原文：
Is Europe Becoming the Most Dynamic
Knowledge Economy in the World?
Abstract
The article discusses the condition and perspective of the European Union in the
knowledge economy and the feasibility of the goal given by the European Council at
the summits held in Lisbon (March 2000) and Barcelona (March 2002),that is, to
increase European R&D expenditure to 3 per cent of GDP by article focuses
on two aspects: comparative performance with its direct counterparts, in particular the
USA; and intra-European distribution of resources and capabilities. A set of
technological indicators is presented to show that Europe is still consistently behind
when compared to Japan and the US, especially in R&D investment and the
generation of innovations. A small convergence occurs in the diffusion of information
and communication technologies (ICTs),the sector most directly linked to the concept
of the ‘new economy’. In the field of knowledge collaboration, Europe takes opposing
paths in the business and academic worlds. Within Europe, the level of investment in
scientific and technological activities is so diverse across countries that it does not
merge into a single continental innovation system.
Introduction
At the Lisbon summit in March 2000, the European Council declared its
intention of making the European research area (ERA) the greatest knowledge
economy in the world. At the Barcelona summit in March 2002 it was stated that
Europe should reach a ratio of R&D to GDP equal to 3 per cent by realistic
are these targets? And, how is Europe doing in the technological race five years after
the first announcement of these goals?
The aim of this article is to present some evidence on the dynamics of
technological change in Europe, compared to the performance of its direct
competitors, the United States and Japan. It is often argued that a new cluster of
innovations, information and communication technologies (ICTs),and associated
productivity growth is leading us into a ‘new economy’ that will deliver an expansion
of employment and improved standards of living (for an overview, see Temple,
2002).On the basis of the impressive performance of the US economy in the 1990s,it
has often been suggested that wealthy nations will rely on their ability to adjust to
these transformations, and that those countries not able to adjust will be marginalized
and will lose the competitive race. The accompanying prediction indicates that Europe
will have slower long-term economic growth than the US because of its insufficient
adjustment to the rules of the ‘new economy’ (Soete, 2001; Daveri, 2002).In other
words, if the old continent continues to lag behind the US and Japan in technological
dynamism,this ould jeopardize the achievement of the ‘European dream’ in domains
such as welfare, public education and health care (see Rifkin, 2004);hence the need to
upgrade the European knowledge base in the most aggressive way. The idea that there
is a ‘new’ economy is certainly fascinating, and it is hardly surprising that it has been
so prominent in the business world, the political community and the press. John
Maynard Keynes knew very well that expectations play a fundamental role in
fostering the business cycle, and the hope that something as intriguing as a ‘new’
economy could be with us has helped some corporations to support their stock market
prices, some politicians to be elected or re-elected, and the media to increase their
sales. The academic community is not immune from these tendencies, although its
function should be to take ideas that have spread too quickly with a pinch of salt, and
it is no surprise that a good share of the optimism vanished with the stock market
recession that began in September dose of scepticism does not imply sharing
the belief that there is nothing new under the sun: now and then something new does
occur in economic and social life. Major changes have taken place in the last decade
and some key components can be singled out, in particular:
exploitation of knowledge has become more and more systematic, with an
increasing propensity by business companies to exploit knowhow in the search for
profit and growth opportunities
transfer across space of commodities, financial resources, expertise and
information has become much easier; while technical feasibility has increased
exponentially, economic costs have been dramatically reduced
number of players able to enter both old and new fields has also increased,
leading to an accelerated pace of economic competition.
Section I presents a broad set of data describing the technological status of
Europe, with regard to both investments – by means of expenditure on R&D– and to
performance in innovative activities – by means of other technological indicators. We
compare the EU-15 and the EU-25 with North America and Japan, and we highlight
recent changes. Particular attention is devoted to ICTs, since this sector is more
strictly linked to the concept of the ‘new economy’, and it represents the main
infrastructure of the knowledge society. Section II analyses the phenomenon of
scientific and technological collaboration since it is assumed, on the one hand, that it
reveals much about the ‘attractiveness’ of various regions of the world and, on the
other hand, that it is a key policy asset in the design of an EU strategy. Finally, in the
last section, we discuss the strategies Europe is using to achieve a more prominent
role in the globalizing learning economy.
I. What is the News about the European Technology Gap?
R&D and Patents
The concern about an increasing technological gap is certainly not new: as early
as the 1960s we heard about ‘the American challenge’ (Servan-Schreiber,1968), and
similar concerns were reiterated in the 1980s and in the 1990s (see,., Patel and
Pavitt, 1987; Archibugi and Pianta, 1992). Europe is not the only region concerned
about its technological worries were echoed in America
(Kennedy,1988;Pianta,1988;Nelson,1989) and we would doubtless find comparable
statements in the Far East as well. But saying that one’s neighbour’s grass is always
greener does not mean that one can dismiss the issue of poor performance by the
European economy in key aspects of knowledge-based production
A similar pattern emerges in terms of business R&D (BERD) as a percentage of
the domestic product of industry (DPI), reported in the right-hand columns of Table 2.
