Table of contents
1. Introduction 5
2. Evolving ML/TF risk picture 5
. Increased ML Threats 5
. Other Contextual Factors and ML Vulnerabilities 8
. Financing of Terrorism 10
. Summary of Potential ML/TF Risks 11
3. Current COVID-19 impact on AML/CFT regimes 11
4. Potential AML/CFT Responses for consideration 13
Annex A. Statement by the FATF President 17
Annex B. Statement or guidance issued by authorities in response
to COVID-19 19
References 29
Key findings
The increase in COVID-19-related crimes, such as fraud, cybercrime,
misdirection or exploitation of government funds or international financial
assistance, is creating new sources of proceeds for illicit actors.
Measures to contain COVID-19 are impacting on the criminal economy and
changing criminal behaviour so that profit-driven criminals may move to other
forms of illegal conduct.
The COVID-19 pandemic is also impacting government and private sectors’
abilities to implement anti-money laundering and counter terrorist financing
(AML/CFT) obligations from supervision, regulation and policy reform to
suspicious transaction reporting and international cooperation.
These threats and vulnerabilities represent emerging money laundering (ML) and
terrorist financing (TF) risks. Such risks could result in:
o Criminals finding ways to bypass customer due diligence measures;
o Increased misuse of online financial services and virtual assets to move and
conceal illicit funds;
o Exploiting economic stimulus measures and insolvency schemes as a
means for natural and legal persons to conceal and launder illicit proceeds;
o Increased use of the unregulated financial sector, creating additional
opportunities for criminals to launder illicit funds;
o Misuse and misappropriation of domestic and international financial aid and
emergency funding;
o Criminals and terrorists exploiting COVID-19 and the associated economic
downturn to move into new cash-intensive and high-liquidity lines of
business in developing countries.
AML/CFT policy responses can help support the swift and effective
implementation of measures to respond to COVID-19, while managing new
risks and vulnerabilities. These include:
o Domestic coordination to assess the impact of COVID-19 on AML/CFT risks
and systems;
o Strengthened communication with the private sector;
o Encouraging the full use of a risk-based approach to customer due
diligence;
o Supporting electronic and digital payment options.
1. Introduction
This paper is part of a coordinated and timely response to the impact of the COVID-19
crisis on global anti-money laundering (AML) and counter terrorist financing (CFT)
efforts and the application of the FATF Standards in this context. This response also
includes a Statement from the FATF President, issued on 1 April, on how the risk-based
approach of the FATF Standards provides for emerging threats and vulnerabilities to be
managed effectively and in support of COVID-19 aid and containment efforts (see
Annex A).
A list of statements and guidance issued by authorities in response to COVID-19 is
included in Annex B, for reference.
This paper was developed in response to the unprecedented and rapidly evolving COVID- 19
public health crisis. The findings contained within are likely to evolve as this crisis further
develops.
This paper is informed by open-source research, and information received from member
countries of the FATF and FATF-style regional bodies (FSRBs) and observer organisations
such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and United Nations.
The focus of this paper relates to three broad themes:
New threats and vulnerabilities stemming from COVID-19-related crime and
impacts on ML and TF risks;
Current impact on AML/CFT efforts by governments and the private sector due to
COVID-19;
Suggested AML/CFT policy responses to support the swift and effective
implementation of measures to respond to COVID-19, while managing new risks and
vulnerabilities identified, including: charitable activity and economic and fiscal
stimulus and financial rescue packages for firms and individuals.
2. Evolving ML/TF risk picture
. Increased ML Threats
The COVID-19 pandemic has generated various government responses, ranging from
social assistance and tax relief initiatives, to enforced confinement measures and travel
restrictions. While unintended, these measures may provide new opportunities for
criminals and terrorists to generate and launder illicit proceeds.
While the precise situation and public health responses in each country varies according to the
impact of COVID-19, the evolving risk picture detailed in this section is based on the following
general assumptions:
Governments, businesses and individuals are increasingly turning to online
systems to enable remote work. Individuals under “lockdown” (or other
movement restriction measures) are also increasingly turning to online platforms for
social interaction.
Businesses that are classified as non-essential have physically closed. Both
essential and non-essential business are seeing increased online sales.
The COVID-19 pandemic has driven significant demand for medical supplies, such as
personal protective equipment, ventilators and medicines and there is a global shortage
of such goods due to the overwhelming demand.
Banks and financial institutions remain in operation with some offering more
limited services and restricting in-person banking.
The closure of many businesses due to “lockdown” measures and other
restrictions on trade and travel has led to mass unemployment or the furloughing of
workers, loss of government revenue and a general economic recession that will
impact the financial and social behaviour of businesses and individuals.
Government resources have been reprioritised towards responding to COVID-19,
taking resources away from other areas of work.
With global trade volumes in decline and individual travel at a near standstill,
conventional transnational organised crime schemes that take advantage of global
supply chains and the traditional illicit revenue schemes of organised crime
groups are impacted by COVID-19.
Increased Fraud
Reporting from FATF members, observers, and open sources indicates that criminals have
attempted to profit from the COVID-19 pandemic through increased fraudulent activities. At
the time of writing, the primary fraudulent activities include:
Impersonation of officials: In such cases, criminals contact individuals (in
person, email or telephone) and impersonate government officials with the intent of
obtaining personal banking information or physical cash. In some cases,
criminals impersonate hospital officials who claim a relative is sick and require
payment for treatment (Interpol, 2020[1]), or government officials requesting
personal banking information for tax relief purposes (US Treasury, 2020[2]). Cases
involving government impersonation are likely to increase as governments
around the world disburse grants and tax relief payments to their citizens, with
criminals attempting to profit from these payments.
Counterfeiting, including of essential goods (such as medical supplies and
medicines): Given the high demand, there is a significant increase in online scams
involving certain medical supplies, personal protective equipment and
pharmaceutical products. In such cases, the suspects claim to be employees of
businesses, charities, and international organisations offering masks, testing kits and
other products, and request credit card information for payment or a shipping fee but
never deliver the goods. (US FDA, 2020[3]) In some scenarios, victims were asked to
make payment in advance via bank transfers and then directed to collect goods from
various locations, but were then subsequently informed that there were no such
arrangements. (Singapore Police Force, 2020[4]) In similar scams, the goods are
delivered to the consumer but are counterfeit or Such scams target both
individual consumers and businesses. FATF members are also seeing an increase in
false and misleading COVID-19 treatment claims and vendors selling illegal
products marketed as “miracle”
Fundraising for fake charities: FATF members highlight an increase in
fundraising scams. In such cases, criminals posing as international organisations or
charities circulate emails requesting donations for COVID-19-related
1 (European Commission, 2020[28]) (Cellule de Renseignement Financier Luxembourg, 2020[6]) (Interpol, 2020[7]) (Europol, 2020[8])
2 (US Justice Department, 2020[9]) (US ICE, 2020[10])
fundraising campaigns (purportedly for research, victims and/or products).
