좫쟲뷰죚캣믺벰웤뛔쫀뷧쎳틗뫍쫀뷧뺭볃뗄펰쿬컄 탂릡ꯄ?一、序言 죋쏱뇒뇒횵ꆣ????쓪?퓂??죕ꎬ훐맺ퟜ샭컂볒놦뛔훐쪱쿂뗄좫쟲뷰죚캣믺뿏뚨쫇튻룶ꆰ럖쮮쇫ꆱ쪽뗄맺듳솿돖폐뗄쏀맺맺햮뗄놣횵뇭쪾ꆰ맘힢ꆱꆣ쫂볾ꎬ쫇ퟔ??쫀볍??쓪듺듳쿴쳵틔살ퟮ퇏훘뗄뺭볃캣ꎨ뛾ꎩ캣믺뺭샺뗄뷗뛎믺ꆣ헢듎뷰죚캣믺탔훊뛀쳘ꎬ쇋컞풤볻ꎬ뺭볃헾훎펰ㄮ뗚튻뷗뛎ꎺ뒥랢웷ꆪꆪ듎벶듻뿮쿬잰쯹캴폐ꎬ랴쿬뇩벰좫쟲ꎬ첽뺿웰살ꎬ탋캶낻좻ꆣ헢듎캣믺뗄뒥랢웷쫇쏀맺쯹캽뗄ꆰ듎벶ꆱ랿듻뗄좫쟲뷰죚캣믺웱횹쫇쿱죋샠늻뿉뿘솦솿퓬돉뗄쳬듳솿돖폐헟캥풼ꆣ쯼험쪼폚????쓪쿄쳬쏀맺뫍펢맺랿퓖ꎨ뗘헰믲몣킥ꎩ쓇퇹뗃틔ꆰ랢짺ꆱꎬ뛸쫇헾닟에뛏볛뾪쪼쿂붵횮뫳ꆣ?쪧컳ꆢ뷰죚쫐뎡볠맜쪽캢ꆢ듭컳뷰죚샭쓮쯀놧늻럅웰????쓪ꎬ쏀맺맺믡춨맽쇋쏀맺짧쟸퓙춶램탞헽쇋톹떹탔뗄ퟷ폃ꆣ낸ꎬ맦뚨????뗄힡랿뗖톺듻뿮뇘탫쫇듎벶듻뿮ꎬ????컒쏇뛔헢뎡캣믺뇘탫폐춸뎹뗄샭뷢ꎬ틔좷놣닉좡쓪탞룄캪???ꆣ듋맦뚨튪쟳뗖톺듻뿮쳡릩헟뇘탫쿲쎻뇘튪듫쪩ꎬ뛅뻸듋샠쫂볾퓙듎랢짺ꆣ폐ퟣ릻쓜솦뮹듻뗄죋쳡릩듻뿮ꎬ듓뛸캪듎벶듻뿮컊쳢二、发生了什么：产生全球金融危机的因素늼훃쇋컨첨ꆣꎨ튻ꎩ캣믺뗄룹풴쏀맺솽듳냫쮽펪뗄뗖톺듻뿮떣놣믺릹랿샻쏀뫍랿늻쿱뛠쫽틔잰뗄뺭볃캣믺ꎬ쒿잰헢뎡캣믺뗄룹풴뗘쏀늻뗃늻돐쫜캪헢킩듻뿮쳡릩떣놣뗄헾훎톹솦ꆣ쫇쏀맺ꆣ쯤좻캣믺뗄ꆰ샏컑ꆱ쫇쏀맺ꎬ떫평폚웤쯻맺듎벶듻뿮뷶햼쏀맺짐캴뎥뢶뗄힡랿뗖톺듻뿮뗄볒뗄탭뛠뷰죚믺릹뒮춨퓚튻웰ꎬ평폚쫀뷧뺭볃뗄쿠뮥ㄲ□?㈰〷쓪쿄쳬ꎬ횻폐㈰?뗄듎벶듻뿮놻췏잷ꎨ힢㊣?ꎬ붻횯ꎬ캣믺폚쫇삩햹떽좫쟲ꆣ힢ꎺ쏀맺뫍훐맺뮥쿠횸떫헢틑ퟣ틔틽랢캣믺ꆣ캴살뻶닟헟뗄튻룶뷌통ꎺ튻룶퓰ꎺ훐맺맺볒훷쾯뫺뷵쳎쮵쏀맺맜샭늻짆쓰돉쇋캣킡킡뗄뒥랢웷뻍뿉뒥랢튻뎡좫쟲캣믺ꆣ떱틸탐뗄힡랿믺ꎬ뛸쏀맺맙풱뫍움싛풱퓲맩뻌폚훐맺벰웤죋캪뇡뗍뗖톺듎벶듻뿮웘맢틽웰죋쏇뮳틉쪱ꎬ췲틚뗄ꆰ믘릺27
CHINA LAW 2010 / 03램싉ꆤ헾훎ꆤ뺭볃킭틩ꆱ쫐뎡ꎨ튪쟳뷨듻헟뷨쿖뿮쪱틔떣놣컯ퟶ떣놣뗄쫛ꆣ힡랿뗖톺평튻볒쪵튵돵쪼쳡릩ꎬ평쇭튻볒냼ힰ돉뛌웚듻뿮ꎩ틑뺭룦ꆣꆰ믘릺킭틩ꆱ쫐뎡뛔짌튵틸탐횤좯ꎬ평뗚죽볒돶쫛ꎬ퓙평쇭튻볒쳡릩럾컱ꎬ떫죎뫎뫍춶틸탐늻뿉믲좱ꎬ틲캪헢킩틸탐틀삵뛌웚ꎨ춨뎣튻볒뚼늻캪뎥뮹떣폇ꎬ틲캪쯻쏇늢쎻폐붫힡랿뗖톺럅쫇룴특ꎩ듻뿮틔싺ퟣ뷰탨쟳뫍헋쏦펯폠ꆣ퓚쯻쏇뗄헋쏦짏ꆣ뎫솮훐탄ꎨ쯼쫇뷰죚뇀삣뗄뫳첨ꎿꎩ????쓪?퓂?ꋚ닺횧독뗄횤좯ꎨ쪹폃랿뗘닺ꆢ웻뎵듻뿮뫍쿻죕릫늼뗄튻쿮퇐뺿쇐뻙쇋펦룃뛔???뗄닺튵듎듻뢺퓰럑듻뿮ꎩꆣ뗄??볒랿컝뗖톺릫쮾뗄쏻떥ꆣ쿖퓚??볒릫쮾훐폐??볒ꋛ뗖톺햮컱웵풼ꆣ평춶틸탐듳맦쒣랢럅ꆣ헢킩뷓쫕쇋헾뢮뗄뻈쫐뷰ꆣ믣퓓퓚튻웰뗄뷰죚퇜짺냼ힰ욷룹뻝럧쿕놻럖돉늻춬뗄??뗚뛾뷗뛎ꎺ캣믺펰쿬쇋뻃뺭쫀맊뗄춶헟ꆢ춶막럝ꎬ듓ꆰ뎬놣쿕막ꆱ떽ꆰ사미막ꆱ펦폐뺡폐ꆣ릫쮾뫍뛔돥믹뷰ꋜ탅폃캥풼뮥뮻ꆣ헢쫇튻룶럇뎣샠쯆놣쿕뫏춬뗄튻룶훘튪뗄컊쳢쫇ꎬ캪뫎헢냣쿠떱킡맦쒣뗄내뷒탅폃퇜짺욷ꆣퟷ캪믘놨ꎬ쒳훖햮좯믲웤쯻햮컱뗄돖폐췏잷ퟣ틔뒥랢튻뎡듳맦쒣뗄캣믺ꆣ헢룶컊쳢뗄듰낸짦헟뿉틔릺싲뷰죚믺릹뾹뻜캥풼뗄놣떥ꆣ떫늻쿱쫇ퟶ놣벰뛔횤좯뮯죚뫍뷰죚퇜짺욷뗄샭뷢ꎬ훮뛠틲쯘뗄믣쿕ꎬ죴ퟶ놣쿕ꎬ릺싲헟뇘탫돖폐ꆰ놣쿕좨틦ꆱꎬ뛸탅뫏닺짺쇋톸쯙웆쏰뗄닺엝쒭ꆣ?폃캥풼뮥뮻뗄릺싲헟퓲늻뇘돐죏ퟷ캪놣쿕뛔쿳뗄믹놾ꎨ?ꎩ횤좯뮯죚ꆣ뷰죚믺릹듓??쫀볍??쓪듺뾪햮컱ꆣ쒳룶탅폃캥풼뮥뮻뗄볛룱믲ꆰ닮뛮ꆱ춨뎣폫믹쪼쟒ퟔ????쓪횮뫳톸쏍볓쯙탋웰쇋튻막횤좯뮯죚샋놾햮컱랢탐헟뗄막욱볛룱돉랴뇈뛸늻쿠춬ꆣ튻캻돖폐뎱ꆣ떱닺펵폐헟ꆢ듻랽믲죎뫎폐좨뷓쫜풴풴늻뛏뗄???릫쮾햮좯늢릺싲튻럝탅폃캥풼뮥뮻뗄춶헟쪵볊믵뇒횧뢶뗄죋붫듋좨샻틆룸튻룶췐맜랽ꎬ뛸췐맜랽짏쫇퓚폫???릫쮾뗄햮컱쟥뎥쓜솦듲뛄ꆣ죧맻???릫퓚닺킧틦ꆢ듻뿮믲탅듻좨뗄횧독쿂쿲춶헟랢탐막쮾폶떽뢺쏦탂컅ꎬ탅폃캥풼뮥뮻뗄닮뛮뻍믡첧룟ꎬ춶욱쪱ꎬ횤좯뮯죚뇣돶쿖쇋ꆣ쏀맺ퟔ????쓪틔살랢탐헟뻍믡돶쫛쓇럝탅폃캥풼뮥뮻틔쒱샻ꆣ탅폃캥풼뮥쇋볛횵??췲뛠틚뗄폐볛횤좯ꆣ뷡맻쫇뒫춳뗄틸탐뒢탮뮻쫐뎡틬뎣뻞듳ꎬ????쓪쓪뗗펵폐???????틚쏀풪ꎬ쿠퓙튲늻쓜돤떱훷튪뗄탅듻살풴ꎬ쿖퓚쳡릩탅듻뗄쫇떱폚좫쟲䝄倠뗄ㄲ㔥ꆣ놾쫐뎡뫍평뮪뛻뷖냼ힰ돶쫛뗄횤좯뮯죚ꆣ헢뇣뾪킺헢룶캣믺뗄맘볼쫂첬쫇????쓪?퓂??죕샗싼탖뗜쇋탅듻뫍뻙햮뺭펪뗄뫩쮮ꎬ냩횮틔뿭쯉뗄믵뇒뫍닆헾틸탐떹뇕ꎬ⃀ퟂﳐ횵?탊쟃삹蝹?쒴뛗쫒킣곓?헾닟ꎬ볓뻧쇋슥쫐뫍닺엝쒭ꆣ폐㈸ⰰ〰ﯔ놹꒡?ꎨ?ꎩ뷰죚퇜짺욷ꆣ횤좯뮯죚뻍쫇튻샠ꆰ뷰죚㌮뗚죽뷗뛎ꎺ캣믺펰쿬쇋짌튵틸탐퇜짺욷ꆱꎬ쯼쫇듓믹놾뷰죚닺퇜짺돶살뗄튻훖뷰헢룶뢴퓓캢쏮뗄횤좯쫐뎡뗄훷튪췦볒쫇듳춶틸죚릤뻟ꎬ뿉틔ퟷ캪죎뫎뷰죚믲닆닺좨틦ꆣ뷰죚퇜짺탐ꆣ횱떽????쓪ꎬꆶ룱삭쮹?쮹뗙룱뛻램낸ꆷ튪쟳짌욷뗄쪹폃폐룷훖룷퇹뗄풭틲ꎬ폈웤쫇폃ퟷꆰ뛔돥ꆱꎺ튵틸탐뫍춶릫쮾뗄튵컱튪럖뾪ꆣ뛸퓚????쓪ꎬ쏀맺싲뷸놣횵웚믵뫍싴돶놣횵웚믵ꎬ웚좨뫍ꆰ붻뮻ꆱꆣ뇈맺믡럏돽쇋헢룶램낸ꆣ듋뫳늻뻃ꎬ쏀맺쯹폐듳틸탐죧ꎬ퓚튻듎ꆰ붻뮻ꆱ훐ꎬ틸탐뿉폃힡랿듻뿮춶ퟩ뫏튪쎴ퟔ붨튪쎴믱좡쇋듳춶릫쮾ꆣ틲듋ꎬ떱춶릫훐뗄튻늿럖뮻좡폅훊릫쮾햮좯ꎨ헢뇣쫇탅듻뷰죚퇜짺쮾뺭샺뷰죚삧뛲쪱ꎬ짌튵틸탐뗄햮컱쟥뎥쓜솦뇣쫜펰욷ꎩꆣ틸탐뿉춨맽솢ퟣ폚뛌웚좨틦쫐뎡살ꆰ뛔돥ꆱꆣ쿬쇋ꆣ떽쇋????쓪쿄쳬ꎬ캣믺뷸죫쇋튻룶탂뷗뛎ꆣ떱뛔돥믹뷰틔듋훖붻틗ퟷ캪쯼쏇뗄훷튪튵컱ꆣꎨ????쓪쪱ꎬ쏀맺헾뢮맙풱뫍릫훚틑뺭틢쪶떽뛠쫽짌튵틸탐틑뗗ꎬ풼튻췲훖뛔돥믹뷰돖폐?췲틚쏀풪뗄닺ꎩ뻭죫쿝죫삧뺳ꆣ좫쟲뷰죚캣믺뗄훷튪횤좯뮯죚뫍뷰죚퇜짺욷돂쫶죧ㄹ??쓪ꎬ뇊헟랢뇭쇋튻욪퇐뺿놨룦ꎺ췐십쮹ꆤ짡쿂ꎺ뛷놫쒷ꎺꆰ틸탐뗄횤좯믮뚯틔벰탅췐늿쏅폫듳탍짌튵ꋙ짌튵힡랿뗖톺떣놣횤좯ꆣ쳡릩힡랿듻뿮뗄틸탐틸탐럖뾪뗄뇘튪탔ꆱꎬ퓚헢욪놨룦훐ꎬ컒솦돂럏돽ꆶ룱뫍뷰죚믺릹춨맽듋샠듻뿮뗄횤좯뮯살맦뇜캥풼럧쿕ꆣ삭쮹?쮹뗙룱뛻램낸ꆷ붫믡틽랢뷰죚뚯떴ꆣ좻뛸ꎬ램뮪뛻뷖붫힡랿뗖톺듲냼ꎬ틔듋캪룹믹쿲횤좯쫐뎡돶낸뮹쫇놻럏돽쇋ꎬ쪣쿂뗄횻쫇샺쪷ꆣ28
짌튵틸탐쿝죫삧뺳ꎬ틲캪쯼쏇돖폐쫽틔췲틚볆쏀뗄ꆣ풪뗄늻솼듻뿮뫍웤쯻ꆰ폐뚾ꆱ닺ꆣ헾뢮웤쪵폐죽훖볲틗탅듻ꆣ쏀맺솪냮뒢놸뻖럮탐뗍샻싊뫍뗍뛮뚨냬램뿉틔룄뇤틸탐뗄놾뷡릹ꎺ릺싲벨폅막ꎻ좫늿싲놣횤뷰뗄믵뇒헾닟ꆣ헢뇣쫇쿂쫶솽훖쫂평뗄풭틲횮쿂늻솼듻뿮뫍ꆰ폐뚾ꆱ횤좯ꎨꆰ늻솼틸탐ꆱ볆뮮ꎩꎻ튻ꎺꋙ슥쫐엝쒭?ꋚ쏀맺막쫐뗄쏍헇ꎨ????쓪??퓂뒴샺춨맽릺싲뿘훆탔뗄웕춨막뛸쇙쪱뷓맜ꎨ맺폐뮯ꎩꆣ쏀쪷ퟮ룟ꎩꆣ맺헾뢮춨맽쫕좡벨폅막ꎨ벨폅막캬뮤쿖폐막뚫뗄좨럅뿭듦뿮ힼ놸뷰뇈싊ꆣ????쓪?퓂??죕ꎬ쏀맺횤틦ꎩ살룄뇤듳틸탐뗄놾뷡릹뛸폖늻닉좡탐뚯쪵쪩뿘좯붻틗캯풱믡펦뮪뛻뷖듳춶틸탐뗄쟫쟳ꎬ춶욱튻훂훆뗄헾닟쿔좻쫇믨춷믨쓔뗄ꆣ붫살쏀맺폐뿉쓜놻웈튪춨맽뛔춶틸탐붵뗍듦뿮ힼ놸뷰뇈싊ꎬ틔쪹쯻쏇쓜틔쎴뛔듳틸탐쪵쪩맺폐뮯ꎨ쇙쪱탔뗄ꎩꎬ튪쎴좫늿싲뷸뷨뿮릺싲룼뛠뗄뷰죚퇜짺욷ꆣ쯼쏇뗄폐뚾닺ꆣ뷰죚퇜짺욷볠맜쯉돚ꆣꆶ????쓪짌욷웚믵붻틗쿖쿂쫶쫂평볓뻧쇋캣믺ꎺ듺뮯램낸ꆷ쳘뗘붫뷰죚퇜짺욷듓쏀맺짌욷웚믵붻틗캯ꎨ?ꎩ슥쫐엝쒭ꆣ퓚쏀맺틔벰쿱펢맺쓇퇹뗄탭뛠풱믡뗄볠맜훐냾샫돶살ꆣ????쓪ꎬ쏀맺짌욷웚믵붻틗맺볒ꎬ듓????쓪떽????쓪튻킩뗘랽뗄랿볛짏헇캯쇋풱죽믡싉쪦늼슳뿋쮹샻ꆤ늩뛷얮쪿뺭맽뎤웚퇐뺿ꎬ붨놶ꆣ룶죋뫍돶ퟢ헟듭컳뗘죏캪헢훖짏헇쟷쫆뮹붫볌탸틩쳡룟뷰죚퇜짺욷쫐뎡뗄놾튪쟳늢쪹웤붻틗췪좫춸쿂좥ꆣ슥쫐엝쒭뗄룹놾풭틲퓚폚쏀솪뒢뗄뿭쯉믵뇒쏷ꆣ쯽뗄붨틩놻쏀솪뒢훷쾯낢삼ꆤ룱쇖쮹엋럱뻶ꎬ룱헾닟쳡릩뗄뿭쯉탅듻ꆣ헢폖볓뻧쇋뷰죚룜룋컊쳢ꆣ듓쇖쮹엋볡뻶랴뛔볠맜뷰죚퇜짺욷쫐뎡뗄쯹폐웳춼ꆣ????쓪뾪쪼ꎬ쏀맺랿볛돶쿖쇋ퟔ??쫀볍??쓪듺틔쏀살맺ퟮ맺믡????쓪춶욱럱뻶뛔뷰죚퇜짺욷쪵쪩볠맜ꆣ듓뿬뗄뗸럹ꆣ랿볛쿂뗸펰쿬ퟮ듳뗄쫇솽훖늻춬죋좺ꎺ늻????쓪훁?쓪?떣?죎?쏀솪뒢훷쾯뗄낢삼ꆤ룱쇖쮹엋퓚쓜붻뗖톺듻뿮뗄죋뫍붻듻뿮떫웤랿닺볛횵쿖퓚뗍폚뗖쯻뗄ꆶ뚯싒쓪듺ꆷꎨ????쓪ꎩ튻쫩훐쮵ꎺꆰ뛔틸탐뫍톺햮컱뗄죋ꆣ웤쯻뷰죚훐뷩살쮵ꎬ쓜듓듻뿮붻틗훐믱샻늢틆탅듻ꎨ?ꎩ맽뛈룜룋ퟷ폃ꆣ쏀맺뗄뷰죚믺릹틔벰룶죋럧쿕쫇튻볾폤뿬뗄쫂쟩ꎬ쯻쏇캪쇋믱뗃ퟣ릻뗄춶믘믽샛쇋맽뛠뗄햮컱ꆣ놨싊ꎬ늻뗃늻듳쯁뻙햮뺭펪ꎬ뷓쫜뒢탮햮컱ꎬ늢?믲짌튵틸탐ꆢ뒢탮믺릹뫍춶틸탐폎쮵맜샭믺릹헐훂뢺햮ꆣꆱꎨ쏀맺횤좯붻틗캯풱믡ꆢ쏀맺믵뇒볠샭쫰ꆢ쏀맺뒢탮쿖폐램싉쪵쪩늻솦ꆣ????쓪?퓂??죕ꎬ냂냍십탐맜샭뻖ꎩ붵뗍믲좡쿻놾튪쟳뫍듦뿮ힼ놸뷰뇈싊ꎬ틔헾떱뻖뷢돽쇋쏀맺횤좯붻틗캯풱믡뢺퓰죋뗄횰컱ꆣ쪹쯻쏇쓜컼쓉풽살풽뛠뗄햮컱ꆣꎨ뇈죧ꎬ쓃샗싼탖뗜럏돽ꆶ룱삭쮹?쮹뗙룱뛻램낸ꆷꆣ퓚떱쪱뗄닆헾틸탐ퟷ샽ퟓꎬ햮컱막놾뇈룟듯㌶ꇃㆣ?늿뎤싞늮쳘ꆤ슳뇶뫍낢삼ꆤ룱쇖쮹엋뗄횧돖쿂ꎬ쏀맺듓????쓪떽????쓪ꎬ쏀맺뗄룶죋뒢탮싊듓?맺?믡쿂폚????쓪럏돽쇋ꆶ룱삭쮹?쮹뗙룱뛻램낸ꆷꎬ룃붵떽벸뫵캪쇣ꆣ램낸맦뚨짌튵틸탐뗄튵컱튪폫춶틸탐뗄튵컱럖뾪ꆣꎨ?ꎩ맽뛈춶믺뫍쫐뎡닙ퟝꆣ탭뛠짌욷뗄볛룱ꎬ틲듋ꎬ솽훖튵컱믬퓚튻웰ꎬ떱춶틸탐쿝죫뷰죚삧뺳뇈죧폍볛ꎨ럨뎤떽????쓪쿄쳬뗄쎿춰???쏀풪ꎬ?쪱?ꎬ?짌?튵틸탐튲쫜떽펰쿬ꆣ쓪?퓂퓲뗸훁쎿춰??쏀풪ꎩꎬ틔벰탭뛠막욱볛룱쫜훆듎벶듻뿮싒첯ퟓꆣ쏀맺맺믡뫍뿋쇖뛙폫늼쪲탐헾폚뷰죚믺릹뫍쫐뎡훷뗄맽뛈춶믺뫍쫐뎡닙ퟝꆣ쫐뎡닙떱뻖뚼횧돖잿훆탔랢럅듎벶힡랿듻뿮ꆣퟝ쫇럇램뗄ꎬ떫맜샭믺릹뇈죧쏀맺횤좯붻틗캯풱믡뫍ꎨ?ꎩ맽뛈럧쿕ꆣ탅듻움맀믺릹뫍춶틸탐닉폃쏀맺짌욷웚믵붻틗캯풱믡좴캴쓜뻵달돶랢짺쇋쪲쎴ꆣ쇋듭컳뗄쫽톧럖컶쒣쪽ꎬ헢킩쒣쪽뗍맀쇋럧쿕ꆣꎨ쟫ꎨ?ꎩ헾뢮쪧컳ꆣ퓚????쓪?퓂?죕뗄튻듎럃힢첸틢ꎺ뷶뷶???뗄힡랿듻뿮쫐뎡훐뗄???뗄폢웚햮뿮훐ꎬ쏀맺뢱ퟜ춳쟐쓡싛벰헢듎캣믺쪱쮵ꎺꆰ죎뫎뗘랽뻍틽랢쇋헻룶쳥쾵뗄뇀삣ꎩ릫쮾뫍룶죋폞듀뗘죏캪쒿죎뫎죋뚼쎻폐듏쏷떽풤쇏돶헢뎡캣믺ꆣꆱ듋움뇭슶잰뗄쟷쫆뇘좻돖탸쿂좥ꆣ컒쏇뇘탫퇐랢룼뫃뗄뺭볃릤쇋탄벣ꎬ횼퓚쏢좴펦룃뛔헢뎡캣믺떣뢺퓰죎뗄죋뗄퓰뻟살뫢솿쾵춳럧쿕ꆣ맜샭룄룯뇘탫볓잿맜뿘ꎬ럀횹맽죎ꆣ좻뛸ꎬ쟐쓡뗄붲뮰늢늻뿒쟐ꆣ헾뢮쫇폐훮뛠쪧컳럖샖맛뗄틸탐좥쎰늻뢺퓰죎뗄럧쿕ꆣ29
CHINA LAW 2010 / 03??뗚쯄뷗뛎ꎺ캣믺듲믷쇋웕춨춶헟뫍막욱짌욷죏캪쫇쫀뷧짏ퟮ낲좫뗄믵뇒ꎻ틔벰ꋛ죕풪쳗쾢붻틗뗄쫐뎡쓦ꎬ퓚죕풪쳗쾢붻틗훐ꎬ죕놾쮽죋뫍죕놾릫쮾폃죕ꎨ?ꎩ탅죎캣믺ꆣ듎듻컊쳢뫍뷰죚퇜짺욷컊쳢훆풪뛒뮻췢뇒ꎬ떽맺췢춶ꎬ틔믱좡룼폅뫱뗄믘놨ꆣ캣퓬쇋튻뎡톸쏍뗄탅죎캣믺ꎬ늢톸쯙쿲헻룶뷰죚쾵춳싻믺살쾮뫳ꎬ췢맺춶놻돶쫛ꎬ잮폖쇷믘죕놾ꆣ볡춦뗄퇓뾪살ꆣ듎듻쫇놻잶죫탭뛠뷰죚퇜짺욷떱훐뗄ꎬ뛸쯹죕풪횻쫇퓝쪱쿖쿳ꎻ????쓪쓪돵ꎬ죕풪뾪쪼욣죭ꎬ쳗폐뗄볛횵춻좻뇤뗃늻좷뚨쇋ꆣ벴쪹쫇횵잮뗄횤좯튲놻쾢붻틗뻭췁훘살ꎬ웚췻뗄쫇쏀맺뫍얷쏋뗄룟샻싊ꎨ뫍죏캪ꆰ폐뚾ꆱꆣ쯹폐죋솢십뛡슷뛸쳓ꎬ싴뿕탐캪쯄뒦룟믘놨ꎩꎬ틠틲캪죕놾헾뢮뻞뛮햮컱ꎨ벸뫵햼???싻퇓ꎬ쯹폐횤좯뗄탨쟳뻹룦뿝캮ꆣ쏀맺막욱쫐뎡뗄쫐뗄????ꎩꆣ뺭볃톧볒풤닢????쓪죕풪붫볌탸듳럹욣횵쯰쪧쇋뷼?췲틚쏀풪ꎬ뮪뛻뷖뺭샺쇋ퟔ????쓪틔살죭ꆣퟮ놯닒뗄튻쓪ꆣ폫웤훘붨뻉폐뗄만뚨믣싊쳥쾵ꎬ늻죧톰쟳믵뇒뚯ꎨ?ꎩ탅듻캣믺ꆣ틸탐뫍웤쯻듻랽춣횹듻뿮떴뗄뎤풶뷢뻶냬램ꎺꋙ붨솢탂뗄맺볊뒢탮믵뇒ꎻꋚ뛔ꎨ????쓪?퓂뗄솽룶탇웚샯ꎬ뛌웚샻싊듓??랭랬믵떽뇒붻틗뿎틔췐뇶쮰틔쿞훆믵뇒뚯떴ꆣ??ꎩꎬ늢뛚믽쿖뿮ꎬ쯹폐죋솢십쫔춼ꆰ럇뻙햮뺭㘮뗚쇹뷗뛎ꎺ좫쟲뺭볃캮쯵펪ꆱꎬ듓뛸훆퓬쇋떹뇕뫍뷰죚믬싒ꆣ듳릫쮾랢쿖쓑폚ꎨ?ꎩ쮥췋ꆣ떽????쓪쓪뗗ꎬ좫쟲뗄ꆰ헦쪵ꆱ뺭랢탐햮좯ꎬ쿖퓚쫔춼쿲틸탐룦듻ꎬ떫췹췹춽샍컞릦ꆣ볃쫜떽캣믺뗄뻧쇒펰쿬ꆣ쏀맺ꆢ얷훞뫍죕놾퇏훘쮥훐킡릫쮾톹룹뛹뻍뷨늻떽듻뿮ꆣ췋ꆣ쿱훐맺쓇퇹쿭쫜솽캻쫽퓶뎤뗄뺭볃튲붵떽튻캻ꎨ?ꎩ럇뻙햮뺭펪ꆣ뛔돥믹뷰ꆢ릲춬믹뷰뫍쮽죋쫽ꆣ뷶퓚쏀맺ꎬ????쓪???뛠췲죋뚪쇋릤ퟷꆣ퓚쏀맺춶헟럗럗돶쫛틔뇜쏢쯰쪧늢듓햮컱샯췑짭돶살ꆣ뫍웤쯻탭뛠맺볒쿻럑탨쟳뚸좻쿂붵ꆣ웳튵쿷복쇋춶㔮뗚컥뷗뛎ꎺ캣믺좫쟲뮯ꆣ벴쪹늻폫쏀맺쫐뎡듲붻뗀뗄릫쮾튲쫜떽늻샻펰ꎨ?ꎩ캣믺싻퇓좫쟲ꆣ쫀뷧짏탭뛠뷰죚믺릹뫍룶쿬ꎬ틲캪쯻쏇퓚쿱훐맺쓇퇹뗄맺볒폐튵컱ꎬ뛸훐맺쫇죋폫릫쮾춶헟퓚쏀맺뷰죚쫐뎡짏펵폐막럝ꆣ뷰죚쫐폫쏀맺듲붻뗀뗄ꆣ쫀뷧룖닺솿쿂붵???ꎬ훆퓬튵쿂붵뎡퓚좫쫀뷧뫤좻떹쯺ꆣ뿧틸탐릩듻춻좻뚳뷡ꎺ싗뛘틸??ꆣ좫쟲뺭볃캣믺춨맽죽룶쟾뗀싻퇓ꎺꋙ쿻럑탨쟳탐춬튵킭믡닰뷨샻싊ꆪꆪ틸탐볤쳡릩맺볊듻뿮뮥쿠쯟복짙ꎻꋚ탅듻춶복짙ꎻ틔벰ꋛ쎳틗복짙ꆣ????쓪ꎬ훮뗄샻싊ꆪꆪ?튻특볤랭랬ꎬ짏짽떽뒴볇슼뗄????ꆣ쫀뷧???폐뿉쓜돶쿖ퟔ??쫀볍??쓪듺틔살뗄쫗듎쿂탅죎캣믺짵훁뛔죕놾쓇퇹뗄맺볒닺짺쇋늻샻펰쿬ꎬ뛸붵ꆣ죕놾쪵볊짏뫜짙쫜폐뚾듻뿮컊쳢뗄펰쿬ꆣ랢햹훐맺볒ꎨ㊣ꦷꋕ맖킹謁튺춡냐싐쮡뇊킳ꆹ謁튡?뫍탂탋쫐뎡맺볒쫜떽퇏훘펰쿬ꎬ틲캪춶헟춻좻뎷ퟟ벸뫵쯹폐뗄랢햹훐맺볒뚼뺭샺쇋퇏훘뗄뺭볃삧놾ꎬ퓬돉췢믣뒢놸뫍뇒횵뚸좻쿂붵ꆣ쓑ꎬ뺡맜쯼쏇뫜짙믲룹놾쎻폐짦ퟣ쏀맺뷰죚쫐뎡ꆣꎨ㊣꧃돒ힺ췍뛗쫆욲瑱?????쓪맺볊춶볒춣횹춶ꎬ돩믘뻞뛮놾ꎬ퓬돉췢ꎨ?ꎩ믵뇒뚯떴뫍룟죕풪ꆣ뇒횵쿔훸뇤뮯ꆣ벱뻧믣뒢놸쿂붵떽캣쿕뗄뗘늽ꎬ뇒횵뚸좻쿂뗸ꆣ뻝짏몣뗄뚯떴ퟨ낭쇋좫쟲뗄짌튵ꎬ캪짌튵믮뚯퓶쳭쇋늻좷뚨맺볊뷰죚톧풺춳볆ꎬ????쓪ꆰ탂탋쫐뎡ꆱ맺볒뗄쮽죋탔ꆣ벸뫵쯹폐뗄믵뇒뛔쏀풪뗄뇈횵뚼쿂붵쇋ꎬ폈웤쫇춶듓????쓪뗄????틚쏀풪쯵복떽????쓪뗄????틚쏀죕풪ꎬ뛔쏀풪짽횵쇋???ꎬ퓬돉죕놾뺭볃퇏훘쮥췋ꎬ풪ꎬ떽????쓪폐뿉쓜쿂붵떽????틚쏀풪ꆣ폫듋춬쪱ꎬ돶뿚뚸좻쿂붵ꆣ평폚탨쟳늻헱ꎬ랢햹훐맺볒뗄돶뿚쿂붵ꎬ쪹헢킩맺볒룟죕풪ꎨ룟죕풪쿴쳵ꎩ쫇평폚ꎺꋙ낲좫춶쿝죫쮥췋ꆣ틆ꆪꆪ죕놾쫇쫀뷧짏뗚뛾듳뺭볃쳥ꎬ죕놾틸탐늢쎻폐ꎨ?ꎩ룅뛸퇔횮ꎬ헢뎡캣믺뿉맩뻌폚헾뢮뗄헾닟짮짮쿝죫듎벶듻뿮뫍뷰죚퇜짺욷뗄싒첯ퟓꎻꋚ죕풪놻쪧컳뫍쮽펪늿럖뗄맽뛈뷨듻뫍춶믺ꆣ뮹폐쟒늻횻쫇30
튻뚡뗣뛹뗄뗀뗂캣몦뫍뢯냜ꎨ뇈죧뮪뛻뷖뷰죚뻞욭늮??쏀맺헾뢮훆뚩쇋늹쳹쿻럑헟릺싲힡랿뫍웻뎵뗄쓡ꆤ싳뗀럲쫂볾ꎬ쏀맺횤좯붻틗캯풱믡뗄볠맜헟훃죴볆뮮ꆣ뗚튻쪱볤랿컝릺싲헟캪릺싲힡랿뿉믱뗃????쏀?컅ꎩꆣ풪뗄튻듎탔쮰뛮뗖쏢듻뿮ꎬ뛸웻뎵훷듓쫂ꆰ뛾쫖뎵ꆱ三、正在采取什么行动对付危机？ꎨ뛠쫽캪뻉뎵탍뫅ꎩ붻틗ꎬ뻍뿉듓ꆰ쿖뷰뮻뻉뎵ꆱ볆ꎨ튻ꎩ쏀맺뗄늻솼닺뻈훺볆뮮ꎨꆶ????쓪뷴벱뮮훐믱뗃쿖뷰늹쳹ꆣ뺭볃컈뚨램ꆷꎩꎬ늼쪲탐헾떱뻖쫚좨뗄????틚쏀풪럖훁????쓪?퓂ꎬ늻솼닺뻈훺볆뮮틑횧뢶????틚엤죧쿂ꎺ쏀풪ꎬ늢탭억붫ퟜ릲횧뢶????틚쏀풪ꆣ쏀맺맺믡엺ힼ??탭억????틚쏀풪틔릺싲짌튵틸탐뫍듦뿮믺릹쪹뗄폃????틚쏀풪훐뗄쪣폠늿럖ꆣ냂냍십탐헾떱뻖짨솢룟벶폅쿈막뫍죏막좨횤ꆣ???볒틸탐쫕떽뿮쿮ꎬ틔횧쇋????틚쏀풪뗄짧쟸랢햹뷰죚믺릹믹뷰ꎬ캪뗘랽뷰죚돖탅듻볆뮮ꆣ떽????쓪?퓂?죕ꎬ뷓쫜풮훺뗄틸탐훐믺폐릹쳡릩탅듻ꎬ뇈죧듻뿮믹뷰ꆢ탅듻솪쏋뫍럧쿕놾㒼튻릴דּ⸳㣒?샔ꪡ?믹뷰ꆣ떽????쓪?퓂ꎬ늻솼닺뻈훺볆뮮믹뷰횻쪣쿂??퓚쏀쇖릫쮾폫쏀맺틸탐뫏늢웚볤엺ힼ쿲웤쳡릩듳풼????틚쏀풪ꎬ떫떽????쓪쓪뗗ꎬ늻솼닺뻈훺볆㈵〰틚쏀풪ꆣ뮮쫜풮랽뾪쪼쿲쏀맺뮹듻ꆣ쿲쏀맺춶벯췅쳡릩㐰ヒ?샔뛗쪡?내쫐횵볆볛ꆣ캪싺ퟣ틸탐뫍쪵튵좨틦뗄풸췻ꎬ쏀??쿲뮨웬벯췅쳡릩???틚쏀풪춶ꎬ쪹웤춶틸맺탐닆컱믡볆ힼ퓲캯풱믡폚????쓪?퓂?죕엺ힼ탞룄믡볆쏀냮폫웤럖룮뾪살ꆣힼ퓲ꎬ튪쟳돖폐뗄닺횻내릺싲헟풸틢횧뢶뗄볛횵살??쿲쏀맺틸탐쳡릩???틚쏀풪춶ꎬ쏀맺닆헾늿볆뇣볛ꆣ헢룶볆볛훆뛈돆캪내쫐횵볆볛ꆣ틲듋ꎬ쎻폐쫐돉쇋ퟮ듳뗄막뚫ꆣ쏀맺닆헾늿붫떣놣쏀맺틸탐폐뚾뎡뗄횤좯뫍닺뿉쓜튪틔웤쯻놨돪살볆볛ꎬ뇈죧닺닺룟듯ㄱ㠰틚쏀풪뗄쯰쪧ꆣퟮ돵횧뢶솿벰웤닺짺뗄쫕틦ꆣ??쿲춨폃웻뎵릫쮾뫍뿋삳쮹샕릫쮾쳡릩???틚쏀믡볆랽램뗄헢룶뇤뮯놻??볒뷰죚믺릹쯹뷓쫜ꎬ쯻풪ꆣ쏇튻벾뛈뗄쫕죫짏짽쇋ꎬ쫕틦듯??뛠틚쏀풪ꎬ쪹탭뛠????틚쏀풪쏖늹뮨웬벯췅폫힡랿뗖톺쿠맘뗄닺웳튵룒폚짏놨샻죳뛸늻쫇쯰쪧ꆣ쏀맺솪냮듦뿮놣쿕뗄잱퓚쯰쪧ꆣ릫쮾폚????쓪??퓂룹뻝맦퓲훆뚩쇋쇙쪱쇷뚯탔떣놣볆??솪냮뒢놸뻖폐튻쿮듙뷸쿻럑헟믱뗃탅듻뗄볆뮮ꎬ캪뷰죚릫쮾뗄햮컱ퟷ쇋떣놣ꆣ쯤좻헢쿮볆뮮풭놾뮮ꎬ탭억쳡릩???틚쏀풪틔쏖늹헢쿮볆뮮뿉쓜헐훂뗄쫇튪냯훺짌튵틸탐ꎬ뿉ퟮ듳뗄쫜틦헟좴쫇춨폃뗧웷릫쯰쪧ꆣ쮾ꎬ쯼춨맽쯼뗄뷰죚늿쏅춨폃뗧웷놾돉캪쇋ퟮ듳뗄??뚨웚닺횧돖횤좯듻뿮릤뻟쫇튻쿮횼퓚쫍럅탅쫜틦헟ꆣ듻뗄볆뮮ꎬ냼삨캪탞붨냬릫슥ꆢ힡햬붨훾뫍짌튵랿뗘ꎨ뛾ꎩ퓚쏀맺췆돶늻솼닺뻈훺볆뮮횮잰ꎬ쏀맺닺쳡릩뗄듻뿮ꆣ뚨웚닺횧돖횤좯듻뿮릤뻟쿲춶헟ꎨ캪뮻좡폅쿈막ꎩ뻈훺쇋솽룶쏀맺힡랿뗖톺떣놣릫쮾릩뿮릺싲룟샻싊뗄힡랿뗖톺횧돖뗄뫍쿻럑헟횧돖뗄횤랿샻쏀뫍랿뗘쏀ꎬ뮹폐쏀맺맺볊벯췅ꆣ뛔쏀맺맺볊벯좯ꆣ춶헟릺싲헢훖횤좯ꎬ뷰죚릫쮾뿉폃쪵쫕뿮쿮쳡췅뗄튻삿ퟓ뻈훺ퟜ뛮듯????틚쏀풪ꆣ쏀맺쓉쮰죋쿖퓚릩뛮췢듻뿮ꆣ헢쿮볆뮮쫔춼듙뷸듻뿮릩펦ꆣ듓????쓪펵폐쏀맺맺볊벯췅ꆢ랿샻쏀뫍랿뗘쏀?????뗄막럝ꆣ훁????쓪ꎬ????틚쏀풪뗄짌튵랿뗘닺탅듻붫떽웚?ꎬ?웤??쓪??퓂ꎬ쏀맺닆헾늿훐횹쇋풭쿈ퟮ룟쿞뛮캪????훐뛠쫽탨튪퓙돯듫뷰ꆣ좻뛸ꎬ뚨웚닺횧돖횤좯듻틚쏀풪뗄뷴벱뻈훺랿샻쏀뫍랿뗘쏀뗄탐뚯ꆣ뿮릤뻟펰쿬폐쿞ꎬ틲캪훁????쓪?퓂?죕ꎬ룃볆뮮횻폐쏀맺늻솼닺뻈훺볆뮮쫇룄뇤쏀맺뷰죚쳥쾵놾???틚쏀풪뗄쿖돉듻뿮ꆣ????쓪?퓂ꎬ뚨웚닺횧뷡돖릹횤뗄뗚튻늽ꆣퟮ뫳맀볆뷶뷶훘ퟩ쏀맺짌튵틸탐뗄좯듻뿮릤뻟퇓뎤떽㈰쓪㏔슡?놾뷡릹붫뮨뗴㓍?샔ꪡ?31
CHINA LAW 2010 / 03쯤좻쏀맺쫇헢듎캣믺뗄헰훐쟸ꎬ탭뛠맺볒뗄틸탐ꆰ뿉쳡웰쯟쯏뗄ꆱ늹쳹ꎬ붫믡퓢떽쫀뷧쎳틗ퟩ횯뗄횱뚼돶쿖쇋웆냜ꎬ폈웤쫇퓚얷훞ꆣ펢맺뫍탭뛠맺볒튲닉뷓랴뛔ꎬ쫜펰쿬뗄맺볒뿉쓜뛔쫜늹쳹뗄릫쮾뗄돶뿚욷좡탐뚯쪹짌튵틸탐맺폐뮯믲쪹웤놾훘ퟩꆣ헷쫕랴늹쳹쮰ꆣ캪횧돖퓚쫀뷧쎳틗ퟩ횯뗄횱뷓웰쯟ꎬ????쓪?퓂??죕ꎬ쏀맺닆헾늿탻늼쇋훘ퟩ쏀맺쯟틸랽뇘탫돶쪾ꆰ훘듳쯰몦ꆱꎨ벰늹쳹ퟨ낭쇋쿠춬닺욷탐놾뷡릹뗄뗚뛾룶늽훨ꎺꆰ뷰죚컈뚨볆뮮ꆱꆣ헢룶뗄돶뿚ꎩꆣ폐맘랽쏦튪헷쫕랴늹쳹쮰ꎬ₱?醙??볆뮮쿲틸탐힢죫?췲틚쏀풪뗄뷰ꎬ틔뮻좡뿉뛒뮻뗄튵돶쪾ꆰ쪵훊탔쯰몦ꆱꆣ폅쿈막ꆣ평폚몬뫽웤듇뛸헐훂맣랺엺움뗄헢쿮볆뮮ꎬ죕놾뫍램맺튲쿲릤튵릫쮾쳡릩늹쳹ꆣ쫇튪붨솢튻뇊릫쮽춶믹뷰ꎬ캪릺싲ꆰ폐뚾ꆱ틸탐얷쏋캯풱믡엺움탭뛠맺볒뗄늹쳹볆뮮캥랴쇋얷릲닺쳡릩뷰ꆣ쳥뗄맦퓲쳵뿮ꆣ쏀맺헾뢮뗄늹쳹ꎬ쏀맺뷰죚믺릹잿훆탔뗄뫍럇잿ꎨ죽ꎩ믵뇒헾닟훆탔뗄뫏늢닺짺쇋맑춷싴훷슢뛏쿖ힴꆣ쏀맺죽볒ퟮ듳훐퇫틸탐뗄복쾢죔퓚볌탸ꎨ쏀맺솪냮믹뷰샻싊쫇?틸탐펵폐쏀맺틸탐뒢탮뗄???ꎬ맊뛸쓜뻍쫕틦싊ꆢ틸??ꎬ얷훞퇫탐샻싊쫇?ꎬ펢룱삼틸탐샻싊쫇????ꎬ죕탐럑ꆢ탅폃뾨럑뫍쳵볾틔벰힡랿뗖톺웚쿞뗈헾닟랢뫅놾틸탐샻싊쫇????ꎩꆣ쏀맺솪냮뒢놸뻖헽퓚뷸탐릫뾪쪩쇮ꆣ평폚좫쟲뷰죚캣믺ꎬ쏀맺뷰죚믺릹뗄뺺헹듳듳쫐뎡횤좯릺싲ꎬ냼삨????틚쏀풪뗄폐뚾횤좯ꎨ힡랿뗖쿷죵쇋ꆣ톺뫍쿻럑햮컱ꎩꆣ쏀맺솪냮뒢놸캯풱믡뗄닺뢺햮뇭늻맽냂냍십탐헾떱뻖뫍닆헾늿뎤뗙쒷ꆤ룇쳘쓉뻶틑퓶훁??ꎬ???틚쏀풪ꆣ탭뛠웤쯻맺볒뗄훐퇫틸탐헽뚨쪵쪩튻훖랽싔ꎬ틔뺡뿉쓜뇜쏢뎹뗗맺폐뮯ꎬ늢뺡솿퓚릺싲릫쮾햮좯뫍뛌웚짌튵햮좯틔복쟡탅듻삧쓑ꆣ짙뗘퓙힢죫쓉쮰죋쏀풪탎쪽뗄헾뢮놾ꆣ????쓪?퓂?쏀맺솪냮뒢놸캯풱믡늻뷶닉폃뒫춳뗄믵뇒헾닟릤죕ꎬ쏀맺닆헾늿탻늼쇋뛔쏀맺훷튪틸탐뗄튻듎ꆰ톹솦뻟ꎬ샻폃샻싊룜룋살듌벤뺭볃퓶뎤ꎬ뛸쟒닉폃놻돆횮닢쫔ꆱ뗄뷡맻ꎬ뷡맻뇭쏷??볒듳틸탐뇘탫돯듫???틚캪뚨솿뿭쯉뫍뚨탔뿭쯉뗄쫖뛎ꎬ폈웤쫇뾪펡뎮욱ꆣ뚨쏀풪뗄뷰닅쓜짺듦쿂좥ꆣ헢듎톹솦닢쫔헐훂탭뛠뺭솿뿭쯉냼삨듓틸탐릺싲헾뢮햮좯뫍웤쯻쇷뚯닺ꎬ뚨볃톧볒뗄엺움ꎬ쮵쯼뮹늻죧튻듎폐솦뗄짳볆ꆣ냂냍십탔뿭쯉냼삨릺싲럧쿕닺뫍럇쇷뚯닺ꎬ뇈죧ꆰ폐탐헾떱뻖쫇퓚쿂뛄힢ꎬ죏캪쯦ퟅ뺭볃뫃ꎬ쏀맺뷰죚뚾ꆱ횤좯ꆣ????쓪?퓂??죕ꎬ솪냮뒢놸뻖탻늼쯼붫릺쳥쾵믡뛈맽쒿잰뗄삧쓑쪱웚ꎬ훘탂믘떽붡뾵뗄뗀슷짏싲룟듯????틚쏀풪뗄뎤웚헾뢮햮좯뫍룟듯????틚쏀풪살ꆣ본폚쏀맺뷰죚믺릹돖폐뗄ꆰ폐뚾닺ꆱ뛠냫캪횤뗄랿샻쏀뫍랿뗘쏀랢탐뗄웤쯻힡랿뗖톺횧돖뗄횤좯ꆣ좯뮯쇋뗄뷰죚닺욷뫍뷰죚퇜짺욷ꎬ쿖퓚쮭튲쮵늻ힼ헢헢튻헐솢벴닺짺쇋붵뗍힡랿뗖톺샻싊뗄펰쿬ꎬ쪹퓙돯룶뛄듲늻듲뗃펮ꆣ뷰뫍탂뗄힡랿뗖톺뇤뗃룼볓뿉탐ꆣ떽????쓪?퓂ꎬ쿲훆퓬릫쮾춨폃웻뎵릫쮾뫍뿋삳쮹샕릫쮾힢죫솪냮뒢놸뻖듓랿샻쏀뫍랿뗘쏀릺싲쇋?췲뛠틚쏀풪뗄놾ꎨ훁짙퓝쪱ꎩ쪹쯼쏇쏢폚탻늼웆닺ꆣ떫뿋삳쮹샕릫힡랿뗖톺횧돖뗄횤좯뫍햮컱ꎬ듋췢뮹쿲헢솽룶웳튵횱쮾퓚????쓪?퓂탻늼웆닺ꆣ춨폃웻뎵릫쮾튲폚???뷓?춶쓪?쇋㐰〰틚쏀풪뗄헾뢮뷰ꆣ퓂?죕탻늼웆닺ꎬ늢내쏀맺웆닺램뗚??헂뷸탐훘ퟩꆣ쏀맺솪냮뒢놸캯풱믡퓚????쓪듓뻈훺듻뿮뫍횤좯쏀맺헾뢮쿖퓚펵폐훘ퟩ뫳뗄춨폃웻뎵릫쮾뗄???뗄막릺싲훐좡쇋???뛠틚쏀풪뗄샻쾢ꆣ좻뛸ꎬ튻떩엗쫛럝ꆣ횤좯ꎬ쫕틦뿉쓜뇤캪쯰쪧ꆣ룹뻝쫀뷧쎳틗ퟩ횯ꆶ늹쳹폫랴늹쳹듫쪩킭틩ꆷ뗄ꎨ쯄ꎩ닆헾헾닟맦뚨ꎬ뛔듓쫂돶뿚뗄릤튵릫쮾뷸탐늹쳹믡쫜떽맺볊짏탭뛠맺볒틑뺭춨맽믲벴붫춨맽튻삿ퟓ듳탍닆헾듌뗄횸퓰ꆣ헢믡캪쒳룶짌튵쪵쳥듸살뷰죚짏뗄뫃뒦ꆣ룹벤볆뮮틔뢴쯕맺쓚탨쟳ꆣ얷캯믡쳡돶쇋튻쿮뺭볃뢴뻝ꆶ늹쳹폫랴늹쳹듫쪩킭틩ꆷ뗄폐맘쳵뿮ꎬ헢쫇튻훖쯕듌벤킭춬볆뮮ꎬퟜ뛮캪????틚얷풪ꆣ퓚헢뎡캣믺뗄32
훐탄쏀맺ꎬ맺믡춨맽쇋ꆶ?????쓪쏀맺뢴쯕폫퓙춶횻폐㘰ꎬ〰ィ겷듓뎳ﷁ뾵쓖뷉쿉ﶡ?램낸ꆷꎬ뫄뻞듯????틚쏀풪뗄헾뢮뾪횧뫍복쮰튻삿ꎨ쇹ꎩ뷰죚컈뚨볆뮮ꆣ????쓪?퓂??죕ꎬ쏀맺닆ퟓ뺭볃듌벤볆뮮ꆣ헢쿮볆뮮뿉쓜ꎨ횻늻맽ꎩ뇈쎻폐튪헾늿쿪쾸엻슶쇋ퟮ돵쫇퓚?퓂??죕탻늼뗄헢쿮볆뮮붫뫃ꎬ떫쯼쫇룶듳퓓믢ꎬ늻믡솢벴닺짺쪲쎴펰쿬ꆣ뛔훘죧뫎쪵쪩ꆣ헢쿮볆뮮쫇튻쿮ꆰ릫ꆪ쮽춶볆뮮ꆱꎬ폃붨맺볒뗄믹뒡짨쪩뗄춶죫첫짙쇋ꆣ볆뮮훐뾴늻돶폐쪲폚릺싲뛠듯?췲틚쏀풪뗄늻솼닺ꎬ볈폐틸탐돖폐뗄쎴듳떨뗄뎫틩ꆣ냂냍십ퟜ춳펦떱샻폃헢룶믺믡쳡돶튻늻솼힡랿뗖톺ꎬ튲폐힡랿뗖톺횧돖뗄뫍닺횧돖뗄횤쿮듳떨뗄뎫틩ꎬ뻍쿱났즭뫀췾뛻ퟜ춳뎫틩탞붨좫맺룟좯ꆣ컞싛쓇훖쟩뿶ꎬ짦벰뗄닺붫놻훷죋ꆪꆪ틸탐뫍쯙릫슷췸쓇퇹ꆣ붨틩ꎺ탞붨ퟮ탂쮮욽뗄좫맺췸싧ꎬ뎬춶릫쮾ꆪꆪ믲탭틔ퟮ뗍엄싴볛엄싴ꆣ릺싲닺뗄뺺룟쯙쳺슷뿍퓋쇐뎵뫍?믲폃폚뗧뚯뎵솾뫍뗧폍믬뫏뎵엄헟붫쫇쮽펪릫쮾ꎬ떫헢킩릫쮾붫뗃떽늻솼닺뻈훺솾뗄좫맺믹뒡짨쪩ꆣ볆뮮믹뷰뗄듳솿늹쳹ꎬ믹뷰늹쳹뗄랽쪽쫇틔??쏀풪뛔ꎨ컥ꎩ????쓪?퓂??죕ꎬ쏀맺닆헾늿냤늼쇋ꆶ쮽컝죋춶뗄쎿튻쏀풪뗄컞ힷ쯷좨헾뢮듻뿮뫍쏀풪뛔쏀훷뿉뢺떣쓜솦뫍컈뚨볆뮮ꆷꎨ???틚쏀풪ꎩꎬ쪹쏦쇙풪뗄헾뢮닎막ꆣ뇈죧ꎬ튻볒쮽펪릫쮾닎폫뺺엄ꎬ틔뷏좡쿻믘쫪뗖톺욷좨샻뗄컝훷쓜릻퓙믱뷰뫍훘릹햮뗍뗄볛룱뇈랽쮵????췲쏀풪릺싲욱쏦볛횵캪?틚쏀풪컱ꆣ헢쿮볆뮮틢퓚냯훺쫜캣믺펰쿬ퟮ훘뗄솽좺컝훷ꎺ뗄횤좯ꎬ헢볒릫쮾헢쎴ퟶ뿉쓜횻탨뮨럑???췲쏀풪ꆣꎨ?ꎩ컞뮹듻뫳뛜뗄컝훷붫믡뗃떽냯훺틔뷏뗍샻쾢훘쇭췢뗄????췲쏀풪붫듓솪냮듦뿮놣쿕릫쮾뷨듻ꎬ놻릺탂돯듫뷰ꎬ틔벰ꎨ?ꎩ쏦쇙좡쿻믘쫪뗖톺욷좨샻뗄싲뗄횤좯퓲캪솪냮듦뿮놣쿕릫쮾ퟷ쇋떣놣ꆣ닆헾늿붫컝훷붫믡뗃떽냯훺ꎬ틔룄솼탅듻쪹퓂뢶믘떽뿉돖탸캪뷸탐릺싲뗄???췲쏀풪뗄춶막럝쳡릩늹ퟣ뷰ꆣ쮮욽ꆣ뗚튻룶볆뮮붫쪹펵폐ퟔ벺힡랿???틔짏랿횵뗄쮽죋춶헟폚쫇닙ퟷ늢뻶뚨닺벯뫏뗄럾컱벰쿺쫛쪱???췲훁???췲컝훷틔뷏뗍샻싊퓙돯듫탅듻ꎬ냬램쫇믺샻ꆣ죧맻쿺쫛펮샻ꎬ쏀맺닆헾늿붫릲춬럖쿭샻틦ꆣ죧폃랿샻쏀뫍랿뗘쏀쳡릩뗄탅듻떣놣ꆣ뗚뛾룶볆뮮붫냯맻늻펮샻ꎬ쮽죋춶헟뿉튻ퟟ쇋횮ꎬ냑헾뢮뫍닺욲훺쏦쇙좡쿻믘쫪뗖톺욷좨샻뗄???췲훁???췲컝훷쓜퓚쇴튻뇟ꎬퟔ벺횻쯰쪧???췲막럝춶훐뗄튻늿럖ꆣ헢퓚ퟔ벺뗄햬ퟓ샯ꎬ냬램쫇쿲듻랽뫍럾컱랽쳡릩횧뢶붱룶볆뮮뛔폚쓜릻닎막뗄쓇킩릫쮾뫍틸탐막뚫살쮵쫇뇊샸ꎬ떱룦듻죋죔좻틔힡랿뗖톺횧뢶쪱ꎬ듻랽뫍럾컱랽늻듭뗄싲싴ꎬ늻맽쓜럱좡뗃틢쿫뗄킧맻뮹돉컊쳢ꆪꆪ퓲쳡릩룄솼듻뿮ꆣ듋췢ꎬ쏦쇙좡쿻믘쫪뗖톺욷좨샻뗄듦퓚ퟅ훘듳뗄늻좷뚨탔ꆣ벴뇣ퟮ훕듋볆뮮쓜릻쪵쪩ꎬ룦듻죋붫믱뗃쏀맺닆헾늿뗄횱뷓냯훺ꎬ쪹퓂뢶듓룦듻튲쫇탨튪뫜뛠쪱볤뗄ꆣ죋뗄햮컱뛔쫕죫뇈싊뗄㌸▽떵봳ㄥꆣꎨ웟ꎩ쏀맺쳡틩뗄뛔뷰죚튵뗄볠맜ꆣ????쓪?퓂닆헾늿폫랿샻쏀뫍랿뗘쏀뚩폐폅쿈막릺싲킭틩ꎬ뫍?퓂ꎬ쏀맺닆헾늿쳡돶듳럹삩듳뛔쏀맺뷰죚쾵춳뗄쿖퓚붫풭쿈쿲쎿랽릺싲????틚쏀풪퓶볓떽쿲쎿랽릺싲볠맜뗄탂듫쪩ꎬ웤훐냼삨ꎺ㈰〰틚쏀풪ꆣ??솪냮뒢놸뻖붫놻뢳폨탂뗄좨솦ꎬ볠맜죎뫎웤쪧좻뛸ꎬ떽????쓪?퓂ꎬ냂냍십볆뮮냯훺뛔쿳뗄?컳?뿉?캣벰뷰죚쾵춳컈뚨뗄듳탍뷰죚쪵쳥ꆣ쏀맺믵뇒볠췲컝훷훐횻폐???ꎬ???죋믱뗃룄솼탅듻ꆣ쏀맺닎샭풺쫰뫍뒢탮볠샭쫰뫏늢돉캪탂뗄맺볒틸탐볠샭쫰ꎬ볠뛠쫽떳ퟩ횯쏘쫩샭닩뗂ꆤ뗂뇶돆헢쿮볆뮮ꆰ쇮죋쪧맜쯹폐솪냮쳘탭짨솢뗄뒢탮믺릹ꆣ췻ꆱꆣ??짨솢튻룶탂뗄쿻럑헟뷰죚놣뮤쫰ꎬ뛔쿻럑탅듻헽죧????쓪?퓂??죕쯹놨뗀뗄쓇퇹ꎬ????냼쓪삨쏀탅맺폃뾨햮컱뫍힡랿뗖톺쪵쪩탂뗄맦퓲ꆣ붫튪쪧좥ퟔ벺힡랿뗄컝훷뗄쫽솿붫듯???뛠췲ꎬ뛸??잿훆쪵쪩룼퇏룱뗄춳튻뇪ힼ틔펦뛔쾵춳럧쿕ꎬ????쓪횻폐???췲ꆣ????쓪맩떵뗄좡쿻믘쫪뗖캣톺벰욷헻좨룶뷰죚쳥쾵뗄듳릫쮾튪뷓쫜볠맜ꆣ헢킩릫쮾뇘샻뗄힡랿쎿퓂욽뻹듯???ꎬ???틔짏ꎬ????쓪쎿탫퓂럻욽뫏뻹룼잿붡뗄놾튪쟳뫍쇷뚯닺튪쟳ꎬ뮹탫럻뫏33
