꧶떦늤ꅃ 16
쇶땍뻷멣룪ꑈ쇙ꖼꙢ띳뾳ꖫ돵ꑗ면궫굮ꢤꛢꅁ걏덺륌덶ꡂ끨ꗰ맯뻷멣ꪺ꯹ꚳ늣ꗍ뱶암ꅁ엽뻷멣룪ꑈ띕꣓띕뉠ꑊ띳뾳롧샙ꑕꪺ룪ꖻꖫ돵ꅝGillan and Starks, 2001ꅞꅃ ꑇꅂ뻷멣룪ꑈꙢ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꪺꢤꛢ ꙝ뻷멣룪ꑈꙢ뿄ꖫ돵ꪺ뱶암몥뱗ꅁꖦ귌Ꙣ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꑗꑝꚨ결궫굮ꪺ뱶암ꙝ꿀ꅃ걏ꗽꡍ뇸ꗳ걏ꅁꖫ맯꧳룪ꑈ뚷ꭏ꯹걹냊꧊ꅁꓗ꣤걏맯뻷멣룪ꑈꥍ돌ꫬ룪꣑삳ꑈꅆꙝ결꙰ꩇꕌ귌굮맯꒽ꕱꩶ뉺늣ꗍ뱶암ꅁ믝굮꿠Ꟗ덴싷뙽ꫭ뉻꒣ꙮꖫ돵ꥍꟖ덴꣺녯ꚳꝑꙡꛬꪺ뻷라ꅝBlack and Gilson, 1998ꅞꅃ 롧ꗑ륌ꕨꪺ뉺뷗ꥍ롧엧엧쏒ꅁ룪뻷멣뭐룻ꑰꪺꅂ룻껸랥ꥍ껸꺧룻꒣왆덱ꪺ룪ꑈ곛ꓱꅁ룻꣣ꚳ냊멁뫊놱ꪺ꿠ꑏꅃ땍ꛓꅁ뻷멣뫊놱ꪺ녪ꯗꕩ꿠꣼꒽ꕱ룪닕Ꙙꪺ걹냊꧊ꅝBhide, 1994ꅞꅂꕎ뉺ꑈ덤ꗴꅝMurphy and Van Nuys, 1994ꅞ뭐꒽ꕱ뚡ꪺ볧Ꙣ냓띾쏶ꭙꅝBrickley, Lease and Smith, 1988ꅞꅁ걏띦ꭋꢮ냝썄ꅝ卨汥楦敲湤⁖楳桮礬?ㄹ㠶ꅞ뻷멣Ꙣ룪껉ꅁ뭐Ꝁ꣤ꕌ놡곛ꓱꅁ맯꧳뱶암꒽ꕱ뚡ꪺ냓띾쏶ꭙꚳ룻ꑪꪺ볧꿠ꅁꛓꕂ꣤라룻쁗셣ꪺ궱맯꒽ꕱ뭐ꕎ뉺ꑈꝑ꽱뚡ꪺ뷄곰ꅃ륌ꕨ뻇ꪺ곣ꡳꅁ럭꒽ꕱ꒤ꚳ룻Ꙩꗷ걏뻷멣룪ꑈ꧒꯹ꚳ껉ꅁꙢ꒽ꕱ낪뚥뫞뉺ꯘ쒳ꑕꅁ뻷멣룪ꑈ라녯꣬룻Ꙩꪺꥥ끕껑늼앶ꅝAlmazam et al., 2004ꅞꅃ? ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺Ꙣꖫ돌ꑪꪺꙮ덂걏덺륌뫊놱꿠뒣꣑떹룪ꑈꟳꙨ쏶꧳꒽ꕱꪺ룪끔ꅃꖫꪺ뫊놱ꢤꛢ덺륌맯낪뚥뫞뉺걉ꕛ삣ꑏꅁꕈ꣏꣤Ꝁꕘ맯룪ꑈꚳꝑꪺꡍ떦ꅃꚹꕾꅁ싇ꗑ뒣꣑뫞뉺많뚤뚡쑶ꪧꪺ뻷라ꅁ럭낪뚥뫞뉺ꫭ뉻꒣ꙮ껉ꅁꖫ꿠뒣꣑떽ꪺꛦ냊ꅝFama and Jenson, 1983ꅞꅃꙁꅁ룪ꑈꕩꕈꕵ롧ꗑ맯셚껄룪끔ꪺꛒ뙱뇀쉟꒽ꕱ곕빬ꅃꕈꑕ꓀ꝏ맯뻷멣룪ꑈꪺ뫊놱ꢤꛢ뭐꣤ꕌꑀ꿫ꑪꩆꪺꓱ룻낵놴끑ꅃ 17
ꅝꑀꅞ뻷멣룪ꑈꪺ뫊놱ꢤꛢ Starksꅝ2000ꅞ뭻결뻷멣룪ꑈ싇ꗑ꓀뒲앶ꥍꚨ결ꕄ굮꣣놱꣮꿠ꑏꩆ륆ꚨ뫊놱ꪺꗘꪺꅃꩆꅁꑝ둎걏꒽ꕱꪺ꧒ꚳꑈꅁ꣣ꚳ뿯뻜뢳ꪺ앶ꝑꅃ뢳걏ꩆꪺꕎ뉺ꑈꅁꚳ뫊놱꒽ꕱ롧뉺ꥍ꣤셚껄ꪺ덤ꗴꅃ럭ꩆ뭻결뢳ꖼ뫉꣬덤ꗴ껉ꅁ뻷멣룪ꑈꩆ녎뙽ꥬ꣤뽮랥Ꝁ결ꅇꅝ1ꅞꗎ롽늼ꅆꅝ2ꅞ뫻꯹ꗷꅁꫭ륆ꕘ꒣몡ꅆꅝ3ꅞ뫻꯹ꗷꕂ꒣낵ꗴ꛳ꅃꛓ뇄꣺닄ꑇ뫘ꛦ결ꪺꕩ꿠꧊낪꧳꣤ꕌ꣢ꅝGillan and Starks, 2001ꅞꅃ 뻷멣룪ꑈ맯꒽ꕱ뫊놱라늣ꗍ꣢귓곛뷄곰ꪺ뱶암ꅆꑪꩆꙢ맯꒽ꕱ놱꣮껉ꅁꑝ라Ꙑ껉뱶암ꗷ꯹ꚳꪺ걹냊꧊ꅃ뻷멣룻ꚳꕩ꿠걏ꑪꮬꩆꕂ맯꒽ꕱ뫊놱ꚳ룻꣎ꪺ꣫뽅ꅃꕂꙝ결낪ꚨꖻꅁꕵꚳꑪꩆ꿠ꚳꕄ냊뫊놱ꪺ꿠ꑏꅝShleifer and Vishny, 1986; Huddart, 1993ꅞꅃ쇶땍ꕵꚳ뫊놱ꩆ믝굮꧓뻡꧒ꚳ뫊놱ꚨꖻꅁ꧒ꚳꪺꩆ뎣ꕩ녱뫊놱꒤샲꽱ꅁ꧒ꕈ녎덹ꚨꅵ띦ꭋꢮꅶ냝썄ꪺ땯ꗍꅃBlackꅝ1992ꅞ뭻결뻷멣Ꙣ뫊놱ꑗ삳ꚳꟳꙨꪺꕄ냊ꑊꅃ뻚과냪ꪺꩫꯟꅁ결꿠꣏꒽ꕱꚳꟳ낪ꪺꕄ냊ꑊꥍ맯꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꚳꟳꑪꪺ뱶암ꅁ꒹덜꒽ꕱ꯹ꚳꓱ뉻Ꙣ덗뎹ꟳꙨꪺ앶ꕂꥍ뭐꣤ꕌ뻷멣룪ꑈꙘꝀꅃ Busheeꅝ1998ꅞꙢ뻷멣ꪺ꧒ꚳ앶ꥍ꒽ꕱ곣땯룪쏶ꭙꑗꅁ뭻결뻷멣Ꙣ듮뮴낪뚥뫞뉺땵뗸ꛦ결삣ꑏꑕꅁ뵔맪ꕩꕈꚨ결ꑀꚳ껄뫊놱ꪺꢤꛢꅃ뫊놱ꪺ녪ꯗ꒴ꙝ꒣Ꙑ뻷멣룪ꑈꪺꚡꛓꚳ꒣Ꙑꅆ뻷멣룪ꑈꪺ낪ꚨꗦ썂ꥍ냊멁ꗦ꧶ꅁꗧꝙ낪ꯗꪺ걹냊꧊ꅁꕩ꿠ꟳꭐ꣏낪뚥뫞뉺ꪺ땵뗸ꛦ결ꅃ 땍ꛓꅁꚳ뻇뭻결Ꙣ맯꒽ꕱꡍ떦ꪺ뱶암ꑗꅁ뻷멣룪ꑈꙢꅵ걹냊ꅶꪺ꽓꧊낪꧳뚰꒤꧒ꚳ앶뫊놱ꅝCoffee, 1991; Bhide, 1994ꅞꅃBhideꅝ1994ꅞ뭻결과냪ꖫ돵ꪺ낪ꯗ걹냊꧊라ꓮ뻷멣Ꙣ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꑗꪺꑊꅁꙝ결뻷멣ꕩꕈꫡ뙏ꓖ덜ꚨꖻ둎뷦놼Ꙩ볆꒽ꕱ앶ꅁꛓ꒽ꕱ앶ꪺ꯹ꚳ걏꣤꿠땯뒧ꕄ냊뫊놱ꕜ꿠ꪺ뻌싇ꅃ Kahn and Wintonꅝ1998ꅞ뭻결뻷멣룪ꑈ삳룔닓ꙡꯤꛒ걹냊꧊ꥍ뫊놱뚡ꪺꧨ뒫쏶ꭙꅁꙝ결ꝑ볭룲뫊놱ꚨꖻꪽ놵곛쏶ꅃꕌ귌뭻결뻷멣룪ꑈ걏ꝟ라ꕄ냊ꑊ뫊놱뭐꧒ꚳ앶꯹ꚳ믹귈뱗ꕛ걏ꝟ뙗륌ꗦ꧶ꝑ볭ꚳ쏶ꅃ 18
Noeꅝ1998ꅞꭨ뭻결Ꙣ과냪꒽ꕱꩶ뉺떲멣ꑕꅁ때뷗걹냊꧊낪ꝃꅁ뻷멣룪ꑈ녎라ꛛ땍늣ꗍ꣣뫊놱ꗘ볐ꥍꢾꓮ낪뚥뫞뉺ꚳ륌ꯗ볖왛륷듁ꪺꛦ냊ꅃꝙ꣏걏Ꙣꚳ띦ꭋꢮ냝썄ꅂ꧹뙑뫊놱ꚨꖻꅂ꿊ꕆꙢ꒽ꕱꪺ돌ꫬ앶ꪺ놡ꑕꅁ뻷멣룪ꑈ꒴ꕩꕈ엩뭻꣬ꅁ싇ꗑ뫊놱낪뚥뫞뉺ꕩꕏ꣤샲ꝑꅃ Maugꅝ1998ꅞꭨ맯뻷멣룪ꑈꪺ걹냊꧊낵ꕘꕴꑀ뫘룑쓀ꅁMaug뭻결꒽ꕱ놱꣮ꪺ걹냊꧊ꚳꖿꙖꪺ껄ꩇꅆ쇶땍ꖫ걹덱꧊낪라엽뻷멣룻깥꧶뷦놼ꑪ뙱ꪺ앶ꅁ룪ꑈꑝ룻깥꧶녱몥뱗ꪺ뫊놱겡냊녯꣬룻낪ꪺ꒽ꕱꙡꛬꥍꝑ볭ꅃ Ꙣ과냪ꅁꚳ뻷멣룪ꑈ덶몥ꕄ냊ꙡ맯꒽ꕱꩶ뉺늣ꗍ뱶암ꅃꕄ굮ꪺꛦ결걏Ꙣ꒽ꕱ꙾ꯗꩆꑪ라ꑗ뒣ꗦꩆ뒣껗ꅂ뭐꒽ꕱ뫞뉺뚥뱨ꣳ냓ꅁꥍ덺륌둃엩꒽뙽꣤ꗘ볐꒽ꕱꅃ맪쏒땯뉻ꅁ꒽Ꙁ끨ꗰ냲ꪺꕄ냊ꛦ결걏ꝟꚨꕜ꣺ꡍ꧳덜Ꙩ귬ꙝꅆ꣒꙰ꅵ걲쏄ꑙꅶ떦늤ꅇ곣ꡳꑈ땯뉻Ꙣ꒽ꝩꩆꕨ낣ꅵ걲쏄ꑙꅶꪺ뒣껗ꯡꅁ믹라ꚳꯜ녪ꪺ삳ꅃꕴꑀꓨ궱ꅁ꒴ꖼ꿠쏒맪꒽뙽ꪺꕄ냊ꛦ결ꚳꝕ꧳듁꒽ꕱ샧륂ꖫ셚껄ꅝStarks, 2000ꅞꅃ 낣ꑆ꒽Ꙁ끨ꗰ냲ꅁꑀꡰꑈ끨ꗰ냲ꥍꙀꙐ냲롧뉺ꑈ덺륌ꅵ맵ꯡꅶꅝbehind the scenesꅞꛦ결맯꒽ꕱ늣ꗍ뱶암ꅃ쇶쇙ꡓꚳꪽ놵쏒뻚ꫭꗜ덯ꑺ륷맯꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꚳꖿ궱뱶암ꅝStarks, 2000ꅞꅁCarleton, Nelson and Weisbachꅝ1998ꅞ땯뉻뻷멣룪ꑈꚳ95ꉈ꿠껉뭐ꗘ볐꒽ꕱ륆ꚨꣳ쒳ꅁ꣤꒤ꑓꚳ87ꉈꪺꗘ볐꒽ꕱ꿠맪믚뱩ꛦꚹꣳ쒳ꅃ 뻷멣룪ꑈ곆ꛜ뿯뻜ꕈꕘ냢ꗷꅁꛓꭄ귶꣏꒽ꕱꪽ놵엜ꪺꓨꚡ뱶암꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꅃ뻷멣ꕘ냢앶라덹ꚨ덜Ꙩ뱶암ꅇꙝ꣑륌꧳ꡄ덹ꚨꪺ믹껦ꑕ뙞삣ꑏꅂ맯꣤ꕌ룪ꑈꛓꢥ꒣ꙮꪺ끔꺧ꅂꩆ닕ꚨꪺ엜떥ꅝParrino, Sias and Starks, 2003ꅞꅃ Parrino et al.ꅝ2003ꅞꗧ땯뉻낪뚥뫞뉺덑궢싷슾ꪺ꒽ꕱꅁ뭐CEOꛛ쑀싷슾ꪺ꒽ꕱ곛ꓱꅁ라덹ꚨ뻷멣꧒ꚳ앶곛럭ꑪ땻ꯗꪺꑕ궰ꅃꚹ떲ꩇ쏒맪뻷멣꧒ꚳ앶라뱶암뢳라ꡍ떦ꪺ낲덝ꅃꛓꕂꅁ뻷멣꧒ꚳ앶ꑕ궰띕Ꟗꅁ꒽ꕱꚳ띕낪ꪺ뻷뉶라ꦵ엳ꕾ뎡ꑈꑨ결CEOꅃ덯ꑝ띎ꣽ뗛뢳ꚳ룻낪ꪺ띎쑀ꕨ곰꽽뉻ꚳ꒽ꕱ뫞뉺ꥍ덗뵤ꪺ엜ꅃ 19
Hartzel and Starksꅝ2000ꅞꪺ곣ꡳ땯뉻뻷멣꧒ꚳ앶ꥍ낪뚥뫞뉺ꪺ셾룪셚껄뇓띐ꯗ뚡ꚳꖿꙖ쏶ꭙꅃꚹꑝ띎ꣽ뗛럭뻷멣ꚳ띕낪ꪺ꒽ꕱꗷ껉ꅁ꣤뱶암ꑏꑝ둎띕ꑪꅃ Ajinkya, Bhojraj and Senguptaꅝ2003ꅞꑝ땯뉻ꑀ뚡ꚳ룻Ꙩ뻷멣앶ꥍꕾ뎡뢳ꪺ꒽ꕱ덱녠ꚳ룻결ꝙ껉ꪺ륷듺ꅃꛓꕂꅁ덯륷듁ꑝ걏룻결꣣엩뭐ꖿ뵔ꪺꅃ꒽ꕱ굙ꚳ띕Ꙩ앶ꗑ뻷멣꧒꯹ꚳꅁ녎ꚳ띕낪ꪺꕩ꿠꧊ꕨ땯ꝇ룻쁗셣ꥍ꣣엩ꪺ륷듺ꅃAjinkya et al.ꑝ땯뉻ꅁ꙰ꩇ뫊놱ꑵ꣣꒣엜ꅁ낪뚥뫞뉺라ꚳ뻷ꓟ뉺ꅃ뻷멣앶뭐륷듺ꪺꖿ뵔꧊뚡ꚳꖿꙖ쏶ꭙꅁ뭐볖왛ꪺ륷듺뚡ꅁꝥ뉻굴Ꙗ쏶ꭙꅃ 뻷멣룪ꑈ뫊놱ꪺ꿠ꑏ뭐ꝑ꽱Ꙣ걆ꦲꩫ덗꒤ꑝꚳ덗뵤ꅃ꣒꙰ꅁꙢ과냪ꅁ돒ꑵ뎡ꚳ뫊럾꒽ꕱ끨ꗰ냲ꪺ덤ꗴꅁꖦꕄ녩끨ꗰ냲롧뉺ꑈ삳굴끟ꭈ끕덤ꗴꅁꛦ꣏ꥥ끕늼ꅃꛓꕂꅁ돒ꑵ뎡ꗓꧺ끨ꗰ냲ꪺ뎡ꗷ덤ꗴ걏뭐꒽ꕱ낪뚥뫞뉺ꭏ꯹냊멁뫊놱ꥍ랾덱ꪺ꿠ꑏꅃ곛Ꙑꙡꅁ뒼ꝑꪺꩫꯟꑝ덗뵤끨ꗰ냲삳ꛦ꣏꣤ꥥ끕늼덤ꗴꅝStarks, 2000ꅞꅃ 뎡꓀곣ꡳꭨ맯뻷멣룪ꑈꪺ뫊놱껄ꩇ띐꣬꙳뫃ꅁ꙰Pozenꅝ1994ꅞ뭻결ꑪꙨ볆ꪺ뻷멣룪ꑈꣃ꒣쑀띎ꚨ결ꛦ냊뽮랥ꪺꩆꅁꕵ굮룪셚껄ꙮꅁꕌ귌꒣뚷뒡ꓢ꒽ꕱ롧샧냈ꅃ ꙝ결뻷멣룪ꑈ맯꧳꒽ꕱ뫊놱뱶암ꪺ껄ꩇ꒣ꑀꅁ뎡꓀곣ꡳꅝBrickley et al., 1988; Bushee, 1998; Borokhovich, Brunarski and Parrino, 2000; Almazam et al., 2004; Bushee and Noe, 2000; Ajinkya et al., 2003ꅞ링룕녎뻷멣룪ꑈ꣤겡냊꽓꧊낵꓀쏾ꅁ땯뉻꒣Ꙑ꽓꧊ꪺ뻷멣룪ꑈ뫊놱껄ꩇꗧꚳ깴늧ꅃ Ajinkya et alꅝ.2003ꅞ땯뉻걙꯹ꚳ꒽ꕱꑪ뙱앶ꕂ룪닕Ꙙ꒣ꓓ엜ꪺꅵ녍ꩠ뻷멣룪ꑈꅶꅝdedicated institutionsꅞꅁꙝ결녠ꚳ뫞륄녯꣬ꭄ꒽뙽룪끔ꅁꟳꛓ샲꣺ꝑ꽱ꅃꙝꚹꅁꖦ귌꒣믝굮꒽ꕱꚳꟳꙨꪺ꒽뙽룪끔뒦앓ꅃ곆ꛜ결ꑆ꿠뫻꯹뉻ꚳꝑ꽱ꅁꅵ녍ꩠ뻷멣룪ꑈꅶ쇙Ᶎ뇦꒽ꕱ듮ꓖ땯ꝇ꒽ꕱ륷듺ꪺ쁗뉶ꅁꕈ뫻꯹ꖦ귌Ꙣꖫ돵ꑗꪺ쁵뛕ꅃ Busheeꅝ1998ꅞꥍBushee and Noeꅝ2000ꅞꑝ녎뻷멣꓀결ꅵQuasi-indexersꅶ 20
ꥍꅵTransientꅶꅃQuasi-indexers꣣ꚳ덑냊쇊뙒ꝙ듁꯹ꚳ꽓꧊ꅃ땍ꛓꅁ뭐Ajinkya et al.ꅝ2003ꅞꥷ롱ꪺꅵ녍ꩠ뻷멣룪ꑈꅶ꒣Ꙑꪺ걏ꅁQuasi-indexersꣃ꒣돟띒녯꣬ꭄ꒽뙽룪끔ꥍꭄ꒽뙽ꝑ꽱ꪺꛦ결ꅁ곆ꛜꖦ귌룻ꚳ꣣ꚳ뫊럾꒽ꕱꝀꟳꙨ륷듁뒦앓ꪺ꽓꧊ꅃ ꙢBrickley et al.ꅝ1988ꅞꪺ곣ꡳ꒤ꅁ곣ꡳ뭻결ꙝ뻷멣룪ꑈ뭐꒽ꕱ뚡쏶ꭙ꒣Ꙑ맯꒽ꕱ늣ꗍ꣤뫊놱꿠ꑏꪺ깴늧ꅃBrickley et al.뭻결뭐꒽ꕱ륌ꯗ녋꓁ꪺ쏶ꭙꅁ녎뱶암뻷멣룪ꑈꪺ뱶암ꑏꅃꙝꚹꅁꕌ귌녎믈ꛦꅂꭏ쁉꒽ꕱꅁꥍꭈ끕꒽ꕱ떥뭐꒽ꕱ뚡ꚳ룻결ꪽ놵ꝑ꽱쏶ꭙꪺ뻷멣룪ꑈ쉫쏾결ꅵ삣ꑏ뇓띐ꅶꅝpressure-sensitiveꅞ뻷멣ꅁ꣒꙰ꭏ쁉꒽ꕱꕩ꿠라꧓놵꒽ꕱꪺ늣쁉띾냈ꅁ믈ꛦꑝꕩꕈ녱꒽ꕱ귉뙕꒤쇈꣺ꝑ꺧ꅁꙝꚹ덯뻷멣룪ꑈ깥꧶꣼꣬낪뚥뫞뉺ꪺꛦ결꧒뱶암ꅁ맯낪뚥뫞뉺ꪺ뫊놱때ꩫ늣ꗍ뱶암ꅃꛓꅵ삣ꑏꧨꅶꅝpressure- resistantꅞ뻷멣ꭨ걏룻꒣깥꧶꣼꣬낪뚥뫞뉺ꛦ결뱶암ꪺꅁ덯뻷멣ꕝ걁꒽Ꙁ끨ꗰ냲ꅂ꒬둦냲ꅂꥍ띏떽냲라떥ꅁꖦ귌ꙝ결꒣뚷녱낪뚥뫞뉺ꢭꑗ꣺녯ꗴ꛳ꙮ덂ꅁ걇ꕩꟳ결ꕄ냊ꙡ꒶ꑊ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꅃBorokhovich et al.ꅝ2000ꅞ곣ꡳꑝ쏒맪Ꙣ뱶암낪뚥뫞뉺ꑗꅁ삣ꑏꧨ뻷멣걏룻삣ꑏ뇓띐뻷멣결ꚳ껄뉶ꪺꅃ Almazam et al.ꅝ2004ꅞꙢ뻷멣룪ꑈ맯셾륓뱶암ꪺ곣ꡳ꒤ꅁꑝ맯뻷멣룪ꑈ낵륌쏾ꪺ꓀쏾ꅃAlmazam et al.뻷멣룪ꑈ맯낪뚥뫞뉺ꪺ뫊놱ꛦ결ꥍ뭐꒽ꕱ늣ꗍꝑ꽱쏶ꭙ덳떲땻ꯗ꓀ꚨꅵꕄ냊ꅶꥍꅵ덑냊ꅶ꣢쏾ꅃ룪꒽ꕱꥍ뽗ꗟ룪압냝쉫쏾결ꅵꕄ냊ꅶꅆ믈ꛦꭈ끕뎡ꥍꭏ쁉꒽ꕱ결ꅵ덑냊ꅶꅃ떲ꩇ뭐ꗽꭥ곣ꡳꑀ교ꅁ뭻결ꅵꕄ냊ꅶ뻷멣룪ꑈ맯낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓꣣엣뗛뱶암ꅁꅵ덑냊ꅶ뻷멣룪ꑈꭨ때ꅃ ꅝꑇꅞ뻷멣룪ꑈꥍꑪꩆ뫊놱ꢤꛢꪺ맯ꓱ 낣ꑆ뻷멣룪ꑈꅁ꣤ꕌꑪꮬꩆꅁ꙰귓ꑈ깡뇚ꑝꚳ뫊놱ꪺ꿠ꑏꅃGorton and Kahlꅝ1999ꅞ녎뻷멣ꥍ귓ꑈꑪꩆꪺ뫊놱ꢤꛢ낵냏ꝏꅃꙝ결뻷멣룪ꑈ꒺뎡ꪺꕎ뉺냝썄ꅁꖦ귌뒣꣑ꪺ뫊놱꒣ꞹ뻣ꅃ귓ꑈꩆꕩꕈ뒣꣑룻꣎ꪺ뫊놱ꅁ걏ꙝ결귓ꑈꑪꩆ꒣냷Ꙩꅁ뻷멣룪ꑈ꒣ꞹ뻣ꪺ뫊놱땍걏ꚳ껄ꪺꅃ 21