Recipients of these emails are then directed to provide credit card information or make
payments through the suspect’s secure digital wallet.
Fraudulent investment scams: The economic crisis resulting from COVID-19 has led
to an increase in investment scams, such as promotions falsely claiming that products
or services of publicly traded companies can prevent, detect or cure COVID-19.
(Europol, 2020[5]) Reporting by FATF members highlighted that microcap
stocks, typically issued by the smallest companies, may be particularly vulnerable to
fraudulent investment schemes as they are low-priced stocks with often limited
publicly-available information. This facilitates the spread of false information
about the company. (US Securities and Exchange Commission, 2020[6])
Cyber Crime
There has been a sharp rise in social engineering attacks, specifically phishing email and
mobile messages through spam campaigns. These attacks use links to fraudulent websites or
malicious attachments to obtain personal payment information.
Email and SMS phishing attacks: Criminals are exploiting concerns about
COVID-19 to insert malware on personal computers or mobile devices. In one
example, cybercriminals posed as the World Health Organization (WHO) and sent
email and mobile messages to lure individuals into clicking malicious links or
opening attachments, which subsequently reveal the individual’s user name and
password. (WHO, 2020[7]) Various versions of these phishing attacks are currently
being reported. Other examples include government impersonation via SMS to lure
individuals to fraudulent government websites to obtain personal account
information and/or sensitive usernames and passwords. (CISA, 2020[8])
Business email compromise scams: Amid a sharp rise in global remote-
working, cybercriminals are also exploiting weaknesses in businesses’ network
security to gain access to customer contact and transaction information. This
information is then used in targeted phishing emails whereby the criminals pose as the
compromised business and request payment for legitimate goods and/or services but
instead direct this payment into their illicit accounts. (FBI, 2020[9]) In another example,
a company received spoofed emails similar to those sent by their business partner to
redirect payment transfers to scammers’ controlled bank accounts, under the pretext
of paying for large supplies of surgical masks and hand sanitiser.
Ransomware attacks: Reports also indicate that cybercriminals are using
different methods to insert ransomware on personal computers and mobile
devices. For example, some FATF members report that cybercriminals are using
malicious websites and mobile applications that appear to share COVID-19-
related information to gain and lock access to victims’ devices until payment is
received. Organisations at the forefront of the COVID-19 response can be
heightened targets for cybercriminals. Specifically, hospitals and other medical
institutions have increasingly become targets of cybercriminals for ransomware
attacks. (Interpol, 2020[10])
Impact on Other Predicate Crimes
Human Trafficking3 and Exploitation of Workers: Criminals may take
advantage of the pandemic to exploit vulnerable groups. This may lead to an
increase in the exploitation of workers and human trafficking. (Council of Europe,
2020[11]) The suspension or reduced activity of government agencies regularly
engaged in detecting human trafficking cases and identifying victims of trafficking
(including workplace inspectors and social and health care workers) means that cases
may go undetected. (WEF, 2020[12]) The shutdown of workplaces, slowdown in the
economy, rising unemployment, and financial insecurity are factors that could
result in an increase in human exploitation. One FATF member has advised reporting
entities to be increasingly alert to the exploitation of workers and trafficking in
vulnerable persons. (Austrac, 2020[13])
Online Child Exploitation: There are reports from some members of a rise in the
production and distribution of online child exploitation material, often for profit. With
the closure of schools, children are increasingly using the internet during
“lockdown” periods, which could lead to an increase in online child exploitation.
(FBI, 2020[14]) There are also reports that “lockdowns” and travel bans are
increasing demand for this material. (Austrac, 2020[13])
Organised Property Crime: With many properties currently uninhabited due to
COVID-19, there are reports of an increase in organised property crime/theft.
(Europol, 2020[15])
. Other Contextual Factors and ML Vulnerabilities
Changing Financial Behaviours
Reporting indicates significant changes in financial behaviours and patterns in light of
COVID-19. Many bank offices and branches are closed due to public health and
“lockdown” measures. Customers are therefore carrying out more transactions remotely. Over
the medium to long-term, an economic downturn could further alter financial activities
and result in individuals seeking financing outside the formal economy.
Increased remote transactions: FATF and FSRB members report that some
banks have closed their physical branches, reduced opening hours or restricted the
services available in-person. Members also report increased online banking
activities, including customer on-boarding and identity verification. Some
supervisors have clarified that, in line with a risk-based approach, banks can
postpone certain elements of customer identity verification during confinement
periods. However, FATF and FSRB members note that some financial institutions
may not be equipped to verify customers’ identity remotely.
Unfamiliarity with online platforms: Certain population segments (., the
elderly, low-income groups, and remote or indigenous communities) may be less
familiar with using online banking platforms, and therefore more susceptible to
fraud. Reports indicate that online bank fraud targeting financial or account
3 Human trafficking is defined in the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children,
supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime as: the recruitment, transportation, transfer,
harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the
abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having
control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of
others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.
information is on the rise. (Cellule de Renseignement Financier Luxembourg,
2020[16])
Unregulated financial services: Citing correlations with past economic
downturns, both FATF and FSRB members note that, in a prolonged economic
recession, those with financing needs may seek out non-traditional or unlicensed
lenders, which may include criminal groups. Members also indicate that
traditional financial gatekeepers may become pre-occupied with business
continuity issues while still having to cope with monitoring suspicious
transactions.
Misdirection of Government Funds or International Financial Assistance and
Increased Risks of Corruption
Many governments are providing stimulus funds to mitigate the economic impact related to
COVID-19. FATF and FSRB members report that criminals may try to fraudulently claim or
misdirect such funds. Corruption in procurement or aid delivery channels could also impact
international financial assistance.