CHINA LAW 2010 / 03룼퇏룱뗄뛔뗈뇪ힼ뫍탅듻럧쿕맜샭뇪ힼꆣ????쓪?퓂훐맺훐퇫틸탐쳡룟쇋틸탐볤듻뿮샻싊ꎬ늢??뛔돥믹뷰뫍쮽죋럧쿕놾믹뷰뇘탫떽쏀맺횤좯쟒쳡룟쇋틸탐뒢탮튪쟳ꎬ훐맺헽퓚쫕뷴믵뇒헾닟틔럀붻틗캯풱믡뗇볇힢닡늢뷓쫜볠맜ꆣ횹춨믵엲헍ꆣ??뷰죚퇜짺욷붻틗붫뷓쫜볠맜ꎬ뛔쫐뎡닎폫헟횴ꎨ쪮ꎩ쎳틗놣뮤훷틥뗄톹솦헽퓚믽샛ꆣ닺튵뷧쒱탐룼퇏룱뗄맦헂ꆣ쟳뗃떽헾뢮뗄뻈훺ꎬ컞싛쫇틔늹쳹ꆢ쮰싊폅믝뮹쫇틔㘮믵뇒쫐뎡믹뷰뫍릲춬믹뷰붫뷓쫜탂뗄볠맜ꆣ쎳틗놣뮤훷틥뗄랽쪽ꆣ뇈죧ꎬ쏀맺룖쳺튵폚????쓪???솪냮뒢놸놣쿕릫쮾붫놻뢳폨쎻쫕죎뫎뿉쓜릹돉퓂?죕헽쪽튪쟳ꆰ릺싲쏀맺ꆱ뗄쳵뿮펦떱돉캪죎뫎듌쾵춳럧쿕뗄틸탐뫍뷰죚믺릹뗄좨솦ꆣ벤램낸뗄쳘즫ꆣ쒿잰풤볆쏀맺맺믡붫튪춨맽뗄듌벤램듳뛠쫽헢킩듫쪩탨튪맺믡솢램춨맽ꆣ뺭볃톧볒싞낸냼몬쇋헢룶튪쟳ꆣ룹뻝쫀뷧쎳틗ퟩ횯뗄ힼ퓲ꎬ뇈죧늮쳘ꆤ죸뛻즭횸돶ꎬ냂냍십볆뮮붫틔죽훖룹놾랽쪽맘쮰뫍쎳틗ퟜ킭뚨틔벰쫀뷧쎳틗ퟩ횯헾뢮닉릺킭뚨ꎬ삩듳헾뢮뗄볠맜ꎺꋙꪰꊱ뢾횽ꮱ믊?꣖뢶꣒믐ꦽ?헢퇹뗄쳵뿮쫇죝틗헐훂릥믷뗄ꆣퟮ뫳램낸냼몬튻룶튪죚믺릹ꎨ뇈죧뮨웬틸탐뫍룟쪢ꎩ캪ퟮ훘튪뗄믺릹ꎬ쯼쟳ꎬ벴헢룶쳵뿮뗄ꆰ쪵쪩뇘탫럻뫏쏀맺뛔맺볊킭뚨쯹쏇뗄쪧냜붫ꆰ뛔뷰죚컈뚨릹돉췾킲ꆱꆣ헢킩믺릹뇘탫돐떣뗄틥컱ꆱꎬ떫헢쫇몬뫽웤듇뗄ꎬ얷쏋ꆢ볓쓃듳뫍럻뫏룼퇏룱뗄놾튪쟳ꎬ튻떩랢짺캣믺ꎬ뻍뿉쳡릩튻웤쯻쫀뷧쎳틗ퟩ횯돉풱맺폐뿉쓜횸퓰헢퇹뗄쳵뿮ꎬ쿲룶뮺돥쟸ꆣꋚ?쿻럑헟놣뮤쫰붫볠샭늻뗀뗂뗄럅듻탐쫀뷧쎳틗ퟩ횯쳡돶짪쯟ꆣ캪ꎬ늢놣헏웻뎵듻뿮ꆢ쿻럑듻뿮뫍힡랿뗖톺듻뿮컄볾ꎨ쪮튻ꎩ룹뻝쫀뷧쎳틗ퟩ횯럾컱쎳틗ퟜ킭뚨ꎬ쏀쫇릫욽뗄ꆢ뿉틔샭뷢뗄ꆣꋛ?탂맦퓲붫폨틔쪵쪩ꎬ뇈맺뺭볃듌벤램낸훐폅쿈맍펶쏀맺릤죋뗄쳵뿮쫇죝틗헐죧쪹힡랿뗖톺횤좯뮯뗄뷰죚릫쮾뇘탫캪ퟔ짭샻틦릺싲훂잴퓰뗄ꆣ㔥ꎬ헢붫쪹쯻쏇뇈뷏뷷짷뗘짳닩쿂쏦뗄듻뿮ꆣꎨ쪮뛾ꎩ얷쏋웹뷱퓚뎬맺볒쮮욽짏뮹캴쓜뻍닉좡퓚킴듋컄쪱ꎬ쏀맺훚풺틑춨맽튻쿮냼몬뛠쫽헢폐킧탐뚯듯돉튻훂틢볻ꆣ????쓪?퓂?죕ꎬ얷쏋뻜뻸쇋킩붨틩뗄램낸ꎬ떫쏀맺닎풺쎻폐탐뚯ꆣ퓚쏀맺ꎬ솢램탙퇀샻쳡돶뗄쳡릩????틚얷풪뻈훺얷쏋훐뗄뚫얷돉풱뇘탫평맺믡솽풺춨맽ꎬ늢평ퟜ춳잩쫰램낸ꎬ틔쪹램싉맺뗄쟫쟳ꎬ헢뇣춹쿔쇋헢퇹튻룶쫂쪵ꎺ퓚얷쏋ꎬ춬폐뗃틔춨맽ꆣ틦폚헻룶얷쏋뗄듫쪩뫍얷쏋훐뷏죵돉풱맺뗄뺭볃삧쓑ꎨ냋ꎩ쏀맺쯹폐볆뮮냼삨????쓪풤쯣뗄믵뇒뮨럑뇈뷏웰살ꎬ룷맺ퟔ벺뗄듫쪩룼햼폅쿈뗘캻ꆣퟜ뛮듯떽쇮죋쓑틔훃탅뗄??????틚쏀풪ꆣ쏀맺붫랢탐ꎨ쪮죽ꎩ맺볊믺릹듳솿햮좯ꎬ쏀맺풤쯣돠ퟖퟜ뛮ꎨ쿖퓚캪???????틚쏀쇬쿈펦뛔헢뎡캣믺뗄ퟩ횯쫇??맺벯췅ꎬ??맺벯풪ꎩ뫜뿬뻍믡뎬맽???ꎨ???????틚쏀풪ꎩ뗄?췅?뾪?쇋?죽ꆣ듎믡ꎬ????쓪??퓂튻듎ꎬ????쓪?퓂튻듎ꎬ솪냮뒢놸뻖쿖퓚뫍붫살뚼튪릺싲쏀맺맺햮틔톹뗍돠????쓪?퓂튻듎ꆣ??맺벯췅퓚????쓪?퓂?죕랢뇭뗄릫ퟖꆣ뷱뫳㓄곃삹䀹훃뿄ꮳ겹ﴱ췲틚쏀풪ꆣ놨튻훂춬틢쯟훮죧쿂뗄뛮췢뷰죚풴ꎺꋙ쿲맺볊믵ꎨ뻅ꎩ뛠쫽웤쯻맺볒냼삨훐맺ꆢ죕놾뫍얷쏋돉풱뇒믹뷰ퟩ횯쳡릩????틚쏀풪ꎻꋚ????틚쏀풪뗄탂뗄쳘맺뚼퓚쪵쪩뺭볃듌벤뫍뿭쯉믵뇒헾닟뗄쿠춬랽싔ꆣ뇰쳡뿮좨늦뿮ꎬ평맺볊믵뇒믹뷰ퟩ횯???룶돉풱맺릲좻뛸ꎬ??맺벯췅돉풱맺횮볤ꎬ폈웤쫇쏀맺뫍얷쏋쿭ꎻꋛ????틚쏀풪릩뛠뇟뾪랢틸탐퓶볓탅듻ꎻꋜ????횮볤ꎬ뻍듌벤탔뮨럑뗄돌뛈뫍쫇럱잡떱닺짺쇋럖웧ꆣ틚쏀풪뗄쎳틗뷰횧돖ꎻꋝ쿲ퟮ늻랢듯맺볒쳡릩??틚얷쏋엺움쏀맺뗄ퟶ램붫헐훂잱퓚뗄춨믵엲헍ꆣ얷쏋쏀풪뗄뛮췢횧돖ꎬ평맺볊믵뇒믹뷰ퟩ횯돶쫛믆뷰폨틔뗄듌벤횻햼???뗄????훁????ꎬ뮪쪢뛙죏캪돯헢뿮쫇ꆣ늻릻뗄ꆣ얷쏋퓚짧믡뢣샻랽쏦뗄뮨럑뇈쏀맺뫍죕놾뚼뮹짌뚨돉솢뷰죚컈뚨캯풱믡ꎬ웤ퟚ횼쫇움맀죵뗣튪뛠ꆣ훐맺뛔캣믺뗄랴펦쫇춨맽엓듳뗄튻삿ퟓ듌벤볆늢볠뚽맺볊뷰죚쳥쾵ꆣ떫늢캴쿲헢룶탂캯풱믡쫚폨뮮ꆪꆪ?췲틚죋쏱뇒ꎨ????틚쏀풪ꎩꆣ뷡맻훐맺헢룶죎뫎쳘좨ꆣ헢룶쪵쳥쫇퓚죰쪿뗄뷰죚컈뚨싛첳뗄탂쫀뷧짏랢햹ퟮ뿬뗄뺭볃쳥톸쯙믖뢴쇋퓶뎤ꎬ풤볆????쏻돆ꆣ탂캯풱믡뗄닎폫랽룼볓맣랺ꎬ떫웤쫚좨뮹늻좷쓪붫삩듳??ꆣ????쓪??퓂훐맺뗄돶뿚믖뢴쇋퓶뎤뚨ꆣ튻훂짌뚨튪뛔뛔돥믹뷰ꆢ뷰죚퇜짺욷ꆢ탅듻움34
맀믺릹뫍뷰죚믺릹짨솢맺볒볠뚽ꆣ쾸뷚평룷맺ퟔ벺훆룦뷫ꆣ냍죻뛻틸탐볠맜캯풱믡튲캴쓜풤볻떽쓇뎡캣뚩ꆣ믺ꎬ캯풱믡뗄킭틩냍죻뛻?뫅뫍냍죻뛻?뫅틠럇폐킧ꆣ쎻폐쳡떽뛮췢뗄뺭볃듌벤ꆣ??맺벯췅튲캴쓜뷢뻶냍죻뛻?뫅뗄?룹횧훹ꆪꆪퟮ뗍놾튪쟳ꆢ볠맜움뷩뫍탭뛠훘튪뗄뻟쳥뗄컊쳢ꎬ뮹탨볌탸쳖싛뫍헹싛ꎬ뇈죧쫐뎡볍싉폫쫐뎡춸쏷ꆪꆪ뇘탫폨틔훘탂짳쫓움볛ꆣ폐죧쿂컊쳢ꎺ킩움싛볒붨틩짨솢탂뗄쫀뷧뷰죚ퟩ횯ꎬ웤죎컱쫇볠맜ꎨ?ꎩ맺볊믵뇒믹뷰ퟩ횯뫍쫀뷧틸탐ꆣ틽죋힢쒿좫쟲뷰죚쫐뎡ꆣ뗄쫇쿱맺볊믵뇒믹뷰ퟩ횯뫍쫀뷧틸탐쓇퇹뗄맺볊믺릹ꋛ맺볊믵뇒믹뷰ퟩ횯뫍쫀뷧틸탐튪쿫웰훘튪ퟷ캴쓜풤볻떽헢뎡캣믺ꎬ늢퓚펦뛔훐횻웰떽쿠떱킡뗄폃ꎬ뇘탫듳럹퓶볓웤뷰ꆣ맺볊믵뇒믹뷰ퟩ횯퓸뫴폵ퟷ폃ꆣ맺볊믵뇒믹뷰ퟩ횯탭억쿲컚뿋삼쳡릩???틚쏀붨솢탂뗄ꆰ탂탋쫐뎡믹뷰ꆱꎬ쫀뷧틸탐붨틩쎿룶랢듯풪ꎬ뇹떺??틚쏀풪ꎬ삭췑캬퇇??틚쏀풪ꎬ냍믹쮹첹?맺?볒쓃돶웤튻삿ퟓ듌벤랽낸훐뗄????살짨솢ꆰ든죵틚쏀풪ꎬ탙퇀샻???틚쏀풪ꆣ맺볊믵뇒믹뷰ퟩ횯뗄풮믹뷰ꆱꎬ풮훺쓇킩늻쓜ퟔ뻈뫍뺭늻힡돠ퟖ뗄랢햹훐맺훺냯훺??룶랢햹훐맺볒뫍탂탋쫐뎡맺볒뛈맽헢뎡캣믺볒ꆣꎨ힢??ꎩ??맺벯췅쿬펦헢룶짨솢믹뷰뗄뫴폵ꎬ떫뗄럧놩ꆣ헢뇊믹뷰릻폃싰ꎿ탭억뗄뷰쓜헦헽쓃돶살싰ꎿꎨ?ꎩ쫀뷧틸탐쎿쓪뗄듻뿮ퟜ뛮횻폐???틚쏀풪ퟳꋜ???쓪?ꎬ뺭볃톧볒풼몲ꆤ쎷쓉뗂ꆤ뾭뛷쮹뫴폵폒ꆣ????쓪?퓂ꎬ죕놾탻늼붫쿲맺볊믵뇒믹뷰ퟩ횯쳡뒴솢탂뗄쫀뷧뒢탮믵뇒ꆰ쫀뷧풪ꆱꆣ쿖퓚믲탭쫇뒴솢릩????틚쏀풪ꎬ얷쏋퓚????쓪?퓂ퟷ돶쿠춬뗄돐헢억훖ꆣ뒢탮믵뇒뗄쪱믺쇋ꎬ믲탭듳럹삩듳쳘뇰쳡뿮좨뗄평폚??맺벯췅탭억쿲맺볊믵뇒믹뷰ퟩ횯쳡릩뗄뛮췢ퟷ폃뻍뿉틔쇋ꆣ헢붫폐훺폚펦뛔쒿잰쫀뷧믵뇒쫐뎡뗄뷰늻쓜솢벴떽헋ꎬ맺볊믵뇒믹뷰ퟩ횯붫춨맽쿲릫훚돶뚯떴ꆣ??맺벯췅뫴폵삩듳쳘놸쳡뿮좨뗄ퟷ폃뇪횾ퟅ퓚쫛햮좯돯벯???쏀풪ꎨ틫힢ꎺ풭컄죧듋ꎬ틉캪???틚헢쏀랽쏦폐쇋훘튪뗄뾪뛋ꆣ풪ꎩꆣ????쓪?퓂??죕ꎬ쫀뷧틸탐탻늼튻쿮볆뮮ꎬ퓚ꋝ믡폐룼뛠뗄맺볒쪵쪩놾볠맜틔듓좫쟲뷰죚쳥솽쓪쓚쳡릩???틚쏀풪틔럶훺뚫얷뫍훐얷뗄삧쓑틸탐쾵훐믱좡쒳훖놣뮤싰ꎿ본폚헢뎡캣믺뛔탂탋쫐뎡뗄펰뫍웳튵ꆣ쿬ꎬ랢햹훐맺볒쫇럱풸틢뷸탐놾볠맜폖틽웰쇋벤쇒ꎨ?ꎩ맺볊믵뇒믹뷰ퟩ횯샻폃탂뗄뷰뒴솢튻룶뗄뇧싛ꆣꎨ십살컷퇇퓚??쫀볍??쓪듺뛔췢헷쫕ꆰ췋탂뗄탅듻볆뮮ꆪꆪ쇩믮탅듻뛮뛈ꆣ쒫컷룧ꆢ룧싗뇈퇇돶쮰ꆱ늢퇓웚ㄲ룶퓂뎥뮹햮컱ꎩ뫍늨삼룹뻝헢룶볆뮮뷨쇋뿮ꆣꎨ㖣꧊삽돒힡?ꎨ?ꎩ좫쟲볠맜ꆪꆪ헢뎡캣믺붫믡닺짺ꆰ늼샗뛙ꋙ????쓪ꎬ평폚탨쟳쿂붵뫍좱짙쎳틗탅듻ꎬ쫀뷧즭쇖쳥쾵뗚뛾ꆱ싰ꎿ헢뎡캣믺붫닺짺탂뗄좫쟲뺭볃쎳틗쿂붵쇋ꎬ쫀뷧쎳틗솿ퟔ????쓪틔살쫗듎쿂뗸ꆣ맽ꆰ붨훾ꆱ싰ꎿ듰낸쯆뫵쫇ꆰ럱ꆱꆣ떫퓚맺볊닣쏦짏뿉좥쫀뷧쎳틗쫇쫀뷧뺭볃퓶뎤폈웤쫇랢햹훐맺볒뗄뺭볃쓜튪쪩럅튻킩퇦믰ꎬ틲캪룄룯펵폐틆뺭볃헾훎좨솦퓶뎤뗄틽쟦ꎬ벸뫵햼떽??뗄퓶뎤ꎬ????쓪컼틽쇋?췲뗄잱솦ꆣ헢뎡캣믺쿔쪾ꎺ폫쫀뷧뺭볃뗄퓶뎤쿠뇈ꎬ맺틚뗄쮽죋춶ꆣ볊믵뇒믹뷰ퟩ횯뫍쫀뷧틸탐뗄뷰쫇늻ퟣ뗄ꆣ틔쿂쫇ꋚ쎳틗쫜ퟨ쫇평폚?ꎩ믵뇒벱뻧뚯떴ꎬ?ꎩ좱짙돶튻킩헹싛럇뎣벤쇒뗄붨틩ꎺ뿚탅듻ꎬ?ꎩ쿻럑탨쟳쿂붵ꆣ뇈죧ꎬ늨싞뗄몣룉즢믵ꋙ룄뇤맺볊믵뇒믹뷰ퟩ횯뫍쫀뷧틸탐뗄춶욱뷡퓋볛횸쫽쫇싗뛘늨싞뗄몣몽퓋붻틗쯹랢늼뗄몣퓋훘튪릹ꎬ퓶볓훐맺ꆢ냍컷ꆢ펡뛈ꆢ뛭싞쮹뗈맺볒뫍랢햹훐풭쇏뇈죧쳺뿳쪯ꆢ쎺첿ꆢ솸쪳ꆢ쮮쓠ꆢ즳ꆢ뮯럊뫍춭맺볒뗄좨솦ꆣ컞싛죧뫎ꎬ헢뎡캣믺뇭쏷쇋?맺벯췅뗄뗈뗄쎿죕욽뻹볛ꆣ????쓪?퓂??죕ꎬ헢룶횸쫽듯떽쇋뻖쿞탔ꎬ붫살㈰맺벯췅믡웰룼듳뗄ퟷ폃ꆣ뒴볇슼뗄??????뗣ꎬ뛸떽쇋??퓂ꎬ헢룶횸쫽붵떽???ꋚ얷쏋쇬떼죋????쓪?퓂??죕뫴폵뛔좫쟲뷰죚뗣쫐ꎬ쫇ㄹ㠶쓪살ퟮ뗍뗄ꆣ뎡뫍뷰죚믺릹뷸탐볠맜ꆣ퓚????쓪훁????쓪쓇뎡캣믺ꋛ캪쇋캬돖쫀뷧쎳틗ꎬ훐맺퇫탐쳡릩뛮췢뗄???훐ꎬ맺볊믵뇒믹뷰ퟩ횯뫍컷랽뗄볒룦뷫쿠맘맺볒튪틚쏀풪뗄쎳틗탅듻ꎬ쫀뷧틸탐삩듳쇋쎳틗탅듻볆뮮ꆣ뷸탐뷰죚볠맜ꎬ떫쿱쏀맺뫍펢맺쓇퇹뗄맺볒좴캴쫜떽쫀뷧틸탐뮹붫붨솢쎳틗듙뷸ퟩ횯틔럶훺뗍쫕죫맺볒ꆣ35
CHINA LAW 2010 / 03헢킩듫쪩뮹캴쫕떽쿔훸킧맻ꆣ뫳뎾ꎬ춨맽쿲뚫쏋맺볒쳡릩죕풪듻뿮틔쳡룟죕풪뗄맺ꋜ????쓪??퓂훁??퓂죕놾돶뿚쿂붵쇋???볊ꎬ뗘헢캻쫇ꆣ죕놾뿉쓜틔헢뎡캣믺캪웵믺틔볓잿죕풪뗄뗘ퟔ????쓪폐쇋뿉뇈쇏틔살뗄ퟮ듳붵럹ꆣ????쓪캻죕ꎬ놾쪹뚫뺩돉캪튫쒿뗄뷰죚뚼돇ꆣ죕놾폐킩죋뫴폵붨뗄쎳틗쮳닮뇈짏튻쓪쿂붵쇋?????ꆣ뛔쯹폐뗘쟸뗄돶솢퇇훞릲춬믵뇒틔뾹뫢쏀풪뫍얷풪ꆣ뿚뻹폐쿂붵ꆣ퓚????닆헾쓪뛈ꎬ죕놾뗄쎳틗돠ퟖ듯ꋟ쏀맺틑늻쓜쿱틔췹쓇퇹퓚쎳틗컊쳢짏뛔훐맺뫍????틚죕풪ꎬ쫇ퟔ????쓪틔살뗄쫗듎쎳틗돠ퟖꆣ죕헢놾늻쪩볓톹솦ꆣ쏀맺틀삵헢솽룶맺볒릺싲쏀맺맺햮ꆣ뷶쫇평폚쿻럑탨쟳쿂붵ꎬ쫗쿈쫇평폚죕풪짽횵ꆣ죕놾뛔쏀맺뗄쎳틗쮳닮횻폐훐맺뛔쏀맺뗄쎳틗쮳닮뗄ꋝ??맺벯췅퓚????쓪??퓂뗄뮪쪢뛙럥믡짏쯄놣럖횤횮튻ꎬ틲듋쏀맺쟣쿲폚쿲훐맺뛸늻쫇쿲죕놾쪩ꆰ컒쏇붫뛔춶뫍컯욷쎳틗뫍럾컱쎳틗늻짨훃탂뗄헏톹ꆣ쏀맺뫍훐맺횮볤뗄쎳틗쒦닁헽퓚퓶볓ꆣ평폚헢퇹낭ꎬ늻쪩볓탂뗄돶뿚쿞훆ꎬ늻쪵탐폐폚쫀뷧쎳틗ퟩ뗄쎳틗쒦닁ꎬ훐맺뿉쓜복짙릺싲쏀맺햮컱ꎬ쪹죕놾뗄횯뗄듌벤돶뿚듫쪩ꆱꆣ떫튻킩맺볒헾뢮뗄쒳킩탐뚯캥뢺떣룼볓돁훘ꆣ놳쇋헢쿮놣횤ꆣ룹뻝????쓪?퓂릫늼뗄쫀뷧틸탐뗄튻ꋠ죕놾늻엂쏀맺맺믡뫍냂냍십탐헾떱뻖ꆣ뛔죕놾럝놨룦ꎬ??맺벯췅훐폐??룶돉풱맺솢램춨맽쇋??쿮살놣쮵ꎬ쎳틗랽쏦ퟮ듳뗄컊쳢붫쫇죕풪뗄짽횵ꎬ뛸짽횵뮤훷틥듫쪩ꎬ쳡룟뷸뿚맘쮰ꎬ믲헟솢램춨맽폫뺭볃퓚컞쿞웚뗄붫살쯆뫵뮹튪볌탸쿂좥ꆣ듌벤듫쪩쿠맘떫폐폚쎳틗ힼ퓲뗄늹쳹랽낸ꆣ????쓪ꋡ튪쿫뢴쯕쫀뷧뺭볃ꎬ췪돉쫀뷧쎳틗ퟩ횯뛠맾믘?퓂??죕ꎬ짨퓚싗뛘뗄쫀뷧틸탐횧돖뗄뺭볃헾닟퇐뺿뫏첸에뇈틔췹죎뫎쪱뫲룼쿔뷴웈ꆣ뿉쫇ꎬ쒿잰뗄캣믺훐탄볠맜뗄볠뚽믺릹ꆪꆪ좫쟲쎳틗틽떼ꆪꆪ탻늼ꎺ좫캪첸에힢죫쇋탂뗄컊쳢ꆣ뇈죧ꎬ뛠맾믘뫏첸에뗄횢뷡쟲??룶훷튪뺭볃쳥춨맽쇋???쿮ꆰ쏷쒿헅떨뗄놣뮤훷쫇랢햹훐맺볒볡돖튪죃랢듯맺볒ꆪꆪ죕놾ꆢ쏀맺뫍얷틥ꆱ듫쪩ꎬ쇭폐ㄳ㓏?췄껖킡?쏋ꆪꆪ쿲랢햹훐맺볒뗄얩닺욷돶뿚뾪럅쫐뎡ꆣ떫퓚헢?ꋞ훘탂잿뗷뗄쫇ꎺ맺볒믵뇒랴펳쪵볊볛횵ꎬ늻듎캣믺웚볤ꎬ??룶랢햹훐맺볒뛔쪳욷돶뿚쪩볓쿞훆ꆣ쓜놻죋캪닙ퟝ틔듌벤돶뿚ꆣ냂냍십탐헾떱뻖횸퓰훐맺헢뛔폚쿱죕놾헢퇹뗄맺볒살쮵쫇룶컊쳢ꎬ틲캪죕놾폐ꆰ닙ퟝ죋쏱뇒ꆱꆪꆪ톹뗍죋쏱뇒뇒횵틔듌벤돶뿚ꆣퟅ솸쪳낲좫떣폇ꆣ죻냍쮹뗙낲ꆤ십삭뇈퓚????쓪?퓂??죕뗄ꆶ폊뮪쪢뛙????쓪?퓂??ꆪ??죕ꎬ??맺벯췅ퟔ캣믺뾪쪼틔살놨ꆷ짏컄쮵ꎺꆰ훐맺뗄뇣틋믵뇒ꆱ쫇퓬돉헢뎡캣믺뗚죽듎뾪믡ꆣퟮ뫳릫놨탻늼쇋쿂쫶튪뗣ꎺꋙ??맺벯췅뗄믹놾풭틲ꆣ쏀맺맺믡뿉쓜춨맽랴뛔맺볊ꆰ믵뇒닙쿖퓚쫇맺볊뺭볃뫏ퟷ뗄ꆰ쫗튪싛첳ꆱꎬ좡듺쇋?맺벯ퟝꆱ뗄탂램싉ꆣ떫쏀맺퇏훘틀삵훐맺릺싲쏀맺맺햮ꎬ췅ꆣꋚ뷰죚믺릹뗄놾뇪ힼ붫튪쳡룟ꎬ떫쎻폐ퟷ돶죎헢쿞훆쇋쏀맺쳖볛뮹볛뗄쪵솦ꆣퟮ뫃뗄잰뷸랽쪽쫇닉뫎뻟쳥돐억ꆣ탭뛠볒붨틩췆돶뷗쳝쪽맦퓲ꎬ틔쪹ퟮ좡뛠뇟탐뚯뻀헽뺭뎣쿮쒿쪧뫢ꎬ뛸늻쫇떥뇟뷢뻶ꆣ맘뢻폐뗄틸탐뫍뻟폐ꆰ쾵춳럧쿕ꆱ뗄ퟮ듳틸탐뇘탫쇴돶쮰벰쎳틗ퟜ킭뚨뗚??쳵뗚튻낸횸돶ꎺ쫀뷧쎳틗ퟩ횯돉ퟮ뛠뗄뷰ꎬ룟듯??믲???ꆣꋛ룸폨훐맺뫍웤쯻퇇훞풱맺ꆰ늻쓜춨맽붻뮻탐뚯ퟨ죅놾킭뚨뗄틢춼ꆱꆣ쏀맺맺볒퓚맺볊믵뇒믹뷰ퟩ횯뫍쫀뷧틸탐룼듳뗄럝뛮뫍뿘쎳틗듺뇭냬릫쫒뿉쓜튪틀뻝헢룶쳵뿮웰쯟훐맺ꆣ컞싛훆ꎨ훁짙??ꎩꆣꋜ뾪랢맺볊릫죏뗄맺볊뷰죚ힼ퓲ꆣ죧뫎맺볊믵뇒믹뷰ퟩ횯뫍쫀뷧쎳틗ퟩ횯펦쿬펦뫴폵ꎬꋝ쎳틗뫍뺭뎣헋뮧쪧뫢붫평쓦닮쮳닮맺뒦샭ꆣ닉좡솪뫏탐뚯좷놣믵뇒볛횵늻쓜죋캪첧룟쎳틗쓦닮뫍四、应付危机的可能的附加行动쮳닮ꆣ펦뛔캣믺뗄헾뢮탐뚯폐솽룶좱쿝ꎺ쯻쏇늻릻듳훐맺헽퓚닉좡뇘튪뗄돵늽듫쪩틔쪹죋쏱뇒돉캪맺떨ꎬ맺볊탐뚯짙횮폖짙ꆣ캣믺쫇좫쟲탔뗄ꎬ룷맺닉좡볊믵뇒ꆣ훐맺펦떱볌탸닉좡헢킩늽훨ꎬ뮹튪훰늽뗘훘듫쪩펦뛔캣믺쫇뇘튪뗄ꎬ떫맺볊듫쪩ꆢ맺볊킭뗷뫍뫏맀죋쏱뇒뗄뇒횵틔쪹웤럻뫏뺭볃쿖쪵ꆣ뚫뺩늽훐맺횮ퟷ튲쫇훁맘훘튪뗄ꆣ36
ꎨ튻ꎩ쏀맺짌튵틸탐쳥쾵ꆣ쏀맺뗄탐뚯헼뻈쇋쏀췻ꆣꆱ쯻쿖퓚뫴폵뛔뷰죚퇜짺욷뷸탐볠맜ꆣ맺뗄짌튵틸탐쾵춳ꎬ쪹웤쏢폨웆닺ꎬ떫듺볛뻞듳ꆣ짌ꎨ쯄ꎩ좫쟲뷰죚볠맜튵틸탐샻폃헾뢮뻈훺뿮믱좡뒴볍슼뗄샻죳ꎬ뛸폖쎻폐춨맽탂뗄램싉뫍맦퓲ꎬ놣횤뛔뷰죚쫐뎡벰쫐뎡닎듳솿듻돶ꎬ틲듋탅듻죔좻늻ퟣꆣ헾뢮엺ힼ뗄뫏늢뒴퓬폫헟쪵쪩볠뚽ꎬ늻뷶퓚맺볒닣쏦짏ꎬ뛸쟒튪퓚좫쟲닣쇋맑춷싴훷슢뛏쳵볾ꆣ쏦짏ꎬ듯돉맺볊킭뚨ꎬ붨솢펵폐ퟣ릻죋솦컯솦뗄쫀뷧??맺믡펦뾼싇춨맽튻룶ퟮ탂냦놾뗄룱삭쮹?쮹뗙뷰죚ퟩ횯ꆣ뷰죚쫐뎡쫇좫쟲탔뗄ꎬ뇘탫닉좡좫쟲뷢뻶룱뛻램낸ꎬ틔쪹짌튵틸탐폫춶릫쮾럖룮뾪살ꆣ냬램ꆣ좫쟲뷢뻶냬램냼삨헢퇹튻킩컊쳢ꎬ뇈죧릲춬믡??탂뷰죚릫쮾뗄뷸죫펦쫜떽맄샸ꎬ틔믖뢴틸탐횮볆뇪ힼꎬ놾뫍뒢놸튪쟳ꎬ춸쏷ꎬ움맀횤좯뫍웤쯻뷰볤뗄뺺헹ꆣ죚릤뻟뗄뇪ힼꎬ틔벰짌욷뫍횤좯춶믺짌뇪ힼꆣ㌮틸탐샻죳쮰펦폨헷좡ꆣꎨ컥ꎩ닉좡킭뗷뗄맺볊탐뚯펦뛔쏀맺뗄싽탔뺭뎣ꎨ뛾ꎩ뢴쯕ꎨ뺭볃듌벤ꎩ램낸헋뮧돠ퟖꆣ뗚죽룶훘뗣쫇뒴퓬탂뗄뻍튵룚캻뗄닆헾듌벤ꆣ맺솽훖싽탔돠ퟖ컊쳢헛쒥ퟅ쏀맺ꎺ풤쯣돠ퟖ뫍뺭뎣믡춨맽뗄뢴쯕?뺭볃듌벤램낸맽폚떨킡ꆣ쯼쫇튻킩쿠헋뮧돠ퟖꆣ헢솽룶컊쳢뮥쿠뻀닸퓚튻웰ꎬ틲캪쏀맺뗄떱킡뗄볆뮮뻛뫏뛸돉뗄듳퓓믢ꆣ룼뛠뗄붹뗣펦럅퓚믹뗍뒢탮싊틢캶ퟅ탨튪췢살쏖늹헢솽훖돠ퟖꆣ뺭뎣헋뒡짨쪩뾪횧짏ꆣ듋췢ꎬ헢쫇튻룶쳡돶붫놻뷱뫳???쓪뮧돠ퟖ쫇ퟮ돉컊쳢뗄ꎬ틲캪쯼짦벰췢햮뗄믽샛ꆣꎨ쏀쯹볇좡뗄탂뗄듳떨볆뮮뗄뫃쪱믺ꆣ튻룶훷틢쫇ꎺ캪쪲맺틑쫇쫀뷧짏잷햮ퟮ뛠뗄맺볒ꎩ퓚뷱뫳벸쓪훐ꎬ돠ퟖ쎴늻붨짨튻룶솬뷓룷듳돇쫐뫍뚫컷몣낶뗄ퟮ탂쮮욽뗄풤쯣늻뿉뇜쏢ꆣ떫쏀맺뇘탫닉좡탐뚯쿷복뺭뎣헋뮧돠뎬룟쯙쇐뎵좫맺쳺슷췸쾵춳쓘ꎿퟖꆣ캪듯듋쒿뗄ꎬ쏀맺ꆢ훐맺ꆢ죕놾펦뻙탐죽랽믡ꎨ죽ꎩ춶틸탐펦뷓쫜탂뗄볠맜ꎺ첸ꆣ훐맺뫍죕놾펦춬틢듌벤맺쓚탨쟳ꎬ뛸쏀맺퓲튪닉??뛔뷰죚퇜짺욷뗄볠맜믹놾ힼ퓲ꆣ뷰죚퇜짺욷퓚좡듌벤뒢탮뗄헾닟ꎬ뇈죧럏돽뛔쯹폐틸탐뒢탮헋뮧뗄맺볊뷰죚쫐뎡짏웰ퟅ쪵훊탔뗄ퟷ폃ꎬ떫펦폐볠맜믹놾헷쮰ꆣힼ퓲ꎬ틔쪹헢킩쫐뎡폐킧뗘랢믓ퟷ폃ꎬ늢뇜쏢틑랢짺ꎨ쇹ꎩ룄퓬맺볊믵뇒믹뷰ퟩ횯뫍쫀뷧틸탐ꎬ틔쪹맽뗄톪쾴ꆣ짙쫽뷰죚퇜짺욷짭짏뗄뺭볃컛뗣믡뛔쯹폐헢솽룶ퟩ횯쓜뷏뫃뗘풤닢캴살뗄뺭볃캣믺늢ퟷ돶랴뗄뷰죚퇜짺욷닺짺늻샻펰쿬ꎬ벴뇣뛔쓇킩놣쇴쇋쿠떱펦ꆣ헢솽룶ퟩ횯뿉뗃떽룼뛠뗄뷰ꎬ뛔맺볊믵뇒믹뷰듳볛횵뗄뷰죚퇜짺욷튲쫇죧듋ꆣ얪튻룶헫뛔뷰죚퇜짺ퟩ횯살쮵ꎬ퓲펦뗃떽탂뗄쫚좨ꎬ틔쪹뺭펪췪짆뗄맺볒욷뗄샠쯆????쓪횤좯램낸쓇퇹뗄냦놾쫇폐뇘튪뗄ꎬ맻뫍맺볊쫕횧쪧뫢뗄맺볒룼죝틗듓쯼쓇샯뷨뿮ꆣ훐맺ꆢ죴죧듋ꎬ붫살뷰죚퇜짺욷뗄볛횵뫍붻틗뻍폐뿉쓜볈춸펡뛈뫍쒳킩웤쯻맺볒펦쫚폨룼룟뗄럝뛮뫍춶욱좨ꆣ쏷폖낲좫ꆣ쒿잰캣믺뻟폐럭듌틢캶뗄쫇ꎬ볠맜뷰죚퇜??뒴솢탂뗄쫀뷧뒢탮믵뇒ꎬ쯼쫇튻룶룷맺믵뇒뗄짺욷쫐뎡붫믖뢴춶헟뗄탅탄뫍쿖듦뗄틔벰캴살뗄뷰삺ퟓꎬ쓜룼컈뚨뗘놣횵ꆣ????쓪?퓂ꎬ훐맺헽쪽쳡틩죚퇜짺욷욱뻝뗄볛횵ꆣ붫쳘뇰쳡뿮좨ꎨ쒿잰쫇쫀뷧훷튪믵뇒삺ퟓꎩ짽벶ꎬ뒴??탂뗄ퟮ뗍쿞뛈뗄놾튪쟳ꆣ맽뛈뗄룜룋ퟷ폃펦솢탂뗄ꆰ뎬훷좨ꆱ쫀뷧뒢탮믵뇒ꆣ훐맺죋쏱틸탐탐뎤폨맜뿘ꎬ룹뻝럧쿕횸쫽뛔춶틸탐싽싽쪩볓놾튪훜킡뒨쳡돶헢룶붨틩ꎬ틲캪쯻죏캪쒿잰뗄쳥쾵폐ퟅ쟳ꆣꆰ믺릹탔좱쿝ꆱꆣ??펦틔췐뇶쮰캪쒣쪽뛔춶틸탐헷쫕붻틗쮰ꆣ짌??맘볼퇫탐럮탐킭뗷뗄믵뇒헾닟ꆣ퇫탐펦뻍웤샻욷웚믵붻틗캯풱믡훷쾯볓샯ꆤ뷰쮹샕퓚??쫀볍??듺쓪싊헾닟뫍뾪럅뗄쫐뎡믮뚯뷸탐톯뫍킭뗷ꆣ떣죎닆헾늿맙풱쪱퓸랴뛔볠맜뷰죚퇜짺욷ꎬ쿖퓚쯻퓲??쏀맺ꆢ얷쏋ꆢ죕놾뫍훐맺럮탐킭뗷뗄닆헾헾닟쮵ꎺꆰ컞싛뷰죚쾵춳뮹쫇볠맜쾵춳뚼쇮쏀맺릫훚쪧뫍튻삿ퟓ뺭볃듌벤랽낸ꆣ맺볊짏펦뻍룷맺뗄튻삿ퟓ뺭37
CHINA LAW 2010 / 03볃듌벤랽낸뷸탐룼뛠뗄듨짌뫍킭뗷ꆣ쏀맺햮컱ꎬ캪쏀맺싽탔뺭뎣헋뮧돠ퟖ쳡릩쇋뷰ꆣ쿱??훘짪쫀뷧쎳틗ퟩ횯뗄풭퓲ꎬ랴뛔놣뮤훷틥뫍훐맺쓇퇹뗄맺볒뿉쓜튪복돖쏀맺맺햮뫍웤쯻쏀맺햮ꆰ틔쇚캪?ꆱ뗄쎳틗뫍믵뇒헾닟ꆣ컱ꆣ쏀맺뻍쎳틗뫍뺭볃컊쳢쿲웤쯻맺볒쪩볓톹솦뗄쳖五、若干结论볛뮹볛뗄쓜솦쫇폐쿞뗄ꎬ틲캪쏀맺뇘탫틀삵죕놾뫍훐좫쟲뷰죚캣믺뢴쯕뗄쯙뛈좡뻶폚쫀뷧뫏ퟷ틔킭뗷맺헢킩맺볒볌탸릺싲쏀맺햮컱ꆣ닆헾뫍믵뇒헾닟ꎬ좡뻶폚ퟷ돶뻶닟틔쫊펦좫쟲뷰죚믺??쏦잰뗄튻룶쪵쪵퓚퓚뗄캣쿕ꎺ쏀풪폐뿉쓜퓚맺릹ꎬ뇈죧맺볊믵뇒믹뷰ퟩ횯뫍쫀뷧틸탐ꎬ좡뻶폚룼뫃볊쫐뎡짏뇀삣ꆣ????쓪뗚튻듎ꆰ쏀풪ꆱ캣믺쫇평풽쓏뗘킭뗷쎳틗헾닟ꆢ닆헾헾닟뫍믵뇒헾닟ꆣ웹뷱좫쟲헾햽헹틽웰뗄ꆣ뷡맻쫇늼샗뛙즭쇖쳥쾵만뚨믵뇒믣싊뗄닟붫쎳틗헾닟폫뷰죚믵뇒헾닟럖룴뾪살ꆣ헢뎡캣믺뗄훕뷡ꆣ떫쏀풪틀좻쫇쫀뷧뒢탮믵뇒ꎬ훷튪쫇틲캪얷훞튻룶뷌통쫇ꎺ뷰죚믵뇒헾닟뛔쎳틗훁맘훘튪ꎬ쫇늻펦춶헟뫍퇫탐뗄릺싲ꆣ퓚샯룹탐헾떱뻖웚볤ꎬ쏀맺닆뾼싇붫웤럖룴뾪살뗄ꆣ헾뫍뺭뎣헋뮧싏짺돠ퟖ훷튪놻죕놾쯹컼쫕ꆣퟮ뷼훐맺ꎨ튻ꎩ헢뎡캣믺춹쿔쇋헢퇹뗄쫂쪵ꎺ좫쟲훷튪뷰릺싲쇋듳솿쏀맺햮컱ꎬ쪹늼쪲탐헾떱뻖뺭쫜힡쇋풤쯣죚믺릹틑맽쪱ꎬ탨튪뷸탐룹놾룄퓬ꆣ뫍뺭뎣헋뮧뗄듳솿돠ퟖꆣ떫붫살쮭믡횧독쏀풪ꎿꎨ뛾ꎩ캴살랢짺춨믵엲헍뗄캣쿕ꆣ쏀맺뿕잰뗄풤??훐맺펦볌탸닉좡듫쪩듌벤맺쓚뺭볃탨쟳ꎬ훐맺쯣돠ퟖ뫍믵뇒릩펦뗄듳솿퓶볓릹돉쇋캣쿕ꎺ퓚????쓪퓙튲늻쓜쿱맽좥쓇퇹틀뾿췢늿탨쟳뫍돶뿚ꆣ좻뛸훐맺믲탭뻍튪떽살뗄뺭볃뢴쯕ꎬ붫튪냩횮틔듳럹춨믵엲뫍퇇훞뗄뺭볃쳥ퟜ뗄살붲뇈쫀뷧웤쯻뗘랽뢴쯕뗃뿬ꎬ헍ꆣ듦퓚ퟅ헢퇹뗄캣쿕ꎬ쓇뻍쫇캪쇋듌벤뺭볃퓶뎤ꎬ쯻쏇뗄냬램쫇듌벤맺쓚탨쟳틔쏖늹돶뿚쯰쪧ꆣ뿭쯉뗄믵뇒헾닟붫돖탸뫜뎤뗄쪱볤ꎬ쒿잰뗄캣믺맽뫳??랴맽살쏀맺퓲펦닉좡듫쪩듌벤맺쓚뒢탮샻싊틔붫믡폐퇏훘뗄춨믵엲헍톹솦ꆣ뇣쿷복쏀맺뺭뎣헋뮧돠ퟖꆣꎨ죽ꎩ놾듎캣믺웚볤쪯폍뫍웤쯻짌욷볛룱뗄쿂붵??쏀맺뫍훐맺펦뷴벱뻙탐룟벶뇰뺭볃듨짌틔뷢뻶쯆뫵횻쫇퓝쪱뗄ꎬ튻떩돶쿖뢴쯕ꎬ쪯폍뫍짌욷뗄볛룱헢킩컊쳢ꎬ뢳폨늼쪲탐헾떱뻖뾪쪼뗄ꆰ햽싔뺭볃뛔붫믡짏짽ꆣ틲듋ꎬ쏀맺뫍웤쯻맺볒늻펦럅웺톰쟳쳦듺뮰ꆱ틔탂뗄믮솦ꆣ쓜풴벼쫵뫍쓜풴ퟔ솢뗄얬솦ꆣ??쯤좻뮹듦퓚ퟅ룹놾컊쳢ꎬ????쓪뗚뛾벾뛈쿔쪾ꎨ쯄ꎩ놾듎캣믺쿔쪾볠맜룄룯쫇뇘탫뗄ꎬ폈웤쫇쇋뺭볃뢴쯕믮솦ꎬ퇇훞폈웤죧듋ꎬ탂탋쫐뎡춶잿쏀맺ꆣ쏀맺뮹탫닉좡듫쪩뿘훆웤풤쯣돠ퟖ뫍뺭뎣헋뮧뺢ꎬ쯤좻랢듯맺볒뗄쪧튵싊죔좻뻓룟늻쿂ꆣ캣쿕죔좻돠ퟖꎬ늢쳡룟쏀맺뗄뒢탮샻싊ꆣ듦퓚ꎬ죧맻믵뇒닆헾헾닟쫖뛎폐킧ꎬ쫀뷧뫍쏀맺믖뢴ꎨ컥ꎩ놾듎캣믺쿔쪾쇋쫀뷧뺭볃쫇뮥쿠솪쾵퓚튻쇋뺭볃퓶뎤ꎬ뛸쯹탨뗄룷맺뗄뫍맺볊뗄룄룯좴캴돶웰뗄ꆣ쿖ꆣ놾듎좫쟲캣믺쿔쪾쇋좫쟲뷰죚쳥쾵뗄죵뗣ꎬ뇘탫ꎨ쇹ꎩ놾듎캣믺쫇튻룶럖쮮쇫쪽쫂볾ꎬ쯼쪹쫀뷧폨틔뻀헽ꆣ뺭볃헾훎솦솿훘탂ퟩ뫏ꆣ??좫쟲룷맺헾뢮뷸탐쇋쪷컞잰샽뗄룉풤ꎬ닉좡닆??죕놾뗄뺭볃맘쾵붫볌탸듓놱쏀쿲퇇훞뫍얷쏋헾뫍믵뇒헾닟듫쪩ꎬퟨ횹쇋좫쟲뗄쮥췋ꆣ떫컊쳢틀좻틆ꆣ죕놾헽퓚닉좡듫쪩쪹뚫뺩돉캪튫쒿뗄뷰죚쫗뚼ꆣ듦퓚ꎺꋙ룟쪧튵싊ꎻꋚ탅듻좱랦ꎻꋛ헾뢮햮첨룟훾??쏀맺뗄뺭볃헾훎솦솿헽퓚쿷죵ꆣ쏀맺퓚뿉풤볻ꎨ풤볆쏀맺뷱뫳??쓪풤쯣돠ퟖ붫룟듯?췲틚쏀풪ꎩꆣ뗄붫살쎿쓪믡폐췲틚쏀풪뗄풤쯣돠ퟖꆣꎨ헢쫇뛠쎴듳（作者系美国乔治华盛顿大学教授） ††††††뗄뇤뮯ꎬ????쓪ꎬ뿋쇖뛙뫍늼쪲쪱웚뗄맙풱퓸듯돉볆（译注：本文所有专名的翻译均查阅正式出版的뮮ꎬ튪죃풤쯣펯폠떽????쓪쪹쏀맺뗄맺햮쿷복떽쇣ꎩ译名手册、上海译文出版社出版的陆谷孙主编的英汉????쓪ꎬ쫀뷧룷맺뺭뎣헋뮧펯폠뗄죽럖횮뛾폃살릺싲大词典和百度搜索引擎。）38
The Global Financial Crisis And Its Impact On World Trade And The World EconomyBy Thomas J. Schoenbaum JD (Mich.) PhD (Cantab.)International Christian University (Tokyo)George Washington University (USA)tschoen@ August 15, 2009Outline of Presentation This Outline is an expansion of a version published in earlier form in the Uniform Commercial Code Journal, vol. 41, no. 4, Spring 2009, pages . IntroductionB. Subprime Loans. The “trigger” for the crisis was defaults by significant numbers of holders of so-called “subprime” housing A. The ongoing global financial crisis is certainly a loans in the United States. This began in the summer of 2007 after “watershed” event, the most important economic crisis since the housing prices began to decline in the US and UK. Great Depression of the 1930s. Its unique qualities, unforeseen • In 1998 the US Congress enacted amendments to nature and the unprecedented economic and political effects and the Community Reinvestment Act, 12 . secs. 2901 et seq., response it has evoked around the world make it highly interesting requiring that 40 percent of home mortgages must be subprime; in as well. . 