Bethel, Liebeskind and Oplerꅝ1997ꅞ꓀꩒ꑪꩆ쇊뙒ꑪ뙱앶ꥍ꒽ꕱ셚껄뚡ꪺ뱶암ꅃ곣ꡳꑈ땯뉻ꕄ냊룪ꑈ끬쁈꒽ꕱꪺ궫ꯘ겡냊ꯡ뙩돵쇊뙒늼ꅁ궫ꯘ겡냊꙰Ꝓ듮꓀꒽ꕱꅁꗷ쇊Ꙟꅁ듮ꓖ쇊꣖떥ꅃꛓꕂ쏒맪꒽ꕱ셚껄라쁈뗛ꕄ냊ꩆ뙩ꑊꛓꚳꚨꅃꚹ떲ꩇꕩ뇀뷗ꖫ돵ꪺ뎡꓀꒽ꕱ놱꣮ꕩꕈ듮뮴낪뚥뫞뉺ꥍꩆ뚡ꪺꕎ뉺냝썄ꅃ ꕴꑀ귓ꑪꩆ덹ꚨꪺ뱶암Ꙣ럭ꩆ걏뿄룪뻷멣꒬곛꯹꒽ꕱ껉늣ꗍꅃ륌ꕨꑷꚳ곣ꡳ뒣ꕘ뿄룪뻷멣맯꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꚳ꽓껭띎롱ꅁꙝ결ꖦ귌ꚳ꿠ꑏ덺륌룪끔ꥍ놱꣮꿠ꑏ뫊놱꒽ꕱꅃ꽓ꝏꪺ걏ꅁ믈ꛦ뫊놱꒽ꕱꚳ곛맯ꪺꚨꖻ쁵뛕ꅁꛓꕂꙝ결꒽ꕱꙖ믈ꛦ굴뛅뿄룪ꅁ믈ꛦ싇ꗑ꒺뎡룪끔ꪺ륆꣬뫊놱ꗘꪺꅁꕩꕈ론곙ꕎ뉺ꚨꖻꅝGillan and Starks, 2001ꅞꅃ 뿄룪뙕듚뻷멣ꪺꢤꛢꑝ꣼ꙕ냪앶꽱룪ꑗꪺ궭꣮ꚳ쏶ꅃ꣒꙰과냪ꅁꩫꯟ롔ꓮ믈ꛦ꯹ꚳ꒽ꕱ앶꽱ꅆꙢꓩꖻꅁ믈ꛦ맯꣤귉듚꒽ꕱꕩ꯹ꚳꯜ낪ꪺ앶꽱ꅃꙢ꣤ꕌ뇸ꗳ꒣엜ꑕꅁꚹ궭꣮ꪺ깴늧엽ꓩꖻꪺꕎ뉺냝썄ꓱ과냪굮뮴ꅝProwse, 1990ꅞꅃꑝ둎걏뮡ꅁ덺륌앶꽱꯹ꚳꅁ뿄룪뻷멣맯꒽ꕱ셚껄ꚳꖿꙖ뱶암ꅃKaplan and Mintonꅝ1994ꅞꑝ뭻결ꓩꖻ믈ꛦ맯꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꚳ궫굮뱶암ꅃ ꓩꖻꥍ과냪떥ꙡꪺ믈ꛦ앶꽱꯹ꚳ뱶암깴늧ꣃꭄ돦ꑀꙝ꿀덹ꚨꅁꕩ꿠뭐꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꪺ꣤ꕌ깴늧ꚳ쏶ꅃ뿄룪뻷멣ꕩ꿠ꑝ라룲꣤ꕌꚡꩆꚳ꒣Ꙑꪺꗘ볐ꅝStarks, 2000ꅞꅃꙝꚹꅁ뿄룪뻷멣걏ꝟ꿠맯꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꥍ꒽ꕱ셚껄늣ꗍꑀ교ꪺ뱶암쇙ꖼꕩꪾꅝGillan and Starks, 2001ꅞꅃ 22
닄ꑔ론 낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓 ꙝ결ꕎ뉺냝썄ꅝagency problemꅞꪺ꙳Ꙣꅁ결꣏꧒뻉교ꪺꕾ뎡꧊랥ꑰ꓆ꅁ꧒ꚳꑈ뭐ꕎ뉺ꑈ꧒굱ꗟꪺꮴ곹꒤ꅁ덱녠라ꕝ걁꣢뚵쏶쇤ꙝ꿀ꅇꑀ결뫊럾ꕎ뉺ꑈꛦ결ꪺ꣮ꯗꅁꑇ결셾륓ꅝcompensationꅞꮴ곹ꅃ뫊럾ꕎ뉺ꑈꛦ결ꪺ꣮ꯗꙢ닄ꑀ론ꪺ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺뻷꣮꒤ꑷꚳ뒣ꅃꙢꕎ뉺뉺뷗ꑕꅁ뭻결뭐셚껄낵덳떲ꪺ셾륓꣮ꯗꅁ꿠엽ꕎ뉺ꑈ뭐꧒ꚳꑈꪺꗘ볐쇍꧳ꑀ교ꅁꚳ껄듮뮴ꕎ뉺냝썄ꅃꖻ론녎셾륓ꪺꥷ롱뭐낪뚥뫞뉺ꪺ셾륓뭐셚껄뚡쏶ꭙ꣢귓궱Ꙗ낵놴끑ꅃ ꑀꅂ셾륓ꪺꥷ롱 륌ꕨꚳ덜Ꙩ뻇뻇곒맯ꅵ셾륓ꅶꑕ륌ꥷ롱ꅃ곛룻ꛓꢥꅁꛨꚡꪺ셾륓ꥷ롱룻결뱳꩸ꅁ낣ꑆꚳ셾륓ꅁ녠쇙ꕝ걁때ꪺ셾륓ꅃFreedman, Keller and Montanaꅝri1982ꅞ뭻결셾륓ꭙ닕슴맯ꚨ귻ꪺꑊ꧒떹꒩ꪺ곛맯돸쁶ꅁꗧ듁꿠싇ꗑ셾륓ꪺꕉꕘ륆ꚨ닕슴ꗘ볐ꅁꙐ껉ꭐ뙩ꑈꑏ룪랽ꪺ륂ꗎ뫞뉺껄꿠ꅃLewellen, Loderer and Martinꅝ1987ꅞ뭻결ꅁ낪뚥뫞뉺ꪺ셾륓꒺깥ꕝꝴꙕ뫘꒣Ꙑꪺꚡꅁ꙰냲ꖻ셾룪ꅂ공ꝑꅂ늼뿯뻜앶ꅂ뭻앶ꅂ뗪샀ꅝphantom stockꅞ2ꥍ뮼ꦵ꧊셾륓3떥ꅃ꒣Ꙑꪺ셾륓ꮬ멁ꕩ룑ꡍ꒣Ꙑꪺꝑ꽱뷄곰ꅁꚳ셾륓ꚳꝕ꧳듮ꓖ낪뚥뫞뉺궷쁉덗쇗ꪺ냝썄ꅁꚳ셾륓ꚡꭨꚳꝕ꧳듮ꓖ낪뚥뫞뉺ꪺ룪땵뗸냝썄ꅃHartzell and Starksꅝ2003ꅞ녎롧뉺ꑈ돸륓꓀결쏘뭐뿯뻜앶ꅂ셾ꓴꥍ공ꝑꥍꪽ놵돸륓ꅁ꒽ꕱ덗볒ꥍ셚껄꒣Ꙑꑝ뭐롧뉺ꑈꪺ셾륓ꚳ쏶ꅃ Robbinsꅝ1978ꅞ맯꧳셾륓뉛뭜꒧뵤돲놴끑돌결ꞹ뻣ꅁꕌ녎셾륓꓀결꒺Ꙣ셾륓뭐ꕾꙢ셾륓꣢뎡꓀ꅁ꒺Ꙣ돸륓ꑄ걏ꑵꝀ싇ꗑꑵꝀꖻꢭꛓ샲녯ꚨ둎띐몡 ??Ꙣ뗪샀군땥꒤ꅁ낪뚥뫞뉺꧒믢꣺ꪺꣃ꒣걏늼ꅁꛓ걏쏾늼ꪺ돦ꛬꅁ꣤돸륓ꭨ곛럭꧳맪뉻ꓩ럭껉ꪺ늼ꖫ믹ꅁ걏믢꣺ꓩꛜ맪뉻ꓩꪺ늼뱗귈썂ꅃꕴꕾꅁ덯걱듁뚡ꪺꝑꗧꕩ꿠결꣤돸륓ꪺꑀ뎡ꗷꅃ?? 뇄ꛦ뮼ꦵ꧊돸륓ꅁꕩ꿠걏결ꑆ굮꽤ꛭ쁵ꡱꪺ낪뚥뫞뉺ꅁꙝ결낪뚥뫞뉺굙룵병ꛜꝏꪺ꒽ꕱꅁ둎때ꩫ믢꣺뮼ꦵ꧊돸륓ꅁꕴꑀꓨ궱ꑝꚳꝕ꧳뿅뙱낪뚥뫞뉺ꪺ듁셚껄ꅁꭐ꣏낪뚥뫞뉺꾸Ꙣ꒽ꕱꪺ듁ꝑ꽱Ꝁꡍ떦ꅃ? 23
ꢬꛓꢥꅁꕝ걁ꅝ1ꅞ냑뭐ꡍ떦ꅃꅝ2ꅞ룻ꑪꪺꑵꝀꛛꗑ뗴뙱앶ꅃꅝ3ꅞ룻ꑪꪺ슾앶ꅃꅝ4ꅞ룻ꚳ뾳뷬ꪺꑵꝀꅃꅝ5ꅞ귓ꑈꚨꪺ뻷라ꅃꅝ6ꅞ겡냊ꪺꙨ꒸꓆ꅁꚹ뎡꓀ꑄꭙ뗛궫꧳ꓟ뉺뱨궱ꅁ걏쓝꧳때ꪺ떹꒩ꅃꛓꕾꙢ돸쁶ꭨꑓ꣤꧊뷨꓀결ꪽ놵ꅂ뚡놵ꅂꭄ끝냈꧊떥ꑔ쏾ꅁꪽ놵돸륓ꕝ걁ꖻ셾ꅂ걺뙋ꅂ볺ꅂ공ꝑ늼떥ꅁꛓ뚡놵셾륓ꭨ걏ꙕ뫘뫖ꝑ뚵ꗘꅁ뷑꙰ꙕ뫘ꭏ쁉ꅂ껈륃룉ꝕꅂ싥샸룉ꝕ떥ꅁꭄ끝냈꧊돸륓ꭨꕝꝴꑵꝀꙷꗾꪺꭏ믙ꅂ냊얥ꪺ쁙믎뭐슾뫙ꅂ뒣꣑ꙮꪺꑵꝀ샴맒떥ꅁ걏쓝꧳룻결꒣뻚맪엩꧊ꪺꕾꙢ돸륓ꅃ Mondy and Noeꊻꅝ1993ꅞꑝ뒣ꕘ곛ꪺ랧꧀ꅁꕌ녎셾륓꓀결뱳롱ꥍ꽕롱꣢뎡꓀ꅁ뱳롱ꪺ셾륓ꕝ걁끝냈꧊뭐ꭄ끝냈꧊셾륓꣢ꑪ뎡ꗷꅁꭥꑓ꓀결ꪽ놵ꪺ끝냈셾륓ꅝ꙰ꅁ셾룪ꅂꅂ공ꝑ떥ꅞ뭐뚡놵ꪺ끝냈셾륓ꅝꕝ걁ꭏ쁉ꅂ끨ꗰ군땥떥ꅞꅆꛓ꧒뿗ꪺꭄ끝냈꧊셾륓ꅁꭨꕩ둎ꑵꝀ뭐ꑵꝀ샴맒꣓뮡ꧺꅁꭥ꙰ꑵꝀ걏ꝟ닅Ꙙ뾳뷬ꅂ걏ꝟ꣣걄뻔꧊ꅂ걏ꝟꚳꚨ둎띐ꅂꕈ빅뻷라떥ꅆꛓꑵꝀ샴맒뎡ꗷꅁꭨꕝ걁ꑈ걆떦ꅂ낪뚥뫞뉺Ꝁ궷ꅂꙐ곛덂ꅂ땷엩ꪬꩰꅂ뱵꧊ꑵ껉떥떥ꅃꛜ꧳꽕롱ꪺ셾륓ꅁꭨ뛈ꪽ놵ꪺ끝냈꧊셾륓ꅃ Ꙣ냪꒺ꑝꚳ덜Ꙩ뻇링룕결셾륓낵ꥷ롱ꅁ덜Ꙩ곒룻ꭝ궭꧳ꪽ놵ꅂ끝냈꧊ꚳꪺ셾륓떹ꕉꅃꟵ뱷곂ꅝ1992ꅞ뭻결셾륓걏ꗸ띾맯꧳귻ꑵ꧒뒣꣑ꪺꑵꝀ륓돒ꅁꖦ걏귻ꑵꪺꝖꑏ꧒녯ꅁꗸ띾ꪺ롧샧ꚨꖻꅁꙐ껉ꑝ걏ꑀ뫘ꫀ라룪랽ꪺ꓀끴ꅃ뷑꧓ꧺꅝ1995ꅞ녎셾룪ꥷ롱결뚱ꕄꓤꕉ떹귻ꑵꪽ놵ꪺꅂꑀ꿫ꪺꅂ끝냈꧊ꪺꑵꝀ돸륓ꅁ꣤ꕝ걁ꑆꖻ셾ꅂꕛ꽚뙏ꅂꙕ뫘걺뙋ꅂꅂ볺공ꝑꅃ녩ꓵ샩ꅝ1996ꅞꕘ셾륓ꭙ뚱ꕄꓤꕉ떹귻ꑵ끝냈꧊꣣엩ꪺ돸륓ꅁ꣤ꕝ걁ꑆ냲ꖻ셾룪ꅂ볺ꥍ뫖ꝑꅃ뛀굞ꦾꅝ1997ꅞꭨ녎셾룪꓀쏾결냲ꖻ떹ꅂ걺뙋볺ꑔ뚵ꅃ뇤냪뚯ꅝ1998ꅞ뭻결셾륓ꗸ띾ꗎ꣓Ꝭꓞ꽤ꛭ귻ꑵꪺꑵ꣣ꅁꑝ걏볺쁹귻ꑵ쁵ꫭ뉻ꅁꕈ뽅쁹귻ꑵꝖꑏꑵꝀꪺ볺쁹ꪫꅃ ꖻ곣ꡳꙝ룪껆ꪺꕩ꣺녯꧊뭐곣ꡳꪺꗘꪺꅁ녎셾륓ꥷ롱결ꅵꙝꕉꕘ돒냈ꩁ냈ꛓ녯꣬ꪺ닕슴떹ꕉꅁꕝ걁냲ꖻ셾룪ꅂ걺뙋ꅂ볺공ꝑ떥ꅶꅃ 24
ꑇꅂ낪뚥뫞뉺ꪺ셾륓뭐셚껄뚡쏶ꭙ ꕎ뉺뉺뷗뒿뒣ꅁꙢ꣮굱낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꡍ떦껉ꅁ삳녎꒽ꕱ롧샧셚껄꿇ꑊꛒ뙱ꙝ꿀ꅁꕈ룑ꡍꕎ뉺냝썄ꅃꑀ꿫ꛓꢥꅁ룪끔꒣맯뫙ꪺ놡ꩰ뙖쑙궫ꅁ볧싃ꪺꕎ뉺냝썄ꑝ둎뙖쑙궫ꅁꙝꚹꅁ꙰꿠Ꙣ뿅뙱ꕎ뉺ꑈꪺ셚껄ꑗ쇍꫱꽵맪ꪺꝖꑏ뭐ꚨꩇꅁꣃ뻚ꕈꡍꥷꕎ뉺ꑈꪺ돸륓ꅁꝙ꿠녎ꕎ뉺냝썄듮ꝃꑪꕢꅃꗑ꧳ꑀ꿫꧊끝냈꧊룪껆ꪺ꣺녯곛맯깥꧶ꅁꛓꝖꑏ땻ꯗꅂꕩꭈ뿠ꯗꅂꕎ뉺냝썄떥룻꒣꧶왛맮ꪺ엜볆ꅁꭨ궱셻뿅뙱ꝸ쏸ꕈ뿅뙱뭾깴ꪺ냝썄ꅁꙁꕛꑗꚳ곛럭ꪺ곣ꡳꞡꕘ셚껄걏셾륓돌궫굮ꪺꡍꥷꙝ꿀ꅁꙝꚹꅁ냪꒺ꕾ뻇맯셾륓ꓴ럇ꡍꥷꙝ꿀ꪺ곣ꡳꙨ볆뚰꒤Ꙣ셚껄뭐끝냈셾륓쏶ꭙꪺ놴끑ꑗꅃ 셚껄볐덱녠꓀결꣢쏾ꅇꅵ라군볐ꅶ뭐ꅵꖫ돵볐ꅶꅃ라군볐ꪺ덱녠걏ꗑ끝냈돸ꫭ꒤ꪺ라군룪끔결셚껄뿅뙱ꪺ뻚ꅁ꙰뉢ꝑꅝnet incomeꅞꅂꡃ곕빬ꅝearnings per share, EPSꅞꅂꩆ앶꽱돸륓뉶ꅝreturn on equity, ROEꅞ뭐셠룪늣돸륓뉶ꅝreturn on assets, ROAꅞ떥ꅃ라군셚껄볐깥꧶꣺녯ꅁ꧶꣼뫞뉺ꑈ귻뻞놱ꅁ때ꩫꚳ껄ꙡ륆ꚨꕎ뉺ꑈ뭐꧒ꚳꑈꗘ볐ꑀ교ꪺ떲ꩇꅁꕂꕩ꿠라ꚳ륄뱷ꙍ쁉ꪺ늣ꗍꅁ덯ꑝ걏라군볐돌ꕏꑈ룡꽦ꪺꙡꓨꅃꖫ돵볐ꪺ걏늼ꖫ돵믹껦ꅁꙝ결ꙮꪺ롧샧뫞뉺ꅁ돌ꯡ닗녎걍Ꙣ늼믹껦ꑗꅝCoughlan and Schmidt, 1985ꅞꅃ굙ꕵꩠ궫ꖫ돵ꪺ셚껄볐ꅁꕩ꿠라땯ꗍ롧뉺ꑈ륌꧳땵뗸ꅁ걏ꙝ굴뻡ꪺꖫ돵궷쁉륌낪ꅁꛓꛦ결ꭏꙵꪺ뉻뙈ꅃ 25
닄ꕼ론 뻷멣룪ꑈ뭐낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꪺ쏶ꭙ ꑛꕈ꣓ꅁꙢꕎ뉺뉺뷗ꑕꅁ셾륓뎣덑럭Ꝁ듮ꑰꕎ뉺냝썄꧒덹ꚨꕾ뎡꧊ꪺꙮꓨꩫꅃ녎뫞뉺셾륓뭐꒽ꕱ셚껄낵덳떲ꅁꕩꕈ녎ꕎ뉺ꑈ뭐꧒ꚳꑈꪺꗘ볐쇍꧳ꑀ교ꅁꕎ뉺뉺뷗ꪺꓥ쑭꒤ꑝ뒿ꕘꅁ셚껄냲슦셾륓ꪺ뻷꣮걏ꅵ꣢궱ꑢꅶꅝtwo-edged swordsꅞꅇꑀꓨ궱ꅁꚹ꣮ꯗ쇶땍녎ꥥ끕ꑈꥍꕎ뉺ꑈ돐덹ꑆꟳꙮꪺ덳떲ꅆꕴꑀꓨ궱ꅁ낪뚥뫞뉺ꅝꕎ뉺ꑈꅞ라ꛛ땍늣ꗍ궷쁉쇍쇗ꪺ뉻뙈ꅝGomez-Mejia et al., 2003ꅞꅁ깥꧶덹ꚨ낪뚥뫞뉺ꕵꩠ궫땵듁셚껄ꅁꦿ늤ꗸ띾듁떦늤ꪺ꣮ꥷꅁꕂ낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꪺ때궭뾱뗈ꅁꑝꚳ륈꒽ꕱꩶ뉺걏끬ꡄ꒽ꕱ믹귈랥ꑪꪺꗘ볐ꅁ맯꒽ꕱꪺ앶꽱곛쏶ꑈꚳ꒣ꪺ뱶암ꅃ 걇꫱ꕎ걙뻇뙽ꥬ끑뷗낣ꑆ뭐셚껄덳떲ꪺ뫞뉺셾륓꒧ꕾꪺ놱꣮뻷꣮ꅁ듁뇦ꕴꑀ뫘뻷꣮ꪺ뙩ꑊꅁꕩꕈ륆꣬ꟳꙮꪺ낪뚥뫞뉺뫊놱ꥍꟳꙮꪺ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꅁꑝꕩꕈ꣮셚껄냲슦셾륓꣮ꯗꑕ맯ꗸ띾덹ꚨꪺꅵꕾ뎡꧊ꅶꅁ늣ꗍꟳꙨꚳꝑꪺ믹껦룪룻ꝃꪺ뫊놱ꚨꖻꅃꛓ뻷멣룪ꑈꪺ꒶ꑊꑷ덑덜Ꙩꓥ쑭쏒맪뵔맪꿠륆꣬ꚹ껄ꩇꅃ ꙰Famaꅝ1985ꅞ쏒맪럭ꑪꩆ걏뿄룪뻷멣껉ꅁꙝ결꣤뫊놱ꥍ놱꣮꿠ꑏꙢ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꑗꪺ꽓껭꧊ꇐꖦ귌ꕩꕈ녯꣬룻꣎ꪺ꒺뎡룪끔ꅁ꧒ꕈ곛맯ꚳ뫊놱ꪺꚨꖻ쁵뛕ꅃꕂ뭐꒽ꕱ뒣꣑떹뛅꣩꯹ꚳꑈꪺ룪끔곛ꓱꅁ뿄룪뻷멣뫊놱꿠듮ꓖ볧Ꙣꕎ뉺ꑈꚨꖻꅃAgrawal and Mandelkerꅝ1990ꅞꟳ뙩ꑀꡂ뵔뭻ꅁꑪꩆꪺ꙳Ꙣ라엽꒽ꕱꕄꪺꅵ뙗썂셾륓ꅶ룻ꝃꅃClayꅝ2000ꅞꪺ곣ꡳ쇶뭻결뻷멣룪ꑈ때ꩫ뱶암셾륓ꓴ럇ꅁ걏꿠뱗ꕛ셾륓셚껄뇓띐ꯗꅃ Hartzell and Starksꅝ2003ꅞꑝ쏒맪Ꙣ놱꣮꒽ꕱ덗볒ꅂ늣띾ꅂ룪뻷라ꥍ셚껄ꪺ놡ꩰꑕꅁ뻷멣앶뚰꒤ꯗꥍ뫞뉺셚껄셾륓뇓띐ꯗꚨꖿꓱꅁ뭐셾륓ꓴ럇ꚨꓱꅃ뵔뭻ꑆ뻷멣뚰꒤ꯗꪺ엜ꑝ라덳녡꣏꣫뽅꧊셾륓엜ꅃꑝ둎걏뮡ꅁ뻷멣룪ꑈ라뱶암뫞뉺맪믚셾륓ꅃꚹ떲ꩇꑝꕩ뇀ꪾ룪뻷멣뻖ꚳ띕Ꙩꗷꅁ둎ꚳ띕ꑪꪺ뱶암ꑏꅃꕂ룪뻷멣라덑뻖ꚳ룻꣎셾륓셚껄뇓띐ꯗꪺ꒽ꕱ꧒Ꝭꓞꅁ덯귓떲ꩇ엣ꗜ 26
뻷멣룪ꑈ낾ꙮꙢ늼뗻믹ꑗ녎면궫굮ꪺꢤꛢꅃ Almazam et al.ꅝ2004ꅞ맯CDA Spectrum룪껆깷꒺맯뻷멣룪ꑈꪺ꓀쏾ꅇ룪꒽ꕱꅂ뽗ꗟ룪압냝ꅂ믈ꛦꭈ끕뎡ꅂꭏ쁉꒽ꕱ뭐꣤ꕌꅁꑓꙁ꓀ꚨꅵꕄ냊ꅶꥍꅵ덑냊ꅶ꣢쏾ꅃ룪꒽ꕱꥍ뽗ꗟ룪압냝쉫쏾결ꅵꕄ냊ꅶꅆ믈ꛦꭈ끕뎡ꥍꭏ쁉꒽ꕱ결ꅵ덑냊ꅶꅃ곣ꡳ땯뉻낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꑗꪺ셾룪셚껄뇓띐ꯗ쁈뗛ꕄ냊뻷멣꧒ꚳ앶ꪺ뚰꒤ꛓ뱗ꕛꅁ뭐덑냊뻷멣꧒ꚳ앶ꪺ쏶셰ꣃ꒣ꑪꅃꙁꅁ낪뚥뫞뉺맪믚셾륓ꓴ럇라쁈뗛뻷멣룪ꑈ꧒ꚳ앶뚰꒤ꯗ뱗ꕛꛓ듮ꓖꅁ걏ꕄ냊뻷멣룪ꑈ꧒덹ꚨꪺ듮ꓖ땻ꯗ라ꟳꑪꅆꛓꕂꅁ뻷멣뫊놱라쁈뗛꒽ꕱꗷ걹냊꧊ꪺ듮ꓖꛓ엜ꑰꅃ ꑝꚳ뻇맯뻷멣룪ꑈ맯깡뇚ꗸ띾꒤ꪺ낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓뱶암낵놴끑ꅃGomez-Mejia et al.ꅝ2003ꅞꪺ곣ꡳ땯뉻ꅁ뻷멣룪ꑈ꯹ꚳ늼ꓱ꣒띕Ꙩꅁ깡뇚뫞뉺ꪺ듁ꚬꑊ라띕ꝃꅁ셠셾륓닕ꚨꪺꓱ꣒ꑝ라띕ꝃꅃ 쇶땍뻷멣룪ꑈꪺ꒶ꑊ덑덜Ꙩꓥ쑭쏒맪뵔맪뭐낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓뚡ꚳꙖ쏶ꭙꅁ걏덯뱶암ꕩ꿠쁈앶걹냊꧊ꪺ뱗ꕛꛓ듮깺ꅝAlmazam et al., 2004ꅞꅆCoffeeꅝ1991ꅞꑝ쏒맪ꅁ뻷멣룪ꑈ결뫻꯹꒽ꕱ낪뚥뫞뉺ꪺ놱꣮ꅁꖲ뚷쓫겹걹냊꧊ꇐꚹ뫘쓫겹결덜Ꙩ뻷멣룪ꑈ꧒꒣꿠놵꣼ꅃMaugꅝ1998ꅞ뭻결낪ꯗꪺ앶걹냊ꚳ맯꧳꒽ꕱ뫞뉺뫊놱ꑝ라ꚳꖿꙖꪺ껄ꩇꅃ ꙝ뻷멣룪ꑈ늣ꗍꪺ뫊놱껄ꩇꖼꚳꥷ뷗ꅁꚳ뻇뙽ꥬ녎땊쉉꧱Ꙣ뻷멣룪ꑈ꽓꧊ꑗꅁꕌ귌뭻결뻷멣룪ꑈ뫊놱ꪺ꣫뽅ꥍ꿠ꑏꙝ꒣Ꙑꪺ압ꯈꅂ궭꣮ꅂꗘ볐ꛓꚳ꧒꒣Ꙑꅃ꣒꙰ꅁBrickley et al.ꅝ1988ꅞ뭻결꒣Ꙑ뻷멣룪ꑈ꒣Ꙑꪺꅵ삣ꑏ뇓띐ꯗꅶ(pressure-sensitivity)ꅁ맯꒽ꕱ덹ꚨꪺ뱶암ꑝ꒣Ꙑꅃ꣒꙰ꅁꚳ룻Ꙩ삣ꑏ뇓띐ꩆ꯹ꚳꗷꪺ뻷멣ꅁ결ꑆ쇗ꝋ궷쁉ꅁꖦ귌ꪺ룪겡냊룻ꕩ꿠끬쁈뫞뉺ꡍ떦ꅃꖦ귌라ꚳ룻Ꙩꙝ뫞뉺ꯘ쒳ꛓ낵ꪺꕎ뉺늼ꅆꛓꚳ룻Ꙩꭄ삣ꑏ뇓띐ꩆ꯹ꚳꗷꪺ꒽ꕱꭨ삳곛ꅃ ꙝ결뻷멣룪ꑈ뫊놱꒴ꚳ꣤꿊뎴ꅁ걇뻷멣룪ꑈ뫊놱녠뭐꣫뽅꧊셾륓ꑀ끟꣏ꗎꅁꕈ듮뵷ꩆ뭐롧뉺ꑈ뚡ꪺꕎ뉺냝썄ꅃ덺륌뻷멣냑뭐뭐셚껄덳떲ꪺ뫞뉺셾륓ꅁ샋듺꣢귓뫊럾ꑵ꣣ꑀ끟꣏ꗎ뛈꣏ꗎꑀ뫘ꪺ놡ꅁ맯꣣ꚳ꒣Ꙑ꽓꧊ꪺ꒽ꕱ륆 27
