（TOC约束理论）W
Whatmakesyourstockpricegoupanddown
TheMcKinseyQuarterly,2002Number2
’sshareholdersagreewithaparticularmove,orwilltheyfailtounderstandthemotivesbehinditandpunishthestockaccordingly?Andwhatcanmanagementdotoimprovetheoute?
Tryingtopredictstockpricemovementsisnecessary,,whenstockpricesfall,thecostofborrowingandofissuingnewequitycanrise,,however,mostofthesepredictionsarenomorethanroughguesses,becausethetoolsCEOs
(NPV)maybeusefulforestimatingthelong-
termintrinsicvalueofshares,,conductedbythepanyorbyinvestmentbankers,arenomorereliableforgaugingmarketreactions.
,rigorousapproach,,onlya
finitenumberofinvestorsreallymatterwhenitestopredictingstockpricemovements.
EveryCEOknowsthatwhenbuyersaremoreanxioustobuythansellersaretosell,sharepricesrise—
dunderstandingwhatmotivatesthem,executivescanpredicthowtheywillreacttoannouncements—andmoreaccuratelyestimatethedirectionofstockprices.
Armedwiththesenewandsolidinsightsabouthowcriticalinvestorsbehaveinspecificsituations,,sell,orholdthepany’-
termselling,apanycouldmanagethetiming,pace,
offfareinthemarket?Doesthepanyneedtopreparethemarketortoconsideracarve-outinstead?
ACEOevenhasthechoiceofforgingaheadinthefaceofadversepredictions,,forinstance,considerboldstrategieseventhoughtheycouldpushsomecriticalinvestorstosellthepany’sstock.
THEFEWTHATMATTER
Itshouldeasnosurprisethatbigtradescansignificantlymovetheneedleonapany’,forexample,solditsstakeinDisney,inSeptember2001,inresponsetoamargincall,Disney’sstockfellby8percent.
Buttypically,short-
termchangesinapany’sstockpricearen’,weconsistentlyfoundthatthemajorityofuniquechangesineachpany’sstockpriceresultedfromthenetpurchasesandsalesofthestockbyalimitednumberofinvestorswhotradedinlargequantities.(By"uniquechanges,"wemeanthoseoccurringrelativetotherestof
,theydonotincludepricebumpsorfallsthatcoincidedwiththeoverallmovementsofthemarketorthesector.)
Althoughthenumberofcrucialinvestorsinapanyrangedfromasfewas30to(moretypically)asmanyas100,,wecouldattributefrom60to80percentofalluniquechanges,quarterbyquarter,tothenettradingimbalancesoftheseinvestors.
,overaperiodoftwoyears,betweenthenetbuyingandsellingofits100mostcriticalinvestors,capturedweekly,’sstockpricemovedsignificantly,thepricewentupordowninconcertwi
ththenetbuyingorsellingoftheseveryinvestors.
—
amovethatlargetradersapplaudedbypurchasingmoreofthepany’sstockbutthatanalysts,smallinstitutions,,onthesurface,tobepositive,thusattractingalargenumberofsmallerinvestors,butwasactuallyneutraltonegative,somethingthelargestinvesto
Whyshouldthesizeoftheimbalancebetweenasksandbidsmatter?Atanyinstant,themarketconsistsofaseriesofgraduatedofferstobuy(inotherwords,Ahasanoutstandingoffertobuy1,000sharesat$60,andBofferstobuy2,000sharesat$)aswellasasimilarsetofofferstosell(Cofferstosell1,500sharesat$,andDofferstosell1,000sharesat$).Asaleismadeonlywhenonesidesurrendersac
rossthisbid-askspread(thatis,Aagreestobuy1,000ofC’ssharesat$).Whenbuyerscollectivelywantlargeamountsofastock,.
Ofcourse,thecorrelationbetweenthebuyingorsellingoflargeinvestors,ontheonehand,andthepriceofastock,ontheother,—
,rumors,,thecorrelationisremarkablypersistent(Exhibit2).