In this case, the difference between the first and the last EU-25 country is even higher:
Sweden has a BERD intensity 25 times higher than Poland. Some contrasting
tendencies also emerge: industrial R&D has decreased in eastern European countries
such as Poland and Slovakia, while it has increased in almost all western European
countries. As a consequence,the coefficient of variation has increased for the EU-15
and, even more, for the EU-25.
Table 2 reports data about R&D regards gross R&D
expenditure(GERD) as a percentage of GDP, the EU-25 intensity is equal to per
cent,substantially lower than the US ( per cent) and Japan ( per cent). In the
second half of the 1990s Japanese R&D intensity grew more than in the US, while the
intensity of the EU-15 grew very little. Within the EU-25, there emerges a clear
divide between, amongst other things, north and south. The country with the highest
level, Sweden, has an R&D intensity that is eight times higher than the country with
the lowest, Latvia. Equally widespread gaps persist in the EU-15. The coefficient of
variations has held steady, indicating that there has been no overall convergence.
GERD GERD Mean Annual BERD BERD Mean
Annual
(%of GDP) (%of GDP) Rate of Growth (% of GDP) (% of GDP) Rate of
Growth
In2001-02 in1996-07 96-97to01-02 in2002 in1988(%) 98to02
USA
Japan
EU-15
EU-25
Austnia
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Irland
Italy
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
UK
Czech Rep
Estomia
Hungary
Latvia
Lithuania
Poland
SlovakRep
Slovenia
Canada
Norway
Switzedand
EU-15
var.
Max/min
EU-25
var.
Max/min
Table 3 shows the patents granted in the USA and applied for in Europe per
million people. Overall, the data show a remarkable increase in the number of patents
at both patent offices as a consequence of the increasing competitiveness over
intellectual property rights (see Andersen, 2004). For patents granted at the US Patent
Trademark Office (USPTO),the high ratio reflects the fact that inventors and firms are
patenting in their own domestic market but,for Japan and European countries,it is
reasonable to assume that they have a comparable propensity to patent in the US,since
for both of them the US is an economically crucial emerges that Japan has a
ratio more than four times higher than the EU-25 even the European
countries with the highest propensity to patent, Switzerland and Sweden, have the
same intensity as Japan. Many European countries,in both the east and the
south,report no or negligible patent activity in the dispersion within the EU is
extraordinarily high. It is difficult to find other aspects of economic and social life
where the distance between the top and the bottom European countries is so wide (on
regional variations in the European systems of innovations, see Chesnais et al., 2000;
Cantwell and Iammarino, 2001).
Patents granted in the US are complemented by patent applications at the
European Patent Office (EPO).Even in the European market, Japan has a patent
propensity above the average of the members of the EU (respectively,135 and 114
patents per million people),and the US is also close to the EU average (107 patents
per million people). The higher growth rates in patent applications at the EPO for both
the EU-15 and the EU-25 show that the construction of the European market is
underway,but with remarkable regional variations. Eastern and southern countries do
not yet seem to participate in the generation of commercially exploitable
is hardly surprising in the light of the very low business R&D
southern countries such as Spain, Portugal and Greece,business R&D
seems to be limited mostly to imitation and learning.
First,the evidence has allowed us to quantify how Europe is lagging behind the
other two major areas, in both investment and performance in technology. In total
R&D investment,the gap between Europe and Japan is even increasing,and that with
the US is not is a particularly worrying signal since R&D is one of the
main inputs for the generation of knowledge and therefore an engine of long-term
economic and social growth.
Second,the gap is more evident in business-related indicators than in publicly
funded indicators of technological activities,such as business R&D and
patents,provide weak signs of catching scientific publications Europe is
reducing the gap with the indicators on human resources (Commission,
2003) confirm the impression of potentially good intellectual capital in the EU that
does not translate into more researchers in the workforce,especially in the industrial
sector.
Third,there are huge differences between European countries. In almost all the
indicators taken into account, a group of small and medium-sized countries,such as
Switzerland,Sweden,Norway,Finland,the Netherlands and Denmark,show
performance that is on a par with or even higher than the US and Japan. Switzerland
and Norway are not members of the EU,and the others are rather small to be able to
raise the EU average.
Fourth,it is evident that the integration of ten new member countries(plus the
former East Germany) has just begun and that these countries are at a very different
overall technological level from the EU-15 countries such as Slovenia,
the Czech Republic, Estonia and Hungary are on a par with and sometimes even
above southern European countries such as Italy,Spain,Portugal and Greece,but the
overall European area at the periphery of scientific and technological advance, limited
until now to southern Europe and Ireland,has now become larger. Growth rates in the
ten new countries have,on average, been slightly higher than the EU-15 but,overall,the
low-tech area of the EU has considerably increased.
This article’s next area of investigation is the ICT sector, the most closely
associated with the new economy (Daveri, 2002).Here Europe, despite originally
lagging behind the US and Japan (see Gambardella and Malerba,1999;Fagerberg et
al.,1999;Vivarelli and Pianta,2000),is slowly catching up. Table 5 shows that the US
and Japan, respectively, invest per cent and per cent of their GDP in ICT while
the EU-25 invests per cent, but in the second half of the 1990s the EU-25
continued to grow at an annual rate of per cent, higher than Japan ( per cent)
and in the opposite direction from the US, which experienced a decline (– per
cent).Within the EU,a mild but significant convergence has occurred between the 15
and the 25 countries. The eastern European countries for which data are available
show an even greater growth , the EU-25’s dispersion has been
substantially reduced.
