Financial Crises, Bank Failures, and the Role of Central Banks
金融危机，银行倒闭和中央银行的作用
英格兰银行培训中心主任
Mario I. Blejer
2 BASIC QUESTIONS: （两个基本问题）
Definition of Financial Crises（金融危机的定义）
Causes of the Financial Crises（金融危机的根源）
Banking crises (runs, panics, etc.)
BoP and Currency Crises
（银行危机（挤提、恐慌等），国际收支和货币危机）
However, under fixed XR, a bank run turns into a currency run if the Central Bank acts as a lender of last resort.（然而，在固定汇率体制下，如果中央银行作为最后贷款人，银行挤提就会演变为货币挤提）
And if a Central Bank’s defense of the peg is based in aggressively raising short-term interest rates, bank soundness could be severely damaged （如果中央银行依靠大幅提高短期利率来维护盯住汇率，银行的稳健就会受到严重破坏）
Main Causes of Banking Crises
（银行危机的主要根源）
Loss of Confidence （丧失信心）
Liquidity Crunch （流动性紧缩）
Solvency Problems arising from Excessive Volatilities （过度波动带来的偿付问题）
Main Causes of Banking Crises
（银行危机的主要根源）
Domestic and External Macroeconomic Volatility（国内外宏观经济波动）
2. Credit Booms and Capital Inflows（信贷扩张和资本流入）
3. Asset prices bubbles and collapses（资产价格泡沫及其破灭）
Excessive Public Sector involvement and Political pressures（公共部门过度参与和政治压力）
Main Causes of Banking Crises (cont’d)
银行危机的主要根源（续）
Increasing currency and maturity mismatches （货币和期限错配加大）
6. Legal and Prudential Weaknesses
（法律和审慎框架的弱点）
Wrong Incentives to Bankers and Depositors
（为银行家和存款人提供错误的激励）
1. Macroeconomic Volatility （宏观波动）
Volatilities tend to alter relationship between the values of bank assets and liabilities （波动一般会改变银行资产和负债价值之间的关系）
Sources--Domestic and External （来源—内部和外部）
EXTERNAL: --Terms of Trade fluctuations（外部—贸易条件变动）
Foreign Interest Rates and Capital Flows （外国利率和资本流动）
Real Exchange Rates （实际汇率）
DOMESTIC: --Inflation and Growth Rates （内部——通货膨胀和经济增长率）
Volatilities could be dealt with by: （通过下列方式应对波动）
Reducing volatilities under domestic control（实施国内控制，减少波动）
Implementation of steady monetary policies （实施稳定的货币政策 ）
Reducing exposure by diversification （通过多样化分散风险） Foreign-owned banks（外国银行）
Volatilities could also be dealt with by:
（也可通过下列方式应对波动）
Insurance（保险 ）
Promote the development of market instruments that provide protection against volatilities – Derivative markets （促进能够抵御波动的市场工具的发展——衍生市场）
Financial cushion against volatility-induced losses -- Capital levels to compensate for volatilities （为波动带来的损失提供财务上的缓冲手段，提高资本金水平应对波动冲击）
2. Credit Booms and Capital Inflows
（信贷扩张和资本流入）
Excessive Credit Creation and Unsound Financial Expansion in the Upswing (mixed evidence) （信贷过度扩张以及经济上升期金融不稳健行为（各种证据））
Surge of short term and unstable capital inflows（大量短期的不稳定的资本流入）
Should central banks discourage credit booms and short term capital inflows? And how?
（中央银行是否应抑制信贷扩张和短期资本流入？如何抑制？）
Sterilization policies（对冲政策）
Controls on Capital Flows（对资本流动实施管制）
Reserve Requirements, variable capital requirements and other prudential instruments (reserve requirements are useful in a crisis—Argentine experience during the Tequila)（准备金要求，不同的资本要求和其他审慎工具（准备金要求在处理危机过程中非常有用——阿根廷的经验））
3. Asset prices bubbles and collapses
（资产价格泡沫和泡沫的破灭）
Asset prices booms carries the risk of a bust (., a bubble) that will destroy the value of securities held in banks. They create a collateral-induced credit crunch（资产价格的迅速上涨会引起泡沫破裂的风险，将破坏银行持有的担保品的价值。资产价格迅速上涨能够带来抵押品引起的信贷紧缩）
Asset price bubbles distort financial decisions and difficult proper credit risk management（资产价格泡沫扰乱金融决策，并提高制定合理的信贷风险管理政策、措施的难度）
Bubbles affect macroeconomic policies and could lead to output contraction（资产价格泡沫影响宏观经济政策并导致产出下降）
Should Central Banks take action to restrain an “excessive’’ rise in asset prices—in order to prevent financial instability—even when inflation forecasts do not deviate from the target rates?