INDUSTRIALMARKETINGFORINVESTORS
,whichwasabouttoannouncethedivestitureofamajordivision,believedthathewas"rightontopof[our]investorbase."Indeed,inageneralway,thepany’sexecutivesknewthebiginvestorswell—
whattheythoughtofmanagement,thecreditworthinessofthepany,’tknowwhatinvestorsthoughtaboutspecificpotentialstrategies,’stotalvalue?Ordidinvestorsthinkthatthepanybenefitedfromcross-
divisionalsynergiesthatwouldendwiththedivestiture?
Todeveloptheabilitytomakepredictionsaboutshareholders,,thepaniesmustthenanalyzeindepththetradingbehaviorofthesemovers,,paniesshoulduseth
Gettingtoknowinvestorsisn’—
,overtime,,:gettingstartedisn’
stimportantinvestors.
IDENTIFYTHECRITICALINVESTORS
’’
portfoliomanagerswhoregularlybuyandselllargequantitiesofsharesinthepanyorinsimilarpanies—typically,managersofmutual,pension,orhedgefundsorevenindividuallargeinvestors.
Inotherwords,—requiringmorediscussionthanwecanpresentinthisarticle—alikelymoverissomeonewhodoesorcouldreasonablyaccountforatleast1percentofastock’stradingvolumeforonequarter.
Moversarenotnecessarilyapany’(suchasfamilyholdingsortrusts)thathaveownedbigblocksofthepany’sstockforalongtimedon’(orunlessthefund’sassetschangedramatically).Amongthelargest20investorsofonebigpharmaceuticalspanywestudied,only
10weremovers,,nearlyhalfofthelargemoversofthestockofthepharmaceuticalspanyovereightquartersfrom1999to2001weren’tlistedamongits20largestinvestorsduringanysinglequarter.
Moreover,,,a$22billioninvestmentfund,hadbeenanactivetraderinother,,thesectorwasdepressed,soforthisandother
reasonsweaddedtheinvestortothepany’,theinvestorpurchasedmorethanfivemillionofthepany’sshares.
,forexample,’supstreamordownstreamsuppliersandhaveahistoryofinvestingmorebr
(highcashflow,say,orhighleverage),havenewCEOs,orfaceparticularmarketchangesorpetitiveconditions.
Todeterminehowmanyinvestorsshouldgoonthelist—40?70?100?—
;,—
longenoughtogivethepanytimetobeefamiliarwithitbutshortenoughsothattherewillalwaysbenewmoverstostudy.
MOVINGTHEMOVERS
Onceapanyhasidentifieditsmovers,"outside-in"analysisofeachone,.
,usingwhatvaluationmethodologies?Howisitlikelytoreacttoeventsortodata,whichafterallcanbeinterpretedinmanyways?Areitsinvestmentssubjecttoanyconstraints,suchastheirsizeandfrequency?Second,theprofileshoulddescribeeachinvestor’sviewsonissuesthatthepanymigh
tface—suchasanynewstrategies(forinstance,whetherthepanyshouldgointoChina),earningssurprises,andchangesinmanagement.
Togetthiskindofinformation,paniesmustphrasethequestionscarefullyinviewofaUSSecuritiesandExchangeCommission(SEC),,
ryingtounderstandwhytheysoldtheirholdingsafterthebusinessannounced,forexample,,distrustthemanagementteamputinplacetomanageexpansioninAsia,orrejectspecificdetailsofthedisclosedplan?
Thepreciseformatoftheprofileswillvaryfrompanytopany,,thecontentofeachprofileshouldfocusonpredictinghoweachinvestorwillreacttospecificcorporateevents(Exhibit3).Companieswillwanttocollecttheinformationinadatabasewhereitcanbeupdatedregularly.
