美国各行业平均经济利润率.ppt

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Understanding and Improving Firm Performance 了解并改进公司的盈利状况 • Average industry performance 行业平均盈利状况 • Strategic positioning by individual firms 单个企业的战略定位 • Economy of scope and firm’s diversification 范围经济和企业多元化 5/12/2022 1 Source: Compustat, Value Line, Marakon Associates Analysis Average Economic Profits of . Industry Groups, 1978-1996 1978至1996年美国各行业平均经济利润率 Value Line Industry Groups 5/12/2022 2 Number of Industries 行业数量 First Quartile Average % 前25%的平均回报率 % Fourth Quartile Average % 后25%的平均回报率 % Note: Return on Equity = Net Income / Year End Shareholders’ Equity; Analysis based on sample of 593 industries Average(平均) = % Median(中位数) = % % % % Return on Equity (Percent) Average Return on Equity in US Industries, 1982-1993 1982-1993年,美国各行业的平均资本回报率 Distribution of Industry Returns 行业利润分布 Source: Jan W. Rivkin’s Analysis Based on Dun and Bradstreet Data 5/12/2022 3 Source: Jan W. Rivkin based on Compustat Operating Income / Assets, 1988-95 (%) 运营收入/总资产,1988-95(%) 0 5 10 15 20 25 Motor vehicles 机动车辆运输 Semiconductors 半导体 Profitability Differences Across Selected Industries 不同行业利润率的差异 Engineering services 工程服务 Scheduled airlines 航空业 Cable TV service 有线电视服务 Trucking except local 长途货运业 Race track operation 跑马 Petroleum / natural gas 石油/天然气行业 Drug stores 药店 Eating places 餐饮行业 Dental equipment 牙医设备 Women‘s clothing stores 女性服装店 Prepackaged software 预装软件 Pharmaceuticals 医药 Computer system design 电脑系统设计 5/12/2022 4 Source: Compustat, Value Line, Marakon Associates Analysis ROE-Ke Spread (30%) (20%) (10%) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% $0 $1 $2 $3 $4 $5 $6 $7 $8 $9 $10 $11 $12 $13 $14 $15 Great Northern Iron Worthington Inds Nucor Steel Technologies Oregon Mills Commercial Metals Carpenter Birmingham British Steel PLC Cleveland-Cliffs Quanex Lukens ACME Metals Ampco USX-US Steel Inland Steel Armco WHX BethlehemAverage Invested Equity ($B) Average Economic Profits of Individual Firms in the Steel Industry, 1978 –1996 1978至1996年美国钢铁行业中各企业的平均利润率 5/12/2022 5 Source: Compustat, Value Line, Marakon Associates Analysis ROE-Ke Spread (80%) (60%) (40%) (20%) 0% 20% 40% 60% $0 $5 $10 $15 $20 $25 $30 SmithKline Glaxo American Home Products Amgen Merck Schering Plough Watson Bristol Myers Rhone-Poulenc Mylan Labs Warner Lambert Eli Lilly Pfizer Perrigo Pharmacia & Upjohn Forest Labs Alza ICN Scherer Ivax Genetech Biogen Roberts Genzyme Dura Chiron Cephalon Gensia Cygnus Immunex Average Invested Equity ($B) Average Economic Profits of Individual Firms in the Drug Industry, 1978 -1996 1978至1996年美国制药行业中各企业的平均利润率 5/12/2022 6 Industry 行业因素 Positioning 企业定位 Residual 其他（暂无法解释） Corporate 企业特征（如规模） Calibrating Profit Drivers 企业利润率不同的原因 Source: Richard P. Rumelt, “How Much Does Industry Matter?,” Strategic Management Journal, 1991; 12:167-185 The “Five Forces” Framework for Industry Analysis “五种竞争力量”的行业分析框架 新进入者 潜在竞争者的进入障碍: 规模经济 品牌认同度 资本要求 所有权 产品差异 转换成本 配送系统的准入 学习曲线 必要要素的获得 低成本产品的设计 政府政策 预期回报 供应商 侃价能力来源 转移成本 要素的差异性 供应商的集中度 要素替代品的出现 供应商的数量 要素成本或差异化的影响 前向一体化/后向一体化的威胁 该成本相对于总成本比例 购买成本占总购买量的比例 行业现有竞争者 影响竞争的因素: 行业成长性 行业集中度和均衡 固定成本/附加价值 产能的非持续性 产品差异性 品牌认同度 转移成本 信息复杂度 竞争者的多样性 企业利益 退出障碍 替代品竞争者 威胁决定于: 替代品相对的性价比 转换成本 购买者对于替代品的倾向 购买者 购买者的侃价能力: 购买者集中度 购买者数量 转移成本 购买者信息 购买者利润 替代产品 克服困难的能力 价格敏感度 价格/总计购买 产品差异 品牌认同度 后向一体化的能力 质量/表现的影响 对于决策者的激励 注: 该图很全面,但具体用时,有选择 性,请注意加粗的条款; 比较供应商与购买者的侃价能力得 到理想的利润状况,但实际利润状况 还要考虑竞争与替代情况 5/12/2022 8 1997 HK Property Industry 1997年香港房地产业 • Fuelled by growing demand, limited supply, and negative interest rate, land value had appreciated rapidly in the years running up to 1997. 需求膨胀，供应有限，实际利率为负，导致地产在97之前的几年中，疯 狂涨价 • Residential (private and public): In 1997, 39% of the HK population lived in public rental estates and 12% in home ownership scheme flats 民居分为公共楼宇和私人楼宇;1997年，39%的香港人居住在政府建造并 廉价出租的公屋里，另有12%生活在政府建造并低价出售的居屋里 • HK property industry was dominated by a few firms: Cheung Kong, Hutchison, Henderson, SHK, SWIRE, and HongKong Land 香港房地产业受控于少数几家公司： 长江实业集团，香港和记，恒基兆 业，新鸿基， 太古集团和香港置地 5/12/2022 9 1997 HK property industry extremely attractive 1997年的香港房地产业赢利极高 • Henderson and SHK announced annual results for the year ending 30 June, 1997, in which their turnover totaled HK$ billion and HK$ billion respectively, and their operating profit amounted to HK$ billion (59%) and HK$ billion (54%). 