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M I D D L E E A S T I N I T I A T I V E
Beyond Oslo:
Challenges
and Prospects
A Report on a Student Study Group
Analysis of the Israel-Palestine Conflict
Edward Djerejian
Nicolas Pantelick
Middle East Initiative
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Harvard Kennedy School
79 JFK Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
Statements and views expressed in this report are solely those of the author(s) and do not imply
endorsement by Harvard University, Harvard Kennedy School, or the Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs.
The designations employed and the presentation of the material on the maps in this report do not imply
the expression of any opinion whatsoever concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or
area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.
Copyright 2023, President and Fellows of Harvard College
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S P R I N G 2 0 2 3
M I D D L E E A S T I N I T I A T I V E
Beyond Oslo:
Challenges
and Prospects
A Report on a Student Study Group
Analysis of the Israel-Palestine Conflict
Edward Djerejian
Nicolas Pantelick
ii Beyond Oslo: Challenges and Prospects
About the Authors
Ambassador (Ret.) Edward P. Djerejian is a Senior Fellow with the Middle East
Initiative. He joined the . Foreign Service in 1962. His 32-year diplomatic
career spanned eight presidential administrations from John F. Kennedy to
William J. Clinton, which included posts in Lebanon, Morocco, France, Moscow,
Syria, and Israel. Overall, he played a key role in the Arab-Israeli peace process,
the .-led coalition against Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, successful
efforts to end the civil war in Lebanon, the release of . hostages in Lebanon,
and the establishment of collective and bilateral security arrangements in the
Persian Gulf. His positions included Ambassador to the Syrian Arab Republic,
Ambassador to Israel, and Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs.
Djerejian completed a 30-year tenure as founding director of Rice University’s
Baker Institute for Public Policy (1994 to 2022), and he is the author of Danger
and Opportunity: An American Ambassador’s Journey Through the Middle East.
Nicolas Pantelick is a Harvard College Senior pursuing a concurrent master’s
degree (AB/AM) in Modern Middle Eastern Studies with a joint concentration in
Government. His research interests include international development, diplomacy,
and peacebuilding. Since the fall of 2022, he has acted as the head research
assistant to former Ambassador Ed Djerejian during his tenure as a Senior Fellow
at the Middle East Initiative of the Belfer Center at the Harvard Kennedy School.
Nic has a strong interest in public service, having lived and worked abroad in
Tunisia and Morocco, focusing on environmental sustainability, local economic
development, and civil society support initiatives.
iiiBelfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School
About the Middle East Initiative and
the Study Group
MEI Senior Fellow Ambassador (Ret.) Edward Djerejian hosted the five-session
Study Group on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with 25 Harvard students from
across the University. Presentations and reading assignments were drawn from
diverse contemporary and historical sources, including six in-depth interviews
with Israeli and Palestinian regional experts across the academic, professional, and
national security spectra. These contributions allowed the authors and students
to analyze historical precedents, examine lessons learned from past policy and
negotiating successes and failures, and understand how acute and problematic the
status quo has become and what possible ways forward could be defined.
Established in 1998, the Middle East Initiative (MEI) is Harvard University’s
principal forum for policy-relevant research and teaching on the contemporary
Middle East and North Africa. MEI convenes policymakers, scholars, and
intellectuals from the region and beyond to expand our understanding of this
complex part of the world and to contribute to the search for solutions to its most
pressing policy challenges. Through the integration of scholarly research, policy
analysis, executive and graduate education, and community engagement, MEI
aims to advance public policy and build capacity in the Middle East to enhance
the lives of all the region’s peoples.
iv Beyond Oslo: Challenges and Prospects
Acknowledgments
We would especially like to thank our guest speakers—Israeli and Arab policy
experts and practitioners—who kindly agreed to share their valuable experiences
and insights on the region.
We also appreciate the Middle East Initiative’s support of this Study Group
and of the resultant report.
vBelfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School
Acronym Glossary
• Middle East Initiative (MEI)
• Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
• Two State Solution (TSS)
• The occupied Palestinian territories (oPt),
typically referring to the West Bank
• Palestinian (National) Authority (PA)
• Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT)
• Israeli Defense Forces (IDF)
• Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
• Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR)
• Nita M. Lowey Middle Partnership for Peace Act (MEPPA)
• Jewish Electorate Institute (JEI)
viiBelfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School
Table of Contents
Introduction ...................................................................................................... 1
Summary ...........................................................................................................2
Key Policy Considerations................................................................................6
Lessons Learned from Past Negotiations .......................................................................... 7
Historical Background ......................................................................................8
Assessing the Current Situation .................................................................... 10
The Settlement Project ..........................................................................................................10
Israeli Democracy and The Occupied Palestinian Territories ......................................14
The Issue of Palestinian Governance ..................................................................................16
Examining the Prospects for Peace and Potential Outcomes ..................... 18
Alternatives to the Two-State Solution ............................................................................20
The One State Reality? ..........................................................................................................22
Lessons Learned from Past Negotiations .....................................................23
Establishing a Political Horizon and Looking Ahead When Conditions for
Renewed Peace Negotiations May Emerge ..................................................25
viii Beyond Oslo: Challenges and Prospects
SecretaIn this Sept. 13, 1993 file photo President Clinton presides over White House ceremonies marking the
signing of the peace accord between Israel and the Palestinians with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, left,
and Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, right, in Washington. (AP Photo/Ron Edmonds, File)
1Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School
Introduction
On the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the Oslo
Accords, we present this paper as the culmination of a
spring 2023 Study Group on the Israel-Palestine Conflict
at Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center’s Middle
East Initative (MEI) under the direction of Senior
Fellow Ambassador (Ret.) Edward Djerejian. The Study
Group consisted of 25 Harvard students from across
the University and was conducted over five sessions.