2005 this was revised to 52 percent. This obliged mortgage lenders B. The Global Economic Crisis did not just “happen”, like a to make loans to people without sufficient means to repay, setting natural tragedy (earthquake or tsunami) caused by forces beyond the stage for the subprime control. Rather, failed policy judgments, incompetent • The two semi-private mortgage guarantee agencies, oversight of financial markets, and adherence to erroneous known as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, were subjected to political economic ideology played preponderant roles. pressure to guarantee these loans. C. We must understand the Crisis to make sure we take • Subprime loans represent only 12 percent of outstanding steps so that such an event never happens again. home mortgage loans in the US. Only 20 percent of these became delinquent in the summer of 2007 , but this was sufficient to trigger II. What Happened: the Factors that Produced the crisis. A lesson for future policy-makers: IT TOOK ONLY A the Global Economic CrisisSMALL TRIGGER TO PRODUCE A GLOBAL CRISIS. • When doubts arose about banks’ subprime mortgage A. The Origin of the Crisis. Unlike most previous economic exposure, the $10 trillion “repo” market (short-term loans that downturns, the origin of the current crisis was the United States. require the borrower to pledge collateral in return for cash) dried Although the “home” of the crisis was the United States, the up. The “repo” market (“repo” is short for “repurchase agreements”) crisis spread around the world because of the complicity of is essential to commercial and investment banks who depend on many financial institutions in other countries and because of the short-term (often overnight) loans to meet capital requirements and interconnectedness of the world economy. Note: the US and China balance their books. have traded accusations: the President of China, Hu Jintao, has • A study by the Center for Public Integrity released May stated that US mismanagement fomented the Crisis, while some 8, 2009, named 25 mortgage companies responsible for about US officials and US commentators have placed blame on China 72% of industry-reported subprime loans. 21 of the 25 have now and the artificially low value of the renminbi. On March 13, 2009, received US government bailout money. Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao expressed “concern” over the PHASE TWO: THE CRISIS AFFECTS SOPHISTICATED continued value of China’s massive holdings of US debt securities. INVESTORS, INVESTMENT COMPANIES AND HEDGE The Crisis has gone through six phases as follows. FUNDSPHASE ONE: THE TRIGGER A major question is why delinquencies of this rather small 87
CHINA LAW 2010 / 03Law • Politics• Economymagnitude were sufficient to trigger such a massive crisis. The implicated in particular bundles of securitizations or derivatives. answer to this question involves understanding the roles played by This uncertainty threw virtually all derivatives and securitizations securitizations and derivatives. A combination of factors produced into question so that they suddenly became “toxic”---unmarketable an asset bubble that suddenly burst. . at any price. C. Securitizations. Beginning in the 1980s and greatly The key event in this regard was the bankruptcy on accelerating after 2001, there occurred a wave of securitizations September 15, 2008 of Lehman Brothers, the fourth largest by financial institutions. Securitization occurs when an asset-investment bank in the US with over 28, 000 employees. holder, lender or anyone entitled to receive a stream of monetary PHASE THREE: THE CRISIS AFFECTS COMMERCIAL payments transfers that right to a trustee who issues securities to BANKSinvestors backed by the proceeds of the asset, loan or credit right. Major players in this sophisticated securities market were In the US over $27 trillion of securitizations were issued since major investment companies. Until 1998 the US Glass-Steagall Act 2001. As a result, traditional bank deposits no longer served as required commercial banks and investment companies to maintain the primary source of credit; instead credit was now financed by separate businesses. In 1998 Congress repealed this law. Shortly the capital markets and securitizations packaged and sold by Wall thereafter all major US banks either established or acquired major Street. This unleashed a flood of credit and leverage that combined investment companies. Thus, when the investment companies with lax monetary and fiscal policy that fueled housing and asset experienced financial difficulty, the solvency of the commercial bubbles. banks also was implicated. The Crisis entered a new phase in D. Derivatives. A securitization is a type of “derivative”, the summer of 2008 when US government officials and the public which is a financial instrument derived from an underlying financial became aware that most commercial banks were in trouble. asset, which can be any financial or property interest. Derivatives In 1977, I published a study, Thomas J. Schoenbaum, “Bank are used for a variety of reasons, especially for “hedging”: buying Securities Activities and the Need to Separate Trust Departments and selling futures, options and “swaps”. For example, in a “swap”, from Large Commercial Banks”, 10 University of Michigan Journal a bank may exchange some of its portfolio of housing loans for of Law Reform 1-42 (1977), in which I argued that repeal of the a highly-rated corporate bond (this is a credit derivative). A bank Glass-Steagall Act could trigger major financial turmoil. However, may “hedge” by taking a position in the short-term interest market. the Act was repealed and the rest is history. Hedge Funds make such transactions their principal business. (At Commercial banks are in trouble because they are holding the end of 2007 there were about 10,000 hedge funds holding over bad loans and other “toxic” assets worth trillions of US dollars. $2 trillion in assets). The principal securitizations and derivatives There are essentially three ways for government to recapitalize the that are involved in the Global Economic Crisis are the following:banks: (1) purchase preferred stock; (2) buy up the bad loans and • Commercial Mortgage-backed securities (CMBSs). “toxic” securities (the “bad bank” plan); or (3) temporary takeover Banks and financial institutions making housing loans can avoid (nationalization) through the purchase of controlling common the risk of default by securitizing such loans. Wall Street sorted the stock. The US government’s policy of recapitalizing major banks by mortgages into bundles that served as the basis for instruments taking preferred stock (which safeguards the interests of existing sold in the securities markets. Mortgages were originated by shareholders) without moving to take control appears to be wrong-one firm, packaged into securites by another, sold by a third, headed. The US may be forced in the future either to nationalize and serviced by yet another, but none worried about repayment (temporarily) major banks or to buy up their toxic assets. because they did not hold the mortgages on their books. The Crisis was exacerbated by the following: • Asset-backed securities (ABSs) (using real estate, car E. The Housing Bubble. In the US and in many countries loans and consumer loans). such as the UK, housing prices tripled in some areas between • Collateral debt obligations (CDOs). These were issued 1995 and 2007. Individuals and lenders mistakenly assumed that in massive quantities by investment banks. They are complex this rise would continue. The root cause of the housing bubble was bundles of derivatives divided into tranches according to risk, from easy credit made available by the US FRB’s easy money policy. “supersafe” to “junk”. This also helped to fuel the leveraging problem. Beginning in 2007 • Credit default swaps (CDSs). This is a credit derivative US home prices have declined at the fastest rate since the 1930s. much like an insurance contract. In return for payment the holder of Two different groups of people are greatly affected by the decline a bond or other debt can buy a guarantee by a financial institution in home prices: (1) people who cannot make their mortgage against default. But unlike insurance where the buyer must hold payments; and (2) people who can afford their payments but an “insurable interest”, the buyer of a CDS does not have to own whose property is now worth less than the mortgage debt. the underlying obligation that is the subject of the guarantee. The F. Excessive Leverage. Financial institutions as well as price or “spread” of a CDS usually varies in inverse proportion to individuals in the United States accumulated excessive debt. the price of the stock of the issuer of the underlying obligation. An • Commercial banks, savings institutions and investment investor who owns ABC Co. bonds and buys a CDS is essentially banks lobbied regulatory agencies (the Securities Exchange betting against the solvency of ABC Co. If ABC Co. experiences Commission, the Comptroller of the Currency, the Office of Thrift some bad news the spread of the CDS will rise and the investor Supervision) to lower or eliminate capital and reserve requirements can sell the CDS for a profit. The CDS market is huge: more than so they could take on more and more debt. (In the case of $ trillion were outstanding at the end of 2007. (This is about Lehmann Brothers, for example, the debt to equity ratio was as 125 % of global GDP). high as 36/1). Note: all trading in derivatives is “over-the-counter” (OTC) • From 1985 to 2005 the personal savings rate in the US and therefore not subject to disclosure or regulation. Most of dropped from 9 % to almost zero. these securitizations and derivatives carried AAA ratings when G. Excessive Speculation and Market Manipulation. The issued. When the subprime loan crisis hit, the values of many prices of many commodities such as oil (soaring to $147 in the securitizations and derivatives were thrown onto question because summer of 2008 and dropping to $40 in January 2009), as well as no one really knew the extent to which subprime loans were many stock prices were subject to excessive speculation as well as 88