Mean Annual Mean Annual Mean Annual Mean Annual Mean Annual Mean
Annual
Granted Patents Granted Patents Rate of Growth Applied Patents Applied Patents Rate of Growth
at USPTO at USPTO 96-97to00-01(% at EPO per m at EPO per m 96–97
per p ople(02-03) per p ople(02-03) people 2002–03 people 1997–98 00–01(%)
USA 301 260 107 80
Japan 277 214 135 106
EU-15 71 54 136 96
EU-25 59 45 114 80
Austnia 70 48 120 88
Belgium 65 59 131 94
Denmark 89 68 153 105
Finland 161 102 297 155
France 66 57 120 92
Germany 138 98 265 183
Greece 2 1 5 3
Irland 38 20 65 41
Italy 30 25 61 46
Luxembourg 81 49 350 239
Netherlands 84 65 356 217
Portugal 1 1 3 2
Spain 7 5 16 10
Sweden 179 118 287 181
UK 63 52 81 68
Cyprus 1 1 29 17
Czech rep 4 1 5 2
Estonia 3 0 3 2
Hungary 6 4 6 3
Latvia 1 0 0 0
Malta 5 3 28 8
Poland 0 0 1 0
SlovakRep 1 0 2 1
Slovenia 9 6 19 10
Canada 109 77 42 21
Norway 55 32 70 46
Switzedand 183 155 504 352
EU-15
var.
Max/min
EU-25
var.
Max/min
If we consider the composition of the ICT sector, while the 1980s saw the
dramatic rise of Japan and other East Asian economies in hardware technologies(for
an overview, see Freeman,1987;Mathews,2000), in the 1990s the US managed to
recover its traditional economic leadership in knowledge-intensive industries by
exploiting and disseminating ICT in the service sector. Within the triad, Japan and the
other East Asian economies continue to have a prominent position in the generation of
the ‘hardware’ component, while the US has a dominant position in the ‘software’
field. Europe has neither. It should, however, be noted that Europe has recently
increased expenditure in the software area, following a general trend towards
so-called ‘weightlessness’, that is, the increase of the share of soft components in ICT
(Daveri,2002;European Informative Telecommunications Observatory,2001).
II. International Technological and Scientific Collaboration
European policy-makers should be concerned by the strong propensity of
European firms for American, rather than European, partnerships. It is not necessarily
a bad thing that European firms have agreements with American firms, but it is
certainly worrying that there are so few intra-European agreements. Policies carried
out at the European level, especially at the European Commission level, to foster
co-operation in R&D and innovation on the continent, have not been able to push for
the greater cohesion of European industry (Narula, 1999).The first possible
explanation would be that the total amount of resources devoted to science and
technology is much greater in US firms and that,obviously, firms engage in
technology alliances with partners who have adequate expertise. The greater flow of
alliances in the US would therefore simply be the outcome of the amount of
investment in knowledge by US companies. In order to control for this factor, we
divided the number of European alliances undertaken by the total amount of,
respectively, European, US and Japanese business enterprises’ R&D expenditure
(BERD).This provides an indicator of the propensity of European companies towards
collaboration in each of these regions. The results are reported in Table 8.
Propensity of European Firms for European, US and Japanese Technological Partners
No. of Agreements Involving European Firms by BERD of the Region (in US$ bn at Constant $
PPP)
Period Europe USA Japan
80-82
89-91
98-00
Propensity of US Firms for European, US and Japanese Technological Partners
No. of Agreements Involving US Firms by BERD of the Region (in US$ bn at Constant Dollars
PPP)
Period Europe USA Japan
80-82
89-91
98-00
Although the attractiveness of the US economy proves to be a bit smaller in
relative terms, European companies’ greater propensity for American partnerships is
confirmed. There are European–US partnerships for each billion $US BERD,
while the equivalent figure for intra-European partnerships is just . Moreover, the
European business community has considerably changed its propensity for partnership
over the last ten years: in the 1980–82 and 1989–91 periods, European companies had
a larger propensity for European than American partners. The figures were,
respectively, and agreements for each billion $US BERD in 1980–82, and
and in 1989– lower part of Table 8 reports the propensity of
American companies to undertake alliances. US companies are now keener to embark
on joint ventures with European partners, and this is a result of the overall increase of
their engagement in collaborations, but internal partnerships continue to be relevant. If
the new economy is represented – among other things – by strategic technology
partnerships, the evidence suggests that this strongly leans towards the US rather than
towards Europe or Japan.
We therefore note an inverse tendency: the European business community has an
increasing propensity for technological alliances with US firms, while the European
academic community has an increasing propensity for intra- European partnership.
One of the main policies used by the European Commission in the last decade,
through the instrument of the framework programmes, has been to promote
collaborations between European institutions and firms. The data reported suggest that
these policies have been much more successful in creating a European research area
(ERA) in academia than in business. The limited resources the European Commission
disposes of (about €4 billion a year in the last approved sixth framework programme)
have not been enough to meet the needs of European industry, while they have proved
to be more effective as regards training and the promotion of researchers’ mobility.