在1996年7月1日至1997年6月30日这一会计年度,恒基 兆业和新鸿基的营业额分别达189亿港元和289亿港元， 营运利润分别为111亿港元（利润率59%）和157亿港 元（54%）。 5/12/2022 10 Why is the industry so profitable? 房地产业高利润的原因 • Bargaining power of buyers 购买者侃价能力 – Consumers and speculators; price sensitivity; expectation of future prices and incomes 消费者与投机商；价格敏感度；对未来价格与收入的预期 • Bargaining power of suppliers 供应商侃价能力 – A dominant supplier --- HK government, but it can be dramatically influenced by the developers; other suppliers (building materials suppliers, contractors, architects, engineers) have little bargaining power 香港政府占支配地位，但很大程度受开发商影响；其他供应 商（建筑材料供应商，建筑商，建筑师，工程师）几乎没有 侃价能力 5/12/2022 11 • Intensity of rivalry: 竞争程度 – the top four developers accounted for 55% of the market in 1991-1994; highly differentiated by location, size, type of premises and market; growing industry; exit barriers low 1991到1994年，前四位的开发商共占55%的市场份额；通过选址、规模、 房型和市场种类形成高度差异化；产业成长性高；退出壁垒低 • Threat of entry: 进入威胁 – large economies of scale in large-scale development projects; large capital requirements in most Government auctions and tenders; cyclical nature of the business; relationships with financial institutions 大规模的开发项目对规模经济要求较高；政府拍卖和招标中资本准入要 求较高； 楼价地价具有周期性特点；和金融机构的紧密关系 • Pressure from substitutes 替代品压力 – Government‘s rental estates and home ownership estates; renting a flat; moving to another location (mainland China) 政府提供可供租用与个人购买的房产；租用公寓；移居他乡(中国大陆) Why is the industry so profitable? 房地产业高利润的原因 5/12/2022 12 • On July 1, 1997, Tung Chee-hwa pledged that the government was to tackle the problem of inflating property prices. 1997年7月1日，董建华保证：政府将解决房地产价格 飞涨的问题。 • Commitment to a supply of at least 85,000 new flats per year 承诺每年提供至少八万五千套新公寓 • While the increased supply of public housing can be guaranteed, that of private housing is not. 政府能保障公屋供应的增长,但不能控制私人楼宇的供 应 Tung Chee-hwa’s Policy 董建华的政策 5/12/2022 13 Dramatic Changes in the Industry 香港房地产业的巨变 • The increase in supply should result in a decrease in price, which however may dampen the demand for housing and make the 70% home ownership difficult to achieve 供给增长使价格下降,会进一步削弱对于住房的需求,预定70％家庭自 置居所的目标难以实现 。 • But the economic environment changed drastically shortly thereafter. In 1998, HK’s economy was hit by the Asian financial crisis, and the HK dollar came under speculative attacks. The interest rate and unemployment rates went up dramatically, and inflation had turned to deflation. 但之后不久，经济环境发生剧烈变化。1998年，香港经济因亚洲金融 危机受严重打击，国际投机商冲击港币。利率和失业率大幅上升，通 货膨胀变成了通货紧缩。 • Property prices plummeted by as much as 50% from their peak in 1997. 与1997年巅峰时期相比，房地产价格直线下跌了多达50%。 5/12/2022 14 How to explain the declining Property Industry in 1999? 如何解释1999年房地产业滑坡？ • Buyers 购买者 – expectation on future prices and income; a wait-and-see approach 对于未来价格与收入的预期使很多人采用了等待、观望的态度 • Suppliers 供应商 – Moratorium on land sales in June 98’; intervention in the stock market in August 98’ 98年6月，政府决定暂停拍卖土地；98年8月政府大举进入股票市 场 • Rivalry 竞争程度 – More price competition更多采用价格竞争 • Barriers to entry 进入壁垒 • Substitutions 替代品 5/12/2022 15 • Institutions and policies 机构与政策 – 50 hectares per year by the Sino-British joint Declaration before 1 July 1997; underestimate of the population growth; heavy reliance on property-related proceeds (30% of the total revenue) 中英联合声明规定香港每年卖地不得超过50公顷;政府低估了人 口增长;财政收入过多依赖房地产相关产业（占总收入的30%） – Change of policy after the handover (85,000 new flats per year); subsequent reversal in June 1998; uncertainty in government policy and consumer confidence 回归之后政策改变（每年85000套新公寓）；1998年6月政策又 一次大扭转；政府政策的不确定性导致消费者信心减弱 What happened after 1997? 1997年后发生了什么？ 5/12/2022 16 • Foreign governments and multilateral organizations 外国政府与跨国公司组织 – Foreign economic conditions can have an important influence on aggregate demand, the financial sector, and the property market. 国际经济环境对总需求、金融业和房地产市场都有重要影响 – Asian financial crisis (Thailand, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines…), and intervention by the International Monetary Fund 亚洲金融危机（泰国，韩国，印尼，马来西亚，菲律宾 ……），及国际货币基金组织干预 What happened after 1997? 1997年后发生了什么？ 5/12/2022 17 What happened after 1997? 1997年后发生了什么？ • Macroeconomic conditions宏观经济条件 – The “double-play”, ., short-selling the HK dollar and taking a short position on Hang Seng Index Futures, had successfully forced up the interest rate, caused property- related stocks and hence the Hang Seng Index to fall 国际投机商的“双重计”策略（即：卖空港币并卖空港股）成功 迫使利率上升,导致与房地产相关的股票下跌并进而导致恒生 指数下跌 – Changing expectation about future prices and income led to a wait-and-see attitude and a vicious cycle of the property prices. 