Chapter 10
Corporate Governance
Michael A. Hitt
R. Duane Ireland
Robert E. Hoskisson
©2000 South-Western College Publishing
Competitiveness
Chapter 3
Internal
Environment
Chapter 2
External
Environment
The Strategic
Management
Process
Strategic Intent
Strategic Mission
Strategic
Competitiveness
Above Average
Returns
Feedback
Strategy Formulation
Chapter 4
Business-Level
Strategy
Chapter 5
Competitive
Dynamics
Chapter 6
Corporate-Level
Strategy
Chapter 8
International
Strategy
Chapter 9
Cooperative
Strategies
Chapter 7
Acquisitions &
Restructuring
Strategic
Inputs
Strategic
Actions
Strategic
Outcomes
Chapter 10
Corporate
Governance
Chapter 11
Structure
& Control
Chapter 12
Strategic
Leadership
Chapter 13
Entrepreneurship
& Innovation
Used in corporations to establish order between the firm’s owners and its top-level managers
Corporate Governance is a relationship among stakeholders that is used to determine and control the strategic direction and performance of organizations
Concerned with identifying ways to ensure that strategic decisions are made effectively
Corporate Governance
Separation of Ownership and Managerial Control
Basis of the modern corporation
Shareholders purchase stock, becoming Residual Claimants
Professional managers contract to provide decision-making
Modern public corporation form leads to efficient specialization of tasks
- Shareholders reduce risk efficiently by holding
diversified portfolios
- Risk bearing by shareholders
- Strategy development and decision-making by
managers
An agency relationship exists when:
Shareholders
(Principals)
Firm Owners
Managers
(Agents)
Decision
Makers
which creates
Agency Relationship
Risk Bearing Specialist
(Principal)
Managerial Decision-Making Specialist
(Agent)
Hire
Agency Theory
The Agency problem occurs when:
- The desires or goals of the principal and agent conflict
and it is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify that the agent has behaved appropriately
Solution: Principals engage in incentive-based performance contracts, monitoring mechanisms such as the board of directors and enforcement mechanisms such as the managerial labor market to mitigate the agency problem
Example: Overdiversification because increased product diversification leads to lower employment risk for managers and greater compensation
Agency Theory
Risk
Level of Diversification
Manager and Shareholder Risk and Diversification
Dominant
Business
Unrelated
Businesses
Related
Constrained
Related
Linked
A
B
Managerial
(Employment) Risk Profile
M
Shareholder (Business) Risk Profile
S
Example: Boards of Directors have a fiduciary duty to shareholders to monitor management
Agency Theory
Principals may engage in monitoring behavior to assess the activities and decisions of managers
However, Boards of Directors are often accused of
being lax in performing this function
However, dispersed shareholding makes it difficult and and inefficient to monitor management’s behavior
Governance Mechanisms
Ownership Concentration
Boards of Directors
Executive Compensation
Multidivisional Organizational Structure
Market for Corporate Control
Governance Mechanisms
Ownership Concentration
Large block shareholders have a strong incentive to monitor management closely
Their large stakes make it worth their while to spend time, effort and expense to monitor closely
They may also obtain Board seats which enhances their ability to monitor effectively (although financial institutions are legally forbidden from directly holding board seats)
Governance Mechanisms
Board of Directors
Insiders
The firm’s CEO and other top-level managers
Related Outsiders
Individuals not involved with day-to-day operations, but who have a relationship with the company
Outsiders
Individuals who are independent of the firm’s day-to-day operations and other relationships
Recommendations for more effective Board Governance:
Governance Mechanisms
Board of Directors
Increase diversity of board members backgrounds
Strengthen internal management and accounting control systems
Establish formal processes for evaluation of the board’s performance
Governance Mechanisms
Executive Compensation
Salary, Bonuses, Long term incentive compensation
Executive decisions are complex and non-routine
Many factors intervene making it difficult to establish how managerial decisions are directly responsible for outcomes
In addition, stock ownership (long-term incentive compensation) makes managers more susceptible to market changes which are partially beyond their control
Incentive systems do not guarantee that managers make the “right” decisions, but they do increase the likelihood that managers will do the things for which they are rewarded
Governance Mechanisms
Multidivisional Organizational Structure
Designed to control managerial opportunism
M-form structure does not necessarily limit corporate-level managers’ self-serving actions
Broadly diversified product lines makes it difficult for
top-level managers to evaluate the strategic decisions
of divisional managers
Corporate office and Board monitor managers’ strategic decisions
Increased managerial interest in wealth maximization
May lead to greater rather than less diversification
Governance Mechanisms
Market for Corporate Control
Operates when firms face the risk of takeover when they are operated inefficiently
Acts as an important source of discipline over managerial incompetence and waste
Changes in regulations have made hostile takeovers difficult
Many firms began to operate more efficiently as a result of the “threat” of takeover, even though the actual incidence of hostile takeovers was relatively small
The 1980s saw active market for corporate control, largely as a result of available pools of capital (junk bonds)
Germany
International Corporate Governance
Vorstand monitors and controls managerial decisions
Aufsichtsrat selects the Vorstand
Employees, union members and shareholders appoint members to the Aufsichtsrat
Owner and manager are often the same in private firms
Public firms often have a dominant shareholder too, frequently a bank
Medium to large firms have a two-tiered board
Frequently there is less emphasis on shareholder value than in . firms, although this may be changing
Japan
International Corporate Governance
Obligation, “family” and consensus are important factors
Banks (especially “main bank”) are highly influential with firm’s managers
Keiretsus are strongly interrelated groups of firms tied together by cross-shareholdings
Other characteristics:
Powerful government intervention
Close relationships between firms and government sectors
Passive and stable shareholders who exert little control
Virtual absence of external market for corporate control
Corporate Governance and Ethical Behavior
It is important to serve the interests of multiple stakeholder groups
Shareholders are one important stakeholder group, which are served by the Board of Directors
Product market stakeholders (customers, suppliers and host communities) and organizational stakeholders (managerial and non-managerial employees) are also important stakeholder groups
Although controversial, some believe that ethically responsible firms should introduce governance mechanisms which serve all stakeholders’ interests
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