ꚨ놱꣮ꗘꪺ(Hartzell and Starks, 2003ꅞꅃ 곛쏶뻷멣룪ꑈ뭐낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓쏶ꭙ꒧ꓥ쑭뻣뉺꙰ꫭ2-1ꅃ 28
ꫭ2-1 뻷멣룪ꑈ뭐낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓쏶ꭙ꒧ꓥ쑭뻣뉺 곣ꡳ 볋ꖻ 곣ꡳ멣궱 ꓀꩒ꓨꩫ 궫굮곣ꡳ떲뷗 ꅝ땯ꫭ껉뚡ꅞ ꅝꕝꝴ곣ꡳ듁뚡ꅞ ꅝꕝꝴ꒽ꕱ셚껄볐ꅞ Agrawal and 1979-1985꙾뚡Ꙣ놴끑럭꒽ꕱ놵뫞귗ꖿ껗뒣ꕘ껉ꅁꑪꩆ맯낪뚥녎뻷멣ꥍꑪꩆ꧒ꚳ앶ꓱ꣒1.ꑪꩆꪺ꙳Ꙣ라엽꒽ꕱꕄꪺMandelkeꅝr1990ꅞ NYSEꥍAMEXꑗ뫞뉺ꪺ뫊놱ꛦ결ꅃ녎뫊놱꓀결ꕄ냊뫊놱뭐덑냊꓀ꚨ낪꒤ꝃꑔ뫘ꅁꙢ꒣Ꙑꪺ껉ꅵ뙗썂셾륓ꅶ룻ꝃꅃ ꖫꕂ뒿뒣ꕘ륌Ꙙ뫊놱꣢뫘ꅁꛓ셚껄ꭨꕈꖫ믹ꪺ닖뽮늧녠돸륓뚡냏뚡ꑕ낵끪쉫꓀꩒ꅃ 2.Ꙣ꒣Ꙑꪺ귗ꖿ껗ꑕꅁ뻷멣꧒ꚳ앶꣖귗ꖿ껗ꪺ꒽ꕱꅃ ꅝCARꅞ뿅뙱ꅃ ꥍꩆ끝둉뚡곒ꚳꖿꙖ쏶ꭙꅃ David, Kochhar, 녱1990-94꙾ꪺ녎뻷멣룪ꑈ뭐꒽ꕱꪺꝑ꽱쏶ꭙ땻ꯗ꓀ꚨ삣녎뻷멣룪ꑈꅂ낪뚥뫞뉺셾삣ꑏꧨ뻷멣ꥍ낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꓴand LevitasFortune Survey꒤ꑏꧨ뻷멣ꥍ삣ꑏ뇓띐뻷멣ꅁ뗸꣤꓀ꝏ맯낪뚥뫞륓ꥍ꣤ꕌ꒽ꕱ꽓꧊낵쏶셰ꭙ볆럇ꚳꙖ엣뗛쏶ꭙꅁ맯듁셾륓ꅝ1998ꅞ 뿯꣺과냪125꒽ꕱ뉺셾륓뭐듁셾륓셾륓ꓱ꣒ꪺ뱶암ꅃ 샋ꥷ 셠셾륓ꓱ꣒ꚳꖿꙖ엣뗛쏶ꭙꅁ삣ꑏꪺ500귓낪뚥뫞뉺ꅁꙁ맯삣ꑏꧨ뻷멣ꥍ삣ꑏ뇓뇓띐뻷멣ꭨ때ꅃ 셾륓왛맮귈ꅃ 띐뻷멣맯셾륓ꓴ럇ꥍ듁셾륓꧒ꓱ꣒낵뻮쉟궱끪쉫꓀꩒ꅃ Clayꅝ2000ꅞ 뿯꣺1991꣬1997샋듺뻷멣룪ꑈꙢ듮ꓖ셾륓뭐셾륓셚껄뇓띐ꯗ꣏ꗎT샋ꥷ뭐끪쉫꓀꩒뻷멣뻷멣룪ꑈ때ꩫ뱶암셾륓ꓴ럇ꅁ꙾뚡ꪺ11367귓왛ꑗꪺ뱶암ꅃ녎셾륓꓀ꚨ뉻셾륓뭐셠꙾셾륓꣢귓룪ꑈꙢ뭐셾륓뭐셾륓셚껄뇓띐걏꿠뱗ꕛ셾륓셚껄뇓띐ꯗꅃ 맮귈ꅃ 멣궱꣓뿅뙱ꅁ뻷멣룪ꑈꭨ꧒ꚳ앶낪ꝃ꓀ꚨ꣢ꯗꪺ쏶ꭙꅃ 쏾ꅃ Hartzell and 녱SꆮP 1992꣬97곣ꡳꕈ쏘뭐뿯뻜앶ꅂ셾ꓴꥍ공ꝑꅂꥍ꧒ꚳꪽ놵ꕈ뷆끪쉫놴끑뻷멣룪ꑈꥍ셾ꅵ뻷멣뚰꒤ꯗꅶ뭐ꅵ낪뚥뫞뉺셾Starksꅝ2003ꅞ ꙾ꪺ룪껆깷꒤뿯뻜돸륓ꑔ귓셾륓멣궱놴ꡳ뻷멣룪ꑈ맯꣤덹ꚨꪺ륓ꪺ쏶ꭙꅁꙁꗎTꥍZ샋ꥷ듺륓셚껄뇓띐ꯗꅶꝥ뉻ꖿꙖꅁ뭐ꅵ셾1914깡꒽ꕱ결볋뱶암ꅃꣃ녎뻷멣룪ꑈ뭐꣫뽅꧊셾륓ꅝ쏘뭐뿯뻜룕뻷멣룪ꑈ뭐꣫뽅꧊셾륓낪륓ꅶꝥ굴Ꙗ쏶ꭙꅁ뻷멣뚰꒤ꯗ엜ꖻꅃ?앶ꅞ꓀ꚨ낪ꝃꅁ늣ꗍꕼ멣궱놴끑ꙕ롳닕ꪺ깴늧ꅃ?ꝃ덹ꚨ뫞뉺셾륓ꪺ깴늧ꅃ?ꑝ라꣏꣫뽅꧊셾륓엜ꅃ? 29
ꅝ쓲ꭥ궶ꅞ 곣ꡳ?볋ꖻ?곣ꡳ멣궱?꓀꩒ꓨꩫ?궫굮곣ꡳ떲뷗? ꅝ땯ꫭ껉뚡ꅞ?ꅝꕝꝴ곣ꡳ듁뚡ꅞ?ꅝꕝꝴ꒽ꕱ셚껄볐ꅞ?????Gomez-Mejia, 볋ꖻꕝꝴꕼ꙾듁뚡곣ꡳ깡뇚꧒ꚳ앶뚰꒤ꯗꅂ뻷멣룪ꑈꅂ곣땯녪ꯗꕈ끪쉫꓀꩒맯깡뇚꧒ꚳ앶뚰꒤깡뇚ꗸ띾ꪺCEO굙ꑝ걏ꗑ깡뇚ꚨ귻뻡Larraza-Kintana, ꅝ1995-98ꅞꪺ253ꥍ냓띾궷쁉맯깡뇚낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꪺ뱶암ꅃ꒽ꕱꯗꅂ뻷멣룪ꑈꅂ곣땯녪ꯗꥍ냓ꗴꅁ뭐ꗑꕾ뎡ꑈꑨ뻡ꗴCEOꪺ꒽ꕱ곛and Makriꅝ2003ꅞ 깡깡뇚놱꣮꒽ꕱ룪셚껄ꕈꖭꞡ룪늣돸륓ꅝROAꅞꥍ썂ꕾ늼돸륓ꖭ띾궷쁉맯깡뇚낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꪺꓱꅁ굙깡뇚뚰꒤꧒ꚳ앶띕낪ꅁ셠ꚬ꽱띕껆ꅁ녱COMPUSTATꞡꅝꥍSꆮP 500ꓱ룻ꅞ뿅뙱ꅃ?뱶암낵듺룕ꅃꕂ녎깡뇚ꗸ띾ꗑꝃꅃꙐ껉ꅁꕌ귌ꪺ셾ꓴ룻때궷쁉ꅁ맯룪껆깷꒤ꪺ3000깡녍띾CEO믢뻉ꪺ꒽ꕱꥍ깡뇚낪꡴닎냓띾궷쁉ꚳ룻낪뇓띐ꯗꅃ뻷멣룪꒽뙽땯ꛦ꒽ꕱ룪껆뚥뫞뉺꓀뙽낵끪쉫꓀꩒ꅃ덺륌ꑈꪺ꒶ꑊꥍ곣땯녪ꯗ면궫굮ꪺ뫊놱꒤뿯ꕘꅃ?Chow샋ꥷꅁ듺룕덯꣢뫘볋ꖻꙢꢤꛢꅃ?끪쉫ꑗꪺ엣뗛깴늧ꅃ?Almazam, Hartzell 녱SꆮP ExecuComp맯뻷멣룪ꑈ꓀ꚨꅵꕄ냊ꅶꥍꅵ덑냊ꅶ꣢쏾ꅃ듺ꗽꕈ볆뻇볒ꮬ뇀뻉ꕘ낲덝ꅁꙁ1.낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓셚껄뇓띐ꯗ쁈뗛ꕄand Starks(2004) 룪껆깷꒤꣺룕꒣Ꙑ뻷멣룪ꑈ맯셾륓늣ꗍꪺ뱶암ꅃ셾륓ꭨ꓀ꕈꅁꙁꕈ뷆끪쉫샋듺꒣Ꙑ뻷멣냊뻷멣꧒ꚳ앶ꪺ뚰꒤ꛓ뱗ꕛꅁ뭐덑냊1992-1997꙾1914깡ꚨ쏘뭐뿯뻜앶ꅂ셾ꓴ뭐공ꝑꥍ꧒ꚳꪽ놵셾륓떥ꑔ룪ꑈ꓀쏾맯셾륓닕ꚨꪺ뱶암ꅃ?뻷멣꧒ꚳ앶ꪺ쏶셰ꣃ꒣ꑪꅃ ꒽ꕱꪺ룪껆ꅃ?귓멣궱꣓뿅뙱ꅃ셚껄ꭨ걏ꕈTobin’s q결뿅뙱볐럇ꅃ?2.낪뚥뫞뉺맪믚셾륓ꓴ럇라쁈뗛뻷멣룪ꑈ꧒ꚳ앶뚰꒤ꯗ뱗ꕛꛓ듮ꓖꅁ걏ꕄ냊뻷멣룪ꑈ꧒덹ꚨꪺ듮ꓖ땻ꯗ라ꟳꑪꅃ 3.뻷멣뫊놱라쁈뗛꒽ꕱꗷ걹냊꧊ꪺ듮ꓖꛓ엜ꑰꅃ ꅝ룪껆꣓랽ꅇꖻ곣ꡳ뻣뉺ꅞ 30
닄꒭론 ꕾ뎡뢳뭐낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꪺ쏶ꭙ 뢳라걏꒽ꕱ돌낪ꪺꡍ떦뻷멣ꅁꚳꡍꥷ낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓뭐ꗴꗎꪺ앶ꝑꅃꙝꚹꅁꕎꫭ꧒ꚳꑈꢭ꓀ꪺ뢳라떲멣뭐앶꯹ꚳ꽓꧊맯꧳꣤ꕜ꿠ꪺ땯뒧ꅁ륆꣬뉯꣮낪뚥뫞뉺ꛦ냊ꅁ륆꣬꒽ꕱꩶ뉺떽꒧ꗘꪺꅁ꣣ꚳ궫굮ꪺꙡꛬꅃ 륌ꕨ맯꧳뢳라맯꧳꒽ꕱꩶ뉺늣ꗍꪺ뱶암곝ꩫ꒣ꑀꅃJensen and Mecklingꅝ1976ꅞ뭐뎯ꞻꅝ1994ꅞꪺ곣ꡳ떲ꩇ곒뭻결뢳라꯹ꓱ꣒띕낪ꅁ꒽ꕱꪺ셚껄ꑝ띕낪ꅁꙝ결럭뢳꯹ꚳꗷ띕Ꙩꅁ꒽ꕱꪺ셚껄ꙮ썡뭐ꛛꢭꪺ쏶ꭙ둎띕ꑪꅁꟳ꿠ꓞ땯뢳뫊놱낪뚥뫞뉺ꪺ냊뻷뭐뮤ꙝꅃ땍ꛓꅁJensen and Rubackꅝ1983ꅞꗧ땯뉻럭뢳꯹뙗륌ꑀꥷꓱ꣒ꅁ뢳라결뫻꯹ꛛꢭꝑ꽱ꅁꦹꦹ뭐낪뚥뫞뉺꓄떲ꅁ낵ꕘꑀ맯꒽ꕱ믹귈꒣ꝑꪺꡍ떦ꛦ결ꅁ꣒꙰쇊꣖껗뭐꣤ꕌ뻷멣맯꒽ꕱꪺ늼ꚬ쇊ꅃMorck et al.ꅝ1988ꅞ뭻결뢳꯹ꚳ앶맯꒽ꕱ셚껄ꭄꝥꪽ뵵쏶ꭙꅆ쁈뗛뢳라꯹ꪺ뱗ꕛꅁ꒽ꕱ셚껄Ꟈ뭐뢳라꯹ꝥ뉻ꖿ곛쏶ꇐ굴곛쏶ꇐꖿ곛쏶ꪺ뉻뙈ꅃ때뷗륌ꕨꓥ쑭꒧떲ꩇ꙰꛳ꅁ곒ꕩ땯뉻뢳라맯꧳낪뚥뫞뉺ꪺ뫊놱뭐뢳앶꯹ꚳꓱ꣒ꚳ녋꓁쏶ꭙꅃ ꫱꙾ꅁ뙽ꥬꚳ곣ꡳ녎쏶ꩠꪺ땊쉉뗛궫꧳뢳ꪺ닕ꚨ꽓꧊ꑗꅁꕾ뎡뢳맯꧳낪뚥뫞뉺꧒꿠늣ꗍꪺ뫊놱꧊ꓞ끟곣ꡳꪺ쏶ꩠꅃFamaꅝ1980ꅞ뭐Fama and Jensenꅝ1983ꅞ땯뉻꒺뎡뢳뭐ꕾ뎡뢳ꪺꗦ꒬뱶암ꕩ륆꣬뫊놱낪뚥뫞뉺ꚳ껄꧊ꪺꪺꗘꪺꅃꕾ뎡뢳ꙝ룻꒺뎡뢳꣣ꚳ뽗ꗟ꧊ꅁ룻꿠ꭏ앀ꩆꪺ앶꽱ꅁꢾꓮ뫞뉺럭ꞽꪺ뻷ꛦ결ꅝFama and Jensen, 1983; Byrd and Hickman, 1992ꅞꅃꕾ뎡뽗ꗟ뢳ꪺ뱗ꕛ뭐꒽ꕱ셚껄ꪺꚨꚳ엣뗛ꖿꙖ뱶암ꅝBarnhart and Rosenstein, 1998; Daily and Dalton, 1992ꅞꅃWeisbachꅝ1988ꅞꗧ땯뉻ꗑꕾ뎡뢳ꕄ뻉ꪺ뢳라ꅁ꣤꒽ꕱꚳ룻낪ꪺ낪뚥뫞뉺ꟳ듀ꅃꋣzun, Szewczyk and Varmaꅝ2004ꅞ끷맯뢳라떲멣뭐뫞뉺뭒맺ꪺ곣ꡳ꒤ꅁ럭ꕾ뎡뽗ꗟ뢳Ꙣ뢳라ꅂ뱦군ꥥ귻라ꅂ셾륓ꥥ귻라ꪺ깵ꚸ띕뱗ꕛꅁ꒽ꕱ낪뚥뫞뉺뭒맺ꪺꕩ꿠꧊띕ꑰꅃByrd and Hickmanꅝ1992ꅞꑝꕘꅁ럭ꕾ뎡뢳뒤ꚳ뢳라Ꙩ볆ꫭꡍ앶ꗷ껉ꅁ굙쑶볐뇽놵ꚬꅝtender offers for 31
biddersꅞ꒽ꕱ껉ꅁ룻꿠ꭏ앀ꩆꪺꝑ꽱ꅃꚳ뻇뒣ꕘ꒣Ꙑꪺ곝ꩫꅁHermalin and Weisbachꅝ1991ꅞ뭐Fosbergꅝ1989ꅞ곒뭻결ꕾ뎡뢳뭐꒽ꕱ셚껄뚡때엣뗛쏶ꭙꅃ Ꙣꕾ뎡뢳라맯낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꪺ뱶암ꑗꅁFamaꅝ1980ꅞ뭻결굙뢳라ꪺ닕ꚨ굙ꕝ걁ꕾ뎡뢳ꅁ꿠ꢾꓮ뢳라뭐낪뚥ꕄ뫞Ꙁ뿑ꣃ귩맜꒽ꕱꩆ끝둉ꪺꛦ결ꅃCore, Holthausen and Larckerꅝ1999ꅞ땯뉻럭ꕾ뎡뢳꯹륆5%ꅁ낪뚥뫞뉺ꪺ셾륓ꓴ럇엣뗛룻ꝃꅃBorokhovich et al.ꅝ2000ꅞ뭻결ꕾ뎡뢳ꪺ뫊놱껄ꩇꙝꕾ뎡뢳꽓꧊ꚳ쏶ꅁ굙걏ꕾ뎡뢳ꪺꢭꗷ걏룪늣뫞뉺꒽ꕱꅝasset management firmsꅞꪺꩫꑈ뢳걏뽗ꗟ귓엩ꅝindividualꅞꅁ꣤맯낪뚥뫞뉺ꪺ뫊놱룻ꚳ껄ꅃꛓꕂ꒣뛈걏ꕾ뎡뢳깵ꛬꅁꕾ뎡뢳꯹ꚳꗷꑝ맯낪뚥뫞뉺ꪺ셾륓꣣ꚳ뫊놱껄ꩇꅝBoyd, 1994; Cyert, Kang and Kumar, 1998ꅞꅃ 셠Ꙙ꣓뮡ꅁꕾ뎡뢳맯꧳꒽ꕱ낪뚥뫞뉺뫊놱ꅁ꽓ꝏ걏셾륓ꪺ뫊놱ꅁ꣣ꚳꑀꥷꪺ놱꣮꿠ꑏꅃ꣤뫊놱ꪺ녪ꯗꥍꕾ뎡뢳꧊뭐걏ꝟꙢ뢳라ꑕꪺꥥ귻라꣣ꚳ뱶암ꑏꚳ쏶ꅃ †? 곛쏶ꕾ뎡뢳뭐낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓쏶ꭙ꒧ꓥ쑭뻣뉺꙰ꫭ2-2ꅃ 32
ꫭ2-2 ꕾ뎡뢳뭐낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓쏶ꭙ꒧ꓥ쑭뻣뉺?곣ꡳ?볋ꖻ?곣ꡳ멣궱?꓀꩒ꓨꩫ?궫굮곣ꡳ떲뷗?ꅝ땯ꫭ껉뚡ꅞ?ꅝꕝꝴ곣ꡳ듁뚡ꅞ?ꅝꕝꝴ꒽ꕱ셚껄볐ꅞ?Boydꅝ1994ꅞ 1980꙾룳뙖12뫘듺뙱뢳라놱꣮ꪺ꒭귓멣궱ꇐ꒽ꕱ䍅?ꙐꕈLISERL VII듺룕1. Ꙣ뢳라놱꣮땻ꯗ룻ꝃꪺ꒽ꕱꅁCEO셾륓ꓴ럇룻낪ꅃ 늣띾ꪺ193깡꒽ꕱ껉ꑝ결뢳ꅂ꒺뎡뢳ꅂ늼꧒ꚳ앶ꅂ뢳라놱꣮ꪺ꒭귓뱶2. CEO셾륓뭐꒽ꕱ덗볒셚껄때엣뗛쏶ꭙꅃ 왛맮귈ꅃ ꩫꑈꕎꫭꅂ뢳셾륓ꓴ럇ꅁꥍ꒽ꕱ덗볒ꅂ암굮꿀뭐꒽ꕱ덗볒ꅂ셚껄ꇐꕈ앶꽱돸륓뉶결ꕎꫭꅁ뗸덯엜볆셚껄ꥍCEO셾륓뚡맯䍅?셾륓ꪺ뱶암ꅃ?ꪺ곛꒬뱶암ꅃ?䍹敲琬⁋慮本?ꕈ냝ꣷꪺꓨꚡ샲녯듺엧꒽ꕱꪺ꧒ꚳ앶엜볆ꅂ뢳라떲멣ꅂCEOꕈ뷆끪쉫ꥍT샋ꥷ꣓1. CEO셾륓뭐뢳꧒ꚳ앶ꅂ셾륓ꥥ귻라ꚨ귻꧒ꚳ앶ꅂ돌慮搠䭵浡?Ꙣ과냪NYS?ꅂ䅍䕘꽓꧊ꥍ꒽ꕱ꽓꧊뭐셚껄엜볆맯CEO셾륓ꪺ엧쏒곣ꡳ낲덝ꅃ?ꑪꩆ꧒ꚳ앶ꅂ꽽늣ꓱ뉶ꝥꙖ쏶ꭙꅃ ꅝㄹ㤸ꅞ?ꥍ乁卄䅑ꑗꖫꪺ뱶암ꅃꣃ녎볋ꖻ꒽ꕱ꓀결ꑪ꒽ꕱ뭐ꑰ꒽2. CEO셾륓뭐뭐CEO꧒ꚳ앶ꅂCEOꗴ듁ꅂꕾ뎡뢳ꓱ뉶ꅂㄶ㜱깡꒽ꕱㄹ㤲ꕱꅁ뗸꣤CEO셾륓Ꙣꙕꛛ엜볆뚡걏ꝟ꣣ꚳCEO귝ꗴ뢳떥ꝥ뉻ꖿꙖ쏶ꭙꅃ ꣬ㄹ㤳꙾뫞뉺셾엣뗛깴늧ꅃ꒽ꕱ셚껄ꕈ늼돸륓뉶ꥍ앶꽱3. 뭐뉻셾륓곛룻ꅁ꽓ꥷ꧒ꚳ앶ꥍ뢳곛쏶엜볆맯꧳ꕈ륓룪껆ꅃ?돸륓뉶꣓뿅뙱ꅃ?앶꽱결냲슦ꪺ셾륓뱶암룻ꑪꅃ 䍯牥Ⱐ1982꣬1984꙾뚡듺엧꒽ꕱ꧒ꚳ앶엜볆ꥍ뢳라떲멣맯CEOꕈ뷆끪쉫ꥍT샋ꥷ꣓1.럭꒽ꕱꩶ뉺떲멣룻때껄뉶껉ꅁCEOꪺ셾륓룻낪ꅆCEO Holthausen, and 205깡과냪꒣Ꙑ늣셾륓ꪺ뱶암ꅁꥍCEO셾륓ꥍ꒽ꕱꯡ꙾ꯗ셚엧쏒곣ꡳ낲덝ꅃ? 셾륓ꙝ결꒽ꕱꩶ뉺꒣꣎ꙝ꿀ꛓꑗꯡꅁ꒽ꕱꯡ꙾ꯗ셚 Larckerꅝㄹ㤹ꅞ?띾ꑗꖫ꒽ꕱꪺ495껄ꫭ뉻ꪺ곛쏶꧊ꅃ꒽ꕱ셚껄ꕈ늼돸륓뉶 껄라뭐CEO셾륓ꝥꙖ쏶ꭙꅃ 떧룪껆ꅃ ꥍ룪늣돸륓뉶꣓뿅뙱ꅃ?2. 룻깴꒽ꕱꩶ뉺떲멣ꪺ꒽ꕱ라ꚳ룻ꑪꪺꕎ뉺냝썄ꅆꙢꚳ 룻ꑪꕎ뉺냝썄꒺ꪺCEO라ꚳ룻낪ꪺ셾륓ꅆꙝꚹ꒽ꕱꪺꕎ뉺냝썄둎띕꽱둣꓆ꅃ 33