There is a third important form of collaboration, which is between enterprises on one
side, and universities on the other. The advantage of this kind of co-operation is that it
allows a quick conversion of scientific knowledge into commercial applications with a
direct and immediate economic return. One way to measure it is by looking at the
share of university R&D financed by industry. The EU shows a little progress, but it
still lags behind the US and Japan in the overall resources for financing R&D
expenditure of universities (Commission, 2003;Garcia-Fontes and Geuna,1999).
III. A Single Europe for Science and Technology?
In addressing a European strategy for innovation, it should be remembered that
the continent has vast regional disparities, and that they are much wider in terms of
scientific and technological competencies than in other aspects of economic life such
as income, production or consumption. In the last 15 years, Europe underwent major
political changes that also affected its science and technology capabilities. Germany,
which for a long time was the technological engine of Europe, has had to face a major
regional problem: the integration of the east. The UK, heart of many centres of
scientific excellence and the European country with the highest number of Nobel
laureates, has underfunded its universities for over 20 The 1995 enlargement
integrated into the EU three small and highly dynamic countries, Sweden, Finland and
Austria, but the 2004 enlargement brought ten countries with no such sophisticated
dowry of scientific and technological infrastructures. The scientific community in
eastern Europe suffered hardship for many years, and the transition to capitalist
economies has been particularly tough, given the academic competencies developed
during the socialist ,EU-25 has a larger population and an expanded
market, but more vulnerable scientific and technological capabilities and a reduced
R&D intensity. The peripheral areas, once confined to southern Italy, Spain, Portugal
and Greece, have now been extended to the east.
We have seen that in Lisbon, European governments committed themselves to
transforming Europe into the most competitive and dynamic knowledge based
economy in the world, and that in Barcelona they set a more ambitious target of
raising R&D expenditure up to 3 per cent of GDP by the same time, the
business sector has been asked to contribute most of this effort which, by 2010,should
finance two-thirds of the total R&D expenditure(while in 2002 business-financed
R&D in the EU-25 was just per cent, see OECD, 2004).
It is self-evident that there is considerable divergence between the announcement
of the political target and the instruments made available. Too little commitment has
been made to reach such an ambitious target, and it is strange that governments
(which have direct control of public expenditure)put the largest burden on to the
business community. The aim of 3 per cent in the R&D/GDP ratio, moreover, appears
very difficult to achieve without a major commitment on the part of all the main
economic players (national governments, the European business community and EU
institutions).For example, it implies an increase in research personnel of the
magnitude of about 100,000 people a year, which seems difficult to realize within the
current EU qualified workforce (Schibany and Streicher, 2003).The Kok Report
(2004)has recently attempted a much-needed assessment of the targets set in Lisbon
and Barcelona. The report, on the basis of the recent evolution of the world economy,
has urged national governments to increase their commitments, but there has been a
significant shift: fulfilling the Lisbon and Barcelona targets are now seen as
‘desirable’ rather than ‘achievable’.
Each country makes its own attempt to upgrade its scientific and technological
potential, and certainly the achievements of any one are more likely to generate
externalities that can be beneficial for the whole European Union. The evidence
reported in this article clearly indicates that a small club of European countries has a
scientific and technological intensity on a par with, and often superior to, that of the
US. The Scandinavian countries have followed a distinctive approach to
competence-building based on: firstly, a highly competent and qualified labour force,
generated through massive investments in education and training; secondly, a
specialization in high-tech industries, through R&D investments in ICT,
biotechnology and electronics; and, thirdly, close collaboration between the business
sector on the one hand, and government and the academia on the other (Commission,
2003).This model should inspire European policy-making much more than the
American one, which is based on firms competing for market share and public
procurement, and R&D public investment concentrated in national priorities such as
defence and space.
There is also much to learn from the policies of individual nations. A small
country like Ireland is managing to improve its technological potential by making the
country attractive for multinational corporations, and is slowly moving out of the
group of R&D-laggard countries. This is not the first time that European governments
have preferred to follow an autonomous route in catching up, and when this has
happened the EU as a whole has received indirect benefits. European nations are so
linked to each other that science and technology outcomes and policies are bound to a
common European faith.
It is evident that successful management of the learning economy will require a
much higher political commitment that should be comparable to the efforts European
governments have devoted to creating a single currency. Lundvall (2001) has
suggested establishing a ‘European High Level Council on Innovation and
Competence Building’ chaired by the President of the EU and with at least as much
political weight as the European Central Bank. This will be a clear sign in Europe that
there is a political commitment to becoming‘ the most competitive and dynamic
knowledge-based economy in the world’ in a decade. But words without facts will
only allow us to observe at the end of the decade that the aim of R&D at 3 per cent of
GDP has not been reached and that the European technology gap has further
increased.
Source: Daniele, Alberto Coco,2005.“Is Europe Becoming the Most Dynamic
Knowledge Economy in the World?” .JCMS. –459.