对未来价格与收入预期的改变造成等待观望现象，这种现象 迫使房地产商以进一步降价来吸引人，可面对持续下跌的价 格，人们更愿意持币待购——如此产生恶性循环 5/12/2022 18 Value Creation 创造价值 • customers’ willingness to pay for the good or service 消费者的购买意愿 • suppliers’ cost of providing the good or service 供应商的生产成本 • degree of competition 竞争程度 5/12/2022 19 Types of Competitive Advantage 竞争优势的来源 Competitive Advantage 竞争优势 Lower Cost 低成本 Differentiation 差异化 5/12/2022 20 FOCUS 专业化 OVERALL COST LEADERSHIP 全方位的成本领先优势 DIFFERENTIATION 差异化 Low Cost Position 低成本的定位 Uniqueness Perceivedby the Customer 顾客眼中的唯一性 Industry wide 在全行业适用 Particular Segment only 只针对某一个细分顾客群 STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE 竞争优势 ST R A T E G IC T A R G E T 战 略 目 标 Generic Strategies 普适的竞争战略 Source: Michael Porter, Competitive Strategy, 1980 Forever: De Beers and . Antitrust Law 钻石恒久远，一颗永流传： De Beers 与美国反托拉斯法 5/12/2022 22 Diamonds 钻石 • treasured because of rarity 物以稀为贵 – why is diamond more expensive than water? 为什么钻石比水贵？ 5/12/2022 23 In the Jungle… 在（钻石开发的）处女地…… • accidental discovery of diamonds in South Africa in 1866, and diamond fever by 1869 1866年在南非偶然发现的钻石带来了1869年的钻石热 • 1874: Cecil Rhodes sold steam-powered pump (competing against hand-held pump), and captured the market in Cape Province within one year 1874年：Cecil Rhodes 出售蒸汽动力泵（与手摇泵竞争）一年内 在Cape Province占领市场 • bought claims in diamond mines in the area, and completed consolidation by 1887 在该地区购买下钻石矿，并于1887年完成兼并整合 5/12/2022 24 Two Problems 两个问题 • If all South African gems were to sweep into Europe, the market would be flooded and prices would plummet. 如果所有的南非珠宝都涌向欧洲，市场泛滥，价格将直线 下降 • The sellers have little control over the types and qualities of stones they produce; thus they need to secure an indiscriminate buyer. 销售商对于出产的矿石种类和质量几乎没有控制力；因此 他们需要好坏都要的购买者 • Ideally: a monopoly of distribution as well as of supply 理想状况：供应与分销都实现垄断 5/12/2022 25 Evolution of Cartel 卡特尔的演化 • 1890 Diamond Syndicate: All its members pledged to buy diamonds from Rhodes’s mines and sell them in specific quantities and at set prices. 1890年钻石辛迪加：所有成员保证将从Rhodes属下的矿中购买钻 石并以特定的质量和既定的价格销售 • 1925: Ernst Oppenheimer bought out the old syndicate and replaced it with a new one (Central Selling Organization) joined by corporate links to his own company, Anglo American (a dominant diamond producer). 1925年： Ernst Oppenheimer 购买了原有的辛迪加联盟并代以新 组织（“中心销售组织”）。与Ernst原下属公司Anglo American（占据统治地位的钻石生产商）建立企业关系 5/12/2022 26 Diamond Sales 钻石销售 • 10 times per year 每年10次 • Preference indicated by 150 sight-holders 5 weeks before the sale 销售5周前,150位钻胚加工商表明购买意愿 • Take it or leave it (no more invitation in the future) 要么全部接收要么全部退回（若退回,未来不 会再得到钻石购买邀请） 5/12/2022 27 . Antitrust Law 美国反托拉斯法 • 1890 Sherman Act 修曼法案 – “every contract or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce.” “任何抑制贸易的合同或预谋” • 1914 Clayton Act 克雷顿法案 – “substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.” “造成竞争大幅度减少、试图在商业行为中创造垄断 ” • Extraterritoriality 治外法权 5/12/2022 28 How and Why Might De Beers Violate . Antitrust Law? De Beers可能触犯反托拉斯法的原因和形式是什么？ • De Beers restricts production, restricts competition, fixes prices, and denies competitors access to markets De Beers限制产量，竞争，限定价格，阻止竞争者进入 市场 • 13% margin, rare in a commodity-based industry 13%的利润率，在差异化小的产品行业很少见 • Does success in the market mean that a company has necessarily acted uncompetitively? 市场成功是否一定意味着公司采用了限制竞争性行为？ 5/12/2022 29 Does De Beers Hurt Consumer Welfare? De Beers是否损害了消费者权益？ • Usually, cartels are presumed to damage consumer welfare by maintaining artificially high prices. But, in the diamond industry, are high and stable prices bad? Or, who would benefit from lower diamond prices? Benign monopoly? Are consumers abused by having to pay high prices for diamonds? 人们通常认为卡特尔人为地维持高价，损害消费者权 益。但在钻石行业，高而平稳的价格是否是坏事？谁 会从钻石低价中获益？好心的垄断者？钻石高价真的 侵害了消费者权益吗? 