Presentations and reading assignments were drawn from
diverse contemporary and historical sources, including
six in-depth interviews with Israeli and Palestinian
regional experts across the academic, professional, and
national security spectra. These contributions allowed us
to analyze historical precedents, examine lessons learned
from past policy and negotiating successes and failures,
and understand how acute and problematic the status
quo has become and what possible ways forward could
be defined. Head Research Assistant to Ambassador
Djerejian, Nicolas Pantelick ’24, aided in drafting this
executive paper, which summarizes the study group’s
deliberations and suggestions for the way forward in the
complex Israel-Palestine political landscape.
2 Beyond Oslo: Challenges and Prospects
Summary
The Palestinian issue remains central despite
efforts to minimize its regional importance. The
Two State Solution (TSS) has grown increasingly
remote as the Israeli settler enterprise in the
occupied Palestinian territories (oPt) of the
West Bank and East Jerusalem has expanded
to over 700,000 people. As such, a final conflict
settlement of supporting Israel as a democratic
Jewish state alongside an independent
Palestinian state appears less and less viable.
Due to settlement expansion and 56 years of
occupation, the TSS now seems an externally
imposed concept, primarily championed by the
international community with limited and diminishing local support.
Though societal divisions in Israel between the secularists and the religious are
more pronounced now than ever, the question remains whether the widespread
opposition to Netanyahu’s rightwing/religious coalition government and policies,
particularly on the political Left, will expand to the issue of the oPt. At present, only
a fringe minority of the protestors have been carrying the slogan “No democracy
with the occupation,” sometimes ostracized by Israeli organizers who fear that
mentioning the occupation would somehow undercut the protest movement.
Endemic internal legitimacy issues beset the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the
PLO, long considered the de facto “sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian
people.” The now more than seventeen-year schism between Hamas in Gaza
and the Palestinian Authority/Fatah in the West Bank since the last Palestinian
elections in 2005 and 2006 has fostered widespread corruption and discontinuity
between the people and their ineffectual governance. Israel has capitalized on
this rift to further its policies of separation and fragmentation and dilute growing
international pressure for an end to their over half-century occupation. To address
continuing drivers of instability, Palestinian institutions must be strengthened from
within. Elections may be the structural remedy for reforms unless these processes
would bring to power extremist Palestinian parties. Israel has a productive role to
play in this process. Instead of exercising a strategy of institutional and legislative
Due to settlement
expansion and 56 years
of occupation, the TSS
now seems an externally
imposed concept,
primarily championed
by the international
community with
limited and diminishing
local support.
3Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School
containment, it should be in Israel’s perceived long-term interest to support the
Palestinian state-building project.
Considering longstanding legitimacy issues, many Palestinians, especially youth,
support or expect a return to armed militia confrontation and intifada. An
armed struggle may well portend if a peaceful solution to the Israel-Palestine
conflict cannot be reached. As Palestinian youth grow further disillusioned with
the patrimonialism of the PA and President Abbas, militancy may become the
preferred avenue for resistance to increase the cost of Israel’s occupation.
A critical binary exists between the main-stay
peace framework approaches—., “land
for peace” and “rights for peace.” Several
potential alternatives to the TSS were
examined and considered by the MEI Study
Group, including federal and confederal
models. Foremost among these was a
one-state framework with equal rights for
Israeli and Palestinian citizens or one state
with unequal rights akin to apartheid. A shift
in focus for negotiations, wherein a doctrine
of universal human rights is established
and safeguarded before any territorial issues are reconciled, may better guarantee
a more amenable conflict compromise. Moreover, the rights-based approach, it is
argued, appears to be the only sustainable outcome as territorial solutions become
progressively less feasible. A rights-based process could also take on a more
integrative slant as communities are not forcibly separated, and all residents west
of the Jordan River are guaranteed equal rights. Nevertheless, such a stratagem
remains equivocal to Israeli interests, given the inherent demographic imperative
for preserving the Jewish majority in Israel.
The occupation status quo and virtual one-state reality present an existential crisis
for Israel, inherently undermining its credentials as a democratic and Jewish
state. Prioritizing the transactional economic and diplomatic relationships with
neighboring Arab states, notably the normalization measures envisioned under the
2020 Abraham Accords, will not, ipso facto, create lasting peace with Palestinians
unless the Arab states and Israel make that a priority. As Saudi Crown Prince
Mohammed Bin Salman stated in September 2023, “For us, the Palestinian issue
As Palestinian youth grow
further disillusioned with
the patrimonialism of the
PA and President Abbas,
militancy may become
the preferred avenue for
resistance to increase the
cost of Israel’s occupation.
4 Beyond Oslo: Challenges and Prospects
is very important. We need to solve that part,” adding that he wants to see Israel
as a “player in the Middle East.”1 If Israel truly values its national identity as a
Jewish democratic state, it would be better advised to initiate peace talks with the
Palestinians as circumstances permit.
Looking ahead, the Study Group considered several factors that could emerge
for achieving and sustaining peace between Israel and Palestine. From the top
down, capable, representative leadership on both sides must be willing to establish
a mutually acceptable political horizon or endgame for the conflict. This basic
tenet is patently lacking as the PLO’s legitimacy flounders, and Israel is engulfed
in political acrimony. Though unlikely, finding common ground for a solution
can only begin when the two sides move from conflict management to conflict
resolution, building on past negotiation achievements to envision a path forward.