market manipulation by financial institutions and market-makers. spread throughout the financial system. Subprime loans were Market manipulation is illegal, but regulatory agencies such as embedded within many derivatives and all values suddenly the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Commodity became uncertain. Even valuable securities were considered Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) failed to discern what was “toxic”. Everyone ran for the exits at once; short selling became happening. endemic; and demand for all securities shriveled. The US stock H. Governmental Failures. markets lost almost $7 trillion in value as Wall Street had its worst In an interview on January 9, 2009, US Vice President Dick year since 1931. Cheney said with respect to the Crisis that “nobody anywhere was K. Credit Crunch. Banks and other lenders stopped lending smart enough to figure it out,” which is a telling comment designed (in two weeks in September, 2008 short term interest rates doubled to absolve those responsible for the crisis from accountability. from 3 to over 6 percent) and hoarded cash; everyone tried to However, Cheney’s statement is disingenuous. There were many “deleverage” at once, producing bankruptcies and financial chaos. government failures: Large companies finding it difficult to issue debt are now trying • Easy Credit. The US Federal Reserve pursued (often in vain) to borrow from banks, and small and medium-sized a monetary policy of low interests rates and low margin companies are unable to get financing altogether. requirements. This was one of the causes of (1) the housing bubble L. Deleveraging. Hedge funds, mutual funds and individual and (2) the run up of the US stock markets (all time highs in Oct. investors sold to avoid losses and to get out of debt. 2007). PHASE FIVE: THE GLOBALIZATION OF THE CRISIS • Relaxation of Reserve Requirements. On April 28, 2009, M. The Crisis goes Global. Many financial institutions and the US Securities Exchange Commission at the behest of the big individual and company investors around the world had stakes in Wall Street investment banks voted unanimously to lower reserve the US financial markets. Financial markets crashed around the requirements for investment banks so they could purchase more of world. Interbank lending suddenly froze: the London LIBOR rate--derivatives with borrowed money. -the rates that banks charge each other for international lending--- • Lax Regulation of Derivatives. The Commodity Futures doubled almost overnight rising to a record percent. The crisis Modernization Act of 2000 specifically exempted derivatives from of confidence adversely affected markets even in countries like oversight by the CFTC. In 1997 a US Commodity Futures Trading Japan that had little actual exposure to the toxic loan problem. Commission lawyer, Ms. Brooksley Born, after extensive study, Developing and emerging market countries were severely affected recommended higher capital requirements and full disclosure of because investors suddenly withdrew capital, causing foreign trades in the derivatives markets. She was overruled by FRB chief reserves and currency values to fall precipitously. Alan Greenspan, who doggedly rejected all attempts to regulate N. Trade and Investment Crash. the derivative market. Congress in 2001 voted against derivative O. Currency Volatility and the High Yen. Currency valuations regulation. Alan Greenspan, the chairman of the Fed from 1987 changed markedly. This extreme volatility hinders global commerce to 2006 stated in his book, “The Age of Turbulence” (2007) that: and adds uncertainty to business operations. Virtually all currencies “Being able to profit from the loan transaction but transfer credit fell in value against the US dollar but especially the Japanese yen, risk is a boon to banks and other financial intermediaries which, in which appreciated even against the dollar by 25 percent, causing order to make an adequate rate of return on equity, have to heavily deep recession in Japan as exports plunged. leverage their balance sheets by accepting deposit obligations and/The high yen (endaka) is due to (1) the flight to quality—or incurring debt.” Japan is the second largest economy in the world, and Japanese • Lack of Enforcement of Existing Laws. On February banks were not deeply implicated in the subprime and derivatives 10, 2009, the Obama Administration fired the person in charge of mess; (2) the yen is viewed as the world’s safest currency; and enforcement at the Securities Exchange Commission.(3) reversal of the yen “carry trade” whereby Japanese individuals • Repeal of Glass-Steagall. Supported by then Secretary and companies exchanged yen for foreign currencies and invested of the Treasury Robert Rubin and Alan Greenspan, Congress abroad to make a greater return. Once the Crisis hit the foreign in 1999 repealed the Glass Steagall Act, which mandated that investments were sold and the money flowed back to Japan. The commercial banks maintain separate operations from investment strong yen is a temporary phenomenon; in early 2010 the yen has banks. Thus, the two types of businesses were merged, and when begun to weaken and the carry trade has resumed in anticipation investment banks experienced financial difficulty, commercial of higher rates (and returns) in the US and the EU and because of banks also were implicated. Japan’s huge government debt (almost 200% of GDP). Economists • The Subprime Loan Mess. Congress and both the predict that the yen will continue to weaken significantly in 2010. Clinton and the Bush Administrations supported mandatory Long-term solutions to currency volatility other than issuance of subprime housing loans. reestablishing the old fixed-exchange rate system: (1) creation I. Excessive Risk. Credit-rating agencies and investment of a new international reserve currency and (2) a “Tobin” tax on banks employed analytically faulty mathematical models currency exchange transactions to limit volatility. that underestimated risk. (Note that it only took 20 percent PHASE SIX: WORLD-WIDE ECONOMIC CONTRACTION delinquencies of 12 percent of the home loan market to trigger P. Recession. By the end of 2008 the “real” economy of the collapse of the entire system). Companies and individuals the entire world was drastically implicated in the crisis. Extreme foolishly assumed that present trends would continue inevitably recession hit the US, Europe and Japan. Economies such as into the future. We must develop better economic tools to measure China that were enjoying double digit growth saw growth drop into systemic risk. Regulatory reform must strengthen regulation to the single digits. In the US alone more than million jobs were prevent overconfident bankers from taking irresponsible risks. lost in 2008. Consumer demand suddenly plunged in the United PHASE FOUR: THE CRISIS HITS ORDINARY INVESTORS States and in most countries. Businesses cut back on investment. AND THE STOCK AND COMMODITIES MARKETSEven companies that do not deal in the US market were adversely J. Crisis of Confidence. The subprime and derivatives affected because of their business in countries like China that do problems produced a cascading crisis of confidence that soon deal with the US. World steel output is down 12%; manufacturing 89
CHINA LAW 2010 / 03Law • Politics• Economyis down 8%. The Global Economic Crisis has spread through three and car-owners who trade in “clunkers” (most types of used channels (1) reduced consumer demand; (2) reduced lending and vehicles) receive cash subsidies in the “cash for clunkers” program. investment; and (3) reduced trade. In 2009 world GDP may decline As of January 2009 TARP had disbursed $ billion for the first time since the 1940s. and had made pledges that will take the total to $ billion. Q. Developing and “Emerging” Market Countries. Virtually Congress has authorized spending the remainder of the $700 all developing countries are experiencing serious economic trouble billion. The Obama although they had little or no involvement with the US financial Administration has created a $100 billion Community markets. International investors in 2008 stopped investing and Development Financial Institutions (CFDI) Fund to make grants withdrew huge amounts of capital causing foreign reserves to and loans to local financial institutions such as loan funds, credit decline dangerously and currency values to plummet. In 2008 unions and venture capital funds. private investment in “emerging market” countries plunged from By August 2009 only about 100 billion TARP funds remained; $928 in 2007 to 466 billion in 2008, and is likely to fall to $165 but in late billion in 2009 according to the Institute of International Finance. 2009 some banking recipients of TARP began to repay the At the same time, developing country exports declined because of US. slack demand, plunging these nations into recession. Mark to Market Accounting. Acceding to the wishes of R. In summary, the crisis can be attributed to government banking and business interests, the US Financial Accounting policy failures and excessive borrowing and speculation by the Standards Board on April 2, 2009, voted to modify the accounting private sector. There was also more than a modicum of moral rule requiring that assets held be valued solely in terms of what hazard and corruption (the Bernie Madoff affair, for example, to a buyer is willing to pay. This valuation system is called marking which SEC regulators turned a blind eye). to market. Henceforth, securities and assets for which no market exists may be valued based on other considerations, such as the III. What Actions Are Being Taken To Combat the amount originally paid for the asset and the income it produces. Crisis?This accounting change was taken up by 45 financial to revise their first quarter earnings upward. The benefit was over $3 A. The US TARP (Troubled Asset Relief Program): $700 billion, allowing many firms to report profits rather than losses. billion authorized and distributed by the Bush Administration as The US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in follows:October 2008 created by rule the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee • $250 billion pledged to purchase senior preferred stock Program, which guarantees debt issued by financial firms. While and warrants in commercial banks and thrift