译文：
欧洲是全球最具活力的知识经济的地区吗？
摘要
本文讨论了欧洲联盟的条件和观点在知识经济和由欧洲理事会定在里斯本
（2000 年 3 月）和巴塞罗那（2002 年 3 月）举行的首脑会议的目标，就是为了
增加欧洲研发的可行性支出占 GDP 的比例。文章着重于两个方面：比较优势与
它的直接对口，尤其是美国和欧洲内部资源和能力的分配。相比于日本和美国的
技术，欧洲仍是一贯落后相比于日本和美国，尤其是在 R＆D 投资和创新的一代。
一个小收敛在信息和通信技术的扩散（ICT）的发生，该部门最直接关系到'新经
济'的概念。在知识领域的合作，以反对欧洲商界，学术界世界的路径。在欧洲，
在科学和技术活动的投资水平是如此不同国家，它不合并成一个单一的大陆创新
体系多元化。
简介
在 2000 年 3 月里斯本首脑会议上，欧洲委员会宣布它使欧洲研究领域（ERA）
的世界上最大的知识型经济的意图。 2002 年 3 月在巴塞罗那首脑会议上有人说，
欧洲应该达到的 R＆D 占 GDP 的比例相当于百分之 3201 现实是这些目标如何？
而且，如何做是欧洲在技术比赛五年后，这些目标的第一次公告之？
本文的目的是提出关于在欧洲技术变革的动力一些证据，而其，美国和日本
的直接竞争对手的表现。人们常常认为，一系列的创新，信息和通信技术（ICT）
的新的集群，以及相关的生产率增长是导致成'新经济'，将提供一个扩大就业和
提高生活水平。论在 20 世纪 90 年代美国经济的出色表现的基础上，经常有人提
出，富裕国家将依靠自己的能力，以适应这些转变，这些国家无法及时调整将被
边缘化，就会丧失竞争力比赛。随附的预测表明，欧洲将有缓慢的长期比美国经
济增长，因为它没有足够调整的'新经济'的规则。换句话说，如果旧大陆继续落
后于美国和日本在技术活力滞后，这可能危及欧洲梦'，如福利，公共教育和医
疗保健领域的成就（见里夫金，2004）;因此，需要升级的最积极的方式在欧洲
的知识基础上。
这个想法，有一个'新'经济肯定是迷人的，这是不足为奇的，它一直所在世
界著名的商业，政治社会和新闻界。约翰梅纳德凯恩斯清楚地知道，期望发挥在
促进经济周期的基础性作用，并希望以有趣的东西作为一个'新'经济可能会和我
们一起，帮助一些公司来支持其股票的市场价格，一些政客要当选或连任，媒体
增加销售，学术界是不是从这些倾向免疫，尽管它的功能应该是采取有蔓延或者
一小撮盐太快的想法，这是毫不奇怪的是，这是毫不奇怪的是，随着股市的衰退，
在 2000 年 9 月开始消失了乐观好的共享。剂量的怀疑并不意味着共享的信念，
没有什么新的阳光下。现在，然后一些新的东西确实发生在经济和社会生活。了
了重大变化，在过去十年中发生了一些关键部件可以被挑选出来，特别是：
1、知识的开发已成为越来越多的系统，通过与商业公司越来越倾向利用在
利润和增长机会搜索专有技术
2、横跨商品，资金，专业知识和信息，大大方便了空间转移，而技术可行
性已成倍增加，经济成本已大大降低。
3、玩家能够进入新的和旧的若干领域也有所增加，从而导致经济竞争的步
伐加快。
第一节介绍了描述欧洲广泛的技术状态数据集，这两个方面的投资 - 通过
对 R＆D 支出的手段，并在创新活动中的表现 - 通过其它技术指标的手段。我
们比较了欧盟 15 国和欧盟与北美，日本。我们强调最近的变化。特别注意的重
点是信息通信技术，因为这个部门是更严格地联系在一起的'新经济'的概念，它
代表了知识社会的主要基础设施。第二节分析了科学和技术合作的现象，因为它
是假设，一方面，它揭示了很多关于吸引世界各地区，另一方面，它是一个重要
的政策资产欧盟的战略设计。最后，在最后一节，我们将讨论欧洲的战略是使用
以实现在经济全球化的学习更突出的作用。
欧洲技术差距的新闻是什么？
研发和专利
关于技术差距日益关注的当然不是最新的：早在 20 世纪 60 年代，我们听到
的关于'美国的挑战'（塞尔-施赖贝尔，1968），和类似的问题在 80 年代和 90 年
代重申（见，例如，帕特尔和帕维特，1987；Archibugi 和皮安塔，1992）。欧洲
并不是唯一地区有关其技术性的关注。在美国也提出了类似的忧虑（肯尼迪，1988;
皮安塔，1988 年，纳尔逊，1989），我们无疑将在远东地区发现以及类似的声明。
但他说，一个人的邻居的喜新厌旧并不意味着一个人可以回绝欧洲经济在知识为
基础的生产的关键方面的表现欠佳的问题。
一个类似的模式在企业 R＆D（企业研发开支）方面作为国内工业产品（DPI）
的比例出现，报告表 1 的右侧列。在这种情况下，第一个和最后一个欧盟 25 国
不同的是，甚至更高：瑞典有企业研发开支比波兰强度高 25 倍。有些对比的倾