Another factor is the role of a valid interlocutor or mediator. The United States
has played that role successfully and unsuccessfully, but circumstances can also
produce direct talks, such as between the Israelis and Jordanians leading to the
Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty in 1994. In any case, the mediator must be credible
and effective to obtain positive results. In future negotiations, it is essential to
couple bilateral or multilateral negotiations with a coherent public diplomacy
effort. Namely, to assure that public opinion is informed—with due respect to the
confidentiality of negotiations—regarding the evolution of talks so that public
support is enhanced when final decisions are made.
Unsuccessful negotiations have too often been too focused on process and
not sustainable outcomes. Fundamentally, any approach must depart from the
zero-sum negotiation paradigm, which contends that “nothing is agreed upon
until everything is agreed upon.” Adherence to this principle has perpetuated stasis
and, ultimately, driven the two sides progressively farther apart.
1 Nadeen Ebrahim, “Saudi Crown Prince Says Normalization Deal with Israel Gets ‘closer’ Every Day,” CNN, September 21,
2023,
5Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School
The broader geopolitical landscape must be
conducive to successful outcomes, and specific
political horizons must be outlined under which
parties deliberate. In times of crisis, there is also
opportunity. Despite the current bleak political
landscape, a new situation could emerge in
Israel and Palestine and the region conducive to
successful peacebuilding. Policymakers should
be prepared to seize that moment to engage in
negotiations and a peaceful settlement of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Despite the current bleak
political landscape, a new
situation could emerge
in Israel and Palestine or
the region that would be
conducive to successful
peacebuilding. Policymakers
should be prepared to seize
that moment, if it occurs, to
engage in negotiations and
a peaceful settlement of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
6 Beyond Oslo: Challenges and Prospects
Key Policy Considerations
Policy considerations are broken down into the following categories and discussed
in different parts of the brief.
The Settlement Project
• Is the Two State Solution (TSS) still a viable option?
• Has the Israeli settlement project succeeded in preventing a contiguous
Palestinian state?
Israeli Democracy and the Occupied
Palestinian Territories (oPt)
• What is the nexus between the current internal Israeli political crisis and
the over-half-a-century occupation of the Palestinian territories? Can
there be Israeli democracy with occupation?
• Given the hundreds of thousands of anti-government protesters in Israel
since January 2023, can Israel emerge after this political crisis and coalesce
around a new pro-peace consensus coalition government wherein
extremist parties are marginalized?
• Has the Israeli body politic moved so far rightward or become so
profoundly divided that the “land for peace” territorial paradigm is no
longer viable?
• What factors would compel Israel to seek a final peace settlement?
For example, will the “cost” of the Israeli occupation be raised by the
growing militancy of Palestinian groups, particularly youth, and the
threat of another Intifada?
The Issue of Palestinian Governance
• Can the Palestinian National Authority resolve its internal political
fractures, reform its autocratic rentier governance model through
democratic elections, and evolve to successfully co-lead peace
negotiations? Or will the Palestinians opt for armed struggle?
7Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School
Examining the Prospects for Peace, Potential Outcomes,
and Alternatives to the Two-State Solution
• How can negotiators balance the land-for-peace principle with a human
and political rights-based approach to achieve a sustainable resolution in
Israel-Palestine?
• What are the possibilities of a confederal or federal solution?
• Has Israel-Palestine become a de facto “One State Reality” with
unequal rights?
• Are the Abraham Accords a positive or negative influence on an
Israeli-Palestinian peace settlement?
Lessons Learned from Past Negotiations
• What lessons can be learned from past negotiations?
• What should the role of the international community, especially the United
States, be in Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution?
• Is there a political horizon that both sides could ultimately adhere to in
framing peace negotiations?
These policy considerations addressed by the Study Group endeavor to bridge
idealism and sustainable outcomes. If the aim of a final conflict settlement
involves supporting Israel as a democratic Jewish state alongside an independent,
pluralistic, and unified Palestinian nation, the Two State Solution (TSS) is
the logical and politically prudent endpoint. However, this outcome grows
increasingly far-fetched as the Israeli settler enterprise in the oPt of the West Bank
and East Jerusalem has expanded to over 700,000 people.
Indeed, this evolving situation points to framing Israel-Palestine as a “one-state
reality.” As a one-state “solution” becomes more applicable, it will consist of an
equal or unequal rights doctrine for the Israeli and Palestinian populations. Yet,
despite the likelihood of such a dénouement, a one-state conception—democratic
or not—will undercut Israel’s very character as either democratic or Jewish.
By tackling these interrelated queries, the MEI Study Group drew on the expertise
of scholars and practitioners from a variety of backgrounds to analyze historical
precedents, lessons learned from past policy and negotiating successes and
failures, and a basic understanding of how acute and problematic the status quo
has become and what possible ways forward could be defined.
8 Beyond Oslo: Challenges and Prospects
Historical Background
In the Israel-Palestine conflict, history—near or far—plays a significant role in
determining perceptions of the current conflict. Approximately seven million
Jewish Israelis and seven million Palestinian Arabs inhabit the land between
the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. Both have historical claims to the
land stretching back to ancient times, from the destruction of the First Temple
in Jerusalem by the Babylonians in 586 BCE, spurring the first exile of Jews
from the Kingdom of Judea, to its later reconstruction and second demolition
(save the Western Wall), by the Romans in 70 CE. In the seventh century CE,
the Islamic conquest of the Levant occurred, followed by several Muslim ruling
dynasties succeeding each other as they wrestled control of Palestine. From 1516
CE to the early 20th century, the Ottoman Empire conquered the region, ruling
it as Ottoman Syria/Palestine under the millet system, which gave minority
religious communities within their Empire limited power to regulate their own
affairs under the overall supremacy of the Ottoman In 1917, the
British government issued the Balfour Declaration, favoring the establishment of
a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine. Following WWI, the League
of Nations granted Britain mandatory power over Palestine in 1922, which the
United Kingdom terminated a quarter century later in 1948.