institutions. Monies this program was design-ed to help commercial banks, the biggest were received by 522 banks to support lending programs. As of beneficiary has been General April 2, 2009, 4 of the banks receiving aid have repaid a total of $338 Electric Company, which is eligible through its financing arm, million. GE Capital. • $10 billion approved for Merrill Lynch pending its merger B. Prior to the US TARP, the US rescued (in exchange for with Bank of America. preferred stock) the two US mortgage guarantee agencies, Fannie • $40 billion investment in American Investment Group Mae, Freddie Mac, and (AIG). AIG. The total rescue package for AIG totals $152 billion. US • $20 billion investment in Citigroup, which will split off its Taxpayers now own % of AIG, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. investment bank, Smith Barney. . In December 2009 the US Department of the Treasury suspended • $20 billion investment in Bank of America so that now the cap, previously $400 billion, on bailouts of Fannie Mae and the US Treasury is the largest shareholder. The US Treasury will Freddie Mac. guarantee Bank of America against losses in up to $118 billion in The US TARP was a first step to recapitalize the US financial toxic assets. system. Ultimately it is estimated that the recapitalization of US • $ billion for General Motors and Chrysler commercial banks alone will take over $4 trillion. Corporation. Although the US remains the epicenter of the Crisis, bank • $5 billion to cover potential losses on a portfolio of failures have occurred in many nations, especially in Europe. The Citigroup mortgage related and many nations have also acted to nationalize or recapitalize • $20 billion pledged to cover potential losses for a Federal commercial banks. Reserve program aimed at improving consumer access to credit. On February 10, 2009, the US Dept of the Treasury • TALF (Term Asset-Backed Loan Facility) is a program announced a second attempt to recapitalize US banks: the aimed at freeing up credit, including loans to build offices, “Financial Stability Plan.” This is a plan to inject up to $1 trillion into apartment buildings and commercial real estate. TALF lends money the banks in exchange for convertible preferred stock. This plan, to investors buying highly-rated mortgage-backed and consumer-which was widely criticized for vagueness, is to set up a public-backed securities. When investors buy such securities, financial private investment fund to finance the purchase of “toxic” bank companies can use the proceeds to make additional loans. This assets (see below for later details of this plan). program is an attempt to promote lending, as between 2009 and US government subsidies and forced and unforced mergers 2011 $814 billion in commercial real estate loans will mature, and of US financial institutions have produced oligopoly conditions. The most will need refinancing. TALF, however, has had limited impact three largest US banks hold 34 percent of all US bank deposits because as of August 1, 2009, the program had only $ billion and are in a position to dictate policy on rates of return, bank fees, in loans outstanding. In August 2009 the TALF was extended to credit card fees and conditions and mortgage terms. Competition March US financial institutions has been severely eroded as a • The US government instituted programs to subsidize result of the Global Financial Crisis. consumer purchases of houses and cars. First-time home buyers However, the Obama Administration and Secretary of the receive an $8000 one-time tax credit for the purchase of a home; Treasury Tim Geithner have decided to implement a strategy 90
that avoids outright nationalization as much as possible and also E. Fiscal Policy. Many nations have enacted or will pass minimizes additional injections of government capital in the form gigantic fiscal stimulus packages to revive domestic demand. of taxpayer dollars. On May 8, 2009, the US Treasury announced The European Commission has proposed a coordinated economic the results of a “stress test” of major US banks that concluded that recovery stimulus totaling 200 billion euros. In the United States, 19 big banks must raise at least $75 billion in capital to survive. the center of the crisis, Congress enacted the American Recovery This stress test was criticized by many economists as less than a and Reinvestment Act of 2009, a massive $787 billion Economic vigorous audit. The Obama Administration is gambling that the US Stimulus package of government spending and tax cuts. This financial system will survive this difficult period and earn its way initiative may be (just barely) better than nothing, but it is a back to health as the economy gets better. No one can now say potpourri of miscellaneous items that will have little immediate whether this gamble will work, given that most of the “toxic assets” impact. Too little is devoted to rebuilding the nation’s infrastructure. held by US financial institutions are securitization financial products No bold initiative is evident in the plan. President Obama should and derivatives. have used this opportunity to propose a bold initiative such as C. Injecting capital into manufacturing companies President Eisenhower’s proposal to build a national highway General Motors and Chrysler saved them (at least temporarily) system. Suggestions: build a nationwide network of state-of-the-art, from declaring bankruptcy. But Chrysler declared bankruptcy in super-fast railroad passenger trains and/or a national infrastructure May 2009. GM also declared bankruptcy on June 1, 2009 and for electric and hybrid vehicles. reorganized under Chapter XI of the US Bankruptcy Act. The US F. On February 18, 2009, the US Department of the government now owns 60% of the reorganized GM. Treasury promulgated the Homeowner Affordability and Stability NOTE: the subsidization of industrial companies that engage Plan ($75 billion) that will enable homeowners facing risk of in exporting may be challenged internationally under the rules foreclosure to obtain refinancing and restructuring of their debt. of the World Trade Organization’s Subsidies and Countervailing This initiative is intended to help two groups of homeowners Measures (SCM) Agreement. There is a financial benefit conferred most affected by the crisis: (1) homeowners not behind on their to a specific business entity. Under SCM Arts. 5 and this is an payments will be assisted to refinance at lower rates; and (2) “actionable” subsidy that can be either challenged directly at the homeowners at risk of foreclosure will be assisted with loan WTO or an affected country may levy a countervailing duty (CVD) modifications to bring monthly payments to sustainable levels. against imports of the subsidized companies. See Report of the The first program will enable 4 to 5 million homeowners who owe Panel, Indonesia---Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile more than 80% of the value of their homes to refinance their loans Industry, WT/DS 54, 55, 59, 64/R (1998). To support a direct at lower interest rates by taking advantage of loan guarantees by challenge at the WTO the complaining party must show “serious Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The second program will help 3 to 4 prejudice” (that the subsidy impedes exports of a like product). million homeowners at risk of foreclosure to stay in their homes by To levy a CVD a party must show “material injury” to a domestic offering payment incentives to lenders and servicers who offer loan industry. modifications made while the borrower is still current on mortgage Japan and France have also granted subsidies to industrial payments. In addition, borrowers at risk of foreclosure will receive companies. direct help from the US Treasury to reduce monthly payments from The EU Commission has criticized many national 38% to 31% debt-to-income ratio for the borrower. subsidization plans as violative of provisions of the European Treasury also increased its Preferred Stock Purchase Community rules. Agreements with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to 200 billion each D. Monetary Policy. Rate reductions by central banks from the original level of $100 billion each. continue (the US Federal Funds rate is now 1%; the ECB rate is However, as of August, 2009, only 235,247 of the million : the Bank of England rate is ; the Bank of Japan’s rate homeowners targeted in the Obama plan have received loan is %). The US FRB is now making open market purchases of modifications. US Senate majority whip Richard J. Durbin, calls the securities, including $800 billion in toxic securities (mortgage and program “disappointing.” consumer debt). The Fed balance sheet has expanded to over $ As reported on August 18, 2009, the number of homeowners trillion. Central banks in many other nations are buying corporate that will lose their homes in the United States will be over bonds and short-term commercial paper to ease the credit crunch. million in 2009, up from million in 2008. Home foreclosure Note: The US Fed is employing not only traditional monetary filings in 2009 average over 350,000 a month, reflecting a steady policy tools using interest rate levers to stimulate growth, but also increase from the average of 60,000 per month in 2005. what is termed quantitative and qualitative easing, essentially G. Financial Stability Plan. On March 23, 2009, the US printing money. Quantitative easing involves buying government Department of the Treasury provided details on how this plan, bonds (treasuries) and other liquid assets from banks; qualitative which was originally announced February 10, is going to work. easing involves purchasing risky and illiquid assets, such as “toxic” This plan is a “Public-Private Investment Program” to purchase up securities. to $1 trillion in troubled assets, both pools of bad mortgages held On March 24, 2009, the Federal Reserve announced that by banks and mortgage-backed and asset-backed securities. In it would