Exploiting stimulus measures: FATF and FSRB members report that a small
proportion of economic support directed to businesses and individuals may
present potential fraud risks, and consequent ML. In particular, criminals can
falsely claim to provide access to stimulus funds to obtain personal financial
information. (US IRS, 2020[17]) FATF members report that criminals may use legal
persons to make fraudulent claims on government stimulus funds by posing as
legitimate businesses seeking assistance. Some FATF members reported taking
steps to reduce risks, such as disbursing aid to people and businesses via existing
government accounts for receiving social benefits. (Australian Ministers for the
Department of Social Services, 2020[18]) Stimulus measures that involve loan
schemes may also be abused by criminals to launder funds.
International financial assistance and increased risks of corruption: Many
countries have an immediate need for emergency financial assistance to respond to
COVID-19. However, international financial institutions report that there is a risk
that emergency financial aid provided to countries can be misappropriated by corrupt
officials, particularly in countries where the rule of law is weak and there are poor
transparency and accountability measures. FSRB members also report that
government contracts to purchase large amounts of COVID-19-related medical
supplies provide opportunities for corruption and the misappropriation of public
funds. This activity may become more prevalent if there is a perception of decreased
financial oversight on government procurement and spending. FSRB members also
indicate that individuals could use corruption or informal channels to obtain
lucrative government contracts outside standard procurement procedures.
Increased Financial Volatility
Recent financial and economic volatility reflects uncertainties associated with COVID-19. In
this context, opportunistic criminals may shift their activities to exploit new
vulnerabilities.
Economic downturn: In an economic downturn, criminals may seek to invest in real
estate or troubled businesses to generate cash and mask illicit proceeds. Criminal
groups can also introduce illicit proceeds into the financial system by restructuring
existing loans and lines of credit. In addition, corporate insolvency proceedings can
free up illicit cash contained in businesses whilst masking the
funds’ origins. FATF members highlight that tax evasion and related crimes may
increase as individuals and companies facing economic difficulties look to reduce their
fiscal burdens. A prolonged economic downturn could result in private sector
entities having fewer resources to combat ML/TF, thereby increasing their risks.
Finally, increases in financial hardship due to an economic slowdown could lead to a
rise in certain types of subsistence crimes in developing countries (., burglary, theft
and wildlife poaching).
Increased physical cash transactions: FATF members report that recent swings in
securities values are resulting in individuals liquidating their portfolios and
transferring large amounts of funds electronically. FATF and FSRB members
reported an overall increase in banknote withdrawals, with some FATF members
raising cash withdrawal limits. FATF and FSRB members highlight that increased use
of banknotes can mask ML/TF activities in the following ways:
o When financial markets stabilise, large movements to re-deposit funds could
provide cover to efforts at laundering illicit funds, including banknotes;
o Banknotes can be used to purchase safe haven assets (., gold), which are less
easily traceable;
o An increased risk of cash-out schemes, where criminals obtain access to an
individual’s bank account and withdraw funds in banknotes from an ATM; and
o Customers involved in suspicious banknote withdrawals or transactions
reference “COVID-19” as the transaction purpose, thereby masking potential
illicit activities.
Virtual assets: FATF and FSRB members highlighted the continuing ML/TF risks
associated with virtual assets. In one recent case, an individual used virtual assets to
launder proceeds earned from selling fraudulent COVID-19 medicine. (US
Justice Department, 2020[19])
Insider trading: Reporting indicates an increase in investor fraud due to
increasingly volatile financial markets. Wholesale financial service providers are
transferring or liquidating assets in securities markets in response to COVID-19-
related uncertainties. These large value shifts in markets can potentially increase the
risk of illicit financial market activities, such as insider trading that seeks to profit
from large value swings. FATF members also report individuals using securities
offerings to raise capital on fake products or medicines.
. Financing of Terrorism
The United Nations has warned that threats related to terrorism remain and that terrorist groups
may see opportunities for increased terrorist and terrorist financing activity while government
attention is focused on COVID-19. (UN, 2020[20]) This is a particular concern in the Sahel
region. One FSRB Secretariat and one FSRB member raised concerns about terrorist groups
using the COVID-19 crisis to raise and move funds and increase existing illicit activity to
finance their operations. As international humanitarian and aid responses to COVID-19
increase, governments should emphasise the importance of implementing the risk-based
approach when mitigating the risk of funds being diverted to support terrorists and
terrorist groups. (US Treasury, 2020[21])
. Summary of Potential ML/TF Risks
Given the relatively early stages of the health and economic crisis, the majority of risks
currently reported relate to proceeds generating predicate offences. ML/TF-specific
trends or typologies emerging from COVID-19 are still in the early stages of identification.
Nevertheless, some national authorities have indicated that their FIUs have begun issuing
COVID-19-related typologies and indicators to their private sector.
At the time of writing, ML typologies relate to misuse of virtual assets to launder illicit
proceeds and misuse of the formal banking system. No specific TF typologies related to
COVID-19 have been reported by FATF or FSRB members.
In summary, and as outlined in the key findings, the potential ML/TF risks emerging from the
aforementioned threats and vulnerabilities could be:
Criminals finding ways to bypass CDD measures by exploiting temporary
challenges in internal controls caused by remote working situations, in order to
conceal and launder funds;
Increased misuse of online financial services and virtual assets to move and
conceal illicit funds;
Exploiting economic stimulus measures and insolvency schemes as a means for
natural and legal persons to conceal and launder illicit proceeds;
As individuals move money out of the banking system due to financial instability, this
may lead to an increased use of the unregulated financial sector, creating
additional opportunities for criminals to launder illicit funds;
Misuse and misappropriation of domestic and international financial aid and
emergency funding by avoiding standard procurement procedures, resulting in
increased corruption and consequent ML risks;
Criminals and terrorists exploiting COVID-19 and the associated economic
downturn to move into new cash-intensive and high-liquidity lines of business in
developing countries, both for the laundering of proceeds as well as to fund their
operations, as well as fraudulently claiming to be charities to raise funds online.
3. Current COVID-19 impact on AML/CFT regimes
Open source research, as well as feedback received from members and FSRB Secretariats
indicate that the COVID-19 pandemic is impacting government and private sectors’
abilities to implement AML/CFT obligations. This is primarily due to confinement and
social distancing measures introduced to contain the COVID-19 virus. Many AML/CFT
government and private sector employees are now working remotely, have been
redeployed to COVID-19 responses, or are not working at all. To some extent, especially for
countries with more limited resources and less advanced business continuity planning,
re-prioritisation efforts by governments are likely to result in a reallocation of resources away
from AML/CFT activities to other areas, such as financial stability, and humanitarian and
economic recovery efforts. There have been indications that some countries with less
resilient AML/CFT regimes or resources may be unable to maintain AML/CFT operations
while they prioritise responding to COVID-19.