向也出现：产业研发有所减少，如波兰和斯洛伐克东欧国家，而它在几乎所有西
欧国家有所增加。因此，变异系数，增加了欧盟 15 国和，甚至以上，而欧盟 25
国。
表 1 报告有关的 R＆D 强度的数据。至于本地生产总值的百分比总 R＆D 支
出（GERD）的，欧盟 25 国强度相当于百分之 ，大大低于美国（占百分之
）和日本（百分之 ）。在 20 世纪 90 年代日本的 R＆D 强度下半年的增
长比在美国更多，而欧盟 15 国的强度增长不大。在欧盟 25 国，现在又出现一个
明显的鸿沟之间，除其他外，北部和南部。具有最高水平，瑞典，国家的 R＆D
强度是八倍比最低，拉脱维亚国家都高。同样广泛存在的差距在欧盟 15 国。系
数的变化保持稳定，这表明有没有全局收敛。
表 1：
研发开支 研发开支 年平均 研发支出 研发支出 年平均
年
(%of GDP) (%of GDP) Rate of Growth (% of GDP) (% of GDP) Rate of
生长
2001-02 1996-07 96-97到01-02 2002 1988(%) 98到02
美国
日本
欧盟 15 国
欧盟 25 国
澳大利亚
比利时
丹麦
芬兰
法国
德国
希腊
爱尔兰
意大利
荷兰
葡萄牙
西班牙
瑞典
英国
捷克
匈牙利
拉脱维亚
立陶宛
波兰
斯洛文尼亚
加拿大
挪威
EU-15
分险
最大最小
EU-25
分险
最大最小
表 2 显示授予在美国和欧洲为每百万人申请专利。总的来说，数据显示，在
两个专利局的专利数量作为提高竞争力的结果显着增加了知识产权权利（见安德
森，2004）。对于在美国专利商标局（USPTO）授予的专利，高比例反映一个事
实，即专利发明人和企业都在自己的国内市场，但日本和欧洲国家，它是合理的
假设，他们有一个比较倾向专利在美国，因为对他们两人的美国是一个经济非常
重要的市场。它出现日本拥有率超过四倍欧盟 25 国平均水平。即使是最高的倾
向，欧洲国家专利，瑞士和瑞典，日本有相同的强度。许多欧洲国家，包括东部
和南部，报告没有在美国或微不足道的专利活动。在欧盟内部扩散是非常高的。
这是很难找到的地方经济和社会生活之间的顶部和底部的欧洲国家的距离如此
之广的其他方面。
表二：美国专利商标局和欧洲专利局由国家授予的专利申请的专利
2002–03 and 1997–98
年平均 年平均 年平均 年平均 年平均 年平均
专利权 专利权 生长速率 申请专利 增长率 增长率
美国 301 260 107 80
日本 277 214 135 106
欧盟 15 国 71 54 136 96
欧盟 25 国 59 45 114 80
澳大利亚 70 48 120 88
比利时 65 59 131 94
丹麦 89 68 153 105
芬兰 161 102 297 155
法国 66 57 120 92
德国 138 98 265 183
希腊 2 1 5 3
艾兰 38 20 65 41
意大利 30 25 61 46
卢森堡 81 49 350 239
荷兰 84 65 356 217
葡萄牙 1 1 3 2
西班牙 7 5 16 10
瑞典 179 118 287 181
英国 63 52 81 68
塞浦路斯 1 1 29 17
捷克 4 1 5 2
爱沙尼亚 3 0 3 2
匈牙利 6 4 6 3
拉脱维亚 1 0 0 0
马尔他 5 3 28 8
波兰 0 0 1 0
斯洛文尼亚 9 6 19 10
加拿大 109 77 42 21
挪威 55 32 70 46
EU-15
风险
最大最小
EU-25
分险
最大最小
来源：作者从美国专利和商标局以及欧洲专利局的数据阐述。
在美国获得专利的补充，在欧洲专利局（EPO）的专利申请。即使在欧洲市
场，日本有一个以上的欧盟成员的平均专利倾向（分别为 135 和 114 项专利每百
万人），而美国也接近欧盟平均水平（107 每百万人专利）。本于通过欧洲专利为
欧盟 15 国和欧盟 25 国表明，欧洲市场的建设正在进行中，但有明显的地域差异
较高的增长率。东部和南部国家似乎还没有参加的商业利用的创新产生。这也难
怪在非常低的企业 R＆D 进行光。在诸如西班牙，葡萄牙和希腊，企业 R＆D 南
方国家似乎大多限于模仿和学习。
首先，证据使我们得以量化欧洲如何落后于其他两个主要领域，投资和技术
性能。在总的 R＆D 投资，欧洲与日本的差距更是越来越多，而与美国不会减少。
这是因为研发，尤其令人担忧的信号，是对知识的产生，因此一个长期的经济和
社会发展引擎的主要投入之一。
二，差距更在企业相关指标明显高于公共资助的研究。科技活动，如企业研