purchase up to $300 billion of long-term government both cases the assets involved would be put up for auction by the bonds and up to $750 billion in other mortgage backed securities owners---banks and investment companies---probably at minimum issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. This had the immediate bid prices. The bidders who purchase the assets will be private impact of lowering mortgage interest rates making refinancing and companies, but such companies will receive massive subsidy new mortgages more affordable. As of August, 2009, the Federal help from the TARP fund in the form of non-recourse government Reserve has purchased over $1 trillion worth of mortgage backed loans of up to $12 for each dollar of private investment, and dollar-securities and debt from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in addition for-dollar equity participation by the government. For example, a to 400 billion of government money directly invested into these private company that bids and purchases $100 million face value firms. securities at a lower price, say $84 million may do so at a cost of The US Fed turned a profit in 2009 of over $45 billion from only $6 million. An additional 72 million will be borrowed from FDIC interest payments on bailout loans and securities purchases. secured by the securities being purchased. US Treasury will match However, this may turn into losses later when the securities are the $6 million of investor equity to make the purchase. The private sold. investor will then manage and decide the servicing of the asset pool 91
CHINA LAW 2010 / 03Law • Politics• Economyand timing of its sale. If the sale is profitable, the US Treasury will legislation and the President must sign the bill in order for a law to share equally in the profit. If there is no profit, the private investor be passed. can simply walk away, leaving the government with the assets and monetary outlay for all US programs including the having lost only a portion of its $6 million equity investment. This proposed 2009 budget totals an incredible $ trillion. The US program is a great deal for those companies able to participate will issue massive amounts of debt securities so that the total US as well as bank shareholders; however, whether it will have the budget deficit (now $ trillion) will very soon exceed 100% of intended effect is problematic—there are major uncertainties. It will GDP ($ trillion). The FRB is now and will in the future purchase also take much time to implement even if it works in the end. US Treasuries to drive down the yield. Over the next 4 years the H. Proposed . Regulation of the Financial Industry. In US budget deficit will exceed $1 trillion each year. March and again in June 2009, the US Department of the Treasury J. Most other countries including China, Japan and EU proposed a vast new expansion of regulation of the US financial members are following this same strategy of fiscal stimulus and system to include:easy monetary policy. • A new Financial Services Oversight Council composed However, a split has developed between members of of the Treasury secretary and heads of seven additional agencies the G-20, especially between the US and the EU, over the would identify firms that pose “systemic risks” and will coordinate appropriateness and the extent of stimulus spending. The EU jurisdiction of other federal oversight agencies. has criticized the US approach as potentially inflationary. The • The Federal Reserve would be given new powers to EU stimulus is only to % of GDP, an amount Washington oversee any large financial entity whose failure could jeopardize considers insufficient. The EU is spending more on social welfare the stability of the financial system. than the US and Japan. China responded to the Crisis by enacting • The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and a huge stimulus package---4 trillion renminbi ($585 billion). As the office of Thrift Supervision would merge to become the new a result, China, the world’s fastest growing economy, quickly National Bank Supervisor, which would regulate all federally resumed growth and is predicted to expand by 8% in 2010. China’chartered depositary exports resumed their expansion in December 2009. In January • A new Consumer Financial Protection Agency would set 2010 China’s central bank raised its rate on interbank loans and and enforce rules on consumer loans, including credit card debt raised bank reserve requirements; China is tightening monetary and mortgages. policy to head off inflation. • Systemic risk would be addressed by imposing more K. Pressures are building for trade protectionism. Industries rigorous uniform standards would be imposed on larger companies may seek relief from governments either in the form of subsidies, that pose the danger of risk to the entire financial system. These tax benefits and trade protectionism. For example, the US steel companies would have to meet more robust capital and liquidity industry on January 8, 2009, formally demanded that a “Buy requirements as well as stricter counterparty and credit risk America” clause be a feature of any stimulus legislation. The management standards. stimulus bill currently expected to pass the US Congress contains • Hedge funds and private venture capital funds would this requirement. Such a provision would be vulnerable to attack be required to register with the SEC and would be subject to under World Trade Organization (WTO) norms, such as GATT regulatory oversight.(General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) Arts. III and XI and • Derivative trading would be subject to regulation with the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement. The final bill strict rules for market the requirement that the provision must be “applied in • Payments and settlements of transactions among a manner consistent with . obligations under international financial firms would be regulated. agreements”, but this is ambiguous, and the EU and Canada and • Money market funds and mutual funds would be subject other WTO members may challenge this by bringing a complaint to to new regulation. the WTO. • The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation would have L. A provision in the US Economic Stimulus law that gives the power to seize not only banks but any financial institution that preference to the hiring of US workers may be vulnerable under could pose a systemic risk. the WTO GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services). The enactment of most of these measures will require M. The European Union has so far failed to agree on legislative action by Congress. effective action at the supranational level. On March 1, 2009, the The economist Robert J. Samuelson points out that the EU rejected a request by Hungary for a 200 billion euro bailout Obama plan would broaden government regulation in three of Eastern European EU members, highlighting the fact that in principal ways: (1) the Federal Reserve would be empowered to the EU, national measures take precedence over measures to designate some financial institutions (like Citibank and Goldman benefit the EU as a whole and the economic plight of weaker EU Sachs) as so important that their failure would “pose a threat to members. financial stability.” These institutions would have to meet much N. International Institutions. The organization taking the more stringent capital requirements to provide a buffer in case of a lead to deal with the Crisis is the G-20, which has met three times, crisis. (2) The Consumer Protection Agency would police unethical in November, 2008, in April 2009, and again in September, 2009. lending practices and would ensure that documents for auto, In its Communiqué of April 2, 2009, the G-20 agreed to make consumer and mortgage loans were fair and understandable. (3) additional financial resources available as follows: New rules would come into play, ., financial firms that securitize 1. $500 billion for the International Monetary Fundmortgages would have to buy 5 percent for their own account, 2. $250 billion in a new Special Drawing Rights allocation which would make them scrutinize the underlying loans more to be shared among 185 IMF memberscarefully. 3. $100 billion to increase lending by multilateral At this writing the US House of Representatives has passed development banksa bill embodying most of these proposals, but the US Senate 4. $250 billion in support for trade financehas not acted. In the US, both houses of Congress must pass 5. $6 billion additional support for least developed countries 92