The COVID-19 crisis appears to affect the following key areas, depending on the
magnitude of a country’s COVID-19 outbreak at the time of writing.
Supervision: The majority of FATF members indicate that their AML/CFT onsite
inspections have been postponed or substituted with desk-based inspections (including the use
of video conferencing). In some instances, onsite inspections are only conducted for high-risk
sectors or entities. Respondents indicated that banks, financial institutions and other reporting
entities continue to implement their AML/CFT requirements and provide requested
information to their supervisors. Some supervisory authorities have indicated that they have
provided risk-based flexibility on the filing of annual reports, and have delayed issuing new
licenses, particularly for some sectors that may have been shut down, such as casinos
(excluding online casinos). Regarding sanctions and other remedial actions, a number of
countries have introduced suspensions on decisions, including imposing monetary
penalties for AML/CFT violations. Registering new companies in registries is also
delayed.
Regulation and policy reform: Many national, supranational and international policy
departments have activated business continuity plans, with most or all staff working
remotely or redeployed to respond to COVID-19. This has, in some jurisdictions, resulted in a
significant pause in new AML/CFT policy and legislatives initiatives. This is further
compounded by the suspension of meetings of some legislative decision-making bodies, or
their prioritisation and focus on COVID-19 emergency matters.
Suspicious transaction reports (STRs): Banks and other reporting entities continue to file
STRs. Some members indicated that financial institutions have not encountered delays or
difficulties to analyse and file STRs. Other members are providing reporting entities
extensions to submit STRs (except in the case of high-risk areas, such as TF) and
threshold-based reports. In many cases, authorities have instructed reporting entities to
expeditiously notify supervisors and/or financial intelligence units (FIU) if they
encounter any delays or barriers to reporting. Jurisdictions that still rely on paper-based
reporting systems, or that have inadequate database software, may face delays in
receiving and processing reports.
FIU analysis: FIUs of FATF members, and FSRB members who responded are operational,
even in those countries severely affected by COVID-19 at present. FIU staff are working
remotely to the extent that information technology systems and security allow. There are some
anecdotal reports that some FIUs in lower capacity countries are significantly reducing
their operations or even shutting down completely.
International cooperation: There are mixed reports about the impact on operational
cooperation due to the COVID-19 crisis. Some delegations expressed concern that delays in
cooperation could be exacerbated over time due to remote working of FIU staff, and
potential re-prioritisation efforts of law enforcement and supervisory authorities and within
the private sector. Formal cooperation, such as mutual legal assistance and extradition
are already impacted by the crisis due to the limitation or suspension of court operations, and
the delayed execution of extradition orders caused by travel restrictions. Some delegations
have reported that the provision of AML/CFT technical assistance has also been reduced or
suspended.
Law Enforcement Authorities (LEAs): Limited feedback indicates that LEAs in FATF
member countries continue to prioritise AML/CFT efforts, with a heightened focus on
emerging COVID-19 predicate offences. Some prosecutions may be postponed or delayed due
to the suspension of trials, hearings, and other in-person proceedings. There are some reports
that the diversion of law enforcement and security resources to COVID-19 responses in
high-risk, poorly resourced countries, may embolden terrorists and terrorist financiers in their
activities.
Private Sector: Respondents noted that financial institutions have initiated business
continuity plans in response to the crisis. Some banks are closing branches, facing
challenges at outsourcing centres, limiting their services and redeploying staff. There are
reports from a few less affected countries that their banks are indirectly impacted and raised
concerns about accessing information to conduct due diligence on foreign customers
and foreign business relationships. Some members have flagged that there is increased
activity in non-banking sectors like online gambling, the insurance sector, dealers in
precious metals and stones and securities, while there is decreased activity in other sectors
like casinos and real estate. The money value transfer service sector faces particular
disruption as migrant workers have been affected by confinement measures and company
shutdowns, and much of their business is done face-to-face. Should the current economic
situation further deteriorate, there is a risk that financial institutions may re-prioritise their
AML/CFT efforts and focus on broader prudential and stability measures.
4. Potential AML/CFT Responses for consideration
This section sets out a range of actions that jurisdictions are taking or could consider
taking in response to these challenges, from dealing with new risks and/or reduced
operational capacity to facilitating charitable activity, economic and fiscal stimulus and
financial relief packages. It provides practical examples of responses taken by authorities.
Coordinate domestically to assess the impact of COVID-19 on AML/CFT risks and
systems, to develop responses and engage with the private sector.
Response teams are working with stakeholders to assess private and public sector
resilience on a continuing basis (., weekly situation reports).
Supervisors, FIUs and LEAs are working together to identify, monitor and
communicate the changing risk landscape (see Section 3) and provide guidance to the
private sector.
AML/CFT supervisors are engaging with prudential supervisors to ensure the
appropriate prioritisation of AML/CFT measures to address potential illicit
activity related to COVID-19 and its impact.
Strengthen communication with the private sector by proactively engaging on the
application of their AML/CFT measures and working constructively with them to
minimise potential impact.
Supervisors and/or FIUs are providing regulated entities with a contact point
where they face serious difficulties in meeting regulatory requirements and
requiring them to keep relevant records and develop a plan to clear the backlog as the
situation improves.
Importantly, some countries are communicating beyond the financial sector, to
designated non-financial businesses and professions, other trusted partners and
industry associations, to address sectors that may have lower resilience.
There are examples of some countries engaging proactively with the non-profit
organisations (NPO) sector. Countries and financial institutions should apply a
risk-based approach to ensure that legitimate NPO activity is not unnecessarily
delayed, disrupted or discouraged. (FATF, 2015[22]) In one jurisdiction, the
government has designated channels for COVID-19 donations.
Encourage full-use of a risk-based approach to CDD and address practical issues.