MAKINGPREDICTIONS
Withthemoversidentifiedandprofiled,theinvestorrelationsstaffandexecutivescanmakereasonablejudgmentsaboutwhowillsell,buy,’tmerelyamathematicalexercise,thoughitdoesinvolvemanycalculations.
Besidesassessingwhethereachinvestorwillapproveordisapproveofagivenannouncement,"bleeds"(buysandsellsincrementallyovertime)or"blasts"(buysandsellsquicklyandinlargeblocks).
,guidedbypastimbalancesinthepany’sstockandthewaytheymovedprices,canusethisestimatetomakearoughassessmentofhowthestockpricewillreact(Exhibit4).Secondary,orknock-
on,eventsshouldalsobeconsidered:ifthestockpricegoesupordown,forexample,whatmightmomentumplayersdo?Thistoocanbederivedfrompastpatterns.
Althoughtheprocessitselfisstraightforward,,,recognizingthatitwouldtakeahit,decidedthatitcoulddolittleaboutthisexcepttoprepareandmanageitsboard.(Inthiscase,estimatesofwhatwouldhappentot
hestockpricewereextraordinarilyaccurate.),’sstockpriceaftertheannouncementcouldhaveaffectedthedeal(anequityandcashbuy),soexecutivesatthetwopaniesusedtheprofilestoidentif
.
Evenifnoimmediatedecisionsarepending,.
BUILDINGTHECAPABILITIES
Companiesthatchoosetoadoptanindustrial-
’’sstockpricechanges,executivesshouldn’taskwhythemarketmoved;theyshouldpinpointwhobought,whosold,,managersshouldviewinvestorsmuchasmanagersinprivatepanies
viewtheircorporateowners—andunderstandthemjustaswell.
Second,,theinvestorrelationsfunctionislargelyadministrative:itoverseestheproduction,butnotalwaysthecontent,ofregulatoryandannualreports;itadministerstheregistryofshareholdersandsetsupinvestorroadshows,visitsbyanalysts,andconferences;andittalkstoshareholders—
whentheycall.
Instead,theinvestorrelationsunitwillhavetotakeonamorestrategicrole,-
’,forthefirsttime,theinvestorrelationsunitwillbeeanimportantadvisertotheCEO.
,independent,andanalyticalinvestorrelationsdirectorsmayemergefromtheranksofbusinessdevelopment
,strategicplanning,oreven,insomeinstances,internalauditing.
Takingamorerigorous,structuredapproachtoinvestorrelationsandstockpricepredictionsclearlyrequiresresources,,whywouldaCEOeverwanttobeleftguessing?
Notes:
KevinCoyneisadirectorandJonathanWitterisanassociateprincipalinMcKinsey’sAtlantaoffice.
1Thepaniesinourstudypeteinavarietyofindustries,includingfinancialservices,industrialservices,packagedgoods,pharmaceuticals,$800millionto$170billion,andeachhadinstitutionalownershipgreaterthan40percent.
2The14plotpointsrepresenteveryweek,duringatwo-yearperiod,whenthepricechangedbymorethan2percentrelativetothemarketindexandthechangewasn’treversedduringthecourseofthefollowingweek.
,smallinvestorsmaypaylessattentiontothepanyonadailybasis;theymaybemoreinfluencedbytheopinionsofhigh-profileanalysts;andlargeinvestorswhoactivelyinvestinastockmaysometimesmakemoresophisticatedtradingdecisions.
4Ofcourse,occasionallyaninvestorwillmakebigtradesforreasonsthathavelittleornothingtodowithcorporateannouncementsandeverythingtodowiththeinvestor—suchastheBassfamily’.
5Althoughthisarticleisnosubstituteforlegalcounsel,wehavereviewedthetopicextensivelyandbelievethattheSECregulation(RegFD),theregulationdoesn’tprohibitpaniesfromconductingdetailedorfocuseddiscussionswithparticularinvestorssolongastheadditionalinformationdoesn’tviolatethetestofmaterialityforthebroaderinve
stormunity.
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