In 1947, the United Nations General Assembly recommended partitioning
Palestine into two states: one Arab and one Jewish. However, the situation in
Palestine deteriorated into a civil war between Arabs and Jews, with the latter
rejecting the Partition Plan while the former accepted it, declaring the State of
Israel’s independence in May 1948. During the war, 700,000, or roughly 80% of all
Palestinian residents, fled or were driven out of the territory that Israel conquered
without the right to return—an event known as the Nakba or “Catastrophe” to
the Palestinians. Starting in the late 1940s and continuing in the ensuing decades,
about 850,000 Jews from the Arab world immigrated, or made “Aliyah,” to Israel.
After 1948, only two parts of Palestine remained in Arab control: the West Bank
and East-Jerusalem, annexed by Jordan, and the Gaza Strip, occupied by Egypt,
both of which Israel conquered during the “Six-Day War” or “June War” in 1967.
2 Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia, “Millet,” Encyclopædia Britannica, January 10, 2022,
9Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School
Disregarding international law (The Fourth Geneva Conventions of 1949), Israel
began establishing settlements in these occupied territories.
The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was founded in 1964. Yasser Arafat
was Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization from 1969 to 2004 and
President of the Palestinian National Authority from 1994 to 2004. He led the
Palestinian movement’s liberation struggle and peace talks. In the wake of the
1991 Madrid Peace Conference, the two-pronged Oslo Accords in 1993 and 1995
inaugurated the Palestinian National Authority (PA) as a temporary administrative
body for parts of Gaza and the West Bank—excluding East Jerusalem—pending
a permanent peace settlement. For the past eighteen years, the PLO has suffered
from a still unresolved legitimacy crisis—leadership between the West Bank, ruled
by Fatah, and Gaza, governed by Hamas. It has remained fractured since Fatah’s
candidate, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), became PNA President in 2005 and
Hamas’ legislative victory in 2006.
10 Beyond Oslo: Challenges and Prospects
Assessing the Current Situation
The Settlement Project
The Israel-Palestine issue has become an unstable “frozen conflict,” with a potential
negotiated solution increasingly remote. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s
electoral victory in 2022 under an extreme right-wing coalition further diminished
the possibility of a settlement between the two sides. Extremist leaders that now
populate the incumbent Israeli cabinet include Minister of Finance Bezalel Smotrich,
Minister of Justice Yariv Levin, and Minister of National Security Itamar Ben Gvir.
In July 2023, the Israeli Knesset passed a law limiting the Supreme Court’s ability to
overturn national government decisions using the legal standard of “reasonableness,”
a principle employed by judges to review ministerial appointments and contest
decisions, such as those related to settlements, among other Predating
the current coalition, it should also be noted that, according to Section 7 of Israel’s
Basic Law as the Nation-State of the Jewish People, passed in 2018, “The State views
the development of Jewish settlement as a national value, and shall act to encourage
and promote its establishment and consolidation.”4 While this Basic Law was
controversial, internationally and within Israel, in July 2021, the Supreme Court ruled
that the law was constitutional and did not negate the state’s democratic
The close engagement between the Coordinator of Government Activities in the
Territories (COGAT) and the PA represents the main channel of governance of the
oPt. Although the IDF sub-division has traditionally fallen under the purview of the
Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) since Netanyahu’s coalition was elected in late 2022, “civil
responsibility” in the West Bank has been transferred from Defense Minister Yoav
Gallant and COGAT head Maj. Gen. Ghassan Alian to Minister of Finance Smotrich.
A former Israeli military official with extensive experience in the occupied territories
told the MEI Study Group that putting COGAT responsibilities under the Ministry
of Finance puts Israel on a collision course with the ICJ in the Hague. In June 2023,
Smotrich began imposing his ultra-nationalist vision over planning approval for
3 Patrick Kingsley, “What’s Reasonable? A Debate over a High Court’s Reach Divides Israel.,” The New York
Times, July 21, 2023,
html?searchResultPosition=1.
4 Amos Schocken, “The Right’s Goal: Eliminating Israel’s Basic Law on Human Dignity and Liberty: Opinion,” Haaretz.
com, November 17, 2022,
eliminating-israels-basic-law-on-human-dignity-and-liberty/00000184-878a-d53f-a5fe-afca16870000.
5 Ruth Levush, “Israel: Supreme Court Affirms Constitutionality of Basic Law: Israel – Nation State of the Jewish People,”
The Library of Congress, July 27, 2021,
affirms-constitutionality-of-basic-law-israel-nation-state-of-the-jewish-people/.
11Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School
construction in West Bank settlements. The resolution amended a 1996 decision
that had formerly imposed numerous stages of authorization from the defense
minister for land usage. Tantamount to de jure annexation, Smotrich now controls
planning laws, building permits, natural resources, and the movement of goods and
people between the West Bank, Gaza, and Israel. Tellingly, settler leaders celebrated
this move, for example, with the Head of the Samaria Regional Council, Yossi
Dagan, ironically stating, “We must stop treating residents of Judea and Samaria as
second-class citizens.”6 Opponents of the Israeli settler program saw the politicized
decision to streamline future settlement construction as designed to eliminate the
possibility of a two-state solution and beckon a complete annexation of the West
Bank, regardless of security or diplomatic considerations. Smotrich’s 2017 “Decisive
Plan” spells out his basic policy, which he is determined to carry out as part of Prime
Minister Netanyahu’s government:
“Ending the conflict means creating and cementing the awareness—
practically and politically—that there is room for only one expression
of national self-determination west of the Jordan River: that of the
Jewish nation. Subsequently, an Arab State actualizing Arab national
aspirations cannot emerge within the same territory. Victory involves
shelving this dream. And as motivation for its fulfillment dwindles, so
will the terror campaign against Israel.