5/12/2022 30 Challenges 挑战 • Declining production in De Beers’ mines, defections of other major producers, and increasing stockpiling ($ b, end 98’) De Beer自产矿石量下降,其他主要粗矿生产商背叛联盟,储备日益 增加(1998年年底高达48亿美元) • Asian financial crises, and importance of the . market --- But De beers is under indictment in the United States just as it wants to expand its direct presence in the . market 亚洲金融危机，美国市场重要性增强——但正当De Beers想要直 接扩张美国市场时,却在美国遭到指控 • falling stock price, and control of 21% shares by . investors 股价下跌，美国投资者控制21%的股份 5/12/2022 31 De Beers’ Strategy De Beer的战略 • Leave 放弃美国市场 – It is simply not realistic for De Beers to leave its largest market. De Beers放弃其最大的市场是不现实的选择 • Evade 逃避 – Avoid prosecution simply by continuing its arms length relationship with the . market 不直接进入美国市场, 从而避免被起诉 • Change business practice 改变商业行为 – From selling off CSO, to rewriting restrictive contracts, to letting market share dip below the percentage considered “monopolistic” 可以解散中央统售机构,或减少带限制性条款的合同，或让市场份额 低于被认为“形成垄断”的水平 • Change law 改变法律 – Lobby the . government to change its policy 说服美国政府改变政策 5/12/2022 32 Where is the money? 哪里更赚钱？ • Diamond jewelry 钻石珠宝 – by value: women’s (73%), bridal (20%) 就价值而言：女性（73%），新娘（20%） – by average price: engagement ring ($2K, 98’) 就平均价格而言：订婚戒指（98年2000美金） • Bulk of profits in the diamond industry is captured at retail level. 钻石行业的利润多半是在零售层面获取的 5/12/2022 33 Way Out 解决办法 • The power of the brand 品牌力量 – 15% retail premium, 15%的零售溢价 – $ for brand name 亿亿美元品牌价值 • Brand the stones, exploit the name, forge retail alliances, and push stock price to a more satisfactory level 开发钻石品牌，打造零售联盟，将股价推向一个更让 人满意的水平 5/12/2022 34 From Forever to LV Connection 从钻石恒久远转向与路易威登联盟 5/12/2022 35 From Forever to LV Connection 从钻石恒久远转向与路易威登联盟 • De Beers and LVMH announced a plan to invest up to $200 million each in a retail venture, under which they will open diamond stores in the world’s fashion capitals. DeBeers与路易威登宣布将各自投资2亿美元在全球的时尚中心开 设钻石店 • To avoid possible conflicts with De Beers’ existing “sight- holders”, wholesalers who buy rough diamonds through De Beers’ Diamond Trading Co., the new company will buy rough or polish diamonds from these wholesalers, not directly from the De Beers group. 为避免与De Beer现有的“钻胚加工商”发生冲突，新公司将从这 些批发商处购买未加工的或打磨过的钻石，而非直接通过De Beers集团 5/12/2022 36 Expense Statement 报社每日支出表 5/12/2022 37 Fixed/Variable Costs 固定/变动 成本 5/12/2022 38 0 1 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 average cost 平均成本 marginal, average variable cost 边际, 平均变动成本 Production rate (Thousands a day) 产量(千每天) M ar gi na l/ av er ag e co st ( $ pe r un it ) 边 际 / 平 均 成 本 ( 美 元 / 单 位 ) Economies of Scale 规模经济 5/12/2022 39 Scale Economies: Sources 规模经济: 来源 • large fixed costs 庞大的固定成本 – research, development, and design 研发和设计 – information technology 信息科技 • falling average variable costs 平均变动成本随产量增加而减少 – container ships 集装箱货轮 5/12/2022 40 Strategic Implications 规模经济: 战略影响 • large-scale production 大规模生产 • seller side: monopoly/oligopoly 卖方: 垄断/寡头垄断 • buyer side: monopsony/oligopsony 买方: 垄断/寡头垄断 5/12/2022 41 Expedia • Created by Microsoft 由微软公司创立 • Nov. 1999: executives of four big airlines (American, United, Northwest, and Continental) offered to give Expedia access to their discounted tickets, and, in return, get half of Expedia. Microsoft refused the deal; and the four airlines set up a competing business, Orbitz, on the day that Expedia went public. 1999年11月, 四大航空公司(美洲航空,联合航空,西北航空和大陆 航空) 主动提议向Expedia提供折扣机票, 条件是要换取Expedia一 半的股票. 微软公司拒绝了此项交易. 于是, 在Expedia上市的当天 ,四大航空公司联合创立了Orbitz, 与Expedia抗衡. 5/12/2022 42 Using Hotels to Trump Airlines 借助酒店业来与航空公司较量 • Expedia pays wholesale prices for 80% of the rooms it handles, getting 26% return as opposed to the usual 10% commission on hotel reservations. Expedia为顾客预定酒店时,有80%都是以较低的批发价格拿到,这 样它就可以获得26%的佣金, 而不是通常的10% • Getting into hotels helped Expedia to trump the airlines, commanding the lowest airfares. Expedia借助酒店预定方面的低价优势与航空公司较量, 迫使它们 提供最优惠的飞机票价 • Expedia (#1), Travelocity (#2), and Orbitz (#3) Expedia(排名第一); Travelocity (排名第二); Orbitz (排名第三) 5/12/2022 43 Challenges 面临的挑战 • Airlines sliced the commissions to online agencies from 10%, to 8%, 5% and 0%. 航空公司逐步降低支付给网上代理的佣金, 从10% 到8%, 5%, 直 至0%. • “Suppliers better get their act together.” “供应商们应团结一致来抗衡Expedia” • Imitation of the Expedia’s winning strategies 其他公司仿效Expedia取胜的策略. • Sources: IHT, Oct 28, 2002, P. 13; BusinessWeek, February 24, 2003, pp. 62-64. 