(即使通货膨胀预测没有偏离目标——为了防止金融不稳定——中央银行是否也应采取措施抑制资产价格的“过度”上升？)
What type of action? Should monetary policy be tightened?（采取何种措施？是否应紧缩货币政策？)
In the mist of a crisis, how should the central bank deal with a bubble?( 在危机过程中，中央银行如何处理“泡沫”？)
THE DEBATE IN THE LITERATURE
某些文献中的不同观点
“Conventional View” （“传统观点”）
Monetary policy should not respond to changes in asset prices, except if they signal changes in expected inflation.（货币政策无需对资产价格的变动做出反应，除非这些变动预示预期通胀率产生了变化）
Monetary policy can do little more than deal with the fallout from unwinding of asset price bubbles（货币政策最多也仅仅能够对资产泡沫释放时的副产品有所影响）
THE DEBATE IN THE LITERATURE
某些文献中的不同观点
Alternative View 其它观点
Central Banks should take action to restrain an “excessive” rise in asset prices, even when inflation forecasts do not deviate from the target rates.（即使预期的通货膨胀率没有超过目标， 中央银行也应当对资产价格的“过度”上涨采取控制措施。）
To reduce the likelihood of misalignments (bubbles) reaction to asset prices should be in the normal course of policy making（调整资产价格的措施应当作为决策的常规内容，以便降低资产价格失真的可能性）
Arguments against reacting directly to asset prices:
（反对直接调整资产价格的观点）
Asset prices are too volatile.（资产价格波动太大）
Misalignment of asset prices are close to impossible to identify…（确认资产价格是否失真很难……）
and even more difficult to correct.（纠正更难）
Systematically reacting reacting to asset prices may be destabilizing and create moral hazard.（对资产价格的系统性调整可能会造成不稳定并引发败德行为）
Misalignment of asset prices (bubbles) are difficult to identify（确认资产价格失调（泡沫）很难）
Difficulty to distinguish between asset price movements that are warranted by underlying fundamentals and those that are not (expectations driven, etc.)（很难区分资产价格的变动是否有基本面的相应变动作支撑（预期引起的价格变动，等等）
Equity price could fall because lower expected future earnings (., lower productivity growth or higher expected taxes) or a change in equity risk premium（股票价格可能会因预期未来盈利下降（如，更低的劳动生产率增长率和更高的预期税收）或对风险补偿的要求变化而下跌）
Arguments in favor of reacting directly to asset prices: （赞成调整资产价格观点）
Asset prices contain information about future inflation that can be incorporated into inflation forecasts （资产价格包含通号膨胀率预期方面的信息，这些信息在通货膨胀率预测中可以体现）
Asset price inflation is usually correlated with other forms of financial imbalances--particularly with credit booms and the rapid build up of unsustainable levels of debt.（ 资产价格暴涨通常和其他形式的金融不平衡相关——特别是信贷扩张和债务水平迅速、不可持续的增长。）
4. Excessive Public Sector involvement and Political pressures （公共部门过度干预和政治压力）
Loan decisions of public banks more likely to be subject to political considerations（国有银行的贷款决策更有可能受到政治因素的影响）
Government influence on credit allocation (price and quantities) of private banks(政府会对私有银行的信贷分配（价格和数量）施加影响）
Regulation preventing banks from engaging in profitable banking activities（ 一些监管规定阻碍银行从事有利可图的银行业务）
4. Excessive Public Sector involvement and Political pressures （公共部门过度干预和政治压力）
Interest rate caps and high reserve requirements
利率上限和高水平的准备金要求
Government forcing banks—public and private—to finance the budget and to hold government paper at below market rates, or over and above competitive and credit risk considerations
政府迫使银行（无论是国有银行还是私有银行）为预算融资，并以不合理的条件持有政府债券（如低于市场收益率，高于或超出具有竞争力的价格范围或信贷风险承受能力）
5. Increasing currency and maturity mismatches （货币和期限错配加大）
Advances in technology and financial liberalization facilitate the rapid transformation of currency composition of bank deposits（技术进步和金融自由化便利了银行存款币种结构的迅速转化）
High domestic interest rates increases incentives to denominate debt in foreign currency（国内利率水平高增加了使用外币为债务计价的动机）
5. Increasing currency and maturity mismatches (cont’d)（货币和期限错配加大（续））
Maturity mismatches increase with the limitation of access to longer term financing（由于存在获取长期融资的各种限制，期限错配不断扩大）
Limitations to hedging operations – In emerging markets there are less opportunities to increase liquidity and spread risks on the asset side of the banks.（保值操作受限——在新兴市场，银行较少有机会让对资产进行以提高流动性和分散风险为目的的保值操作）
Central Banks should implement prudential measures that limit the scale of short run foreign currency denominated borrowing (by banks and customers)
（中央银行需要使用谨慎的举措来限制（银行和消费者）短期外币借款的规模吗？）
Adopt and Enforce Regulations that Promote deeper longer-term credit markets（制定并执行监管措施，以增加长期信贷市场的市场深度）
In general, higher foreign exchange reserves reduce vulnerabilities. Increasing reserves in time of crisis is conducive to increase confidence – (Cooperative agreements between Central Banks) （一般来说，外汇储备水平越高，越有助于降低脆弱性。在危机爆发期间增加储备水平有助于增强信心——（中央银行间的合作协议））
6. Legal and Prudential Weaknesses
法律和审慎框架的弱点
6. Legal and Prudential Weaknesses
（法律和审慎框架的弱点）
Regulatory Forbearance before and during a crises （在危机发生之前和发生时，监管上的克制行为）
Consolidated Supervision and the Location of Banking Supervision（合并监管和银行业监管的地点）
7. Wrong Incentives to Bankers and Depositors
（为银行家和存款人提供错误的激励）
Lack of proper incentives to encourage market discipline and to discourage excessive risk taking（缺乏适当的激励措施，以鼓励（市场参与者）遵守市场纪律，阻止（市场参与者）过度承担风险）
Who bears the cost of restructuring（谁承担重组的成本）
Schemes that reduce the exposure of depositors to specific bank risk （降低存款人受具体银行风险的影响的计划）
7. Wrong Incentives to Bankers and Depositors—Policy Issues
（为银行家和存款人提供错误的激励——政策问题）
Implicit and Explicit Provision of Deposit Insurance （隐性和显性的存款保险机制）
Ex-ante vs. Ex-post Deposit Compensations（事前/事后存款补偿）
Should banks be closed during a crisis?（是否应在危机期间关闭银行？）