to be financed by sales of IMF gold. stimulus package to the creation of a “vulnerability fund” to assist It was also agreed to establish a Financial Stability Board developing countries that cannot afford bailouts and deficits. The whose purpose will be to assess weaknesses and to oversee the G-20 has responded to this call for funds, but is it sufficient and will international financial system. No specific powers, however, were the money pledged be actually contributed?allocated to this new Board. This entity is the new name for the • In 1944 the economist John Maynard Keynes called for Swiss-based Financial Stability Forum. The new Board will include a new world reserve currency, the Bancor. The time may be right broader participation but its mandate is unclear. for the creation of such a reserve currency, possibly by greatly National oversight was agreed to be established over hedge expanding the role of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). This would funds, derivatives, credit rating agencies, and financial institutions. help counteract the present volatility of world currency markets. The details are left to each country. The G-20’s call for expansion of the role of SDRs marks an No mention was made of additional economic stimulus. The important beginning for this point. G-20 also failed to come to grips with many important and specific • Will more nations adopt capital controls to secure some issues that will continue to be discussed and argued, such as the protection from the globalized financial system? Given the impact following:of the crisis on emerging markets, a sharp debate is reemerging on a. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World the desirability of capital controls in developing countries. (Malaysia Bank. It is remarkable that international institutions such as the IMF in the 1990s introduced an “exit tax” on foreign capital as well as a and the World Bank failed to foresee the crisis and have played a 12 month moratorium).relatively small role. The IMF has agreed to lend $ billion to e. World Trade. Ukraine; $ billion to Iceland; $ billion to Latvia; $ billion to i. World Trade declined in 2009 due to falling demand and Pakistan; and $ billion to Hungary. IMF aid has helped a total the lack of trade credit; world trade volumes fell for the first time of 15 developing and emerging market countries weather the storm since 1980. In the past world trade has been an engine of world of the Crisis. economic growth, particularly for developing countries, posting b. The World Bank has a total lending capacity of only nearly 8 percent growth and attracting over $1 trillion in private about $35 billion per year. In February 2009 Japan announced that investment capital in 2007. it will lend $100 billion to the IMF; the EU matched this pledge in ii. Trade is hampered by (1) extreme currency volatility; and March 2009. Because the additional money pledged by the G-20 (2) lack of export financing; and (3) declining consumer demand. to provide additional capital to the IMF may not be forthcoming, the For example, the Baltic Dry Index is a daily average of prices for IMF will raise $500 by selling bonds to the public. On February 26, the shipping of major raw materials such as iron ore, coal, grains, 2009, the World Bank announced a plan to provide $31 billion over cement, sand, fertilizer and copper that is published by the London-two years to shore up ailing banks and businesses in Eastern and based Baltic Exchange. On May 20, 2008 this Index reached a Central Europe. record high of 11,793, and by December the Index dropped to 663, c. The IMF has used its new capital to create a new lending the lowest since 1986. program, a Flexible Line of Credit. Mexico, Colombia and Poland iii. In order to maintain world trade the central bank of China have borrowed money under this program. has made available an additional $20 billion in trade finance loans; d. Global GovernanceꆪWill the Crisis Produce “Bretton the World Bank (IFC) is expanding its Trade Finance Program. The Woods II”? Will the Crisis produce new global economic World Bank will also establish a Trade Facilitation Facility (TFF) to “architecture”? It appears that the answer is “no”. But some benefit low income countries. These measures have not yet had fireworks may take place on the international level because much effect. reforms have the potential to shift economic and political power. iv. Japanese exports dropped 26 percent in November-The crisis demonstrates that the IMF and the World Bank are December of 2008, the fastest pace of decline since comparable underfunded by comparison to the growth of the world economy. data became available in 1985. Japan’s trade surplus dropped Some very hotly debated proposals will be the following: % in 2008 from the previous year. Exports to all regions fell. In • Changing the voting structure of the IMF and the World fiscal 2008 Japan incurred a trade deficit of 725 billion yen, the first Bank to increase the power of countries like China, Brazil, India, trade deficit since 1980. This is due not only to declining consumer Russia and developing countries. In any case the crisis pointed up demand but most of all to the high value of the yen. the limitations of G-7; in the future a larger role will be played by v. At the Washington Summit in November, 2008 the the G-20. G20 pledged that “we will refrain from raising new barriers to • Leaders of the European Union on February 22, 2009 investment or to trade in goods and services, imposing new called for global financial oversight of financial markets and export restrictions, or implementing World Trade Organization-institutions. During the crisis of 1998-99, the IMF and western inconsistent measures to stimulate exports.” But certain actions experts lectured the countries involved on financial regulations, by national governments belie this pledge. According to a World but nations like the US and the UK were left alone. The Basel Bank report released in March 2009, 17 members of the Group of Committee on Banking Supervision also failed to warn of the crisis 20 have enacted 47 protectionist measures, raising import duties and its accords, Basel I and Basel II, were not effective. The three or enacting trade-distorting subsidies in connection with economic pillars of Basel IIꆪminimum capital requirements, supervisory stimulus measures. On September 19, 2009, the Global Trade review and market discipline and disclosure---must be revisited and Alert, a monitoring service overseen by the London-based Centre reevaluated. Some commentators have proposed the creation of a for Economic Policy Research supported by the World Bank new World Financial Organization that will be tasked with the job of announced that the world’s 20 major economies have passed 121 overseeing global financial markets. “blatantly protectionist” measures and that 134 more are in the • The IMF and the World Bank need vastly expanded pipeline. capital if they are to play a significant role. The IMF has called for vi. There is renewed emphasis that national currencies the creation of a new “emerging markets fund”, and the World Bank reflect actual values and not be artificially manipulated to stimulate has proposed that each developed country designate % of its exports. The Obama Administration has accused China of “currency 93
CHINA LAW 2010 / 03Law • Politics• Economymanipulation”----keeping the Yuan at a low value to create exports IV. Possible Additional Actions to Deal with the from China. Sebastian Mallaby in the Washington Post of January Crisis. Governmental actions to combat the Crisis 30, 2009 stated that “China’s cheap currency” was the basic suffer from two defects: they have not been bold cause of the Crisis. The US Congress may pass new laws against enough and international actions have been minimal. international “currency manipulation.” But the heavy dependence The Crisis is global and national measures to deal of the US on Chinese purchases of US debt obligations limits US with the Crisis are necessary, but international bargaining power. The best way forward is multilateral actions to measures and international coordination and correct current account imbalances, not unilateral solutions. The cooperation are also essential. GATT Art. XV:4 states that WTO members “shall not by exchange action frustrate the intent” of this Agreement. The USTR may file a A. The US Commercial Banking System. US actions have complaint against China based on this provision. In any case the saved the commercial banking system from collapse, but at a IMF and the WTO will be called upon to work together to assure great price. Commercial banks are making record profits using that currency values do not artificially inflate trade deficits and government bailout money without significant lending so there surpluses. is still a dearth of credit. Government mandated mergers have China is taking the initial steps necessary to make the created oligopoly conditions. renminbi an international currency. China should continue these • The Congress should consider passing an updated steps and also gradually revalue the Yuan to bring it into line with version of the Glass-Steagall Act that mandates a separation economic realities. Tokyo has followed China to upgrade the between commercial banks and investment companies. international status of the yen by offering yen loans to ASEAN • Entry of new banking companies should be encouraged countries. Tokyo may seize the crisis as an opportunity to enhance to revive competition between banks. the status of the yen and to make Tokyo a preeminent financial • A tax on bank profits should be levied. capital. Some in Japan are calling for the creation of an common B. The Recovery (Economic Stimulus) Act. A third priority Asian currency to rival the US dollar and the euro. is fiscal stimulus to create new jobs. The Recovery/Economic vii. The US will not be in a position to exert traditional trade Stimulus law enacted by Congress is too timid. It is a miscellaneous pressure on either China or Japan. The US will depend on both collection of relatively small projects. Much more focus should be countries’ purchases of US government debt. Japan’s trade surplus placed on infrastructure spending. In addition, this is the occasion with the US is one-fourth that of China, so US is apt to pressure for proposing a bold new program that will be remembered for the China rather than Japan. Trade friction is increasing between the next 100 years. One idea: why not construct a national system of US and China. Because of such trade friction China may reduce state-of-the-art super-fast trains between major cities and coast to purchases of US debt, placing a greater burden on Japan. coast. viii. Japan has little to fear from the US Congress or Obama Banks should be subject to new regulatory Administration. The biggest problem with respect to trade for Japan controls:will be the high value of the yen, which appears likely to continue • Regulatory ground rules for derivatives. Derivatives into the indefinite future. play an essential role in the international financial markets but ix. Completing the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) of there must be regulatory ground rules to enable these markets to trade negotiations at the WTO is more urgent than ever to revive function efficiently and to avoid the bloodbath