资料来源: IHT, 2002年10月28日, 第13页; 商业周刊, 2003年2月 24日, 第62至64页. 5/12/2022 44 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 沃尔玛 • Set up by Sam Walton (62’-4/92’) Sam Walton创立（62年--92年4月） • 33% annual return on equity for 20 years 连续20年33%的年资本回报率 • Market value (end of 93’): $ billion 市值（93年年末）：575亿美元 • $300 sales per square foot as compared with $210 of industry average每平方英尺销售额为300美元，而行业平均值是210美元 • heirs of Sam Walton: #5-#9 richest with $ billion each Sam Walton的继承人：五个人每人获得45亿美元，并列成为世界 排名第五的富豪 5/12/2022 45 Discount Retailing 折扣零售业 • emerged in mid-1950s, offered 10-15% price discount as compared with conventional department stores, analogous to supermarkets 20世纪50年代中期出现，借用超市的经营理念，相对于传统百货 商店有10%-15%的价格折扣 • annual growth rate of 25% in the 1960s, and 9% in the 1970s, 7% in the 1980s, and % in the 1990s 60年代年增长率为25%，70年代9%，80年代7%，90年代% • Trends toward fewer new store openings / emphasis on refurbishment of existing stores 尽可能少的开设新店/强调对于已有商店的修缮 • In 1993, top five discounters accounted for 71% of industry sales 1993年，前五位的折扣商占据了整个产业的71% 5/12/2022 46 A Cardinal Principle 一条重要原则 • locating stores in isolated rural areas and small towns, usually with populations of 5,000 to 25,000 店址选在偏僻的、人口为5000到25000 的农村地区或小城镇 5/12/2022 47 Merchandiser 销售运作 • tailored Wal-Mart merchandise based on a thousand store and market traits / product display based on consumer preferences 沃尔玛不同的商店商品供应不同，这取决于一千家商店和市场特 点/商品陈列也是根据消费者偏好决定的 • “always low prices, always” / nationally advertised branded products / 13 major circulars per year / advertising expense: % of discount store sales (industry average of %) /posting their competitors’ circulars in their stores weekly “永远最低价”/出售已具有全国性名牌的商品/每年仅13次发行传 单宣布基本销售政策/广告费用占销售额的%（行业平均为 %/每周将竞争对手的产品宣传贴到自己商店的窗户上 5/12/2022 48 Operations 运营 • vendor relationships与供应商的关系: – tough negotiator / one of the 40 interviewing rooms equipped with only one table and four chairs/ no manufacturers’ representatives since 1992 (3-4% savings) / 3,600 venders (90% dollar volume) to receive orders and interact with Wal-Mart electronically / relations with vendors on Wal-Mart’s terms 精明的谈判者/40个面试房间每间都只配有一张桌子和四把椅子/从 1992年起取消制造商代表(节省3-4%)/3600个供应商(占总金额的 90%)以电子化的方式接受订单并与沃尔玛发生互动关系/与供应商 的关系中沃尔玛占据主动 • Hub-and-spoke distribution network (27 distribution centers, each handling 150 stores within 200 miles) / trucks are more than 60% full on back hauls / picking up goods from . suppliers within their existing distribution network 中心辐射式的分销网络 (27家配送中心, 每家处理负责周围200里内150 家商店) /卡车回程运载率超过60%/利用美国供应商已有的分销网络运 送商品 • Leased 70% of Wal-Mart stores and owned the rest 沃尔玛70%店面租用,仅购买其余的30% 5/12/2022 49 Sam’s Legacy Sam的遗产 • Value of the dollar (travel expenses limited to 1% of purchases, keeping prices below everybody else’s) / making life at the company unpredictable, interesting and fun / checking out competition, and copying the best ideas / taking care of people who will take care of customers: responsibility, trust, and checkup 注重节俭（旅行的花费控制在交易额的1%，保持价格 最低）/让公司生活充满奇迹与乐趣/时常审视竞争对 手，模仿最好的理念/要关心员工，才能进一步让员工 关怀顾客：培养员工的责任感、信任感并展开时时评 定 5/12/2022 50 HRM 人力资源管理 • Third largest employer after the federal government and GM / non-unionized / no superstar / profit sharing / employees totally committed to the company / 650 suggestions $ 85 million savings in 1993. 在联邦政府和通用汽车之后第三大雇主/没有工会/不雇用明星级人 物/利润分享/雇员对公司相当忠诚/1993年员工提出的650条建议使 公司节省了8500万美元。 • 15 regional VPs (>200 days/year on the road), managing 11-15 district managers, each of which is in charge of 8-12 stores 15位地区副总(每年外出的时间超过200天) 每人管理11-15名地方 级管理人员,每一位地方级管理人员负责8-12家商店 • “live to work for the glory of Wal*Mart” “为沃尔玛的繁荣而活 ” 5/12/2022 51 Quantification of Competitive Advantage 竞争优势的量化 5/12/2022 52 Sustainability of Competitive Advantage 竞争优势的可持续性 • Wal-Mart has a lock on small town rural markets where they have exploited first mover advantages. But its suburban strategy is questionable / can only rely on its cost advantage 沃尔玛锁定小城镇郊区市场，具备先入为主的优势。但它的（大 城市）郊外策略是有问题的/它只能依赖成本优势 • Risk of changing business format 经商模式变化的风险 – from mom and pop stores, to department stores, to chains of department stores, to discount stores, … 从夫妻店，到百货商店、连锁商店、折扣商店…… – catalog shopping, computer shopping, home shopping network, warehouses, supercenters 目录、网络购物，家庭购物网络，仓储销售，超级购物中心 • standard imitation risks to the sustainability of any strategy 模仿威胁任何战略的可持续性 5/12/2022 53 Adolph Coors in the Brewing Industry 身处酿酒业的Adolph Coors 5/12/2022 54 Company Overview 公司简介 • Adolph Coors Company is #3 with a bullet. Its principal holding, Coors Brewing, is the third-largest brewer in the US (after Anheuser-Busch and Miller Brewing). Coors Light, nicknamed "The Silver Bullet," is its top brand and the #4 US beer. Coors makes about a dozen beers, including Blue Moon Belgian White Ale, George Killian's Irish Red Lager, and Keystone. It also makes Zima, a clear, malt-based brew, and Coors Non- Alcoholic. Coors bought the UK's Carling brand from Interbrew, making it the #2 brewer in the UK. The heirs of founder Adolph Coors control the firm's voting stock. • Adolph Coors Company 为第三大啤酒生产经销公司。 