发和专利等指标上，提供了迎头赶上弱的迹象。欧洲在科学出版物上是减少与
（委员会，2003 年）证实，欧盟不转化为劳动力多的研究者，特别是在工业部
门，潜在的良好印象，人力资源，智力资本的指标的差距。
第三，欧洲国家之间存在着巨大差异。在几乎所有的指标考虑，小型和中型
国家，如瑞士，瑞典，挪威，芬兰，荷兰和丹麦，显示性能是一个等同于甚至高
于美国和日本要高集团。瑞士和挪威不是欧盟成员国，其他都比较小，能够提高
欧盟的平均水平。
第四，很显然，对 10 个新成员国（加上前东德）的整合刚刚开始，这些国
家正处于一个非常不同的整体，从欧盟等 15 个国家的技术水平，斯洛文尼亚，
捷克共和国，爱沙尼亚和匈牙利有关刑罚与以上，有时甚至如意大利，西班牙，
葡萄牙和希腊的南欧国家甚至整个欧洲地区，但在科学和技术进步的边缘，现在
有限的，直到南欧和爱尔兰，现在已经越来越大。在十个新的国家平均增长率，
已略高于欧盟 15 国，但总体而言，欧盟的低技术含量的面积大大增加。
本文的调查下一个领域是信息和通信技术部门，最密切与新经济（Daveri，
2002 年）有关。在这里，欧洲，尽管最初仅次于美国和日本滞后，正在慢慢赶
上来。表 5 显示，美国和日本，分别占投资占国内生产总值的百分之 和
在信息和通信技术，而欧盟 25 国投资的百分之 ，但在 20 世纪 90 年代欧盟 25
年下半年继续增长为年率百分之 ，高于日本（百分之二点二）和来自美国，
其中经历了下降相反的方向（ 百分之）。在欧盟内部，一个温和，但已发生
显着的收敛之间的 15 和 25 个国家。东部为有数据可查的欧洲国家表现出更大的
增长速度。因此，欧盟 25 国的分散已经大幅减少。
如果我们考虑到信息和通信技术部门组成，而 80 年代的日本和其他东亚经
济体的急剧上升，硬件技术也在革新。在 20 世纪 90 年代，美国成功地恢复其传
统的经济领导在知识密集产业通过利用和传播信息和通信技术服务部门。在黑社
会，日本和其他东亚经济体继续有一个在'硬件'组件一代突出的位置，而美国却
在'软件'领域的主导地位，欧洲却没有。值得注意的是，欧洲最近增加在软件方
面的开支，下面一对所谓的'失重'，也就是在信息和通信技术的软元件。
二、国际技术和科学合作
欧洲政策制定者应该关注的是欧洲公司对美国的强烈倾向，而不是欧洲的伙
伴关系。这未必是坏事，欧洲公司与美国公司有协议，但肯定是令人担忧的是有
这么几个欧洲内部的协议。开展政策在欧洲的水平，尤其是在欧洲委员会一级，
以促进非洲大陆的合作，研发和创新，都没有能够推动欧洲工业更大的凝聚力。
第一个可能的解释，将是专门用于科学和技术资源总量远远更大的美国公司，
而且，很明显，企业与合作伙伴谁拥有足够的专业知识从事技术联盟。该联盟美
国采取更大的流量将因此根本是在知识的由美国公司投资金额的结果。为了控制
这一因素，我们划分了由总金额数分别进行的欧洲联盟，欧洲，美国和日本企
业 R＆D 支出（企业研发开支）。这提供了对欧洲公司在每个地区的合作倾向的
指标。该研究结果发表在表 3
表 3 技术合作伙伴，1980-2000
欧洲企业对欧洲的倾向，美国和日本的技术合作伙伴，涉及本地区企业研发开支由欧洲公司
协议号（以美元购买力平价美元，恒亿$）
时间 欧洲 美国 日本
80-82
89-91
98-00
倾向美国对欧洲公司，美国和日本的技术合作伙伴协议，涉及美国号由该区域企业研发开支
的企业（以美元购买力平价定值美元计）
时期 欧洲 美国 日本
80-82
89-91
98-00
虽然美国经济吸引力被证明是一个相对而言有点小，欧洲公司对美国的伙伴
关系更加倾向被确认。有 欧美每亿美元美国企业研发开支的伙伴关系，而
对欧洲内部的合作伙伴关系等数字仅仅是 。此外，欧洲企业界已大大改变了
过去十年的伙伴关系的倾向：在 1980-1982 年和 1989-1991 年期间，欧洲公司在
欧洲比美国更大的合作伙伴倾向。
这些数字分别为每亿美元美国企业研发开支在 1980-1982 年，在 1989-91 和
和 协议。表 3 告的下一部分的美国公司倾向进行联盟。美国
公司现在更热衷于走上与欧洲伙伴建立合资企业，这是对他们在参与合作的总体
增加，但内部伙伴关系仍然是相关的。如果新经济的代表 - 除其他事情 - 通过
战略技术伙伴关系，有证据表明，这对美国强烈而不是向欧洲和日本倾斜。
因此，我们注意到一个逆趋势：欧洲的商界为美国企业技术联盟与提高的倾
向，而欧洲学术界有一个欧洲内部的合作日益倾向。使用的由欧洲委员会在过去
十年中通过仪器框架方案，主要政策之一是促进欧洲的机构和公司之间的合作。
报告的数据表明，这些政策已在创造更多的业务比欧洲学术界研究领域（ERA）