that has occurred: the the world economy. However, the current Crisis has injected new economic taint on a few derivatives has adversely affected all, even issues into the negotiations. For example, the main sticking point those that retain substantial value. What is necessary is a version of the DDA is the insistence on the part of developing countries of the Securities Act of 1933 for derivatives so that in the future that advanced countriesꆪJapan, the US and the EUꆪopen their the values and the trading of derivatives may be both transparent markets to agricultural exports from developing countries. But and secure. An irony of the present Crisis is that regulation of the during the Crisis 16 developing countries enacted export controls derivatives markets will restore investor confidence and the values on food products. This is a problem for some countries such as of existing and future derivatives that have food security concerns. • New minimum capital requirements. Excessive leverage On September 24-25, 2009, the G-20 met for the third time should be regulated by sliding capital requirements placed on since the Crisis began. The Final Communiqué proclaims the Investment Banks according to an index of risk. following highlights:• A transaction tax should be levied on Investment Banks • The G-20 is now the “premier forum” for international modeled on the Tobin tax. economic cooperation, replacing the G-7. Gary Gensler, Chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading • Capital standards for financial institutions are to be Commission, who opposed the regulation of derivatives in the raised, but no specifics commitments were made. Many experts 1990s as a Treasury Department official, now says, “Both the propose a tiered set of rules so that the riskiest banks and the financial system and the regulatory system failed the American biggest that pose “systemic risk” be required to put aside the public.” He now calls for subjecting derivatives to regulation. greatest capital, as high as 8 or 10 percent. Financial Oversight. New laws and regulations • China and other Asian countries are to be given greater assuring supervision of financial markets as well as market quotas and control (at least 3 %) over the IMF and the World Bank. participants, not only at the national level, but on a global basis • Internationally agreed international financial regulations through an international agreement to create a World Financial are to be developed. Organization with adequate staffing and resources. Financial • Imbalances in trade and current account are to be markets are global and global solutions are necessary. Global addressed by deficit and surplus countries. solutions would involve such matters as common accounting standards, capital and reserve requirements, disclosure, standards 94
for rating securities and other instruments and standards for the Crisis appears to be only temporary; the price of oil and speculators in commodities and securities. commodities will rise when recovery occurs. Thus, the US and international action to deal with the chronic other nations must not abandon the drive for alternative energy current account deficit in the United States. Two chronic deficit technology and energy independence. problems bedevil the US: (1) the budget deficit and (2) the current E. The Crisis highlights that regulatory reform is needed account deficit. These two problems are intertwined because the particularly in the US. The US must also take steps to get its low savings rate in the US means that foreign capital is necessary budget and current account deficits under control as well as to to cover both deficits. The current account deficit is the most increase the US savings rate. problematic since this involves piling up foreign-held debt. (The F. The Crisis demonstrates the interconnectedness of the US is already the most indebted nation in the world). For the world economy. next several years budget deficits are unavoidable, but the US G. The Crisis is a watershed event that has realigned must move to cut down the current account deficit. For these economic and political power in the world. purposes trilateral talks between the US, China and Japan should • Japan’s economic relations will continue to shift from be convened. While China and Japan should agree to stimulate North America to Asia as well as to the EU. Japan is taking steps to domestic demand, the US should adopt policies, such as repealing make Tokyo a preeminent financial capital. all taxes on bank savings accounts, to stimulate savings. • US economic and political power is diminished. The US of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank will run trillion dollar budget deficits every year for the foreseeable so that these organizations are better prepared to foresee future future. (What a change from 2001 when Clinton and Bush officials economic crisis and to react to them. These two organizations agreed on plans for budget surpluses to reduce the total US may receive greater capitalization and, in the case of the IMF, new national debt to zero by 2010). In 2007 two-thirds of the current authorizations to make it easier for well-run countries as well as account surpluses of world nations were used to purchase US countries experiencing balance of payment difficulties to borrow debt, which financed the US chronic current account deficit. money. China, India, and certain other countries should be granted Nations such as China may seek to reduce their holdings of US higher quotas and higher voting power. Treasuries and other US debt. The US will have limited bargaining a. Creation of a new world reserve currency that is a power to pressure other nations on trade and economic matters basket of national currencies and is a more stable store of value. because it must depend on nations such as Japan and China to In March of 2009, China formally proposed upgrading the Special continue to purchase US debt. Drawing Right (presently a basket of the main world currencies) • A real danger ahead: The possible collapse of the to create a new “super-sovereign” world reserve currency. Zhou dollar in international markets. In 1971 the first “dollar” crisis Xiaochuan, Governor of the People’s Bank of China, made this occurred caused by the Vietnam War. The result was the end proposal because of what he termed the “institutional flaws” of the of the Bretton Woods system of fixed currency exchange rates. current system. But the dollar survived as the world’s reserve currency chiefly b. Coordinative monetary policies by key central banks. because of purchases by European investors and central banks. Central banks should consult and coordinate both their interest rate During the Reagan Administration the US twin fiscal and current policies and their open market operations. account deficits were absorbed mainly by Japan. Most recently c. Coordinative fiscal policies and economic stimulus China purchased massive amounts of US debt, enabling the Bush packages by the US, the EU, Japan and China. There should Administration to incur massive budgetary and current account be more international consultation and coordination of national deficits. But who will support the US dollar in the future?economic stimulus packages. • China should continue to enact measures to stimulate d. Reaffirmation of World Trade Organization rules against domestic economic demand; China can no longer rely on external protectionist and “beggar thy neighbor” trade and monetary demand and exports to the degree that it has in the past. China, policies. however, and Asian economies are generally recovering more quickly than the rest of the world through a strategy of stimulating V. Some Conclusionsdomestic demand to replace lost exports. • The US in turn must enact measures to stimulate the A. The speed of the recovery from the Global Economic domestic rate of savings in order to cut down the US current Crisis will depend on world cooperation to coordinate fiscal and account deficit. monetary policies; decisions taken to adapt global financial • The US and China should urgently engage in high level institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank; and better economic discussion to deal with these problems, reinvigorating the coordination of trade policy, fiscal policy and monetary policy. Up to “Strategic Economic Dialogue” begun by the Bush global policy has compartmentalized trade policy from financial • Although fundamental problems remain, the second and monetary policies. A lesson of the Crisis is that financial and quarter of 2009 shows renewed economic activity especially monetary policies are vital to trade and cannot be considered in Asia and strong investment in emerging markets, although separately. unemployment remains high in the developed world. The danger B. The Crisis points up the fact that the principal exists that, if monetary and fiscal policy tools work, and the world global economic institutions are out of date and are in need of and the US resume economic growth, that needed national fundamental international reforms will not occur. The Global Crisis has C. Danger of future inflation. The unprecedented US demonstrated weaknesses in the global financial system that must budget deficits and the huge increase in the money supply pose be corrected. the danger that economic recovery, when it occurs probably in • Unprecedented government interventions on a global scale 2010, will be accompanied by tremendous inflation. The danger in the form of fiscal and monetary policy measures have prevented exists that easy monetary policy will hold for too long in the effort to global depression. But problems still remain: (1) high unemployment; stimulate economic growth, and the current Crisis may be followed (2) lack of credit availability; (3) burgeoning government debt (the US by serious inflationary deficit is projected to be $9 trillion over the next 10 years). D. The fall in the price of oil and other commodities during 95