其下属核心企业 Coors Brewing，是美国第三大酿酒厂(位居Anheuser-Busch 和 Miller Brewing之后)。 素有“银子弹” 美誉的Coors Light ，为其首选品牌，位 居同业第四。旗下还拥有大量啤酒品牌，包括Blue Moon Belgian White Ale ， George Killian‘s Irish Red Lager， 和 Keystone。 它还生产一种纯麦芽 酿制、不含酒精的Zima酒。Coors收购interbrew下属的英国支柱品牌，使 其成为英国第二大酿酒商。Adolph Coors创始者的继承人现在掌控公司具 有表决权的股票。 5/12/2022 55 Industry Consolidation 行业集中化 • Scale economies in production (packaging inputs and packaging process) 实现生产规模经济(包装原材料及包装过程) • Increasing scale economies in marketing 增强营销规模经济 • Shift away from draft beers, to packaged beers, which reduced perish-ability and permitted forms to concentrated on high throughput 从小规模、散装啤酒向高产量、保质期更长的精装啤酒转型 • Slack demand 需求萎缩 5/12/2022 56 What was Coors’ strategy historically? 过去Coors的战略 • Backward integration 后向一体化 – made all its cans and bottles; backward integration into agricultural inputs helped Coors differentiate its beer Coors自产所有包装（铝罐和玻璃瓶）并从农业原料开始实现后向一 体化，这有助于产品差异化 • Plant location 厂址 – In 1975 capacity in the ten states west of Colorado was seven million barrels less than consumption in those states. 1975年Colorado西部的十个州啤酒生产能力比消费量少700万桶 • Plant scale 工厂规模 – Its sole brewery, million barrels of capacity in 1977, was well above the MES 1977年，Coors唯一一家酿酒厂的年生产能力（1510万桶）已远远超 出最低有效规模。 • Capacity utilization 设备利用率 – 90-95%, due to the regional vacuum in supply vis-à-vis demand within which Coors operated 由于Coors经营地区供应短缺，Coors的设备利用率可高达90-95% 5/12/2022 57 • Production process 生产 – Aging beer for 70 days rather than 20-30 days; no pasteurization 不采用加热杀菌法，生产期长达70天（加热杀菌法只需20-30天） • Marketing 营销 – Pricing Coors Banquet, at a discount to the leading national premium brands, Budweiser and Miller; relied on banquet’s light body, the distinctiveness of various inputs (Rocky Mountain spring water) and its unique production process to mostly “self-sell” . Coors Banquet的定价低于是以全国名品Budweiser和Miller。 Banquet属清淡型，以其独特的原料（来自落基山脉的泉水）和生产 工艺, 基本实行“自销”。 • Distribution 分销 – Non-pasteurization elevated transportation and storage costs by requiring continuous refrigeration 由于不采用加热杀菌法，储运要求持续制冷，成本提高 What was Coors’ strategy historically? 过去Coors的战略 5/12/2022 58 Why has Coors’ performance deteriorated since 1977? 为何自1977年Coors业绩恶化？ • Backward integration 后向一体化 – Can prices have come down because of excess capacity 生产过剩导致铝罐价格下跌 • Plant location 厂址 – The capacity shortfall in the west has declined from 7 million to 3 million barrels due to expansion by A-B and Miller in California 由于A-B和Miller 在California的扩张，西部生产能力 短缺量从700万箱下降到300万桶 • Capacity utilization 设备利用率 – Declining capacity utilization 设备利用率下降 • Plant scale 工厂规模 – catching up by competitors 遭竞争者赶超 5/12/2022 59 • Advertising广告 – Miller had led a general run-up in the industry’s average advertising- intensity (% in 73’, % in 80’ and 10% in 85’); Coors suffered from catching up as it moved into new states. Miller拉动全行业提升平均广告强度（73年%，80年%，85年10%) ；Coors为将产品打入其他州而加倍广告投入. • Other marketing-related elements 其他与营销相关的因素 – Proliferation of brands, and stagnant share of premium beers, caused diseconomies in production and marketing 高档啤酒市场份额停滞不前, 及名牌产品增加导致生产与营销的规模不经 济。 • Distribution 分销 – Beer wholesalers suffered declining margins in the 1980s, and Coors’ suffered even more because of Coors’ declining local market shares 80年代，啤酒批发商利润下滑，Coors的批发商则因其市场份额萎缩而更 是如此。 Why has Coors’ performance deteriorated since 1977? 为何自1977年Coors业绩恶化？ 5/12/2022 60 Should Coors build a brewery in Virginia? Coors是否该在Virginia建酿酒厂？ • Building a million-barrel packaging facility in Virginia does not offer significant upside: savings of $ /barrel in transportation cost amount to an annual payback of $6 million on an initial investment of $95 million. 在Virginia建立240万桶的包装能力并不能带来显著效益：每桶运 输成本节约美元，即初始投资9500万美元只能带来每年600万 美元回报 • The potential conflict with Coors’ Rocky Mountain image Coors啤酒的落基山脉形象面临潜在冲突 • Face a stagnant demand and excess capacity in the East 东部生产过剩而需求停滞 • It should acquire existing capacity from some else rather than add new capacity itself 应该吸纳他方已有生产力，而非自己新建生产力。