ꅝ쓲ꭥ궶ꅞ 곣ꡳ?볋ꖻ?곣ꡳ멣궱?꓀꩒ꓨꩫ?궫굮곣ꡳ떲뷗?ꅝ땯ꫭ껉뚡ꅞ?ꅝꕝꝴ곣ꡳ듁뚡ꅞ?ꅝꕝꝴ꒽ꕱ셚껄볐ꅞ?????Borokhovich, 1987꙾ꕈꭥꪺ121깡듺엧덳떲ꕾ뎡뢳ꅂꖼ덳떲ꕾ뎡뢳맯롧뻺ꕈ뷆끪쉫ꥍT샋ꥷ꣓1. 덳떲ꕾ뎡살뭐꣤ꕌꕾ뎡뢳곛ꓱꅁ뫊놱꿠ꑏBrunarski and 롧뻺놵뫞귗ꖿ껗놵뫞귗ꖿ껗꒽ꕱ뙗썂돸륓ꪺ뱶암ꅃ?엧쏒곣ꡳ낲덝ꅃ ?룻깴ꅃ Parrinoꅝ2000ꅞ ꪺ꒽ꕱꅃ 2. 럭덳떲ꑪꩆ꧒ꚳ앶뙗륌꣤ꕌꕾ뎡뢳꧒ꚳ앶껉ꅁ꒽ꕱꪺ뙗썂돸륓룻ꝃꅃ 3. ꕾ뎡ꩆꪺ덳놵뭐ꭄ덳떲꽓꧊맯꒽ꕱ뙗썂돸륓뱶암ꪺ룑쓀꿠ꑏ낪륌뫞뉺꧒ꚳ앶ꥍ뢳라떲멣ꅃꪺ룑쓀꿠ꑏ낪륌뫞뉺꧒ꚳ앶ꥍ뢳라떲멣ꅃ ꅝ룪껆꣓랽ꅇꖻ곣ꡳ뻣뉺ꅞ? 34
닄ꑔ뎹 곣ꡳꓨꩫ ꖻ뎹ꗽ맯뻷멣룪ꑈꅂꕾ뎡뢳ꅁ뭐뫞뉺셾륓뚡쏶ꭙꅁꓥ쑭뇀뻉ꕘꖻ곣ꡳ낲덝ꅃꙁ맯ꖻ곣ꡳ곛쏶엜볆ꙝ엜볆ꅂꛛ엜볆뭐놱꣮엜볆ꪺ뚶Ꟈ낵ꥷ롱뭐룑쓀뿅뙱볐ꅁ놵뗛ꅁꙁ꓀ꝏ뇔굺ꖻ곣ꡳꪺ곣ꡳ듁뚡ꅂ곣ꡳ볋ꖻ룪껆꣓랽ꅃ돌ꯡꅁꖻ곣ꡳ낲덝뭐엜볆뇀뻉ꕘꖻ곣ꡳ꒧맪쏒볒ꮬꅃ 닄ꑀ론 곣ꡳ낲덝 ꖻ곣ꡳ낲덝껚뻚곣ꡳꗘꪺꅁꗽ껚뻚뻷멣룪ꑈ꽓꧊맯낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓늣ꗍꪺ뱶암낵놴끑ꅁꕴꕾ뗸ꕄ냊뭐덑냊뻷멣룪ꑈ걏ꝟ라맯낪뚥뫞뉺ꪺ셾륓뭐꒽ꕱ셚껄뚡늣ꗍ꒣Ꙑ깴늧ꅁ돌ꯡꭨ맯ꕾ뎡뢳걏라맯낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꪺ뱶암낵ꕘ낲덝륷듁ꅃ ꑀꅂ뻷멣룪ꑈ꽓꧊맯낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꪺ뱶암 뻷멣룪ꑈ뫊놱ꪺ꣫뽅ꥍ꿠ꑏ라ꙝ꒣Ꙑꪺ압ꯈꅂ궭꣮ꅂꗘ볐ꛓꚳ꧒꒣ꙐꅝAllen and Panian, 1982; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2001; Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino and Buchholtz, 2001ꅞꅃBrickly, Lease and Smithꅝ1988ꅞꪺ곣ꡳ꒤ꅁ땯뉻뻷멣룪ꑈ맯꒽ꕱꪺ뫊놱꿠ꑏ늣ꗍꙝ뭐꒽ꕱ뚡ꪺ쏶ꭙꛓꚳ깴늧ꅃꕌ뭻결뭐꒽ꕱ뚡ꚳ룻결ꪽ놵ꝑ꽱쏶ꭙꪺꅵ삣ꑏ뇓띐ꅶꅝpressure-sensitiveꅞ뻷멣룪ꑈ맯꒽ꕱ늣ꗍꪺ뫊놱꿠ꑏ룻깴ꅁꛓ룻꒣깥꧶꣼꣬낪뚥뫞뉺ꛦ결뱶암ꪺꅵ삣ꑏꧨꅶꅝpressure- resistantꅞ뻷멣룪ꑈꕩꟳ결ꕄ냊ꙡ꒶ꑊ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꅃBorokhovich et al.ꅝ2000ꅞ곣ꡳꑝ쏒맪삣ꑏꧨ뻷멣뫊놱걏룻삣ꑏ뇓띐뻷멣ꚳ껄뉶ꪺꅃ Almazam et al.ꅝ2004ꅞꑝꚳ쏾ꪺ꓀쏾ꅁ녎뻷멣룪ꑈ맯낪뚥뫞뉺ꪺ뫊놱ꛦ결꓀ꚨꅵꕄ냊ꅶꥍꅵ덑냊ꅶ꣢쏾ꅃ룪꒽ꕱꥍ뽗ꗟ룪압냝떥룻꒣깥꧶꣼뱶암ꪺ뻷멣쉫쏾결ꅵꕄ냊ꅶꅆ믈ꛦꭈ끕뎡ꥍꭏ쁉꒽ꕱ떥뭐꒽ꕱꚳꝑ꽱ꦹ꣓ꕩ꿠꧊ꪺ결ꅵ덑냊ꅶꅃ떲ꩇ땯뉻ꅵꕄ냊ꅶ뻷멣룪ꑈ맯낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓꣣엣뗛뱶암ꅁꅵ덑 35
냊ꅶ뻷멣룪ꑈꭨ때ꅃ Hartzell and Starksꅝ2003ꅞꪺ곣ꡳ땯뉻ꅁ뻷멣룪ꑈ꧒ꚳ앶띕뱗ꕛꅁ낪뚥뫞뉺ꪺ꣫뽅꧊셾륓라쁈꒧ꑗꅆꝙ뻷멣룪ꑈ맯낪뚥뫞뉺ꪺ뫊놱껄ꩇ라꣏녯꒽ꕱꟳꕩꕈꝑꗎꟳ낪ꓱ꣒ꪺ꣫뽅꧊셾륓꣓ꕏ낪뚥뫞뉺꒣뒱ꯥ둫꣤슾ꅁꕈ꒽ꕱ띕꣎ꪺ셚껄ꫭ뉻꣓뒫꣺꣤뻖ꚳꟳ낪ꪺ돸륓ꅆ뒫ꕹ룜뮡ꅁ뻷멣룪ꑈ뭐낪뚥뫞뉺꣫뽅꧊셾륓ꪺꗦꑥ꣏ꗎꕩꕈꝕ꧳듮뵷꧒ꚳꑈ뭐ꕎ뉺ꑈ꒧뚡ꪺꕎ뉺냝썄ꅃ걇낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓셚껄뇓띐ꯗ뭐뻷멣룪ꑈ뚡꣣ꚳ엣뗛ꖿ곛쏶ꅃ꙰Almazam et al.ꅝ2004ꅞꪺ곣ꡳ떲ꩇ꧒굺ꅁꕄ냊뻷멣룪ꑈ룻덑냊뻷멣룪ꑈ맯꧳낪뚥뫞뉺ꪺ뫊놱껄ꩇ룻꣎ꅁꕄ냊뻷멣룪ꑈ꧒ꚳ앶맯꧳낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓셚껄뇓띐ꯗꗧꚳꖿꙖꪺ뱶암ꅃ걇ꖻ곣ꡳ륷듁ꕄ냊뻷멣룪ꑈ꧒ꚳ앶맯꧳낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓셚껄뇓띐ꯗ뚡꣣ꚳ엣뗛ꖿ곛쏶ꅁ덑냊뻷멣룪ꑈꭨ때ꅃ ꙝꚹꅁꖻ곣ꡳ냑ꛒAlmazam et al.ꅝ2004ꅞꪺ꓀쏾ꅁ녎뻷멣룪ꑈ꓀ꚨꅵꕄ냊ꅶ뭐ꅵ덑냊ꅶ꣢뫘ꅁ뿄뻷멣ꅂ꒽ꕱꩫꑈꅂꥍꭈ끕냲쉫쏾결ꅵ덑냊ꅶ뻷멣룪ꑈꅆ걆ꦲ뻷멣ꅂꕾ냪뻷멣ꅂꥍ꣤ꕌꩫꑈ뻷멣쉫쏾결ꅵꕄ냊ꅶ뻷멣ꅃꣃ뻚ꓥ쑭ꪺ곣ꡳ떲ꩇ뇀뷗낲덝꙰ꑕꅇ 낲뮡1-aꅇꕄ냊뻷멣룪ꑈ꧒ꚳ앶띕낪ꅁ낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓띕ꝃꅃ 낲뮡1-bꅇꕄ냊뻷멣룪ꑈ꧒ꚳ앶띕낪ꅁ낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓셚껄뇓띐ꯗ띕낪ꅃ ꑇꅂ뢳라떲멣맯낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꪺ뱶암 뢳라맯꧳낪뚥뫞뉺늣ꗍꪺ뫊놱꿠ꑏ낣ꑆ꣼꣬꣤ꗷ꯹ꚳ낪ꝃꪺ뱶암ꕾꅝMorck et al, 1988ꅞꅁ꒺ꕾ뎡뢳ꪺꓱ꣒ꑝ라뱶암뢳맯낪뚥뫞뉺ꪺ뫊놱껄ꩇꅃ Ꙣ뢳맯낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꪺ뫊놱꿠ꑏꑗꅁ굙꓀ꚨ꒺ꕾ뎡뢳꣓왛맮ꅁ륌ꕨ곣ꡳ떲ꩇꕩꕈ땯뉻ꅁ뢳라ꪺ닕ꚨ굙ꕝ걁ꕾ뎡뢳ꅁ꿠ꢾꓮ뢳라뭐낪뚥ꕄ뫞Ꙁ뿑ꣃ귩맜꒽ꕱꩆ끝둉ꪺꛦ결ꅝFama, 1980ꅞꅃ굙ꕾ뎡뢳꯹륆5%ꅁ낪뚥뫞뉺ꪺ셾륓ꓴ럇엣뗛룻ꝃꅝCore et al., 1999ꅞꅃCyert et al.ꅝ1997ꅞ뭐Boydꅝ1994ꅞ곣 36
ꡳ떲ꩇ뭻결ꕾ뎡뢳깵ꛬ뭐ꕾ뎡뢳꯹ꚳꗷ곒맯낪뚥뫞뉺ꪺ셾륓꣣ꚳ뫊놱껄ꩇꅃ걇ꖻ곣ꡳ륷듁ꕾ뎡뢳ꪺ덝롭꿠륆꣬꣮낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꪺꗘꪺꅃ ꖻ곣ꡳ녎Ꙑ껉ꝑꗎꕾ뎡뢳ꑈ볆ꓱ꣒뭐ꕾ뎡뢳꯹ꓱ꣒꣓듺룕꣤맯낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꪺ뱶암ꅃ낲덝꙰ꑕꅇ ?††?낲뮡2ꅇꕾ뎡뢳맯꧳낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꚳ뫊놱껄ꩇꅃ ꫭ3-1 ꖻ곣ꡳ꒧곣ꡳ낲덝띊뻣 낲덝1-a?ꕄ냊뻷멣룪ꑈ꧒ꚳ앶띕낪ꅁ낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓띕ꝃꅃ?낲덝1-b?ꕄ냊뻷멣룪ꑈ꧒ꚳ앶띕낪ꅁ낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓셚껄뇓띐ꯗ띕낪ꅃ?낲덝2?ꕾ뎡뢳맯꧳낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꚳ뫊놱껄ꩇꅃ? 37
닄ꑇ론 엜볆ꥷ롱뭐뿅뙱 ꑀꅂꙝ엜볆ꅇ ꖻ곣ꡳ뻚곣ꡳ낲뮡ꅁꙝ엜볆ꚳ셾륓ꅂ셾륓셚껄뇓띐ꯗꅃꕈꑕ꓀ꝏ맯ꑗ굺삳엜볆낵ꥷ롱룑쓀ꅇ ꅝꑀꅞ낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꅝCompensation, COMPꅞꅇ ꖻ곣ꡳꪺ낪뚥뫞뉺ꪺ걏꒽ꕱꪺ돌낪뚥뫞뉺ꑈ귻ꅁ꙰셠뗴셠롧뉺ꅃHartzell and Starksꅝ2003ꅞꥍGomez-Mejia et al.ꅝ2003ꅞꙢ곣ꡳ꒤녎셾륓ꥷ롱결뉻셾륓ꅂ공ꝑꅂꥍ쏘뭐뿯뻜앶ꪺ셠ꥍꅁꕸ왗ꗘꭥ끝돸꒤뫲뒦앓낪뚥뫞뉺귓ꑈ꒧뉻뭐공ꝑ셾륓셠ꥍꅁ늼꓀공뛈ꕈ셠볆ꫭꗜ꒧ꅁ걇때ꩫ녯ꪾ낪뚥뫞뉺Ꙣꑀ라군꙾ꯗ꒧뵔꓁꓀공ꑊ볆ꅃꙝꚹꅁ곣ꡳ녎낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꭨꥷ롱결ꅇ 뫞뉺셾륓ꇗ뫞뉺뉻셾륓ꇏ볺ꅝ공ꝑꅞ4 ꅝꑇꅞ낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓셚껄뇓띐ꯗꅝPay for Performance Sensitivityꅞꅇ 결ꑆ룑뻷멣룪ꑈ맯낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓뭐셚껄뇓띐ꯗꪺ뱶암ꅁ곣ꡳ냑ꛒHartzell and Starksꅝ2003ꅞꪺ낵ꩫꅁꕈ럭듁셚껄뭐ꭥ듁셚껄ꪺ엜냊뙱뭐ꭥ듁뻷멣꧒ꚳ앶뚰꒤ꯗꪺ궼셚결ꛛ엜볆ꅁ낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓뱗뙱결ꙝ엜볆ꅁ왛맮ꚹ꣢ꪺ쏶ꭙꝀ결Ꝑ쉟뻷멣룪ꑈ뱶암낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓셚껄뇓띐ꯗꪺꓨꚡꅃ 뫞뉺셾륓뱗뙱ꅝ럭꙾ꯗ뫞뉺셾륓ꇐꭥ꙾ꯗ뫞뉺셾륓 ∆CPMPꅞꇗꭥ꙾ꯗ뫞뉺셾륓 ꑇꅂꛛ엜볆ꅇ Ꙣꖻ곣ꡳ꒤ꅁꛛ엜볆결ꕄ냊뻷멣룪ꑈꅂ덑냊뻷멣룪ꑈꅂꕾ뎡뢳ꅂꥍ셚껄뱗뙱ꅃꕈꑕ꓀ꝏ맯ꑗ굺ꛛ엜볆낵ꥷ롱룑쓀ꅇ ?결꣏뫞뉺셾륓꿠쇍꫱녠멁ꅁ걇ꖻ곣ꡳ맯낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓엜볆낵륌맯볆덂뉺ꅃ? 38
ꅝꑀꅞꕄ냊뻷멣룪ꑈꥍ덑냊뻷멣룪ꑈꅝACINT and INACINTꅞꅇ Almazam et alꅝ.2004ꅞ녎뻷멣룪ꑈ맯낪뚥뫞뉺ꪺ뫊놱ꛦ결꓀ꚨꅵꕄ냊ꅶꥍꅵ덑냊ꅶ꣢쏾ꅃ믈ꛦꭈ끕뎡ꥍꭏ쁉꒽ꕱ떥뭐꒽ꕱꚳꝑ꽱ꦹ꣓ꕩ꿠꧊ꪺ결ꅵ덑냊ꅶꅁꙝ결덯뻷멣룪ꑈ깥꧶꣼꣬낪뚥뫞뉺ꪺꛦ결꧒뱶암ꅃ룪꒽ꕱꥍ뽗ꗟ룪압냝떥룻꒣깥꧶꣼뱶암ꪺ뻷멣쉫쏾결ꅵꕄ냊ꅶꅃ ꖻ곣ꡳ뻚Almazam et al.ꅝ2004ꅞꪺ꓀쏾ꅁꣃ냑럓냪꒺ꪺ맪믚놡ꩰ뭐곣ꡳ냑ꛒ뎯깡뱺ꅝ2000ꅞꥍ램쒣뫕ꅝ1998ꅞ맯뻷멣룪ꑈꪺꥷ롱ꅁ녎뻷멣룪ꑈ꓀결걆ꦲ뻷멣ꅂ뿄뻷멣ꅂ꒽ꕱꩫꑈꅂꕾ냪뻷멣ꅂꭈ끕냲ꅁꥍ꣤ꕌꩫꑈ뻷멣떥ꅃ뿄뻷멣ꅂ꒽ꕱꩫꑈꅁꥍꭈ끕냲쉫쏾결ꅵ덑냊뻷멣룪ꑈꅶꅆ걆ꦲ뻷멣ꅂꕾ냪뻷멣ꅁꥍ꣤ꕌꩫꑈ뻷멣쉫쏾결ꅵꕄ냊뻷멣룪ꑈꅶꅃ ꕄ냊뻷멣룪ꑈ꧒ꚳ앶ꅝACINTꅞ =(걆ꦲ뻷멣꙾꦳꯹볆+ꕾ냪뻷멣꙾꦳꯹볆+꣤ꕌꩫꑈ뻷멣꙾꦳꯹볆) ꇒ꙾꦳걹덱Ꙣꕾ볆 덑냊뻷멣룪ꑈ꧒ꚳ앶ꅝINACINTꅞ =(뿄뻷멣꙾꦳꯹볆+꒽ꕱꩫꑈ꙾꦳꯹볆+ꭈ끕냲꙾꦳꯹볆) ꇒ꙾꦳걹덱Ꙣꕾ볆 ꅝꑇꅞꕾ뎡뢳ꅝNOUTB; OUTEDIRꅞꅇ Famaꅝ1980ꅞ뭻결ꕾ뎡뢳걏꒣Ꙣ꒽ꕱ뻡ꗴ슾ꛬꅁ꣣ꚳ녍띾꿠ꑏꕂꙡꛬ뙗땍뽗ꗟꅁꡍ떦껉ꕩ룻ꯈ왛ꙡ뿅뙱ꗸ띾ꗾ궱꧊ꪺ땯깩ꅁꣃꕩ땯뒧뫊럾ꪺꕜ꿠ꅃVafeasꅝ2000ꅞꭨ뻚ꕾ뎡뢳ꪺ뽗ꗟ꧊녎ꕾ뎡뢳믝Ꙑ껉닅Ꙙꑕꙃ꣢귓뇸ꗳꅇ?1.ꭄ꒽ꕱ귻ꑵꅁꭄ곛쏶녱꒽ꕱ끨ꗰꅆ2.ꭄ뭐꒽ꕱ곛쏶ꪺ뢳ꅁ꙰꒽ꕱꪺ압냝ꅂꯟ깶떥ꅃꙢ냪꒺ꪺꓥ쑭꒤ꅁ램뱺곂ꅝ2000ꅞ녎뢳ꅂ냆뢳ꅂ꒽ꕱ롧샧뫞뉺ꑈ귻ꅂ쏶ꭙꗸ띾겣빮ꕎꫭꕈ뭐ꑗ굺꣣ꚳ뿋쓝쏶ꭙ꒧ꕾꪺ뢳ꚨ귻결ꕾ뎡뢳ꅃ뎯뱺뱺ꅝ2003ꅞ녎ꕾ뎡뢳ꥷ롱결ꡓꚳ귝ꗴ꒽ꕱ뫞뉺슾냈ꅁ뭐낪뚥ꕄ뫞ꚳꑇ 39