This goal will be achieved even with declarations—with an unequivocal
Israeli statement to the Arabs and the entire world that a Palestinian State
will not emerge—but primarily with deeds. It requires the application
of full Israeli sovereignty to the heartland regions of Judea and Samaria,
and end of conflict by settlement in the form of establishing new cities
and settlements deep inside the territory and bringing hundreds of
thousands of additional settlers to live therein. This process will make
it clear to all that the reality in Judea and Samaria is irreversible, that the
State of Israel is here to stay, and that the Arab dream of a state in Judea
and Samaria is no longer viable. Victory by settlement will imprint the
understanding upon the consciousness of the Arabs and the world that
an Arab state will never arise in this land.”7
6 Jeremy Sharon, “Netanyahu Hands Smotrich Full Authority to Expand Existing Settlements,” The Times of Israel, June
18, 2023,
7 Bezalel Smotrich, “Israel’s Decisive Plan,” חולישה, March 12, 2020,
12 Beyond Oslo: Challenges and Prospects
This policy will undoubtedly have reverberating effects on the status quo.
According to an IDF spokesperson, the current trends speak for themselves: 95%
of Palestinian construction requests in the oPt are rejected, while 60-70% of Jewish
settler requests are Netanyahu has underscored the stance of his
finance minister, stating in July 2023 that remote settlements and illegal outposts
in the West Bank will “remain as enclaves surrounded by a future sub-sovereign
Palestinian entity if a peace agreement is reached.”9 Progressively, Netanyahu has
rejected the idea that Israel would accept a neighboring demilitarized Palestinian
state, an outcome he had advocated in the past.
In a presentation to the Study Group, Diana Buttu—lawyer, former spokesperson
for the PLO, and past HKS and HLS fellow—asserted that the settler movement
is thoroughly integrated into all Israeli government sectors, from Labor to
Likud. The wholesale normalization of settlements among those in the highest
government echelons has allowed the enterprise to thrive, particularly as the
Israeli body politic has steadily increased in religiosity and shifted rightward over
the last two decades. The Netanyahu bloc prevailed in 2022 despite narrowly losing
the popular vote, million to million. So, what drove the victory? First, voter
turnout was unexpectedly high at %, especially among the right-wing base.
Secondly, the votes for Balad—a Palestinian party that opposes the idea of Israel
as a Jewish state and seeks to turn it into a binational state within the pre-1967
borders—and the left-leaning Meretz party were not reflected in parliamentary
seats because they failed to reach the threshold required to win a seat. Finally,
turnout among Palestinian citizens of Israel (54%) remained far lower than among
Israeli Jews, though it was up almost 10% from
In Buttu’s view, rather than embodying a break from the past, the 2022 election
results were a culmination of prior trends, principally driven by Israel’s
longstanding ethno-nationalist, expansionist project, which the Zionist center
and left have been complicit in or failed to challenge. This project has appealed
to young Israelis from low socio-economic and religious backgrounds, many of
whom strongly identify with Jewish pride after years of indoctrination by religious
8 Breaking the Silence, “IDF Spokesperson on Palestinian vs. Israeli Settler Construction Requests in the West Bank,”
Twitter, July 19, 2023,
9 Jacob Magid, “PM: Remote Settlements Will Become Enclaves in Sub-Sovereign Palestinian Entity,” The Times of
Israel, July 18, 2023,
palestinian-entity/.
10 Mairav Zonszein and Daniel Levy, “Israel’s Winning Coalition: Culmination of a Long Rightward Shift,” International
Crisis Group, November 8, 2022,
.
13Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School
parties that controlled the education As such, the Jewish Power Party
and its leader, Itamar Ben Gvir, also typify the biggest winners from the 2022
election. Much like Smotrich’s “Decisive Plan,” Ben Gvir’s party has developed
a strategy that would “ensure a Jewish majority and a loyal civilian population,”
including through “emigration, transfer of the enemy, an exchange of populations
and any other way that will help the enemy leave our country.”12 The Minister of
National Security is a proud acolyte of the late extremist Meir Kahane, whose Kach
party was disqualified from the Knesset in 1988 for inciting racism and outlawed
as a terror group in 1994. Ben Gvir threatened the late Prime Minister Yitzhak
Rabin’s life just weeks before his assassination in He hung a photograph
in his home of Baruch Goldstein, who massacred 29 Palestinian worshippers
in Hebron at the al-Ibrahimi Mosque in 1994. Accordingly, Buttu underpinned
her austere assessment of the Israeli settler movement’s deep integration into
national political affairs by referencing that even Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin
felt politically inhibited in taking action against Hebron settlements after the 1994
tragedy despite his left-wing credentials and active commitment to the peace
negotiations with the Palestinians and Israel’s Arab neighbors.
Following attacks against Israeli targets by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
armed group, the Israeli military incursions into the Palestinian city of Jenin in
June and July 2023 were the most pervasive West Bank offensives in nearly two
decades, signifying, for some, “the complete disintegration of the post-Second
Intifada status quo.”14 These escalations fall under the IDF’s doctrine of “mowing
the lawn,” the strategic approach of using disproportionate military force to
periodically weaken local Palestinian resistance—or “root out terror,” in official
terms—and manage a recalcitrant population resistant to Israeli
Perfected in Gaza, this method battered the Jenin refugee camp from the air
and ground, destroying critical infrastructure for water and electricity: a kind of
“collective punishment.”16 Now, just as in Gaza, most urban centers in the West
Bank can overnight be isolated and dominated, as with Jenin.