5/12/2022 61 What, if anything, might Coors have done differently earlier on? 如果可能，Coors当初应该采取哪些不同举措? • Stay regional --- building a brewery in California before A-B and Miller managed to do so 坚持地方品牌路线——赶在A-B和Miller之前在California 建酿酒厂 • Go national sooner 更快成为全国性品牌 • A combination of the above two strategies. Coors first dug itself deeper into a regional niche, and then belatedly decided to go national 或结合上述两种策略，Coors仍可以先更深入地开发地方品牌市场， 之后再选择是否走向全国 5/12/2022 62 Lessons 教训 • It failed to act on SRI’s recommendation to build a California brewery, did not anticipate or react quickly to the effects of Phillip Morris’s acquisition of Miller, ignored the obvious unsustainability of its advantages with regard to vertical integration and production scale and, most broadly, missed the point that any time a company makes a lot of money, its rivals (and others) are likely to come after it. Coors未听从SRI”在California建酿酒厂“的建议；对于Phillip Morris 并购Miller，事前未预料、事后也未采取迅速反应；没有认 识到自己的优势（纵向一体化和规模经济）不具有可持续性。由 此得出教训：一家公司可以抓住机遇在任何时点赚钱，但竞争对 手（或其他人）也可以随之采取同样措施。 5/12/2022 63 单独或同时经营早、晚报的支出表 5/12/2022 64 Economies of Scope 范围经济 • source -- joint cost: cost of inputs that do not change with scope of production 一个主要来源是： – 共同成本: 一种不会随生产种类多少而变动的要素 投入成本。 • Examples 例如 � Qwest的IP网络: 声音+数据 � 有线电视+电话 • 战略影响—生产多样化产品或提供多样化服务。 5/12/2022 65 Core Competence 核心能力 • marketing -- brand extensions 营销 ---品牌延伸  spreading promotional costs over multiple products/businesses, eg, Disney 通过多样化产品/服务分摊促销的成本, 如迪斯尼 • Technology 科技  applying basic technology to multiple products, eg, small LCDs 将核心技术应用到多种产品中, 如小型液晶显示机 5/12/2022 66 • Richard Branson—正直的反传统冒险家 • By 1999, Virgin empire had more than 200 companies, employing 25,000 people and generating over $5 billion revenue. 至1999年, 维京帝国拥有200多家公司, 25,000名员工, 并创造约50亿 美元的收入.  音乐出版-- Virgin Records  航空客运-- Virgin Atlantic  软饮料-- Virgin Cola  网上金融服务– Virgin Direct  铁路– Virgin Trains • “Virgin is basically a venture-capital business with a brand name.” “从根本上来讲,维京是一个以独立品牌为资本的风险投资公司.” Virgin — What’s in a name “维京”之名值多少钱? 5/12/2022 67 Canadian Pacific 加拿大太平洋公司 • 1881: founded to build transcontinental railway 为建设跨大陆铁路而设立 • 2001: petroleum, coal, railway, shipping, hotels 石油天然气, 煤炭, 铁路, 船运, 旅馆 业 • 2001二月: announced split into five companies; stock rose $ to $ 宣布分拆成五个公司; 股票上升 10％。 5/12/2022 68 Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) 帝国化学公司 • Established in 1926, and encouraged to match its German and . rivals in size, innovation and global reach 于1926年成立, 力争在规模, 创新及全球化等方面与其德国和美国 的对手较量 • Dominant in Great Britain and the Commonwealth, and expanded into the Continental Europe and . through JVs and Merges and acquisitions 在英国及英联邦占主导地位, 并通过合资,合并,收购等方式向欧洲 大陆及美国扩张. • Underlying the structure, composition, and expansion of the old ICI: technology and vertical integration 帝国化学公司的公司构建, 组成及扩张的背后: 科技和纵向联合 5/12/2022 69 Why ICI chose to de-merge? 帝国化学公司为何要分拆? • Two clusters: pharmaceuticals and other bio-science-related activities, and the traditional chemical business; synergies and mutual interdependence within each of the two clusters, but not across them 两大类业务:1.制药及其他生命科学相关领域, 2.传统化学产品工 业; 相互依赖与协作广泛存在于两类业务内部,但是跨领域(1和2之 间)的协作并不存在. • July 1992: old ICI split to Zeneca and new ICI / Market value: GBP billion (Dec 94’) v. GBP billion (July 92’) / 57% increase v. 25% for FT100 1992年七月: 原来的帝国化学公司分拆成为 Zeneca和新的帝国化 学公司/市值从1992年7月的76亿英镑变成1994年12月的132亿英 镑/57%的涨幅, 而同时期的金融时报指数(FT100)的增长仅为 25% 5/12/2022 70 General Dynamics: Compensation and Strategy 通用动力公司： 薪酬与战略 5/12/2022 71 A Conglomerate 财团成长 • 1899: Electric Boat/1900: sold US Navy the first submarine/sold over 200 submarines and cargo ships to US Navy by end WWI/acquired military aircraft business/entered nuclear submarine business/F-111 contract /F-16 and Tomahauk sea-launched cruise missile 1899年：成立电力造船公司/1900年：向美国海军卖出 第一艘潜艇/一战结束前向美国海军出售超过200艘潜 艇和货船/获得军用飞机的生意/进入核潜艇生产领域/ 签订F-111战斗机的合同 /F-16战斗机和战斧巡航导弹 5/12/2022 72 Poor Performance 业绩不佳 • GD share: $79 (2/87’) to $ (12/90’) /operating loss in 90’/layoff of 8,500/rating downgraded/bankruptcy suspected by Pentagon/#50 in size but #473 in performance GD 股票：由87年2月79美元跌至90年12月的美 元/90年营业亏损/8500名员工解雇/公司评级下跌/被 五角大楼怀疑破产/企业规模排名第50而业绩排名第 473 • Crown family (22%) has a reputation for intervening the internal matters. 