떥뿋쏶ꭙꪺ뢳ꅃ Ꙣ냑ꛒ냪꒺뭐냪ꕾꪺꓥ쑭ꯡꅁꖻ곣ꡳ녎ꕾ뎡뢳ꥷ롱결ꅇ1.ꭄ꒽ꕱ꒧꣼릵ꑈ꒽ꕱ쏶ꭙꗸ띾꒧뢳ꅂ뫊맮ꑈ꣼릵ꑈꅆ2.ꭄꭥ뚵뇸ꗳ닅Ꙙ귓엩꒧ꑇ떥뿋ꅃ Ꙑ껉ꕈꕾ뎡뢳ꑈ볆ꓱ꣒뭐ꕾ뎡뢳꯹ꓱ꣒꣓샋엧ꕾ뎡뢳맯낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓꒧뫊놱껄ꩇꅃ ?ꕾ뎡뢳ꑈ볆ꓱ꣒ꕾ뎡뢳ꑈ볆?(NOUTB)ꇗ?뢳라덗볒??ꕾ뎡뢳꯹ꓱ꣒ꕾ뎡뢳꯹셠볆?(OUTEDIR)ꇗ꙾꦳걹덱Ꙣꕾ볆? ꅝꑔꅞ셚껄뱗뙱ꅝ∆ROEꅞ 결뿅뙱ꛛ엜볆맯낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓셚껄뇓띐ꯗꙝ엜볆ꪺ뱶암ꅁ녎셚껄뱗뙱뭐뇽뿅뙱꒧ꛛ엜볆ꅝꕄ냊뭐덑냊뻷멣룪ꑈꅞ곛궼ꅁ뗸ꚹꗦ궼뚵맯낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓뱗뙱ꪺ뱶암ꅃꙝ냪꒺륌ꕨꪺ곣ꡳ땯뉻라군셚껄맯냪꒺낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꚳ룻ꑪꪺ곛쏶꧊ꅝꩌ뽯ꫢꅁ1999ꅞꅁ걇덯료ꪺ셚껄ꪺ걏라군셚껄볐ꇐ앶꽱돸륓뉶ꅃ 앶꽱돸륓뉶뱗뙱ꅝ럭꙾ꯗ앶꽱돸륓뉶ꇐꭥ꙾ꯗ앶꽱돸륓뉶?∆ROEꅞꇗ ꭥ꙾ꯗ앶꽱돸륓뉶? ꑔꅂ놱꣮엜볆 결뱗뙩곣ꡳꪺ샋ꥷ껄ꩇꅁꖻ곣ꡳ샀놱꣮꒽ꕱ덗볒ꅂ곣땯뙏ꗎ뉶ꅂ곕빬엜늧꧊ꅂ꒽ꕱ셚껄떥엜볆ꅃꕈꑕ꓀ꝏ뮡ꧺ꒧ꅇ ꅝꑀꅞ셚껄 ꖻ곣ꡳꙐ껉ꕈ라군셚껄볐ꅝROEꅞꥍꖫ돵셚껄볐ꅝTobin’s Qꅞ꣓뿅뙱낪 40
뚥뫞뉺셚껄ꅃ륌ꕨ곣ꡳ땯뉻ꅁ낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓덱녠뭐꒽ꕱ셚껄Ꝁ놾륟ꅁꛓꕂꅁ라군셚껄룻ꖫ돵셚껄맯낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꪺ뱶암결ꑪꅝꩌ뽯ꫢꅁ1999ꅞꅃ 1. 라군셚껄볐ꅝROEꅞꅇ ꖻ곣ꡳꕈ앶꽱돸륓뉶ꅝReturn of Equity, ROEꅞꝀ결라군셚껄볐ꅁꓱ뉶꣺ꛛꕸ왗롧샙띳돸ꅝTEJꅞ룪껆깷꧒뒣꣑꒧ꅵ땼ꭥ뉢귈돸륓뉶ꅶꅃ꒽ꚡ꙰ꑕꅇ 앶꽱돸륓뉶ꅝ땼ꭥ꺧ꭥꝑ꽱 ROEꅞꇗꩆ앶꽱 2.ꖫ돵셚껄볐ꅝTOBINQꅞꅇ Tobin’s Q녠ꗎ꣓뿅뙱꒽ꕱ믹귈ꪺ볐ꅃTobin’s Qꪺꥷ롱결꒽ꕱꪺꖫ귈낣ꕈ룪늣ꪺ궫롭ꚨꖻꅝreplacement cost of assetꅞꅃ룪늣궫롭ꚨꖻ삳ꪺ걏룪늣뉻Ꙣ쇊뙒꧒믝ꕉꕘꪺ믹귈ꅁꙝꚹ럭Tobin’s Q귈띕낪ꅁꕎꫭꪺ걏꒽ꕱ꧒돐덹ꪺ때룪늣ꖼ꣓ꚨ뻷라띕ꑪꅁ꣏녯ꖫ돵떹꒩꒽ꕱꪺ뗻믹ꅝ꒽ꕱꖫ귈ꅞ곛맯룪늣ꪺ궫롭ꚨꖻ뱗ꕛꅁꗧꝙꕩꥷ롱결꒽ꕱ믹귈띕낪ꅃ걏ꕸ왗꿊ꕆ꒽ꭈꑏꪺ뻷멣뒣꣑궫롭ꚨꖻ룪끔ꅁꙝꚹꖻ곣ꡳꕈ룪늣녢궱믹귈꣓ꕎ듀궫롭ꚨꖻ룪끔ꅁꑝ둎걏앶꽱ꖫ귈ꕛ굴뛅녢궱믹귈ꅁ낣ꕈ룪늣녢궱믹귈꣓뿅뙱Tobin’s Qꅃ꣤군뫢ꓨꩫ꙰ꑕꅇ ꩆ앶꽱ꖫ돵믹귈(뒶덱)+굴뛅녢궱믹귈 Tobin’s Q= 룪늣녢궱믹귈 ꆰ ꩆ앶꽱ꖫ돵믹귈ꇗ믹 × 뒶덱걹덱Ꙣꕾ볆 ꅝꑇꅞ꒽ꕱ덗볒ꅝSIZEꅞꅇ ꗑ륌ꕨꓥ쑭ꅝFox, 1983ꅆFinkelstein and Hambrick, 1989ꅆDavid et al., 1998ꅆClay, 2000ꅞꕩꪾꅁ셾륓라꣼꒽ꕱ덗볒꧒뱶암ꅁ럭꒽ꕱ덗볒띕ꑪꅁ꣤낪뚥뫞뉺꒧셾륓ꓴ럇덱녠띕낪ꅃꚹ놱꣮엜볆ꪺ덝롭걏결ꑆ쇗ꝋ덹ꚨ셾륓꣼꒽ꕱ덗볒뱶암꧒ 41
덹ꚨꪺ낾뭾ꅃꖻ곣ꡳꕈ빐냢썂ꪺꛛ땍맯볆Ꝁ결꒽ꕱ덗볒ꪺ볐ꅃ 덗볒ꅝSIZEꅞꇗlnꅝ빐덦ꅞ ꅝꑔꅞ곣땯녋ꯗꅝINOVꅞꅇ 룪썂꒧뱗ꕛꕩꭐ뙩꒽ꕱ꒧믹귈ꅁꗧꝙ곣땯뙏ꗎ띕낪ꅁ꒽ꕱꖼ꣓ꚨ볧ꑏ띕녪ꅁ셚껄ꗧ룻곣땯녋ꯗꝃꪺ꒽ꕱ결꣎ꅝChan, Lakonishok and Sougiannis, 200?ꅞꅁꙢ낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꦹꦹ뭐꒽ꕱ셚껄놾륟ꪺ놡ꑕꅁ곣땯녋ꯗ띕낪ꪺ꒽ꕱꅁ꣤낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓덱녠ꑝ띕낪ꅃꖻ곣ꡳꕈ곣땯뙏ꗎꓤꕘ꒧ꥍ낣ꕈ샧띾ꚬꑊ뉢썂꒧곣땯뙏ꗎ뉶꣓뿅뙱곣땯녋ꯗꅃ꒽ꚡ꙰ꑕꅇ 곣땯뙏ꗎ뉶ꅝ곣땯뙏ꗎꓤꕘ?INOVꅞꇗ?샧띾ꚬꑊ뉢썂? ꅝꕼꅞ곕빬엜늧꧊ꅝVARꅞꅇ ꖻ곣ꡳꕈꗳ꙾ꯗꭥ꒭꙾꒧ꡃ곕빬엜늧ꭙ볆꣓뿅뙱곕빬엜늧꧊ꅃ 42
ꫭ3-2 ꖻ곣ꡳ꒧곣ꡳ엜볆띊뻣 엜볆?엜볆ꥷ롱?COMP 낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꅆ낪뚥뫞뉺뉻셾륓뭐볺ꪺ셠ꥍꅃ ∆CPMP 낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꪺ뱗뙱ꅃ ACINT ꕄ냊뻷멣걆룪ꑈꅆ 걆ꦲ뻷멣ꅂꕾ냪뻷멣ꅁꥍ꣤ꕌꩫꑈ뻷멣꯹ꚳ꒽ꕱ볆ꪺꛊ꓀ꓱꅃ INACINT 덑냊뻷멣걆룪ꑈꅆ 뿄뻷멣ꅂ꒽ꕱꩫꑈꅁꥍꭈ끕냲꯹ꚳ꒽ꕱ볆ꪺꛊ꓀ꓱꅃ NOUTB ꕾ뎡뢳ꑈ볆ꓱ꣒ꅆꕾ뎡뢳깵ꛬ뢳깵ꛬꛊ꓀ꓱꅃ OUTEDIR ꕾ뎡뢳꯹ꓱ꣒ꅆꕾ뎡뢳꯹셠볆꒽ꕱꙢꕾ걹덱볆ꛊ꓀ꓱꅃ ∆ROE 앶꽱돸륓뉶뱗뙱ꅃ ROE 앶꽱돸륓뉶ꅆ땼ꭥ꺧ꭥꝑ꽱낣ꕈꩆ앶꽱ꅃ TOBINQ ꟹ뮫Q볆ꅆ ꩆ앶꽱ꖫ돵믹귈ꅝ뒶덱뭐굴뛅녢궱믹귈셠ꥍ낣ꕈ룪늣녢궱믹귈ꅞꅃSIZE 덗볒ꅆ빐덦꣺맯볆ꅃ INOV 곣땯녋ꯗꅆ곣땯뙏ꗎꓤꕘ낣ꕈ샧띾ꚬꑊ뉢썂ꅃ VAR 곕빬엜늧꧊ꅆꗳ꙾ꯗꭥ꒭꙾꒧ꡃ곕빬엜늧ꭙ볆꣓뿅뙱곕빬엜늧꧊ꅃ 43
닄ꑔ론 곣ꡳ듁뚡ꅂ곣ꡳ볋ꖻ룪껆꣓랽 ꖻ곣ꡳ꒧맪쏒꓀꩒ꕄ굮녍ꩠꙢ2002꙾ꛜ2003꙾꒧ꑗꖫ꒽ꕱ결곣ꡳ볋ꖻꅁ놴끑뻷멣룪ꑈ꽓꧊뭐ꕾ뎡뢳걏ꝟ맯낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꪺ뱶암ꅃ곣ꡳ맯뙈ꕝꝴꑗꖫ꒽ꕱꅁ뇆낣뿄ꭏ쁉쏒꣩띾ꅂ륂뿩띾ꅂꛊ덦띾ꅂ?Ꙙ띾떥ꅃꚳ쏶ꑗꖫ꒽ꕱꙗ뫙ꅂ셠롧뉺셾륓ꅂ뻷멣룪ꑈ꧒ꚳ앶뭐꧒ꚳ곛쏶끝냈룪껆걏꣺ꛛꑗꖫ꒽ꕱ꒧꙾ꯗ꙾돸ꕈꅵꕸ왗롧샙띳돸ꫀꅶ룪껆깷ꅝTEJꅞꅃ볋ꖻ뿯꣺볐럇꙰ꑕꅇ 1. ꧳ꕸ왗쏒꣩ꗦ꧶꧒ꑗꖫ꒧꒽ꕱꅃ 2. 볋ꖻ꒽ꕱꙢꗁ냪2002꙾ꛜ2003꙾뚡ꖲ뚷ꚳꞹ뻣ꪺ끝냈돸ꫭ룪껆ꅂ믹룪껆ꅃ 3. 뇆낣ꗾ썂ꗦ돎ꭄ뻺꙾꣮꒧꒽ꕱꅃ 4. 뇆낣뿄ꭏ쁉쏒꣩띾(28ꅂ58ꅂ60)ꕈ꙳끕뻌쏒ꅝ91ꅞꓨꚡ꙳Ꙣꪺ꒽ꕱꅁꙝ결ꚹ늣띾꧊뷨꽓껭ꅁ끝냈룪껆떲멣늧꧳ꑀ꿫늣띾ꅁꙁꕛꑗ꣤곛쏶걆떦라군꣮ꯗ믝뿭럓끝걆뎡ꗜꅁ결쇗ꝋ맯곣ꡳ늣ꗍꑺ쉚ꅁ걇꒣ꙃꑊ볋ꖻ꒤ꅃ 5. 뇆낣륂뿩띾ꅝ26ꅂ56ꅞꅂꛊ덦띾ꅝ29ꅞꅂ?Ꙙ띾ꅝ98ꅞꅁꙝ덯늣띾ꭄ꣥ꮬ꒧뭳덹띾ꅁ끝냈떲멣뭐ꑀ꿫늣띾ꗧꚳ꧒꒣Ꙑꅁꖻ곣ꡳ녎덯ꕩ꿠뱶암곣ꡳ떲ꩇꪺ늣띾Ꝓ낣ꅃ 6. 뇆낣ꖼ뒦앓롧뉺ꑈ셾륓롧뉺ꑈ셾륓결륳꒧꒽ꕱꅃ굙셾륓결륳ꪺ낪뚥뫞뉺꺣꧈ꕵ걏놾ꙗꅁ맯ꗸ띾롧샧녎꒣꣣맪믚ꪺꡍ떦꿠ꑏꅁ걇뇆낣꧳곣ꡳ볋ꖻ꒧ꕾꅃ ꫭ3-3결볋ꖻ뽺뿯꒧륌땻ꅁꫬꡂ뽺뿯꒧볋ꖻꑷ녎ꭄ뻺꙾꣮꒽ꕱ뭐ꗾ썂ꗦ돎꒽ꕱ뇆낣Ꙣꕾꅃꛓ낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓결륳꒧꒽ꕱꚳ2002꙾꒧ꓓꑬꅝ2511ꅞꅆ2003꙾꒧ꑪ빼믕ꅝ1432ꅞꅂꥍ껤ꅝ1714ꅞꅂ쑒ꖿ냪믚곬ꅝ2302ꅞꅂ쓥ꫡꯘ덝ꅝ2539ꅞꅁꞡ꒩ꕈ뇆낣ꅃ 44
ꫭ3-3 볋ꖻ뽺뿯륌땻띊뻣 ? 9?꙾ 92꙾ Ꙙ군 ꫬ뎡Ꝓ뿯꒧볋ꖻ 627 659 1286 뿄ꭏ쁉늣띾 42 41 83 륂뿩띾 17 17 34 ꛊ덦띾 8 12 20 ?Ꙙ띾 1 1 2 뫞뉺셾륓결륳 1 4 5 셠군 558 584 1142 45
닄ꕼ론 맪뗽볒ꮬ ꖻ곣ꡳ결놴끑ꕄ냊뻷멣룪ꑈ뭐덑냊뻷멣룪ꑈꅁꥍꕾ뎡뢳맯낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓뭐셾륓셚껄뇓띐ꯗ꒧뱶암ꅁ뻚낲덝ꯘꗟ꣢귓맪쏒볒ꮬ꙰ꑕꅇ ꅂ ꑀꅂ뻷멣룪ꑈ뭐ꕾ뎡뢳맯셾륓ꪺ뱶암 ꖻ곣ꡳ냑ꛒAlmazam et al.ꅝ2004ꅞ맯뻷멣룪ꑈꪺ꓀쏾ꅁ녎뻷멣룪ꑈ꓀결ꅵꕄ냊ꅶ뭐ꅵ덑냊ꅶꅁ뗸꣤꓀ꝏ맯낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꪺ뱶암꧊ꅁ꙰ꗽꭥ꒧낲덝ꅁ곣ꡳ륷듁ꕄ냊뻷멣룪ꑈ꧒ꚳ앶맯낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꚳ엣뗛굴Ꙗ뱶암ꅁ덑냊뻷멣룪꧒ꚳ앶ꭨ때ꅃꕾ뎡뢳엜볆냑ꛒCyert et al.ꅝ1997ꅞ뭐Boydꅝ1994ꅞꪺ곣ꡳꅁ덝롭ꕾ뎡뢳ꑈ볆ꓱ꣒뭐ꕾ뎡뢳꯹ꓱ꣒꣢ꛛ엜볆ꅁ륷듁덯꣢귓ꛛ엜볆맯낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓곒ꚳ굴Ꙗ뱶암ꅃꛓ냑ꛒ륌ꕨ맯낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓곣ꡳ꒧곛쏶ꓥ쑭녯ꪾꅁꗧꚳ굙ꑺ뱶암낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓꒧엜볆ꅁ결쇗ꝋ맪쏒떲ꩇ꣼꣬덯ꙝ꿀ꪺ뱶암ꅁ녎꣤꿇ꑊ놱꣮엜볆ꅁ군ꚳ앶꽱돸륓뉶ꅂTobin’s Q볆ꅂ덗볒ꅂ곣땯뙏ꗎ뉶ꅂ곕빬엜늧꧊떥ꅃ볒ꮬ꙰ꑕ꧒ꗜꅇ 䍐䵐楴??ß??ß?䅃䥎?楴???ß?䥎䅃䥎?楴???ß?乏啔?楴ꇏß?何呅䑉?楴ꇏß?剏?楴†??†††??ß?呏䉉乑楴ß?卉婅楴?ß?䥎佖楴?ß?噁?楴? e?????䍐䵐楴?††ꅇi꒽ꕱt듁꒧낪뚥뫞뉺ꅝ셠롧뉺ꅞ셾륓 䅃䥎?楴?ㄠ††?ꅇi꒽ꕱt-1듁꒧ꕄ냊뻷멣룪ꑈ꧒ꚳ앶ꓱ꣒ 䥎䅃䥎?楴?ㄠ?ꅇi꒽ꕱt-1듁꒧덑냊뻷멣룪ꑈ꧒ꚳ앶ꓱ꣒ 乏啔?楴††††ꅇi꒽ꕱt듁꒧ꕾ뎡뢳ꑈ볆ꓱ꣒ 何呅䑉?楴??ꅇi꒽ꕱt듁꒧ꕾ뎡뢳꯹ꓱ꣒ 剏?楴††††††ꅇi꒽ꕱt듁꒧앶꽱돸륓뉶 呏䉉乑楴†††ꅇi꒽ꕱt듁Tobin’s Q볆 46