11 Zonszein and Levy, “Israel’s Winning Coalition: Culmination of a Long Rightward Shift.”
12 Zonszein and Levy, “Israel’s Winning Coalition: Culmination of a Long Rightward Shift,” 3.
13 Zonszein and Levy, “Israel’s Winning Coalition: Culmination of a Long Rightward Shift,” 3.
14 Jehad Abusalim, “In Jenin, Palestinians Resist against Israeli Helicopters and Drones,” In These Times, July 10, 2023,
15 Mouin Rabbani, “Israel Mows the Lawn,” London Review of Books, July 31, 2014,
16 Tareq Baconi, “The Tale of Two Invasions: What the Last Attack on Jenin Tells Us about Israel Now,”
The New York Times, July 10, 2023,
14 Beyond Oslo: Challenges and Prospects
At the same time, other experts viewed the Jenin invasion as a direct prelude to a
future broad offensive in the northern West Bank, including Nablus, to facilitate
illegal (re) Growingly, the military and political establishments are
functioning in lockstep to buoy West Bank settlements. For example, in March
2023, the Israeli Knesset annulled the 2005 Disengagement Law, initially passed by
Prime Minister Ariel This ordinance had mandated Israel’s evacuation
of all army personnel and 8,000 Jewish Israeli settlers from 21 settlements in the
Gaza Strip and the dismantling of a further four settlements in the northern West
Bank. As a result of the Disengagement Law’s abrogation, the re-establishment
and re-population of the Homesh, Sa-nur, Gadim, and Kadim settlements in the
northern West Bank have begun in short To achieve this objective and
further proliferate the settler enterprise requires eliminating local Palestinian
pushback and marginalizing the Palestinian Authority’s role. Israeli settlers will
only relocate to live in this area if the state provides them with security, which can
only be achieved at the cost of local Palestinians.
Israeli Democracy and The Occupied
Palestinian Territories
Though societal divisions in Israel between the secularists and the religious are
more pronounced now than ever, the question remains whether the widespread
opposition to Prime Minister Netanyahu’s coalition government and policies,
particularly on the political Left, will expand to the issue of the oPt. For their
part, nearly 76% of Palestinian citizens of Israel approve of the grassroots protest
against the government’s judicial reform, and a large proportion even contends
that Palestinian citizens of Israel should play a more active role in democracy
However, opinions vary over the status of the Israeli judicial
system and if it is directly relevant to Palestinian citizens of Israel—% feel it
is, while % feel it is If the scope of the demonstrations were expanded
beyond internal Israeli democracy to incorporate anti-occupation sentiment
and an end to settlements, the approval figures of demonstrations by Palestinian
17 Ameer Makhoul, “Why Israel’s Offensive on Jenin Was a Failure,” Middle East Eye, July 7, 2023,
18 Makhoul, “Why Israel’s Offensive on Jenin Was a Failure.”
19 Benjamin Ashraf, “How Smotrich’s West Bank Plan Actualises a Second Nakba,” The New Arab, March 22, 2023,
20 Arik Rudnitzky, “Survey among the Arab Public in Israel,” Moshe Dayan Center, June 25, 2023,
21 Rudnitzky, “Survey among the Arab Public in Israel.”
15Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School
citizens of Israel would likely rise. At present, only a minority of the protestors
have been carrying the slogan “No democracy with the occupation,” with the
situation in Huwara the most relevant cross-cutting solidarity
An August 2023 Associated Press report focuses on this issue: “The pro-democracy
movement lacks any clear message of opposition to Israel´s open-ended military
rule over millions of Palestinians. This contradiction reflects a widely held belief
among Jewish Israelis that the conflict with the Palestinians is both intractable and
somehow separate from Israel’s internal strife. Critics of the protest movement,
including Palestinians, say this is a significant blind spot and that such selective
advocacy of democratic ideals shows how disconnected Israelis are from the harsh
reality of those living under Israel’s occupation… ‘It’s so ironic that they’re talking
and protesting for democracy while at the same time, it’s been a dictatorship
for Palestinians for 75 years,’ said Diana Buttu, ‘They’re afraid that their own
privileges and rights are going to somehow be affected, but they won´t make the
connection’ with the occupation…But largely missing from the raucous protests is
any meaningful reference to Israel’s 56-year occupation of lands the Palestinians
seek for their future state. A small contingent of activists waving Palestinian
flags have taken part but remain mostly on the fringe. In some cases, they have
even been ostracized by organizers who feared that mentioning the occupation
would somehow undercut the protest movement. Israel’s Palestinian citizens, who
make up a fifth of the population, have sat out the protests in part because the
demonstrations are ignoring the occupation. ‘The protest is against the reduction
of the democratic space for Jews. Most Jews in Israel don’t have a problem with
Israel enforcing an apartheid regime in the West Bank,’ said Dror Etkes, a veteran
anti-occupation activist.”23
22 Standing Together, “@alonleegreen in #Huwara,” Twitter, March 3, 2023,
31621677913108481?s=43&t=Sm0mRI8zjH-g7hl_ZtxDnw.
23 Tia Goldenberg, “Israeli Protesters Are Calling for Democracy. but What about the Occupation of Palestinians?,”
AP News, August 3, 2023,
85ac924429180ae1115b61f125fe1362#:~:text=But%20the%20pro%2Ddemocracy%20movement,separate%20from%20
Israel’s%20internal%20strife.