的成功。在欧洲委员会（约€40 亿元，在去年批准的第六个框架计划年）配置有
限的资源没有得到足够的满足欧洲工业的需要，而他们已被证明是更有效的关于
培训和推广研究人员的流动性。还有第三个重要形式的合作，这是企业之间的一
方，并在其他大学。这种合作的类型的优点是它允许通过直接和即时的经济回报
的科学知识迅速转化为商业应用。其中一个方法来衡量它通过在大学的 R＆D 的
经费份额是看行业。欧盟显示了一点点进步，但仍落后于整体资源仅次于美国和
日本的融资大学研发支出（委员会，2003;加西亚丰特斯和 Geuna，1999）。
三，一个有关科学与技术单一欧洲吗？
在谈到欧洲战略的创新，我们应该记住，这个大陆有广阔的地区差距，他们
是太大的科学和技术能力方面宽度比在经济生活的其他方面，如收入，生产或消
费。在过去的 15 年里，欧洲经历了重大，也影响了它的科学和技术能力的政治
变化。德国，很长一段时间是欧洲的技术引擎，不得不面临着重大的区域性问题：
对东亚一体化。英国，卓越的科学和与诺贝尔奖获得者人数最多的欧洲国家多中
心的心，拥有超过资金不足，1995 年扩大到欧盟的三个小和高活力的国家，瑞
典，芬兰和综合的大学奥地利，但 2004 年扩大带来了没有这样的科学和技术基
础设施先进的嫁妆十个国家。在东欧遭受科学界多年的困难，以及对资本主义经
济的过渡，尤其艰难，因为在社会主义制度发展的学术能力。总体而言，欧盟 25
国有更多的人口和扩展市场，但较脆弱的科学和技术能力，并减少 R＆D 强度。
周边地区一旦被关进意大利南部，西班牙，葡萄牙和希腊，现在已经延伸到东部。
我们已经看到，在里斯本，欧洲各国政府承诺将其转变成最具竞争力和活力
的世界知识经济的欧洲，而在巴塞罗那他们成立一个提高的 R＆D 经费支出占国
内生产总值的百分之三到 2010 年更雄心勃勃的目标。与此同时，工商部门已要
求促进这项工作的，到 2010 年，应资助三分之二的研发总开支（而在 2002 年业
务经费研发在欧盟 25 个最只是百分之 见经合组织，2004）。
这是不言自明，是有关系的政治目标的手段公布及提供相当大的分歧。承诺
太少已达到这样一个雄心勃勃的目标，而且奇怪的是，政府（对公共支出的直接
控制）被列入到商界的最重的负担。在 3 次的研发百分之目的/国内生产总值的
比例，而且，似乎很难做到没有对所有主体（国家政府，欧盟企业界和欧盟机构）
经济主体的一部分重大的承诺。
例如，它意味着在 10 万人左右，每年的研究人员的增加幅度，这似乎难以
实现在当前欧盟的合格劳动力（Schibany 和施特莱歇尔，2003）。该角报告
（2004）最近尝试了在里斯本和巴塞罗那制定的目标非常需要的评估。在对世界
经济发展的基础上最近的报告，敦促各国政府增加其承诺，但出现了重大转变：
实现里斯本和巴塞罗那的目标是现在'理想'而不是'实现'见过。每个国家生产自己
尝试升级其科学和技术潜力，当然任何一个成就更容易产生外部性，可以为整个
欧盟有利。在这篇文章中报道的证据清楚地表明，一个小俱乐部的欧洲国家有一
个标准杆强度与科学和技术，并经常优越，是美国的。斯堪的纳维亚国家采纳，
以能力建设独特的方法为基础：第一，高度称职和合格的劳动力，通过教育和培
训大量的投资产生的;第二，在高新技术产业，通过信息通信技术的研发投资，
专业化，生物技术和电子学以及第三，与一方面工商界，政府和对其他（委员会，
2003 年）学术界的密切合作。这种模式应该激励欧洲政策的决策比美国一个，
这是对公共采购市场份额和竞争公司的更多信息，与 R＆D 的公共投资，如国防
和太空的国家优先事项集中。
还有很多东西要学，从各个国家的政策。像爱尔兰的小国正设法改善使该国
的跨国公司有吸引力的技术潜力，并正在缓慢移动的 R＆D 为落后国家的小组进
行。这不是第一次，欧洲各国政府更愿意遵循自主路线在追赶，当发生这种情况，
欧盟作为一个整体已收到间接的好处。欧洲国家是如此相互联系的科学技术成果
和政策是绑定到一个欧洲共同的信念。
很明显，在学习经济的成功管理需要更高的政治承诺，应与欧洲各国政府致
力于创造一个或者已建议成立一个欧洲高级理事会创新能力建设，会议由欧盟主
席和至少高达欧洲中央银行的政治份量。这将是一个明显的迹象表明，欧洲是有
政治承诺将来在十年来最具竞争力和活力的知识型经济。但是，没有事实的话，
只会使我们能够在本十年末观察到的 R＆D 占 GDP 的比例还没有达到，而欧洲
技术的差距进一步在扩大。
出 处 : 丹 尼 尔 , 阿 尔 贝 托 可 可 ，《 欧 洲 是 全 球 最 具 活 力 的 知 识 经 济 的 地 区
吗？》,(3): 433-459。