卉婅楴†††††ꅇi꒽ꕱt듁꒧덗볒 䥎佖楴†††?†?ꅇi꒽ꕱt-1듁꒧곣땯볆 噁?楴††††††ꅇi꒽ꕱt-1듁꒧곕빬엜늧볆 e?琠†††††††?ꅇi꒽ꕱt-1듁꒧득깴뚵? ꑇꅂ뻷멣룪ꑈ맯낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓셚껄뇓띐ꯗ꒧뱶암 결뿅뙱ꕄ냊뭐뻷멣룪ꑈ꧒ꚳ앶맯낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓셚껄뇓띐ꯗ꒧뱶암ꅁꖻ곣ꡳ냑ꛒHartzell and Starksꅝ2003ꅞ맯셾륓셚껄뇓띐ꯗꪺ덂뉺ꅁ녎앶꽱돸륓뉶뱗뙱ꅝ∆剏?i?ꅞ꓀ꝏ뭐ꕄ냊뻷멣룪ꑈ꧒ꚳ앶ꅝACINTit-1ꅞꥍ덑냊뻷멣룪ꑈ꧒ꚳ앶ꅝINACINTit-1ꅞ곛궼ꅁ뗸ꚹ꣢곛궼뚵맯낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓엜뙱ꅝ∆CPMPitꅞ늣ꗍ꒧ꗦ꒬Ꝁꗎ뱶암ꅃ럓낲덝꒧륷듁ꅁꕄ냊뻷멣룪ꑈ맯낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓뻷뇓띐ꯗꚳꖿꙖ뱶암ꅁ덑냊뻷멣룪ꑈꭨ때ꅃꚹ끪쉫볒ꮬꗧ녎굙ꑺ뱶암낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓뱗뙱꒧엜볆덝ꥷ결놱꣮엜볆ꅃ볒ꮬ꙰ꑕ꧒ꗜꅇ ∆䍐䵐楴??ß??ß??∆剏?楴ꇑ䅃䥎?楴??⤫ß??∆剏?楴ꇑ䥎䅃䥎?楴??⤫ß?䅃䥎?楴??? ? ß?䥎䅃䥎?楴???ß?∆剏?楴?ß?剏?楴?ß?呏䉉乑楴?ß㠠卉婅楴??ß?䥎佖楴?††††?ß噁?楴? e?????∆䍐䵐楴†? ꅇ?꒽ꕱ?듁꒧낪뚥뫞뉺ꅝ셠롧뉺ꅞ셾륓뱗뙱?䅃䥎????ㄠ††?ꅇ?꒽ꕱ???듁꒧ꕄ냊뻷멣룪ꑈ꧒ꚳ앶ꓱ꣒?䥎䅃䥎????ㄠ?ꅇ?꒽ꕱ???듁꒧덑냊뻷멣룪ꑈ꧒ꚳ앶ꓱ꣒?剏??琠†††††?ꅇ?꒽ꕱ?듁꒧앶꽱돸륓뉶??∆剏??琠††††ꅇ?꒽ꕱ?듁꒧앶꽱돸륓뉶뱗뙱??呏䉉乑楴†††?ꅇ?꒽ꕱ?듁Tobin’s Q볆??卉婅?琠††††?ꅇ?꒽ꕱ?듁꒧덗볒??䥎佖?琠††††?ꅇ?꒽ꕱ???듁꒧곣땯볆?? 47
噁??琠†††††?ꅇ?꒽ꕱ???듁꒧곕빬엜늧볆??e楴†††††††† ꅇ?꒽ꕱ???듁꒧득깴뚵????????????????????????? 48
닄꒭론 ꓀꩒ꓨꩫ ꖻ곣ꡳꭙ녎녱ꕸ왗ꑗꖫ꒽ꕱ끝냈돸ꫭꥍ롧샙띳돸꒤꣺녯ꪺ룪껆낵닎군엧쏒ꅁꕈSPSS닎군덮엩뙩ꛦ꓀꩒ꅁꕈ엧쏒ꖻ곣ꡳ꒧낲덝ꅃꖻ곣ꡳ녎뇄ꗎ꣬ꪺ닎군꓀꩒ꓨꩫꚳ뇔굺꧊닎군ꅂ곛쏶꧊꓀꩒ꥍꙨ꒸끪쉫꓀꩒ꅃ ꑀꅂ뇔굺꧊닎군 ꚹ뎡ꗷ녎군뫢곣ꡳ듁뚡꒤ꅁ꧒ꚳ볋ꖻ꒽ꕱ닕ꚨ꽓꧊뭐셾륓ꅂꕄ냊뻷멣룪ꑈ꧒ꚳ앶ꓱ꣒ꅂꕄ냊뻷멣룪ꑈ꧒ꚳ앶ꓱ꣒ꅂꕾ뎡뢳ꑈ볆ꅂꕾ뎡뢳꯹ꓱ꣒떥꒧ꖭꞡ볆ꅂ꒤ꛬ볆ꅂ볐럇깴ꅂ돌ꑪ귈뭐돌ꑰ귈떥뇔굺꧊닎군귈ꅁ듁뇦ꑆ룑볋ꖻ꒽ꕱꙕ뚵엜볆꒧룪껆꓀ꖬ놡ꅃ ꑇꅂ곛쏶꧊꓀꩒ ꚹ뎡꓀Ꙣꑆ룑볒ꮬ꒤ꅁꡍꥷ엜볆꣢꣢뚡걏ꝟꦼꚹ뽗ꗟꅁꡍꥷ덯꣢닕엜볆뚡꒧쏶ꭙ녪ꯗꅃꖻ곣ꡳꕈPearson곛쏶낵곛쏶ꭙ볆샋ꥷꅁꕈꝀ결끪쉫꓀꩒꒧냲슦ꅃ ꑔꅂꙨ꒸끪쉫꓀꩒ 끪쉫꓀꩒ꭙꕈꑀ귓볆귓ꛛ엜볆ꅝindependent variableꅁ뽗ꗟ엜볆ꅞ둹굺ꅂ륷듺꛴군ꑀ꽓ꥷꙝ엜볆ꅝdependent variableꅁ곛엜볆ꅞꪺ꓀꩒ꅃ뒫ꕹ룜뮡ꅁ끪쉫꓀꩒ꕩ곣ꡳꑀ귓볆귓ꛛ엜볆맯삳엜볆꒧뱶암ꅁꛓꛛ엜볆맯ꙝ엜볆꒧엜냊ꚳꪽ뵵쏶ꭙꝙ쓝뵵꧊볒ꮬꅁ뫙결뵵꧊끪쉫ꅁ볒ꮬ꙰ꑕꅇ Yi=a1ꇏß1X1tꇏß2X2tꇏß3X3tꇏꅅꅅꅅꇏßn X ntꇏe i ꣤꒤Yiꅇꙝ엜볆 X1tꅂX2tꅂX3tꅅꅅꅅX ntꅇꛛ엜볆 a1ꅇ멉뙚뚵 49
ß1ꅂß2ꅂß3ꅅꅅꅅßnꅇ끪쉫ꭙ볆 e iꅇ득깴 ꖻ곣ꡳ륂ꗎꙨ꒸끪쉫볒ꮬ룕맏뿅뙱ꅇ ꅝꑀꅞ귓ꝏꛛ엜볆맯ꙝ엜볆ꪺ룑쓀꿠ꑏ결꛳ꅈꙢ닎군ꑗ걏ꝟ꣣ꚳ엣뗛꧊ꅈ ꅝt샋ꥷꅞ ꅝꑇꅞ덺륌Ꝑꥷꭙ볆ꅝR2ꅞꕈ룑쓀뻣엩볒ꮬ꒧룑쓀꿠ꑏꅁꣃ싇ꗑF샋ꥷꕈ샋듺뻣엩볒ꮬ걏ꝟ꣣ꚳ닎군ꑗ꒧엣뗛꧊ꅃ ꙢꙨ꒸끪쉫꓀꩒꒧삳ꗎꑗꅁꖲ뚷닅Ꙙ볒ꮬꪺ냲ꖻ낲덝ꅁꝟꭨ삳녎볒ꮬꕛꕈ귗ꖿꅁ녎룪껆꒩ꕈ신뒫ꅁꕈ쇗ꝋ늣ꗍ떲ꩇꪺ낾뭾ꅃꙝꚹꅁꖻ곣ꡳꝑꗎ녠멁꓀끴샋ꥷꅂ늧뷨엜늧꧊샋ꥷꅂꛛ곛쏶샋ꥷꥍꙀ뵵꧊샋ꥷ떥뙅쉟꧊꓀꩒ꅁꕈ쇗ꝋꛛ엜볆Ꙁ뵵꧊뭐꛴군뭾깴뱶암곣ꡳ떲ꩇ꒧ꖿ뵔꧊ꅃ 50
닄ꕼ뎹 맪쏒떲ꩇ뭐꓀꩒ 결ꑆ엧쏒ꖻ곣ꡳ꒧낲뮡ꅁꑆ룑뻷멣룪ꑈ꽓꧊ꅂꕾ뎡뢳맯낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꪺ뱶암ꅁꙢ롧륌룪껆ꪺ띪뚰뭐띊뻣ꯡꅁ녎럓볋ꖻ뇔굺꧊닎군ꅂ곛쏶꧊꓀꩒ꅂ뻷멣룪ꑈ뭐ꕾ뎡뢳맯낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꪺ뱶암ꅂ뻷멣룪ꑈ맯낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓셚껄뇓띐ꯗꪺ뱶암ꪺ뚶Ꟈ꓀ꝏ엧쏒곣ꡳ낲뮡ꅁꣃ꓀ꝏ뮡ꧺ엧쏒륌땻뭐꣤롱뉛ꅃ 닄ꑀ론 뇔굺꧊닎군 ꖻ곣ꡳ걏ꕈ2002꙾뭐2003꙾Ꙣꕸ왗쏒꣩ꗦ꧶꧒ꑗꖫꪺ꒽ꕱ결곣ꡳ맯뙈ꅁꝑꗎꑗꖫ꒽ꕱ뒦멼ꪺ꙾돸뭐끝냈돸ꝩ룪껆낵꓀꩒뭐놴끑ꅃꫭ4-1걏볋ꖻ늣띾ꪺ꓀ꝇꪬꩰꅁ셠군ꚳꑑ꒭귓늣띾ꅁꙘ군1142볋ꖻꅁ녱ꫭ4-1꒤ꕩꕈ땯뉻볋ꖻ꒤ꕈ륱ꑬ띾ꚳ돌낪ꪺ늣띾ꓱ꣒ꅁꙀꑆ볋ꖻ셠볆ꪺꉈꅁꚸ낪결꾼슴띾ꅝꉈꅞꅃ룔닓늣띾꓀ꖬ놡꙰ꫭ4-1뭐맏4-1ꅃ 51
ꫭ4-1 볋ꖻ늣띾꓀ꝇ띊뻣 늣띾ꙗ뫙91꙾ 92꙾ Ꙙ군??깡볆?ꓱ꣒?깡볆?ꓱ꣒?깡볆?ꓱ꣒?ꓴꩤ띾?8 % 8 % 16 %궹ꭾ띾?22 % 22 % 44 %뛬붦띾?21 % 21 % 42 %꾼슴띾?53 % 52 % 105 %륱뻷뻷뇱띾?33 % 34 % 67 %륱뵵륱왬띾?15 % 15 % 30 %꓆뻇띾?32 % 31 % 63 %곁볾뎳늡띾?7 % 7 % 14 %덹꿈띾?7 % 7 % 14 %뿻앋띾?24 % 24 % 48 %뻳붦띾?9 % 9 % 18 %ꡔꢮ띾?4 % 4 % 8 %륱ꑬ띾?249 % 275 % 524 %샧ꯘ띾?31 % 32 % 63 %왛ꗺ띾?6 % 6 % 12 %꣤ꖦ늣띾?37 % 37 % 74 %Ꙙ군?558 % 584 % 1142 % 52
꣼듺볋ꖻ닕ꚨ늣띾ꓴꩤ띾궹ꭾ띾뛬붦띾꾼슴띾륱뻷뻷뇱띾㘥ㄥ㘥ㄥ㐥㐥㤥륱뵵륱왬띾㘥꓆뻇띾곁볾뎳늡띾덹꿈띾㘥㌥뿻앋띾㐵?ㄥㄥ뻳붦띾ㄥ㈥㐥ꡔꢮ띾륱ꑬ띾샧ꯘ띾왛ꗺ띾꣤ꖦ늣띾 맏4-1 볋ꖻ늣띾꓀ꝇ뛪믦맏 ꗑꫭ4-2ꕩꕈ땯뉻ꕸ왗ꑗꖫ꒽ꕱ낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꖭꞡ볆결384롕/꙾ꅁ꒽ꕱ뚡ꪺ깴늧ꯜꑪꅁ돌낪ꪺꑀ꙾륆꣬8664롕ꅁ돌ꓖꪺꑀ꙾ꑾ롕ꅃꙢ91꙾꣬92꙾뚡ꅁ낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꖭꞡꑗꑆꉈꅁ덯꣢꙾뚡앶꽱돸륓뉶ꑕ궰ꑆꉈꅁ굙ꗑꚹ왛꒧ꅁꕸ왗ꑗꖫ꒽ꕱ낪뚥뫞뉺ꪺ뉻셾륓뭐꒽ꕱ셚껄뚡ꪺ덳떲꧊ꕇ꒣ꑪꅁꖻ뎹꒧ꯡ녎ꕈ끪쉫볒ꮬ꣓샋뗸꣢뚡ꪺꖿ굴Ꙗ쏶ꭙꅃꙢ뻷멣룪ꑈ꧒ꚳ앶ꓱ꣒ꪺ뎡ꗷꅁꕩꕈ땯뉻ꕄ냊뻷멣룪ꑈ꧒ꚳ앶ꖭꞡ볆ꕵ꒽ꕱ꧒ꚳꙢꕾ걹덱ꗷꪺꉈꅁꕂ뭐덑냊뻷멣룪ꑈ꧒ꚳ앶ꖭꞡ볆ꉈ곛ꓱꅁ곹ꕵ걏덑냊뻷멣룪ꑈ꧒ꚳ앶ꖭꞡ볆ꪺ1/8ꅁꝥ뉻뻷멣꧒ꚳ앶ꪺꕄ냊뭐덑냊뎡ꗷ곛맯꒣ꖭꞡꪺ뉻뙈ꅃꕾ뎡뢳ꓱ꣒ꖭꞡ곹결셠뢳깵ꛬꪺ1/3ꅁ꒺뎡뢳ꖭꞡ곹결2/3ꅁ엣ꗜꙢꙨ볆ꑗꖫ꒽ꕱꪺ뢳ꗴꥒ꒴ꕈ꒽ꕱꪺ뫞뉺럭ꞽꚨ귻ꅂ뫞뉺럭ꞽꚨ귻꒧끴낸ꑇ뿋떥ꕈ꒺ꪺ뿋쓝ꅂ뭐뫞뉺럭ꞽꚨ귻쓝꧳Ꙑꑀꩫꑈ뻷멣ꕎꫭꑈꅁ쏶ꭙꗸ띾ꑬ꒽ꕱꪺ뢳뫞뉺럭ꞽꚨ귻결ꕄꅃꕂ꒺뎡뢳꯹ꚳꗷ룻Ꙩꅁꚳꉈꅁꕾ뎡뢳뛈ꉈꅃ꣤빬룔닓놱꣮엜볆ꪺ뇔굺닎군룔꙰ꫭ4-2ꅃ 53
ꫭ??㈠ꙕ엜볆꒧뇔굺꧊닎군?엜볆???ꖭꞡ볆?볐럇깴?돌ꑰ귈?돌ꑪ귈?⁑??꒤ꛬ볆?儳?ꙝ엜볆?????䍐䵐??㌸㐴⸶?㐵㔱?㘱㠶㘴?ㄹ㠶?㈷㠳㐲㈶?∆䍐䵐? ㌰⸶㠳?ㄮ㘹??㤳⸵?㈶⸲??ㄳ⸶ㄵ?〮㤶?㈰?ꛛ엜볆?????䅃䥎?楴??††㈮㔹ㄱ?㜮㜳??㤷⸳????ㄮ㜶??䥎䅃䥎?楴???㈰⸷㐹ㄹ⸸??㤳⸴???ㄵ⸴㌲⸷??何呎??㌳⸹㐷?㈱⸹???㔰?㘶⸶?㠳⸳??何呅䑉??㌮㔴〶?㘮㔵??㘸⸸?〮〶?ㄮ〱㐮〷??∆剏? ?㈶⸳㔶?㈰⸷??㐷㠮?㐱??㔹⸵???㜮?㐱⸶??놱꣮엜볆?????剏??㘮㌹㌹?㈱⸹??㈰㘮?㜰⸵?〮㤸?㜮㘳ㄷ⸴??呏䉉乑?ㄮ㈸〵?〮㘸?〮ㄲ?㘮㔴?〮㠷㈷?ㄮ〹?ㄮ㐹??䥎佖??㈮㐸㠸?㐮㈸??㔴⸱?〮〷?ㄮ㈲㌮ㄴ?卉婅?ㄵ⸰㜹?ㄮ㌱?㤮㐲?ㄹ⸶?ㄴ⸲??ㄴ⸹?ㄵ⸸??噁????ㄷ㘮?㈱㔹?〮〰?㐹㜳?〮ㄷ㈲?ㄮ〷?㔮㜷???ꫭ꒤ꙕ엜볆ꥷ롱결ꅇ䍐䵐?낪뚥뫞뉺ꅝ셠롧뉺ꅞ셾륓ꅝꕡ꒸ꅞꅆ∆䍐䵐?낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓뱗뙱⠥?ꅆ䅃䥎?楴??‽ꭥ듁ꕄ냊뻷멣룪ꑈ꧒ꚳ앶ꓱ꣒⠥?ꅆ䥎䅃䥎?楴??‽ꭥ듁덑냊뻷멣룪ꑈ꧒ꚳ앶ꓱ꣒⠥?ꅆ⁏啔乂‽ꕾ뎡뢳ꓱ꣒⠥?ꅆ?何呅䑉?‽ꕾ뎡뢳꯹ꓱ꣒⠥?ꅆ剏??앶꽱돸륓뉶⠥?ꅆ∆剏???앶꽱돸륓뉶뱗뙱⠥?ꅆ卉婅?덗볒ꅆ呏䉉乑?ꟹ뮫?볆ꅆ䥎佖?곣땯볆⠥?ꅆ噁??곕빬엜늧볆ꅃ†††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††?ㄱ㐲귓왛맮귈ꅃ? 54
닄ꑇ론 곛쏶꧊꓀꩒ 결엧쏒꣢꣢엜볆뚡꒧쏶ꭙꅁꢾꓮꙢ낵끪쉫꓀꩒껉ꅁꛛ엜볆뭐놱꣮엜볆뚡ꙝ곛쏶꧊ꓓ낪늣ꗍ끞쑭꧊냝썄ꅁꖻ곣ꡳꕈSpearman곛쏶ꭙ볆꽸끽엧쏒뭐꓀꩒꒧ꅃ룔꙰ꫭ???ꅃ Ꙣꛛ엜볆뭐놱꣮엜볆뚡ꪺ쏶ꭙ꒤ꅁ낣ꑆ곛쏶ꭙ볆룻낪ꪺ결ꕾ뎡뢳꯹ꓱ꣒ꅝ何呅䑉???ꅞ뭐ꕾ뎡뢳깵ꛬꓱ꣒ꅝ乏啔???ꅞꅝt귈= ꅁp귈< ꅞꅁꥍꟹ뮫Q볆ꅝ呏䉉乑楴ꅞ뭐앶꽱돸륓뉶ꅝ剏???ꅞꅝt귈= ꅁp귈< ꅞꅁ꣤빬엜볆뚡꒧곛쏶ꭙ볆곒ꑰ꧳ꅁ엣ꗜꙨ볆엜볆뚡꒧곛쏶꧊꒣ꑪꅃ결ꑆ뙩ꑀꡂꑆ룑ꛛ엜볆뭐놱꣮엜볆뚡ꪺ곛쏶꧊걏ꝟ맯꧳놵ꑕ꣓ꪺ끪쉫꓀꩒늣ꗍꙀ뵵꧊냝썄ꅁꖻ곣ꡳꙢ끪쉫꓀꩒꒤ꕈ엜늧볆뾱몦ꙝ꿀ꅝvariance-inflation factor, VIFꅞ뙩ꛦ뙅쉟Ꙁ뵵꧊냝썄꒧쑙궫꧊ꅁ룔꙰ꫭ4-4뭐ꫭ4-5ꅁ땯뉻ꙕꛛ엜볆꒧VIF귈곒Ꙣꕈꑕꅁ엣ꗜ엜볆뚡꒧Ꙁ뵵꧊냝썄꒣ꑪꅃ ?????????? 55
ꫭ??㌠곛쏶ꭙ볆꽸끽愠戠??엜볆?䍐䵐楴?∆䍐䵐?? 䅃䥎?楴???䥎䅃䥎?楴???乏啔?楴?何呅䑉?楴?∆剏?楴 剏?楴?呏䉉乑楴?卉婅楴?䥎佖楴?䍐䵐楴??????????????????????∆䍐䵐楴 〮㈱?????????????????????䅃䥎?楴????〮〵????〮〲???????????????????䥎䅃䥎?楴?????〮〴???〮〱????〮〹㐪????????????????乏啔?楴??〮〹㌪??〮〰????〮〸????〮〸㔪??????????????何呅䑉?楴??〮〴???〮〰???〮〹???〮〹㘪??〮㐸ㄪ????????????∆剏?楴 〮〰???〮〶????〮〱???〮〲???〮〰????〮〰???????????剏?楴??〮㈸ㄪ??〮〹???〮〵????〮〵???〮ㄴ㐪??〮〶㐪??〮〳?????????呏䉉乑楴??〮㈸ㄪ??〮?〳?〮〳????〮〴???〮㈲㈪??〮〳????〮〰???〮㐵㘪??????卉婅楴??〮㐳㜪??〮〰???〮㈴㔪??〮〱????〮〸㈪???〮〳????〮〰???〮㈵㔪??〮ㄸ〪????䥎佖楴??〮ㄲ㜪???〮〲???〮〳????〮ㄳ㌪??〮ㄹ㤪??〮〴????〮???〮〱???〮㈰ㄪ???〮〶㌪??噁?楴???〮ㄵ㌪???〮〱???〮?〱?〮〰????〮〲????〮〲????〮〴????〮ㄷ㜪???〮〰????〮㘪??〮?〳愠ꚹ결印敡牭慮곛쏶ꭙ볆꽸끽ꅃ?戠ꙕ엜볆꧒ꕎꫭ꒧ꥷ롱뷐냑럓ꫭ???뮡ꧺꅃ 挠⨪ꅇꫭ륆꣬?ꉈ엣뗛ꓴ럇ꅆ?ꅇꫭ륆꣬?ꉈ엣뗛ꓴ럇 56