Some supervisors are communicating with reporting entities about the
importance of continuing to provide essential financial services while also
mitigating ML/TF risks by using the full range of tools at their disposal. In relation to
CDD, supervisors have put in place some of the following measures:
o Applying simplified due diligence measures where lower risks are identified, for
example, accounts created specifically to facilitate government payments to
individuals or businesses and offering access to digital/contactless
payment See below section on economic relief packages.
o Providing guidance that there may be legitimate reasons for customers not
providing information for ongoing due diligence or ‘know-your-customer
(KYC) refreshers’ (., if they are confined, under quarantine or ill) and that the
usual processes for dealing with these situations (including exiting the
customer relationship) may not be appropriate at this
o Allowing reporting entities to accept recently expired government-issued
identification until further notice in order to verify the identity of an individual
(although still required to determine the authenticity of the identification).
o Considering the application of delayed verification provisions for new
business relationships in line with the FATF Standards (., by implementing
transaction limits). Reporting entities can accept digital copies of documents as an
interim measure, with the originals to be sighted in due course.
Encouraging the use of responsible digital identity and other responsible
innovative solutions for identifying customers at onboarding and while
conducting transactions. See the recent FATF Digital ID Guidance (FATF, 2020[23])
that highlights that non-face-to-face onboarding and transactions conducted
using trustworthy digital ID are not necessarily high-risk and can be standard or even
lower-risk.
Support electronic and digital payment options.
More broadly, supervisors are encouraging the full use of electronic and digital
channels to continue payment services while maintaining social distancing. Some
examples include increasing contactless limits, increasing point of sale purchase
limits, raising maximum limits for e-wallets and reducing charges for domestic
money transfers between banks to encourage the use of contactless payment
methods in order to reduce the spread of the virus.
Undertake pragmatic, risk-based AML/CFT supervision.
All supervisors have continued AML/CFT supervisory activities, although
practices are adapted to be more pragmatic in the current situation (see
Section 4).
Supervisors continue to monitor the business continuity plans put in place and
operationalised by financial institutions in order to ensure their sound operations,
including implementation of AML/CFT measures. Some supervisors are adjusting their
focus as relevant. For example, they are putting greater focus on online casinos
and gambling platforms considering regular casinos and gambling arcades are closed,
and more focus on dealers in precious metals and stones with greater investment in
gold.
4FATF Interpretative Note to notes that “financial products or services that provide appropriately defined and limited services to certain
types of customers, so as to increase access for financial inclusion purposes” are an example of a lower risk scenario.
5More information on how such measures can be implemented is set out in the 2017 FATF guidance on AML/CFT measures and financial
inclusion, with a supplement on customer due diligence.
Conversely, there is potentially less focus on lower risk areas such as
cash-intensive businesses that have halted trading. All supervisors should
consider reviewing their supervisory priorities and plans and adjust these to
emerging risks, as necessary.
Understand new risks and adapt operational responses.
Authorities are working with relevant partners, domestically and internationally, to
understand and monitor the evolving risk environment (see Section 3). This requires
liaising with a broad range of stakeholders. Countries with existing
public/private partnerships are harnessing these forums to obtain the latest
information.
A number of countries have introduced special taskforces or other operational
coordination measures to deal with COVID-19-related crime, particularly in
relation to fraud.
In some countries, authorities have issued advice to relevant agencies on the
prioritisation of investigations and prosecutions.
Some FIUs have asked regulated entities to use a keyword in their reports to triage and
prioritise incoming STRs. FIUs are developing strategic analysis based on review
of available bulk data and adapting STR prioritisation and analysis.
Agencies are considering pooling available resources, including repurposing
assets confiscated or forfeited from criminals to assist in COVID-19 responses
(., using confiscated properties as temporary/emergency hospital facilities).
Clarify AML/CFT requirements in the context of economic relief measures.
Authorities are providing clarity on how to apply AML/CFT requirements in the
context of economic relief packages for individuals and businesses.
To facilitate the smooth processing of applications, some supervisors have
approved simplified due diligence measures (including for customer verification) for
transactions under government assistance programs where they are assessed to present
lower risks. They include obligations for regulated entities to put in place mitigation
measures, such as ongoing due diligence and to review CDD if other risks are later
detected.
One country has implemented measures to identify risk indicators, and
implemented processes and controls to prevent the misuse of the aforementioned
assistance packages for ML/TF purposes. These measures will likely vary
depending on the scope and delivery of the relief package and contextual factors,
including corruption issues.
Countries receiving economic stimulus by international organisations such as the IMF
may receive additional guidance to implement targeted AML/CFT measures to ensure
those funds are not diverted for other purposes (such as corruption or ML).
All countries should guide regulated entities to remain vigilant to detect
suspicious financial transactions, particularly in the context of cross-border flows from
countries that are receiving emergency COVID-19-related funding from
international organisations and other donors.
Continue cooperating across borders.
FIUs should keep the Egmont Group Secretariat appraised of any developments,
including any operational disruptions that could impact international cooperation
responses and provide a key contact point.
Increased communication may be required, particularly on group-wide
supervision.
Monitor the impact of COVID-19 on the private sector.
FIUs and supervisors should continue to monitor the impact on reporting entities, as the
COVID-19 situation continues.
Prolonged economic disruption may force some regulated entities to close down.
Disorderly shutdowns may leave significant ML/TF vulnerabilities.
Annex A. Statement by the FATF President
COVID-19 and measures to combat illicit financing6
Paris, 1 April 2020 - The members of the FATF, both domestically and multilaterally, are
applying every available resource to combat the COVID-19 pandemic. As the global
standard-setter for combating money laundering (ML) and the financing of terrorism (TF) and
proliferation, the FATF encourages governments to work with financial institutions and other
businesses to use the flexibility built into the FATF’s risk-based approach to address the
challenges posed by COVID-19 whilst remaining alert to new and emerging illicit finance
risks. The FATF encourages the fullest use of responsible digital customer onboarding and
delivery of digital financial services in light of social distancing measures. At a time when
critical relief is needed in-country and beyond, effective implementation of the FATF
Standards fosters greater transparency in financial transactions, which gives donors greater
confidence that their support is reaching their intended beneficiaries. The continued
implementation of the FATF Standards facilitates integrity and security of the global
payments system during and after the pandemic through legitimate and transparent
channels with appropriate levels of risk-based due diligence.