16 Beyond Oslo: Challenges and Prospects
The Issue of Palestinian Governance
A salient facet of the current situation revolves around the endemic internal
legitimacy issues besetting the PA and the PLO as the de facto “sole legitimate
representative of the Palestinian people” since Arafat informally accepted a
reduced Palestine in 1974. Indeed, the now more than seventeen-year schism
between Hamas in Gaza and the Palestinian Authority/Fatah in the West Bank
since the last Palestinian elections in 2005 and 2006 have fostered deep-seated
divisions between the people and their ineffectual governance and widespread
corruption. Israel has capitalized on this rift to further its policies of separation
and fragmentation and dilute growing international pressure for an end to
their half-century occupation. Significantly, while the PA’s security forces—in
its unpopular close coordination with Israel—have maintained a semblance of
regional stability, this has actively suppressed Palestinian political
Since taking office in 2005, Abbas has continued Arafat’s neo-patrimonialism,
with his Fatah party remaining the primary redistributor of resources, whether
economic rents and monopolies or prestige-based advantages such as VIP vehicles
and freedom of movement. Underscoring the PA and PLO’s authoritarianism, in
the last PNC meeting in 2018, members “elected” Abbas by clapping instead of
voting, revealing a widespread unwillingness to grant space for a new generation
of leaders. Further, in 2021, after the cancellation of legislative and presidential
elections and growing popular protests against Israel, the PA launched a
crackdown on Palestinian political and civil society activists. The PA also has
the most elderly governmental cabinet in the region, with an average member
age of nearly 68 years, according to 2020 figures, more than double the average
Palestinian voter age of 33 Summarizing the popular discontent, a March
2023 report from the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR)
revealed that a majority of Palestinians support the dissolution of the PA and view
its collapse as in the interest of the Palestinian people, considering its continued
existence as serving Israeli
24 Khalil Shikaki, “Public Opinion Poll No (87),” PCPSR, March 23, 2023,
25 Jacob Nyrup and Stuart Bramwell, “Who Governs? A New Global Dataset on Members of Cabinets,” American Political
Science Review 114, no. 4 (2020): 1366–74,
26 Shikaki, “Public Opinion Poll No (87).”
17Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School
In light of these legitimacy issues, many Palestinians, especially youth, support
or expect a return to armed confrontation and intifada (70% of West Bankers,
according to the March 2023 PCPSR poll).27 Additionally, over two-thirds of
Palestinians (68%) support forming armed groups, such as the Jenin Battalion or
the Lions’ Den, and almost all (87%) oppose the PA security services arresting
and disarming members of these militias. 70% of Palestinians believe that Israeli
punitive measures under the guise of occupation and security will increase the
incidence of armed attacks. Driving these results, the number of armed clashes
with the Israeli army increased at least three times in 2022 compared to 2021;
Palestinian deaths in the oPt in 2023 have surpassed 200 already, after reaching
the highest point since The 31 Israeli deaths in 2022 were the highest since
2008, and settlers’ violent incidents against Palestinians stood at 755 compared to
496 in 2021 and 358 in
Interpreting these developments, at the same time, PCPSR Director Dr. Khalil
Shikaki noted in a presentation to the MEI Study Group that Palestinian youth are
beginning to favor a one-state solution with equal rights rather than opting for an
independent but autocratic Palestinian state. Though such an outcome is unlikely
under current circumstances, this attitude indicates the level of discontent among
young Palestinians.
27 Shikaki, “Public Opinion Poll No (87).”
28 Khalil Shikaki, “Critical Policy Brief, Number 2/2023,” PCPSR, June 2023,
29 Shikaki, “Critical Policy Brief, Number 2/2023.”
18 Beyond Oslo: Challenges and Prospects
Examining the Prospects for
Peace and Potential Outcomes
Since the Oslo Accords, the TSS has emerged as the leading solution for the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, envisaging a sovereign Palestinian state living in peace
and security next to the State of Israel. One senior former Israeli national security
official stated to the MEI Study Group that he would prefer Israel dealing with the
security challenges that an independent Palestinian state or entity would present,
as Israel does with other Arab neighbors, rather than continue to deal with
the recurring security challenges posed by the oPt. Although the international
community first adopted the two-state framework in 1947 with the United Nations
General Assembly’s Partition Plan for Palestine, the TSS has increasingly divorced
from the on-the-ground reality in the PCPSR’s March 2023 report found
that 74% of Palestinians believe “the two-state solution is no longer practical or
feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements.”31 TSS support in the oPt has
fallen from 43% in September 2020 to 33% in a joint survey in December 2022
from PCPSR and New Wave Research in Hebrew and Interestingly,
29% of young Palestinians (18-23 years) believe the solution operable, slightly
more than the oldest PCPSR survey respondents (55+ years) at 26%, a consistent
finding since 2016. Searching for a compelling explanation, PCPSR argues that
this relative, though limited, optimism “probably reflects the refusal of the youth
to acknowledge the role of settlement expansion in determining the fate of the
two-state solution.”33
30 “Resolution 181 (II). Future Government of Palestine,” A/RES/181(II) of 29 November 1947,
November 29, 1947,
NSF/0/7F0AF2BD897689B785256C330061D253.
31 Shikaki, “Public Opinion Poll No (87).”
32 Khalil Shikaki, “The Palestine/Israel Pulse, a Joint Poll Summary Report,” PCPSR, December 2022,
33 Shikaki, “The Palestine/Israel Pulse, a Joint Poll Summary Report.”
19Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School
Source: Modified from
On the Israeli side, support for the two-state solution has dramatically fallen in the
three decades since the Oslo Accords among Israeli Jews, at only 34%, compared
to 39% for the entire national This result also parallels the precipitous
decrease in support for the TSS among Palestinians, with 44% of Israeli Jews
previously co-signing the two-state framework in September 2020. Moreover,
generational divides appear even more pronounced for Jewish respondents
compared to Palestinians, with just 20 percent of Jews aged 18-34 believing in
the TSS compared to 38% of Jews aged 55+. One immense hurdle precluding the
realization of a two-state solution for Israeli Jews involves the logistical, economic,
and moral quandary of unilaterally withdrawing from the West Bank and
relocating or removing current settlements. The backlash related to the 2005 Israeli
disengagement under Prime Minister Ariel Sharon underscores this widespread
consternation. One former Israeli official reiterated to the Study Group that if no
peace agreement is forthcoming, an Israeli unilateral withdrawal from the West
Bank to define secure borders with a security corridor on the Jordanian border
should not be discounted.