닄ꑔ론 뻷멣룪ꑈ뭐ꕾ뎡뢳맯낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꪺ뱶암 Ꙣꖻ론꒤ꅁ곣ꡳ녎엧쏒Ꙣꕸ왗ꪺꑗꖫ꒽ꕱ꒤ꅁ뻷멣룪ꑈ꒶ꑊꅁ걏ꝟ꙰ꙐBorokhovich et al.ꅝ2000ꅞꥍAlmazam et al.ꅝ2004ꅞꪺ곣ꡳ떲ꩇꅁꕄ냊뻷멣룪ꑈꅝ걆ꦲ뻷멣ꅂꕾ냪뻷멣ꅂꥍ꣤ꕌꩫꑈ뻷멣ꅞ곛맯꧳덑냊뻷멣룪ꑈꅝ뿄뻷멣ꅂ꒽ꕱꩫꑈꅂꥍꭈ끕냲ꅞ룻꿠뱶암낪뚥뫞뉺ꅁꙢ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꑗ늣ꗍ룻ꑪꝀꗎꅃꛓꕂ녱Cyert et al.ꅝ1997ꅞ뭐Boydꅝ1994ꅞ곣ꡳ떲ꩇꅁ뭻결ꕾ뎡뢳깵ꛬ뭐ꕾ뎡뢳꯹ꚳꗷ곒맯낪뚥뫞뉺ꪺ셾륓꣣ꚳ뫊놱껄ꩇꅃ걇ꖻ곣ꡳꙐ껉맯ꕄ덑냊뻷멣룪ꑈ뭐ꕾ뎡뢳맯뫞뉺셾륓ꪺ뫊놱꧊낵엧쏒ꅁꣃ맯엧쏒떲ꩇ낵뙩ꑀꡂ놴끑ꅃ 녱ꫭ4-4맪쏒떲ꩇꕩꕈ땯뉻ꅁꙢ놱꣮앶꽱돸륓뉶ꅂTobin’s Q볆ꅂ덗볒ꅂ곣땯녋ꯗꅂ곕빬엜늧꧊떥놱꣮엜볆ꪺ뱶암ꯡꅁꕄ냊뻷멣룪ꑈ꧒ꚳ앶맯꧳낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꚳ엣뗛굴Ꙗ뱶암ꅝt귈= ꅁp귈= ꅞꅁ륆꣬5ꉈꪺ엣뗛ꓴ럇ꅆ땍ꛓ덑냊뻷멣룪ꑈ꧒ꚳ앶맯꧳낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓쇶ꚳ굴Ꙗꪺ뱶암ꅁ꒴꒣꣣엣뗛꧊ꅝt귈= ꅁp귈= ꅞꅃꚹ떲ꩇ쏒맪낲뮡1-aꅃꚹ떲ꩇ뮡ꧺꅁ굙걏꒽ꕱ꧒ꚳ앶꒤ꅁꕄ냊뻷멣룪ꑈ꧒꯹ꗷ띕낪ꅁꙝ꣣ꚳꗎ롽늼ꅝvote on footꅞꪺ꽓꧊ꇐ맯꧳덑룪꒽ꕱꪺꗷ꯹ꚳ덱녠뛈걏뗛늴꧳싇ꗑ룪샲꽱ꪺ왛쉉ꅁ럭덑룪꒽ꕱꙢ믹ꫭ뉻ꑗꅁꕄ냊뻷멣룪ꑈ뭻결꒣ꙁ꣣ꚳꗷ꯹ꚳꪺ믹귈ꅁ꣤ꝙ라싇ꗑ늼꧟냢ꅁꕈ신뒫룪ꙡꪺꓨꚡ맯덑룪꒽ꕱ낪뚥뫞뉺늣ꗍ뫊놱껄ꩇꅁ늣ꗍꕏ낪뚥뫞뉺꒣뒱꺡띎ꡄ꣺뙗썂셾륓ꪺꗘꪺꅃ땍ꛓ덑냊뻷멣룪ꑈꗷ꯹ꚳꪺꗘꪺꅁ덱녠꒣걏ꙝ결돦꿂룪뭐덑룪쏶ꭙꅁ꣢뚡ꕩ꿠ꙝ결ꗦꑥ꯹ꅁ걏늣띾ꑗꑕ륃ꅁꗧ걏ꦼꚹ뚡꣣ꚳ귉뙕쏶ꭙꅁꗧ꣢뚡꣣ꚳ꣤ꕌ뚡놵ꝑ꽱쏶ꭙꅁꝙ꣏덑룪꒽ꕱꪺ믹ꫭ뉻걏꒽ꕱꩶ뉺뻷꣮ꙁ꒣꣎ꅁ덑냊뻷멣룪ꑈꪺꗷ꯹ꚳꕩ꿠엜냊ꗧ꒣ꑪꅁ덑냊뻷멣룪ꑈ맯꧳낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓뫊놱ꪺ뱶암둎꒣룻ꕄ냊뻷멣룪ꑈ결녪ꅃ Ꙣꕾ뎡뢳맯낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꪺ뱶암ꑗꅁ꣢뚵볐ꇐꕾ뎡뢳ꑈ볆ꓱ꣒ꅝt귈= ꅁp귈= ꅞꅂꕾ뎡뢳꯹ꓱ꣒ꅝt귈= ꅁp귈= ꅞ맯꧳낪 57
뚥뫞뉺셾륓곒꒣꣣닎군ꑗꪺ엣뗛꧊ꅁ꒣닅Ꙙ낲덝2ꇐ뭻결ꕾ뎡뢳맯꧳낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꚳ뫊놱껄ꩇꪺ륷듁ꅃꕾ뎡뢳맯낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓꒣꣣뫊놱꿠ꑏꪺ귬ꙝꕩ꿠걏ꙝ결ꕾ뎡뢳꯹ꚳ볆ꓓꓖꅁꖭꞡꑾ곹3ꉈꅁCore et al.ꅝ1999ꅞ뭻결ꕾ뎡뢳꯹볆ꛜꓖ굮륆꣬5ꉈꅁ맯꧳낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꑾ꣣뫊놱껄ꩇꅃꛓꕂEisenbergꅝ1975ꅞ뭻결ꅁꗑ꧳ꕾ뎡뢳면ꯈ왛뭐녍깡ꪺꢤꛢꅁ굙굮꣏뢳라ꚨ결ꑀ귓ꚳ껄ꪺ뫊놱뻷꣮ꅁ삳엽ꕾ뎡뢳ꚳ뢳라ꑪꙨ볆ꪺ깵ꚸꅆ왛냪꒺ꑗꖫ꒽ꕱ뢳라꒤ꅁꕾ뎡뢳뛈셠뢳깵ꛬꪺꑔ꓀꒧ꑀꅁꙢꡍꥷ낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꑗ땯뒧꒣ꑆꡍꥷ꧊ꪺꝀꗎꅃꙁꅁꕸ왗ꑗꖫ꒽ꕱꗦꑥ꯹놡쑙궫ꅁ쇶땍결ꕾ뎡뢳ꅁꕩ걏ꕩ꿠뭐꒽ꕱ뚡꒴꣣ꚳ뚡놵ꝑ꽱쏶ꭙꅁ굙결ꩫꑈ뢳ꅁ꧊뷨ꕩ꿠룻결뛉ꙖAjinkya et al.ꅝ2003ꅞꥷ롱ꪺꅵ녍ꩠ뻷멣룪ꑈꅶ걏ꖻ곣ꡳꥷ롱꒤걹냊꧊룻깴ꪺꅵ덑냊뻷멣룪ꑈꅶꅁ걏ꗑ꒽ꕱ곛쏶꒧ꯟ깶라군깶뻡ꗴ꒧ꕾ뎡뢳ꅁ뻡ꗴ꒽ꕱ뢳꣣ꚳꡄ꣺꒽ꕱꝑ꽱돌ꑪ꓆꒧ꕾꪺ꣤ꕌꗘꪺꅁ덯꒣꣣뽗ꗟ꧊ꪺꕾ뎡뢳덹ꚨ때ꩫꚳ껄뫊놱뭐꣮낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꪺ놡ꅝ뢭믈뗘ꅁ2002ꅞꅃꕂꗑꓽ릩ꗟꅝ2002ꅞꪺ곣ꡳ땯뉻ꅁ냪뢳라룻ꩠ궫냵ꛦ띾냈ꕜ꿠ꅁꛓꦿ늤뫊럾ꕜ꿠ꅁꑝ걏꣏녯ꕾ뎡뢳맯꒽ꕱꪺ뫊럾껄꿠꒣꧶맼엣ꪺ귬ꙝ꒧ꑀꅃꑝ둎걏ꑗ굺귬ꙝꅁ덹ꚨꕾ뎡뢳때ꩫ뭐뫞뉺셾륓ꑀ끟꣏ꗎꅁ맯꒽ꕱꩶ뉺뻷꣮ꪺ낷ꗾ늣ꗍꝕ꽱ꅃ ꚹꕾꅁ셚껄맯꧳낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꗧꚳ뱶암ꅁ꒣뫞걏ꕎꫭ라군셚껄ꪺ앶꽱돸륓뉶ꅝt귈= ꅁp귈= ꅞꅁ걏ꖫ돵셚껄ꪺTobin’s Q볆ꅝt귈= ꅁp귈< ꅞꅁ곒륆꣬1ꉈꪺ엣뗛ꓴ럇ꅃ엣ꗜ꒽ꕱ꧒ꚳꑈ맯꧳ꕎ뉺ꑈꪺ뫊놱ꅁꙝ꒽ꕱ셚껄걏뗻ꥷꕎ뉺ꑈꫭ뉻궫굮ꪺ뻚ꅁꙝꚹ셾륓ꪺ굱ꥷ꒴곛럭뿠셚껄볐ꅃꙢꑕꑀ귓맪쏒꒤ꅁ곣ꡳ녎놴끑셚껄볐맯꧳셾륓꣮굱꙰ꚹ궫굮ꪺ놡ꑕꅁ뻷멣룪ꑈꪺ꒶ꑊ걏ꝟ꿠ꟳꕛ녪낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓뭐꒽ꕱ셚껄뚡ꪺ덳떲ꅃ ???? 58
ꫭ??㐠ꕄ냊뭐덑냊뻷멣룪ꑈ맯낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓뱶암꒧맪쏒떲ꩇ?맪쏒볒ꮬ???䍐䵐楴?ß??ß?䅃䥎??????ß?䥎䅃䥎??????ß?乏啔???ꇏß?何呅䑉???ꇏß?剏???†?†††?ß?呏䉉乑楴?ß?卉婅???ß?䥎佖???ß?噁???? e楴??ꛛ엜볆?ꭙ볆?륷듁닅뢹?볐럇뭾?t귈 p귈 VIF 䅃䥎??????** ꇐ? 䥎䅃䥎?????? ꇐ? 乏啔???? ꇐ? 何呅䑉???? ꇐ? 剏????*** ꇏ? 呏䉉乑楴?*** ꇏ? < 卉婅楴?*** ꇏ? < 䥎佖??*** ꇏ? < 噁?楴?*** ? < ??㴰⸲㜲†䅤橵獴敤⁒?㴰⸲㘵?䵯摥氠䘽‴〮ㄸ㤨瀼〮〰〰ㄩ??맪쏒볒ꮬ꒤ꙕ엜볆꧒ꕎꫭ꒧ꥷ롱뷐냑럓ꫭ???뮡ꧺꅃ??⨪?ꅇꫭ륆꣬?ꉈ엣뗛ꓴ럇ꅆ⨪ꅇꫭ륆꣬?ꉈ엣뗛ꓴ럇ꅆ?ꅇꫭ륆꣬ꉈ엣뗛ꓴ럇ꅃ? 59
닄ꕼ론 뻷멣룪ꑈ맯낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓셚껄뇓띐ꯗꪺ뱶암 뻷멣룪ꑈ맯꧳낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓셚껄뇓띐ꯗꪺ맪쏒떲ꩇ꙰ꫭ4-5꧒ꗜꅁꕄ냊뻷멣룪ꑈ맯꧳낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓셚껄뇓띐ꯗꚳ엣뗛ꖿꙖ쏶ꭙꅝt귈= ꅁp귈= ꅞꅁ륆꣬1ꉈꪺ엣뗛ꓴ럇ꅃ덑냊뻷멣룪ꑈ쇶땍ꑝ맯낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓뽮껄뇓띐ꯗꚳꖿꙖ뱶암ꅁ꒣꣣엣뗛꧊ꅃꚹ떲ꩇ꒣뛈Ꙍ쏒ꗑHartzell and Starksꅝ2003ꅞ뭐Almazam et al.ꅝ2004ꅞꪺ곣ꡳ떲ꩇ뇀뻉ꕘꪺ낲뮡1-b륷듁ꅆꕄ냊뻷멣룪ꑈ룻꿠맯낪뚥뫞뉺땯뒧뫊놱Ꝁꗎꅁ덑냊뻷멣룪ꑈꪺ뫊놱껄ꩇꭨ룻깺ꅃꛓꕂꗑꚹ떲ꩇꑝꕩ뮡ꧺꅁꕄ냊뻷멣룪ꑈ꒣뛈ꕩ뭐낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꑀ끟꣏ꗎꅁꕂꕄ냊뻷멣룪ꑈꪺ꒶ꑊꅁꟳꕩ낷ꗾꕈ꒽ꕱ셚껄결냲슦ꪺ낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓꣮ꯗꅃ 덜Ꙩ곣ꡳ곒ꑷ엣ꗜ뻷멣룪ꑈ꣣ꚳ돟ꙮ꽓껭룪볐ꪺꪺ꽓꧊ꅝBennett, Sias and Starks, 2003; Binay, 2002ꅞꅁꙝ결뻷멣룪ꑈ꧒ꚳ앶꯹ꚳ룻ꑀ꿫룪ꑈ결Ꙩꅁ꣣ꚳ놱꣮믹ꪺ꿠ꑏꅁꗧꚳ았꣏꒽ꕱ엜ꕈꝬꓞ뻷멣룪ꑈ룪ꪺ꿠ꑏꅃ꙰ꖻ론뻷멣룪ꑈ맯낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓셚껄뇓띐ꯗꪺ엧쏒ꅁ땯뉻ꕄ냊뻷멣룪ꑈ맯꧳셾륓셚껄뇓띐ꯗ뚡꣣ꚳ곛쏶꧊ꅁ둎꿠ꭐ꣏꒽ꕱ엜낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓떲멣ꅁ뱗ꕛ맯낪뚥뫞뉺꣫뽅꧊셾륓ꅝ꙰쏘뭐뿯뻜앶걏뉻꓀공ꅞ셠셾륓ꪺꓱ꣒ꅁ듮ꓖ뛇닎ꕈ낪뚥뫞뉺ꥷ셾륓결ꕄ굮ꪺ셾륓꣓랽ꪺꓨꚡꅁꕈꝬꓞꕄ냊뻷멣룪ꑈꪺ룪ꅃꕂꚹ뫘뭐셚껄곛덳떲ꪺ셾륓꣮ꯗꑝ룻꿠녎ꕎ뉺ꑈ뭐꧒ꚳꑈꪺꗘ볐Ꝁ덳떲ꅁ듮ꓖ때뿗ꪺꕎ뉺ꚨꖻꅃ Ꙣ꣤빬곛쏶엜볆ꑗꅁ뛈앶꽱돸륓뉶뭐셾륓뱗뙱뚡꣣ꚳ엣뗛ꖿꙖ쏶ꭙꅝt귈= ꅁp귈= ꅞꅁ륆꣬1ꉈꪺ엣뗛ꓴ럇ꅁ엣ꗜ럭꙾ꯗꪺ라군셚껄ꫭ뉻라맯낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓뱗ꕛ뭐ꝟ늣ꗍꗟꝙ꧊ꪺ뱶암ꅆ굙럭꙾ꯗ셚껄꒣꣎ꅁꕩ꿠둎라ꗟꝙ맯낪뚥뫞뉺늣ꗍ듮셾걏꒣ꕛ셾ꪺ껄ꩇꅃ???? 60
ꫭ??㔠ꕄ냊뭐덑냊뻷멣룪ꑈ맯낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓셚껄뇓띐ꯗ뱶암꒧맪쏒떲ꩇ?맪쏒볒ꮬ???∆䍐䵐楴?ß0?ß1?∆剏?楴ꇑ䅃䥎?楴??⤫ß2?∆剏?楴ꇑ䥎䅃䥎?楴??⤫ß3䅃䥎?楴?? †††??ß?䥎䅃䥎?楴???ß5?剏?楴?ß?剏?楴?ß7呏䉉乑楴?ß8卉婅楴?ß9䥎佖楴?†††??ß10噁?楴? e楴???ꛛ엜볆?ꭙ볆?륷듁닅뢹?볐럇뭾?t귈 p귈 VIF ∆剏?楴ꇑ䅃䥎?楴 ?? *** ꇏ? ∆剏?楴ꇑ䥎䅃䥎?楴?? ꇏ? ∆剏?楴 ꇏ? 䅃䥎?????? ꇐ? 䥎䅃䥎?????? ꇐ? 剏????*** ꇏ? 呏䉉乑楴? ꇏ? 卉婅楴? ꇏ? 䥎佖?? ꇏ? 噁?楴? ? ? 61
닄꒭뎹 떲뷗뭐ꯘ쒳 ꖻ뎹껚뻚곣ꡳ맪쏒떲ꩇꅁ맯꧳낲덝륷듁ꅁ쉫꿇ꕘ둘쉉떲뷗ꅁꣃ꓀ꝏ맯꒽ꕱꅂ룪ꑈꅁ뭐걆ꦲ뒣ꕘ둘쉉뫞뉺맪냈ꑗꪺꯘ쒳ꅃ결꣏ꯡ쓲곣ꡳꙢ녱곛쏶곣ꡳ껉꿠ꟳ결뚶ꝑ뇀깩ꅁꑝ룔굺둘쉉ꯡ쓲곣ꡳꯘ쒳뭐ꖻ곣ꡳꙢ뻞Ꝁ껉꧒꣼꣬ꪺ궭꣮ꅁ듁뇦ꖼ꣓곣ꡳ꿠Ꙣꖻ곣ꡳ냲슦ꑗꅁ맯꧳뻷멣룪ꑈ뭐ꕾ뎡뢳Ꙣ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꑗꪺ쒳썄ꑗ꿠ꟳꕛ깩뭐ꕒ맪ꅃ 닄ꑀ론 곣ꡳ떲뷗뭐ꯘ쒳 ꑀꅂ곣ꡳ떲뷗 륌ꕨꕸ왗맯낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓뭐꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꪺ곣ꡳ꒤ꅁꙨ녎뫞뉺셾륓뭐꒽ꕱ셚껄낵덳떲ꕈ룑ꡍ꙳Ꙣ꧒ꚳꑈ뭐ꕎ뉺ꑈ뚡ꪺꅵꕎ뉺냝썄ꅶꅃꚹ뫘Ꝁꩫ깥꧶덹ꚨ꒽ꕱꕎ뉺ꑈꚨꖻꪺ때궭뾱뗈ꅁꕂꭐ꣏낪뚥뫞뉺뛈ꩠ궫꒽ꕱ땵듁셚껄ꅁꛓꦿ늤꒽ꕱꪺ듁ꝑ꽱ꅁ맯꧳꒽ꕱ뻣엩땯깩ꖼꖲꚳꝑꅃꖻ곣ꡳ놴끑ꕸ왗꧒ꚳ앶ꖫ돵ꑗ뻚띕결궫굮ꙡꛬꪺ뻷멣룪ꑈꥍ꫱꙾꣓볶ꪺ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꑵ꣣ꇐꕾ뎡뢳떥꣢뫘꒺뎡ꩶ뉺뻷꣮맯꧳꒽ꕱ낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꪺ뱶암ꅁ샋엧뻷멣룪ꑈꪺ꒶ꑊ뭐ꕾ뎡뢳ꪺ뽗ꗟ꧊걏ꝟꕩꕈ륆꣬ꟳꙮꪺ낪뚥뫞뉺뫊놱ꥍꟳꙮꪺ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꅁꑝꕩꕈ꣮셚껄냲슦셾륓꣮ꯗꑕ맯ꗸ띾덹ꚨꪺꅵꕾ뎡꧊ꅶꅁ늣ꗍꟳꙨꚳꝑꪺ믹껦룪룻ꝃꪺ뫊놱ꚨꖻꅁ뙩ꛓ맯꒽ꕱꪺ셚껄늣ꗍ뱶암ꅃ룻결꽓ꝏꪺ걏ꅁꖻ곣ꡳ뭻결륌ꕨ곣ꡳ맯꧳뻷멣룪ꑈ꒶ꑊ맯꧳꒽ꕱꩶ뉺늣ꗍ뱶암ꪺ꒣ꑀ교꧊ꅁ쏶쇤Ꙣ꧳뻷멣룪ꑈꙝꖻꢭ꽓꧊라늣ꗍ꒣Ꙑꪺ뫊놱녪ꯗꅁꖻ곣ꡳ냑ꛒAlmazam et al.ꅝ2004ꅞꪺ꓀쏾ꓨꚡꅁ뻷멣룪ꑈ걹냊꧊꓀ꚨꅵꕄ냊ꅶ뭐ꅵ덑냊ꅶ꣢뫘ꅁ꓀ꝏ놴끑꣢뫘뻷멣룪ꑈ맯꧳낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꪺ뱶암ꅃ꿷녎ꖻ곣ꡳ꒧맪쏒떲ꩇ띊뻣꙰ꑕꅇ 롧륌닎군엧쏒ꅁ땯뉻ꕄ냊뻷멣룪ꑈ꧒ꚳ앶ꅁꝙ걆ꦲ뻷멣ꅂꕾ냪뻷멣ꅂꥍ꣤ꕌꩫꑈ뻷멣ꅁ맯꧳꒽ꕱ뫞뉺꣣ꚳ룻ꑪꪺ뫊놱ꑏꅆꕄ냊뻷멣룪ꑈ꧒ꚳ앶띕낪ꅁ낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓띕ꝃꅁ셾륓셚껄뇓띐ꯗ띕낪ꇐꭐ꣏낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓꣮ꥷꕛ녪뫞뉺 62