Addressing COVID-19-related financial crime risks by remaining vigilant
Criminals are taking advantage of the COVID-19 pandemic to carry out financial fraud and
exploitation scams, including advertising and trafficking in counterfeit medicines, offering
fraudulent investment opportunities, and engaging in phishing schemes that prey on virus-
related fears. Malicious or fraudulent cybercrimes, fundraising for fake charities, and
various medical scams targeting innocent victims are likely to increase, with criminals
attempting to profit from the pandemic by exploiting people in urgent need of care and the
goodwill of the general public and spreading misinformation about COVID-
19. National authorities and international bodies are alerting citizens and businesses of these
scams, which include impostor, investment and product scams, as well as insider trading in
relation to COVID-19. Like criminals, terrorists may also exploit these opportunities
to raise funds.
Supervisors, financial intelligence units and law enforcement agencies should continue to share
information with the private sector to prioritise and address key ML risks, particularly
those related to fraud, and TF risks linked to COVID-19. Additionally, criminals and
terrorists may seek to exploit gaps and weaknesses in national anti-money laundering/counter-
financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) systems while they assume resources are focused
elsewhere, making risk-based supervision and enforcement activity more critical than
ever. Financial institutions and other businesses should remain vigilant to emerging ML and TF
risks and ensure that they continue to effectively mitigate these risks and are able to detect and
report suspicious activity.
Digital onboarding and simplified due diligence
With people around the world facing confinement or strict social distancing measures, in-
person banking and access to other financial services is difficult, and unnecessarily
exposes people to the risk of infection. Use of digital/contactless payments and digital
onboarding reduce the risk of spreading the virus. As such, the use of financial technology
(Fintech) provides significant opportunities to manage some of the issues presented by
COVID-19. In line with the FATF Standards, the FATF encourages the use of technology,
including Fintech, Regtech and Suptech to the fullest extent possible. The FATF recently
6
released Guidance on Digital ID, which highlights the benefits of trustworthy digital
identity for improving the security, privacy and convenience of identifying people
remotely for both onboarding and conducting transactions while also mitigating ML/TF risks.
The FATF calls on countries to explore using digital identity, as appropriate, to aid financial
transactions while managing ML/TF risks during this crisis.
When financial institutions or other businesses identify lower ML/TF risks, the FATF
Standards allow them to take simplified due diligence measures, which may help them adapt
to the current situation. The FATF encourages countries and financial service providers
to explore the appropriate use of simplified measures to facilitate the delivery of government
benefits in response to the pandemic.
Delivery of aid through non-profit organisations
This global public health emergency has highlighted the vital work of charities and NPOs to
combat COVID-19 and its effects. The FATF has long recognised the vital importance of
NPOs in providing crucial charitable services around the world, as well as the difficulties in
providing that assistance to those in need. The FATF has worked closely with NPOs over the
years to refine the FATF Standards to provide flexibility to ensure that charitable
donations and activity can proceed expeditiously through legitimate and transparent
channels and without disruption. It is important to recognise that FATF Standards do not
require that all NPOs be considered high-risk and that most NPOs carry little or no TF risk. The
aim of the FATF Standards is not to prevent all financial transactions with
jurisdictions where there may be high ML/TF risks, but rather to ensure these are done
through legitimate and transparent channels and money reaches its legitimate intended
recipient. National authorities and financial institutions should apply a risk-based
approach to ensure that legitimate NPO activity is not unnecessarily delayed, disrupted or
discouraged. FATF encourages countries to work with relevant NPOs to ensure that much
needed aid is getting to its intended recipients in a transparent
Ongoing outreach and advice
Regulators, supervisors, financial intelligence units, law enforcement authorities and other
relevant agencies can provide support, guidance and assistance for the private sector on
how national AML/CFT laws and regulations will be applied during the current crisis. Such
guidance can give financial institutions and other businesses reassurance that the authorities
share their understanding of challenges and risks involved in the current situation, and of the
appropriate actions to take. Authorities in some countries have already taken swift action
and provided this type of advice. Mechanisms by which victims, financial institutions, and
other businesses can report COVID-19 related fraud may be especially useful.
At the international level, the FATF is working with the Committee on Payment and
Market Infrastructures and the World Bank to help ensure coordinated policy responses for
the continued provision of critical payment services against the backdrop of the COVID-
19 crisis. The FATF, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and United Nations are
working with their membership to mitigate the impacts of the COVID-19 crisis,
including through the use of AML/CFT measures, where relevant. In addition, the FATF is
working with its members and the FATF-Style Regional Bodies to identify and share good
practices in response to common issues faced in many affected countries.
FATF’s commitment to support efforts to address COVID-19 issues
The FATF stands ready to provide further AML/CFT guidance to support the current
global efforts to tackle the COVID-19 crisis and its effects, and welcomes feedback.
7 See 2015 Best Practices Paper on Combating the Abuse of Non-Profit Organisations
Annex B. Statement or guidance issued by authorities in response to COVID-19
Below are statements and guidance issued by FATF and FSRB members in response to
COVID-19. The measures cited, and taken by FATF members’ authorities, have not been
reviewed or considered by the FATF membership as a whole, and therefore do not
constitute the official view of the FATF.
Anguilla –The FIU has issued a public release to the reporting entities as well as the
general public on the risk of potential scams/fraud.
Australia – AUSTRAC updates to reporting entities on COVID-19 including advice
and guidance on: working with reporting entities during COVID-19 pandemic,
extension on annual compliance reporting, advice on rule changes for early access to
superannuation funds, suspicious matter reporting and advice on meeting KYC
requirements:
Bolivia – The UIF (FIU Bolivia) issued an official communication addressed to
reporting entities on COVID-19 pandemic risk on ML/TF to advise them on how to
better comply with their AML/CTF obligations.
Brazil – COAF has replicated the FATF and GAFILAT communiqués in Portuguese
and published in its web-site. Furthermore, it addressed these statements
together with red flags to all reporting entities, supervisors and other competent
authorities.
presidente-
do-gafi-sobre-covid-19-e-medidas-de-combate-ao-financiamento- ilicito
Canada – FINTRAC message to all reporting entities in light of COVID-19:
Cayman Islands –The FRA (FIU) has published and circulated notices regarding the
physical closure of the office and guidance on how reporting entities should submit
reports during the physical closure of the office.