王冠家族(22%)经常干涉内务 5/12/2022 73 William Anders’ Era William Anders 的时代 • The laws of economics are immutable. If you don’t have a market (end of Cold War, and GD’s over 70% reliance on defense contract) you don’t have a business. 经济规律不可动摇。没有市场（冷战结束时，GD超过 70%依赖于国防合同）就应该关门。 • Identifying problems: hired hands rather than partners/accounting-based bonuses instead of shareholder-value-focused/too high exercise prices for options 问题在于：激励机制失灵/关注会计账面而非股市价值 /期权履约价过高 5/12/2022 74 Gain/Sharing Scheme (91/2/15- 94/2/15) “收获/分享”计划 （91年2月15日—94年2月15日） • Top 25 executives: cash “Gain/Sharing” bonuses 25位最高层经理：“收获/分享”奖金 • Bonuses of 100% base salaries for $10 increase in share price for 10 consecutive days/for next $10 share price increase over 10 days, additional bonuses of 200% base salaries/no limit on the number of bonuses/half of each award deferred until retirement and the other half in cash 如果股票升值10美元并保持10天有100%的奖金/再升 10元并保持10天再增加100%的奖金/没有奖金上限/ 奖励一半以现金发放，另一半将延期至退休时发放 5/12/2022 75 Stock Investment Plan 员工股票投资计划 • 62,000 employees/prior 91’: a match of $.75 for every $1 investment by employees in any stock/after 91’: a one-to-one match for investment in GD stock but a :1 match for other investments/employee ownership：% (prior 91’), % (6/91’), and 15% (6/92’) 共62000名员工/91年之前：员工每1美元任何股票投 资获公司附加投资美元/91年之后： 1美元GD股票 投资获公司附加投资1美元，1美元其他股票投资获公 司附加投资美元/公司股票员工持有率：91年以前 %，91年6月%，92年6月15% 5/12/2022 76 Turnaround within One Year 一年内扭亏为盈 • write-off of over $1b in 12/90’/cuts in capital spending and R&D spending /reductions in inventories & working capital 90年12月注销10亿美元坏帐/削减投资与研发费用/降低存货与运 营资本 • 12/91’: earnings $505m/cash$820m ($109m) /long-term debt $168m ($636m) /$11b new businesses/backlog $3b ($) /$ share price (113% increase), and $ increase in shareholder value 91年2月：收入亿美元/现金持有量 亿（过去亿）/长 期债务亿（过去亿）/新订单110亿/未完成订单30亿 （过去256亿）/股价 美元（增长113%），股民权益增加 12亿 5/12/2022 77 Different Voices 不同的声音 • 78% shareholder approved the plans 78%的股东同意此项计划 • UAW protest 工会反对 • institutional investors 机构投资者： – 10 days too short 10天太短 – only upside no downside （收入）只会上浮不会下滑 – high bonuses v. Layoffs 高额奖金与大批工人解雇 – short-term gains v. long-term losses 短期受益与长期亏损 5/12/2022 78 Divestiture 剥离资产 • GD would only remain in businesses where it could be #1 or #2 in the market/sold 7 core and non-core businesses for $3b between 11/91’-12/93’/a much smaller and more focused (submarines & tanks) company/ 98,150 employees to 26,800/headquarters staff from 650 to 200. GD将仅保留处于市场第一与第二位的业务/91年11月 —93年12月间以30亿美元的价格出售7项核心或非核 心业务/成为一家更小、更专业（潜水艇与坦克）的公 司/员工从98150人削减到26800人/ 总部员工从650人 削减到200人 5/12/2022 79 Huge Gain: 1/91’-12/93’ 91年1月—93年12月巨大经济收益 • a dividend-reinvested return of 553% over a base shareholder value of $1b/well above defense industry benchmark and S&P 500 在原本10亿美元股东价值基础上,股息再投资的回报率为553%/远远 超过国防工业的基准和S&P500指数 • distribution of value gain: Anders (%), top 25 exc. Anders ( %), 1,300 executive (%), 48,000 SIP participants (%), Crowns (%), William Buffett (%), other shareholders (%) 收益分配： Anders (%)，最高层除Anders之外的24位经理人员 （%），1300位经理人员（%），员工中购买公司股票的 (%), “王冠家族” (%), William Buffett （%），其他股 东（%） 5/12/2022 80 Why focused strategies may be wrong for emerging markets? 为什么专业化战略 在刚起步市场中可能是错误的？ 5/12/2022 81 Prevailing Views in Western Economies 西方经济的主流观点 • Core competencies and focus are now the mantras of corporate strategies in Western economies 核心竞争力与专业化现在是西方经济企业战略所推崇的 • But things are quite different in the emerging markets 但刚起步市场存在很大不同 – without effective securities regulation and venture capital firms 没有有效的股票市场管制制度和风险投资公司 – Without strong educational institutions 没有强大的教育机构 – Communications with customers is difficult when the local infrastructure is poor 基础设施薄弱，难以与顾客沟通 – Unpredictable government behavior 政府行为不可预测 5/12/2022 82 How Groups Can Add Value 集团公司如何增加价值 • Capital market: Venture capital firm, private equity provider, mutual fund, bank, auditor 资本市场：风险投资公司，私人资金提供者，互惠基金，银行，审计 • Labor market: business school, certification agency, head-hunting firm, relocation service 劳动力市场: 商学院，认证机构，猎头公司，调职服务 • Product market: Certification agency, regulatory authority, extrajudicial arbitration service 产品市场：认证机构，监管机构，庭外仲裁服务 • Government regulation: Lobbyist 政府管制：采用说客 • Contract enforcement: Courts, extrajudicial arbitration office 合同履行：依靠法庭和庭外仲裁机构 5/12/2022 83