셾륓뭐꒽ꕱ셚껄뚡ꪺ덳떲꧊ꅁ덑냊뻷멣룪ꑈ맯꧳낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓걏셾륓셚껄뇓띐ꯗꣃꡓꚳ엣뗛ꪺ뱶암ꅃꗑꚹꕩꢣꅁꕄ냊뻷멣룪ꑈ뫊놱ꕩꕈ뭐뭐셚껄곛덳떲ꪺ꣫뽅꧊셾륓ꑀ끟꣏ꗎꅁꕩꕈꚳ껄궰ꝃꕎ뉺ꚨꖻꅁ듮뵷ꕎ뉺ꑈ뭐꧒ꚳꑈ뚡ꪺꕎ뉺냝썄ꅃ ꛓꕂꚹ떲ꩇ엣ꗜꕄ냊뻷멣룪ꑈ뭐덑냊뻷멣룪ꑈ곛ꓱꅁ꣤면ꑆꑀ귓룻결궫굮ꪺꢤꛢꅆꙝ결ꕄ냊뻷멣룪ꑈ덱녠꒣쏶ꓟ꣤뭐꒽ꕱꖼ꣓쏶ꭙꪺ뫻꯹ꅁꖦ귌룻녠ꕈ걉ꕛ꒩덑룪꒽ꕱ뫞뉺삣ꑏ걏ꕈꗎ롽늼ꅝvote on footꅞꪺꓨꚡ꣓땯뒧꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꕜ꿠ꅁ꣏듮뵷ꩆꥍ꒽ꕱꕎ뉺ꑈ뚡ꪺꝑ꽱뷄곰ꅃ 땍ꛓꅁꕾ뎡뢳맯꧳낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓꒣꙰륷듁꣣ꚳ뫊놱껄ꩇ닅Ꙙꅃꖻ곣ꡳꕈꕾ뎡뢳꒽ꕱ뢳라깵ꛬꓱ꣒ꥍ꯹ꚳ꒽ꕱ꧒ꚳ앶ꓱ꣒Ꝁ결뿅뙱맯낪뚥뫞뉺뱶암ꪺ볐ꅁ떲ꩇ땯뉻때뷗걏ꕾ뎡뢳깵ꛬ걏꧒ꚳ앶ꓱ꣒ꅁ뭐낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓뚡곒때엣뗛뱶암ꅃ뇀듺귬ꙝꑔ쉉꙰ꑕꅇ ꅝꑀꅞꕾ뎡뢳꒣꣣뽗ꗟ꧊ꅇ쇶땍ꕾ뎡뢳ꭄ꒽ꕱ걏쏶ꭙꗸ띾ꪺ뢳ꅂ꣼뚱ꑈꅁ걏꣤뿋쓝ꅁꕩ꿠라ꙝ뭐꒽ꕱ뚡꣣ꚳ뚡놵ꝑ꽱쏶ꭙꇐ귉뙕쏶ꭙ걏냓띾ꦹ꣓ꅁ꒽ꕱ뚡덺륌ꗦꑥ꯹ꪺꓨꚡ륆꣬돦꿂룪ꕾꪺ꣤ꕌꗘꪺꅁ꣏ꕾ뎡뢳꿊ꕆ뽗ꗟ꧊ꅁꭤ깺꣤뫊놱껄ꩇꅝ뢭믈뗘ꅁ2002ꅞꅃꕂꗑ뻷멣룪ꑈ맯낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꪺ엧쏒꒤ꅁ땯뉻걹냊꧊룻ꝃꪺꅵ덑냊뻷멣룪ꑈꅶꇐ뿄뻷멣ꅂ꒽ꕱꩫꑈꅁꥍꭈ끕냲떥맯꒽ꕱꩶ뉺땯뒧ꪺ뱶암룻ꑰꅁ녱곛쏶꓀꩒꒤땯뉻ꅁ덑냊뻷멣룪ꑈ뚰꒤ꯗ뭐ꕾ뎡뢳꯹볆뚡ꝥ뉻ꖿꙖ엣뗛쏶ꭙꅁ엣ꗜ덑냊뻷멣룪ꑈ꧒ꚳ앶뭐꒽ꕱꕾ뎡뢳꯹볆뚡덜ꚳ궫야ꪺ뎡꓀ꅆ굙덯뻷멣룪ꑈ굙ꚨ결꒽ꕱꕾ뎡뢳ꪺꕄ엩ꅁꗧ라엽ꕾ뎡뢳ꪺ뫊놱꿠ꑏ돠ꖢꅃ ꅝꑇꅞꕾ뎡뢳ꓱ꣒륌ꝃꅇ뻣엩ꛓꢥꅁꙢꕸ왗ꑗꖫ꒽ꕱ꒤ꕾ뎡뢳ꓱ꣒ꖭꞡ뛈꧒ꚳ뢳깵ꛬꪺꑔ꓀꒧ꑀꅁ꯹ꚳꗷꑝ뛈ꚳ3ꉈꅁꙢCore et al.ꅝ1999ꅞꪺ곣ꡳ꒤ꅁ뭻결ꕾ뎡뢳꯹볆ꛜꓖ굮륆꣬5ꉈꅁ맯꧳낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꑾ꿠꣣뫊놱껄ꩇꅁꛓꕸ왗ꑗꖫ꒽ꕱ뢳라ꕾ뎡뢳곒ꖼ륆꣬ꚹꓴ럇ꅃ?ꅝꑔꅞ뢳라낾궫띾냈ꕜ꿠ꅇꗑ꧳냪뢳라꒧덝군룻ꩠ궫냵ꛦ띾냈ꕜ꿠ꅁꛓꦿ 63
늤뫊럾ꕜ꿠ꅁ꣏녯ꕾ뎡뢳맯꒽ꕱꪺ뫊럾껄꿠꒣꧶맼엣ꅝꓽ릩ꗟꅁ㈰〲ꅞꅃ ꫭ5-1 ꖻ곣ꡳ꒧곣ꡳ낲덝맪쏒떲ꩇ띊뻣?낲덝?꒺깥?떲ꩇ?낲덝1-a ꕄ냊뻷멣룪ꑈ꧒ꚳ앶띕낪ꅁ낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓띕ꝃꅃ ꚨꗟ?낲덝1-b ꕄ냊뻷멣룪ꑈ꧒ꚳ앶띕낪ꅁ낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓셚껄뇓띐ꯗ띕낪ꅃ ꚨꗟ?낲덝2 ꕾ뎡뢳맯꧳낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꚳ뫊놱껄ꩇꅃ ꒣ꚨꗟ??ꑇꅂꯘ쒳?††끷맯ꖻ곣ꡳ떲뷗ꅁ곣ꡳ맯꒽ꕱꅂ룪ꑈꅁ뭐걆ꦲ뒣ꕘ둘쉉ꯘ쒳꙰ꑕꅇ?ꅝꑀꅞ맯꒽ꕱꪺꯘ쒳? 롧륌엧쏒녯ꪾꅁꕄ냊뻷멣룪ꑈ뭐뫞뉺셾륓ꥍ뫞뉺셾륓뚡꙳Ꙣ엣뗛쏶ꭙꅁ결ꑆꝬꓞ뻷멣룪ꑈꪺ룪ꅁ꒽ꕱꝙꕩ녱낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓떲멣ꑗ뗛ꓢꅁ꣏싇ꗑꕾ룪ꥍ걆ꦲꩫꑈ떥뻷멣룪ꑈꪺ룪륆꣬ꖫ돵ꑗꭇ쑒ꪺ셚껄ꫭ뉻ꅃꛓꕂꝑꗎꕄ냊뻷멣룪ꑈꅂ낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓뚡ꪺꧨ뒫쏶ꭙꅁꙐ껉Ꝁꗎꅁ꒽ꕱꕩ듮ꓖꕎ뉺ꚨꖻꅁ륆꣬륷듁ꩶ뉺ꪺꗘꪺꅃ Ꙣꕾ뎡뢳뫊놱꿠ꑏꓨ궱ꅁꙝ결깵ꛬꓱ꣒뭐꯹ꚳꗷ륌ꝃꅁ때ꩫ맯뫞뉺늣ꗍ덗뵤껄ꩇꅃꖼ꣓굙꒽ꕱ때ꩫꙢꕾ뎡뢳깵ꛬꑗ꒩ꕈ뱗ꕛꅁꕩ싇ꗑ귗뢳라뎹땻ꅁ뷡꒩ꕾ뎡뢳꽓껭ꪺꫭꡍ앶ꑏꅁꕈꢾꓮ꒺뎡뢳뭐뫞뉺꓄떲ꅁꛓꕾ뎡뢳때ꑏꓮꪺ놡ꩰ땯ꗍꅃ ꅝꑇꅞ맯룪ꑈꪺꯘ쒳 룪ꑈꙢꝐ쉟꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꪺ닻껉ꅁꑝꕩꕈꕄ냊뻷멣룪ꑈꪺ꧒ꚳ앶Ꙩ맨럭ꑀꝐ쉟볐ꅁꕄ냊뻷멣룪ꑈ꧒ꚳ앶룻Ꙩꪺ꒽ꕱꅁ룻깥꧶꣼꣬꣤뱶암ꛓ떽꣤꒽ꕱꩶ뉺떲멣ꅁ꙰뫞뉺셾륓ꅃ 64
ꅝꑔꅞ맯걆ꦲ뻷쏶ꪺꯘ쒳 륌ꕨꪺ왛꧀셠뭻결ꕾ룪걏ꖫ꒤ꪺ걸ꓴ뉲썾ꅁ룪ꖻ뚯ꭰ샲ꝑꑆ떲ꯡꝙꚬꓢꪺ꽓꧊ꅁ맯꧳ꖫꪺ엜냊녠늣ꗍ궫ꑪꪺ뱶암ꅁ걆ꦲꑝ굱ꗟ덜Ꙩ맯꧳ꕾ룪뙩ꑊꕸ왗룪ꖻꖫ돵ꪺ궭꣮ꅃꙢꖻ곣ꡳ꒤땯뉻ꅁꕾ룪ꪺ낪걹냊꽓꧊Ꙣ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꑗ면ꑆ궫굮ꪺ뫊놱ꕜ꿠ꅁ뷕ꥍꕎ뉺ꑈ뭐꧒ꚳꑈ꣢ꪺꗘ볐ꅁ듮뮴꒽ꕱꪺꕎ뉺ꚨꖻꅃꖼ꣓걆ꦲꙢꛒ뱻맯꧳ꕾ룪ꪺ룪걆떦껉ꅁꕩꕈ녎ꕾ룪꧒ꕎꫭꪺ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꕜ꿠ꑀ꣖꿇ꑊ뻣엩ꛒ뙱ꅃ 65
닄ꑇ론 ꯡ쓲곣ꡳꯘ쒳뭐곣ꡳ궭꣮ ꑀꅂ맯ꯡ쓲곣ꡳꪺꯘ쒳 ꅝꑀꅞꖻ곣ꡳꙢꕾ뎡뢳맯뫞뉺셾륓ꪺ뫊놱꿠ꑏ뿅뙱ꑗꅁꖻ곣ꡳꕵ녎뢳라ꚨ 귻닊꓀결꒺뎡뢳뭐ꕾ뎡뢳꣢뫘ꅁꖼꙁ뉠ꑊ놴ꡄꕾ뎡뢳ꪺꢭ꓀ꅁꙝ결 Hallockꅝ1997ꅞ땯뉻뢳곛꒬덳떲(reciprocally interlocking boards of directors)ꪺ꒽ꕱ5ꅁ꣤CEOꪺ셾륓룻낪ꅁLambert, Larcker and Weigelt.ꅝ1993ꅞꑝ땯뉻CEO 겣꒧뢳ꓱ뉶뭐꣤셾륓ꚳ엣뗛ꪺꖿꙖ쏶ꭙꅁꕩꢣꕾ뎡뢳ꪺꢭꗷ뱶암꣤뽗ꗟ꧊뭐뫊놱ꛦ결ꅃꖼ꣓곣ꡳꙢ놴ꡳꕾ뎡뢳뭐뫞뉺셾륓쏶ꭙ껉ꅁꕩ녎ꕾ뎡뢳ꪺꢭ꓀꽓꧊ꑀ꣖ꛒ뱻ꅃ ꅝꑇꅞꙢ낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꪺ덂뉺ꑗꅁ낣ꑆ끝냈돸ꫭꑗ뒣꣑ꪺ뉻셾륓룪껆ꅝ굙꙾ 돸꒴ꚳ뒦앓ꅞꅁꕩꕈꕈ냝ꣷꪺꓨꚡ꣺녯낪뚥뫞뉺늼꓀공ꅂ쏘뭐뿯뻜앶 ꥍ꣤ꕌ륓녥ꓨꚡꪺ룪껆ꅁꕈꡄ교ꟳ결럇뵔ꪺ떲ꩇꅃꕂ낪뚥뫞뉺ꪺ뵤돲ꕩ ꕈ녱꒽ꕱ셠롧뉺ꅂ셠뗴ꅂCEO쉘꣬냆셠ꅁ뱗ꕛ볋ꖻ볆ꅁꕂꕩꕈ샋듺뻷 멣룪ꑈ뭐ꕾ뎡뢳ꪺ뫊놱걏ꝟ뛈궭꧳셠롧뉺뱨꿅ꅃ ꑇꅂ곣ꡳ궭꣮ ꅝꑀꅞꕸ왗Ꙣꑗꖫ꒽ꕱ덗뵤낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓뒦앓ꑗꅁ뛈궭꧳뉻셾륓뎡꓀ꅁ뫞 뉺셾륓ꪺ땯꧱ꕩꕈꚳ덜Ꙩ뫘ꓨꚡꅁ꙰늼꓀공ꅂ쏘뭐뿯뻜앶떥ꅁ덯 룪끔곒꒣ꙢꙨ볆ꑗꖫ꒽ꕱ쑀띎뒦앓ꪺ뵤돲ꅁ굙ꕈ뉻셾륓결뫞뉺셾륓꒧ ꕎꫭꅁꙝ꒣ꪾ꣤꧒꧒ꚳ셾륓꒧ꓱ꣒ꅁ맯꧳ꓥ쑭ꪺ뇀뷗ꚳ꧒ꭝ궭ꅁ룻깥꧶ 늣ꗍ뭐륷듁꒣닅Ꙙꪺ놡ꅃꕂꚳ덜Ꙩ꒽ꕱ곆ꛜ꒣뒦앓낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓ꅁ ꣏녯ꕩ뭠뚰꣬ꪺ볋ꖻ볆궰ꝃꅃ ꅝꑇꅞꖻ곣ꡳꙢꕾ뎡뢳맯낪뚥뫞뉺셾륓엧쏒껉ꅁ뛈꿠녱꙾돸꒧뢳뫊뭐뫞뉺 ꑈ룪껆Ꝑꥷ뢳꒧꒺ꕾ뎡쏶ꭙꅁꙢ꒽ꕱꖼꕄ냊뒦앓ꕾ뎡뽗ꗟ뢳ꪺ놡 5 Hallock (1997) ꥷ롱뢳곛꒬덳떲결ꅇA꒽ꕱ뉻ꗴꪺ셠뗴결B꒽ꕱꪺ뢳ꅁꙐ껉ꅁB꒽ꕱꪺ뉻 ꗴꪺ셠뗴ꗧ결A꒽ꕱꪺ뢳ꅃ 66
ꑕꅁꚹ뫘ꓨꚡꝐꥷꑕꪺ꒺ꕾ뎡뢳ꕩ꿠뭐맪믚놡ꚳ꧒ꕘꑊꅁꟳꕩ꿠ꚨ 결곣ꡳ낲뮡꒣꿠ꚨꗟꪺ귬ꙝꅃ 67
냑ꛒꓥ쑭 ꑀꅂ꒤ꓥ뎡꓀ ꓽ릩ꗟꅁ200?ꅁ뢳라떲멣뭐꒽ꕱ곕빬ꪺ뛇뮼껄ꩇꅁꡰꗟꩆꝤꑪ뻇라군뻇곣ꡳ꧒ 뫓ꑨ뷗ꓥꅃ ꕀ곉믈ꛦꅁ1999ꅁ셰Ꙙ냪ꕀ곉믈ꛦ돸ꝩꅃ Ꝥ띱ꅁ2004ꅁ럭ꕎ꒤냪롧샙궲ꅁꑗ껼뮷ꩆꕘꪩꫀꅃ Ꟶ뱷곂ꅁ1992ꅁꗸ띾귻ꑵ맯셾륓꣮ꯗ삳꒧곣ꡳꅁꡰꗟ꒤냪ꓥ꓆ꑪ뻇ꗸ띾뫞뉺곣ꡳ꧒뫓ꑨ뷗ꓥꅃ ꥐ뱺꙰ꅁ2004/11/5ꅁOECDꗬ싄듋ꅇ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺 ꗸ띾ꗍ꙳귬ꭨꅁꑵ냓껉돸ꅃ ꩌ뽯ꫢꅁ1999ꅁꕸ왗ꑗꖫ꒽ꕱ놱뫞뻷꣮꒧곣ꡳ-놴끑깡뇚ꗸ띾뭐ꭄ깡뇚ꗸ띾낪뚥ꕄ뫞셾륓뭐싷슾ꪺ놱뫞껄ꩇꅁ냪ꗟ꒤ꑳꑪ뻇ꗸ띾뫞뉺뻇꡴돕ꑨ뷗ꓥꅃ 굊꫶쒫ꅁ2004ꅁ꒺놱ꅵ꒣ꭏ쁉ꅶꕾ뎡ꩆ뵝껖ꛛꑶ꣓ꇐ녍던ꗾ뉹돌ꑪꙁꭏ뚰많뢳뷍꒽ꕱꩶ뉺띳쇍뛕ꅁ냓띾뙧ꕚꅁ닄890듁ꅃ 낪ꥧ?ꅁ1999ꅁ뻷멣룪ꑈ꯹낾ꙮ뭐셚껄꒧곣ꡳꅁ냪ꗟ꒤ꖿꑪ뻇라군뻇곣ꡳ꧒뫓ꑨ뷗ꓥꅃ 녩ꓵ샩ꅁ1996ꅁ셾륓ꪺ곛쏶뉺뷗볒ꚡꅁꑈ뫞뉺ꅁ33(2)ꅃ 뇤냪뚯ꅁ1998ꅁ엜냊ꚡ셾룪맯셾룪몡ꢬꪺ뱶암ꅁ꒤귬뻇돸ꅁ28(4)ꅁ1-11ꅃ 뎯ꞻꅁ1995ꅁ깡뇚ꗸ띾ꅂ셰쓝꯹뭐롧샧셚껄꒧곣ꡳꅁ냪ꗟ꒤ꖡꑪ뻇끝냈뫞뉺곣ꡳ꧒뫓ꑨ뷗ꓥꅃ 뎯녱롴ꅁ2003ꅁ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺ꅂ낪뚥뫞뉺ꟳ궡뭐ꗸ띾믹귈쏶ꭙ꒧곣ꡳꅁ냪ꗟ꒤ꖿꑪ 뻇ꗸ띾뫞뉺곣ꡳ꧒뫓ꑨ뷗ꓥꅃ 뎰귅몽ꅁ2004/11/2ꅁ뢳뫊륓돒꓀공엜ꚨ돌낪뻷녋ꅁ셰Ꙙ돸ꅁB1ꅃ 독쇩꒯ꅂ볚뙩ꑨ뭐녩쑟ꗺꅁ2000ꅁ냪ꗸ띾롧뉺ꑈ셾륓뭐꣤롧샧셚껄꒧맪쏒곣ꡳꅁ ꕸ왗롧샙뻇라2000꙾꙾라ꅁꕸꕟꅁꕸ왗ꅃ 뙤곮ꯌꅁ1996ꅁ낪뚥ꕄ뫞륓돒뭐꒽ꕱ롧샧셚껄꒧맪쏒곣ꡳꅁ냪ꗟꕸ왗ꑪ뻇라군뻇 ꡴뫓ꑨ뷗ꓥꅃ 뛀굞ꦾꅁ1997ꅁ뉻ꕎꑈꑏ룪랽뫞뉺ꅁꕸꕟꅇ뗘껵껑ꞽꅃ 램쒣뫕ꅁ1998ꅁꕸꅂ과ꅂꓩ룪Ꙣꕸꗸ띾ꭾ뷨뫞뉺껄뉶꒧ꓱ룻곣ꡳꅁ냪ꗟꚨꕜꑪ뻇ꑵ띾뫞뉺뻇꡴뫓ꑨ뷗ꓥꅃ 뢭Ꙋ껉ꅁ2000ꅁꗸ띾귛뉺ꪺ꓀꩒볒ꚡ뭐엩꣮엜빅ꅁꓓ롧샙뫞뉺뗻뷗ꅁ3(2?ꅁ1-13ꅃ 뢭믈뗘ꅁ2002ꅁ녱ꕸ왗ꑗꖫ꒽ꕱ뫴꾸룪끔뒦앓곝덺ꧺꯗꅁ라군곣ꡳꓫꕚꅁ닄200듁ꅁ70-77ꅃ 뢭믈뗘ꅂꟵ꙳귗뭐걟꧓꺦ꅁ2002ꅁ꒽ꕱꩶ뉺뭐뗻꓀꡴닎ꅁ냓뒼ꓥ꓆띾ꗷꚳ궭꒽ꕱꅃ 뷑꧓ꧺꅁ1995ꅁ셾룪덝군굮꿀뭐닕슴껄꿠쏶ꭙ꒧곣ꡳꇐꕈ닕슴꽓꧊뭐ꗴ냈꽓꧊결놡맒엜볆ꅁ냪ꗟꕸ왗ꑪ뻇냓뻇곣ꡳ꧒돕ꑨ뷗ꓥꅃ 68
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