Chile – UAF has issued several communiqués and press release addressed to the
reporting entities in order to inform and guide them to better comply with the
AML/CTF obligations during this COVID-19 pandemic situation. This agency also
issue communiqués addressed to all relevant authorities, and a social media
campaign to raise awareness on the ML/TF risk associated to the pandemic was also
launched (
People’s Republic of China – The Peoples Bank of China (PBC) has issued Notices on
AML/CFT requirements in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic to all its
branches on 5th Feb 2020. All branches of PBC should continue more pragmatic
AML/CFT supervisory activities adapted to local situation and provide necessary
guidance to local regulated entities when they face difficulties in meeting
regulatory requirements;
PBC has also issued Guidance on how to meet the AML/CFT requirements in
responding to the COVID-19 pandemic to regulated entities on 5th Feb 2020. All
regulated entities are encouraged to develop contingency program meeting the
AML/CFT requirements by using the full range of tools at their disposal. To
support charitable activity and medical aid, simplified due diligence measures are
allowed but the STR of TF and the other high-risk areas should be maintained
overall.
Colombia – UIAF issued a press release sent to all compliance officers and
published it on its website, requesting greater rigor in CDD measures, in the
context of the health emergency caused by COVID-19 pandemic. UIAF has also
replicated the GAFILAT communiqué in its web-site and carried out a social media
campaign to boost all the stakeholders to continue to rigorously implement AML
/ CFT risk management systems (
#YoNoBajoLaGuardia).
a_exige_se_sigan_30457
t_covid_19_sus_30438
Costa Rica – The FIU/ICD issued a statement to all relevant authorities and the
reporting entities to guide them on the ML/TF risk associated with COVID-19 and to
advise them on possible good practices:
.
Cuba – The Central Bank of Cuba has issued communiqués in line with the FATF’s
and GAFILAT’s statement on COVID-19 and its associated ML and FT risks to raise
awareness of the reporting entities and the public sector on this matter.
Denmark, Kingdom of – FSA Fighting money laundering and terrorist financing
must continue during the Covid-19 crisis:
releases/2020/Fighting_money_laundering_covid19.
Dominican Republic – To prevent citizens from being scammed during the
Covid-19 emergency, information campaigns are carried out in order to inform the
population about the channels and mechanisms to receive financial aid
programs. In the official websites of the relevant organizations, specific sections have
been created for said programs, which are reported by press and social media.
aplicar-al-fase/
EGMONT Group - The ECOFEL eLearning platform - accessed by FIUs and other
competent authorities from all over the world - now hosts a large quantity of
reports and other content related to ML/TF threats and vulnerabilities arising from
COVID-19 outbreak, including the online course “COVID-19 emerging risks”.
Furthermore, the ECOFEL will soon start organizing round-table discussions that will
bring together the FIUs from jurisdictions that are experiencing different stages of
COVID-19 outbreak, in order to share their experiences and lessons learned as to
how to tackle the relevant managerial and operational issues they face and prepare
the FIUs to efficiently return to a normal operational routine once the lockdown
decisions by governments are lifted.
Egypt – Guidance issued by the Central Bank of Egypt on bank operations during
COVID-19 on 20 March 2020.
European Banking Authority – Statement on actions to mitigate financial crime risks
in the COVID-19 pandemic:
impact-
covid-19-eu-banking-sector.
Europol – press release and report on pandemic profiteering: how criminals
exploit the COVID-19 crisis:
19-
pandemic.
Finland – FIU-FI disseminated an alert to reporting entities concerning the
possible typologies related to COVID -19 on 26 March 2020.
France – Joint communiqué by financial supervisor (ACPR-AMF) on the scam
financial risks related to Covid-19 (in French):
publications/communiques/communiques-
de-lamf/lamf-et-lacpr-mettent-en- garde-le-public-contre-les-risques-darnaques-
dans-le-contexte-de-lepidemie.
Statement of ACPR (France’s main financial supervisor) as regards the continuity of
its mission and adaptation during the crisis (in French):
prudentiel-et-de-resolution-assure-la-continuite-de-ses-missions-durant-la.
Confirmation that asset freezing obligations and STR reporting cannot be granted any
exceptions during the crisis (bill) (in French):
899&categorieLien=id.
Statements issued on extension of deadlines for reporting AML-CFT obligations for:
Banking sector (in French):
prudentiel-et-de-resolution-annonce-un-assouplissement-des-modalites-de- remise;
Insurance sector (in French):
prudentiel-et-de-resolution-annonce-un-assouplissement-des-dates-de-remise- des;
Portfolios management sector (in French):
des-
activites-de-gestion-en-periode-de-coronavirus.
GAFILAT– The heads of delegations, together with the Presidency and the
Executive Secretariat of GAFILAT, approved an official statement on COVID-19
and its associated ML and FT risks. The document was developed with the inputs
received from the member countries and in accordance with the measures
reported by FATF. This statement attempts, on the one hand, to alert the
authorities of the member countries and the private sector about possible
emerging risks and, on the other hand, to share good practices and mitigating
measures identified in response to the common problems faced by the GAFILAT’s
member countries and the international community.
de-
interes-17/3823-gafilat-covid19-en-gafilat/file
Germany – BaFin information on new developments and key points on the
COVID-19 situation (in English and German):
Guatemala – SIB, (FI’s regulator) issued statements related to financial
supervision on AML/CTF and to the use of cash in order to prevent and mitigate the
possible ML/TF risk emerging from the CODIV-19 pandemic situation.
2386&name=
2638&name=
Guernsey - The Guernsey Financial Services Commission has issued press
releases emphasizing to the financial services and DNFBP community the
importance of operational resilience in the face of increased fraud risk (including
cybercrime) arising from Covid-19 measures being taken domestically and
worldwide, and on encouraging regulated firms to move to electronic customer
verification measures. Consumers have also been alerted to various types of
potential Covid-19 scams.
fraud-
arising-covid-19
support-financial-services-industry
Honduras – UIF, has published on its website, the statement issued by GAFILAT in
this regard, as well as the document issued by the United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crime (UNODC) on Cybercrime and COVID-19. These documents were shared
with the compliance officers of the reporting entities, so that they can use them as a
tool to identify possible risks.
futuros/
Hong Kong, China – Hong Kong Monetary Authority guidelines for financial
institutions:
circular/2020/;
circular/2020/.
Isle of Man - The regulators and the financial intelligence unit in the Isle of Man
have published statements providing guidance to the regulated sector on
potential risks, and also setting out expectations of the regulators, during COVID- 19:
gaming/
Israel - The Israeli National Police, IMPA (the Israeli FIU), the Bank of Israel
(Banking Supervision Division), the Israel Securities Authority and the Israeli
Capital Markets, Insurance and Savings Authority have published notices to
reporting entities and the public, concerning specific risks arising in connection with
the COVID-19 crisis.
Italy – At the outset of the lockdown, Unità di Informazione Finanziaria per l’Italia
– UIF provided obliged entities in all relevant sectors with indications on how to
maintain appropriate contacts for any communications, disclosures or requests and
for facilitating compliance:
.
With a second Communiqué UIF indicated the need to leverage IT tools to identify
suspicions through remote screening. Also, based on an assessment of the impacts of
the emergency, the terms for the filing of certain data related to threshold-based
disclosures have been prolonged:
.
Furthermore, UIF has set out to monitor developing trends and identify emerging
threats and vulnerabilities, with a view to highlighting areas of risk and providing
obliged entities with indicators for the detection of suspicious transactions in the
context of the emergency. In the wake of initiatives undertaken by the FATF and
European bodies and of similar measures adopted by counterparts in other
jurisdictions, UIF issued on 16 April a Communiqué drawing the attention of
AML/CFT obliged entities and their staff to the new threats and risks to which they may
be exposed and to the need to promptly detect suspicions related to the Covid-19
emergency and report them:
anomalia/Comunicazione-UIF-
.
On April 10, 2020 Banca d’Italia issued a communication to banks and financial
intermediaries drawing the attention on the central role of the financial system to
transmit the effects of governmental measures, and to avoid detrimental impacts on
clients. In this framework, Banca d’Italia also issued recommendations on the
implementation of anti money laundering safeguards, recalling to calibrate AML
obligations according to the emerging ML/TF risks associated with COVID-19. In
this respect, specific attention is requested in order to prevent misuse of financial
public aid to individuals and corporations:
vigilanza/
Japan – Consumer Affairs Agency & National Police Agency advice public to be
aware of COVID-19 related frauds (in Japanese):
.
Jersey - The Jersey FSC has issued guidance and launched a series of webinars
about working in the pandemic, including a specific webinar on the subject of
customers due diligence.
on-
customer-due-diligence/
Republic of Korea – KoFIU has issued guidance for reporting entities on STR
reporting requirements during the crisis.
Luxembourg – the FIU (CRF) has published a COVID-19 typologies report:
COVID19-
(in English);
(in
French).
Mexico – FIU and the National Banking and Securities Commission (CNBV) Joint
statement to regulated entities; CNBV statement on prudential and AML/CFT
requirements; FIU and Tax and Customs Authority joint statement for DNFBPs (all
public documents and in Spanish). In addition, the FIU and the CNBV shared with the
financial entities a non-public document about the ML and TF Risks related to
COVID-19:
0;
Morocco – Bank Al-Maghrib has issued a press release on measures taken during
COVID-19 on 29 March 2020.
Namibia – FIU public statement on COVID-19 lockdown and public alert on
COVID-19 scams:
19%20%E2%80%93%20National%;
21&cntnt01showall=&cntnt01pagelimit=25&cntnt01returnid=76.
Netherlands, Kingdom of – The FIU has issued an information leaflet to all
reporting entities, informing them on how they can identify specific financial
COVID-benefits paid by the Dutch government, on possible misuse situations and on
possible red flags related to COVID-19 fraud cases. These red flags have been
developed in cooperation with the several public authorities (Anti Money
Laundering Centre, Inspectorate SZW (Social Affairs and Employment) and Public
Prosecutors Office). An interview with more details on the information leaflet can be
found here: warns-of-
covid-19-fraud-and-money-laundering/?type=free.
DNB (the central bank) and AFM (the Dutch Financial Markets Authority) have
issued several notifications:
(DNB, overview page)
banken/nieuwsbrief-banken-april-2020/ (DNB, April 6, 2020)
(AFM, April 1, 2020).
Dutch National Police has issued a warning on cybercriminals taking advantage of
corona-related measures:
.
New Zealand – Joint guidance by three supervisory agencies:
.
Nicaragua – The AML/CTF/PF National Committee has replicated the public
documents that the FATF / GAFILAT have published on COVID-19 and its risks
associated with ML/TF in order to analyze and evaluate the emerging risks that may
result in this context.
Palestinian Authority – Palestine Monetary Authority issued Circulate No.
(84/2020) for Specialized Lending Institutions Operating in Palestine; Circulate No.
(85/2020) for Banks Operating in Palestine; Circulate No. (86/2020) for Money
Exchangers Operating in Palestine on 26 March 2020.
Paraguay – SEPRELAD issued a press release and guidance addressed to the
relevant private and public sector in order to alert them on ML/TF related
emerging risks.
asociados-de-lavado-de-activos-y-financiamiento-del-terrorismo-n108
Peru – The SBS published several communiqués and press release addressed to
reporting entities and the public, concerning specific risks arising connected with the
COVID-19 pandemic.
SBS/noticia/gafilat-difunde-comunicado-sobre-covid19--y-sus-riesgos- asociados-de-
lavado-de-activos-y-financiamiento-del-terrorismo/id/1607
INFORMATIVOS/2020/
Portugal – Statements by supervisors:
boletim/;
emitidos-pela-eba-e-pelo-gafi-no-contexto-da-pandemia;
boletim/;
spx?v=;
s/;
s/
;
ED043E9A0784/0/.
Saudi Arabia – SAMA provided guidance to regulated entities.
Seychelles – Advisory from the FIU and Financial Services Authority statement on
COVID-19 to reporting entities:
.
Singapore – The Singapore Police Force (SPF) and AML/CFT authorities (.
Monetary Authority of Singapore) have provided guidance and advisories to
regulated entities and the public respectively. SPF has issued an advisory warning of a
new type of e-commerce scam involving sale of face masks:
room/news/20200222_others_new_type_of_ecommerce_scams_involving_the_sa
le_of_face_masks.
SPF also regularly shares news on types of scams, including those relating to
COVID-19, via
The Ministry of Law has issued a statement to all Registered Dealers, describing
government-wide measures taken in response to Covid-19:
The Monetary Authority of Singapore has been providing guidance to financial
institutions on risks and expectations of regulators and supervisors during
COVID-19:
and-
supervisory-measures-to-help-fis-focus-on-supporting-customers.
Spain – SEPBLAC public message:
8 Recent advisories on scams include one where Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong warns of fake COVID-19 emails purportedly sent
by him asking for “contributions” and the Ministry of Health’s warning of scammers impersonating its COVID-19 contact tracing personnel
to request for personal information and financial details.