The TSS now appears even less expedient at the current juncture than perhaps at
any point since the mid-1990s. Nevertheless, and despite the obstacles impeding
its institution, a majority of study group participants signaled support for the
two-state solution. Indeed, the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference and its aftermath—
including the Oslo Accords in 1993 and 1995, subsequently popularizing
34 Shikaki, “The Palestine/Israel Pulse, a Joint Poll Summary Report.”
20 Beyond Oslo: Challenges and Prospects
the two-state paradigm—has largely defined the international community’s
political and developmental approach, even as the on-the-ground landscape
has significantly deteriorated. While the Israeli settler project has progressively
expanded, the TSS has increasingly appeared as an externally imposed concept,
primarily championed by the international community with limited and
diminishing local support, as the PCPSR survey results attest. The TSS remains
the preferred outcome for many, including the Harvard student participants in the
study group, perhaps due to its pro-peace roots.
Yet, notwithstanding some recent aberrations from the two-state policy, most
notably under the Trump administration, the US posture has clung to the TSS.
The Biden administration has doubled down through bi-partisan legislation from
Congress like the 2022 Nita M. Lowey Middle Partnership for Peace Act (MEPPA),
which aims “to foster better cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians
and build the foundation for peaceful co-existence and a sustainable two-state
solution,” providing $250 million in funding over five years for various regional
peace-building initiatives and
Alternatives to the Two-State Solution
Several potential alternatives to the TSS were examined and considered by the
MEI Study Group. Chief among these was a one-state framework with equal rights
for Israeli and Palestinian citizens or one state with unequal rights. Generally,
polling from PCPSR and its Israeli counterparts show tepid support for either
of these paradigms as a final solution. In a video presentation with Ambassador
Djerejian, former Foreign Minister of Jordan Marwan Muasher, echoed the
“One-State Reality” conception, warning that the further institutionalization of
such a scenario belies democracy.
Israeli Jews also more strongly support a single non-democratic state without
equality over a democratic state that would include Palestinians with equal
An important consideration is the higher demographic growth rate
of the Palestinians over the Israeli Jews. However, when comparing possible
conflict outcomes, Israeli Jews still prefer the TSS over the contrasting one-state
35 “Nita M. Lowey Middle East Partnership for Peace Act (MEPPA): West Bank and Gaza,” . Agency for International
Development, 2022,
36 Shikaki, “The Palestine/Israel Pulse, a Joint Poll Summary Report.”
21Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School
Ultimately, as some study group participants held, one-state
formulations are unlikely to reconcile the trauma and deep-seated political
tensions from decades of conflict.
Some study group members expressed support for a confederation or
federation derived from the auspices of King Hussein’s 1972 federation plan,
with the potential to evolve as a “Swiss state,” developing regulated cantons
and semi-autonomous regions. While this solution paradigm and its corollary
aspects—such as freedom of movement, citizenship and residency for refugees and
settlers, and joint authority over Jerusalem and civic affairs—largely lacked support
from Palestinians and Israeli Jews in recent surveys, a majority of Palestinian
citizens of Israel were receptive to the full confederation In sum,
these findings from PCPSR and its partners were consistent with Israeli Arabs’
disposition for supporting solution frameworks that beckoned a swift democratic
resolution to the conflict. Thus, the Israeli Arab bloc seems to encapsulate an often
overlooked and marginalized political, social, and economic force, domestically
and regionally.
Marwan Muasher described a critical binary between the main-stay peace
process approaches—., “land for peace”—and what he considered a more
cogent, actionable rights-based framework—or “rights for peace”—tied to a
foundational legal doctrine asserting national equality among citizens. Writ large,
Muasher found that the TSS has equated to a figment to which the international
community has paid lip service without translating their support into a realistic
implementation plan. Indeed, this political paralysis has led to the one-state
reality in Israel-Palestine that Muasher perceives, along with other regional
policymakers and academics, bolstered by expanding Israeli settlements in the
West Bank and East Jerusalem. Under the status quo, Muasher thus advocates a
shift in focus for negotiations, wherein a doctrine of universal human rights is
established and safeguarded before any territorial issues are reconciled. Drawing
on the Israel-Palestine conflict’s endemic volatility, for Muasher, the rights-based
approach appears to be the only sustainable outcome as territorial solutions become
progressively less feasible. Alternatively, a rights-based process could also take on a
more integrative slant as communities are not forcibly separated, and all residents
west of the Jordan River are guaranteed equal rights. Nevertheless, the ultimate
37 Shikaki, “The Palestine/Israel Pulse, a Joint Poll Summary Report.”
38 Shikaki, “The Palestine/Israel Pulse, a Joint Poll Summary Report.”
22 Beyond Oslo: Challenges and Prospects
formation of such a stratagem remains equivocal for Israeli interests, given the
inherent demographic imperative for preserving the Jewish majority in Israel.
The One State Reality?
It is becoming increasingly evident that the Israel-Palestine conflict should be
characterized as a one-state reality wherein both territories fall under the same
ultimate authority structures. The recent scholarship of Michael Barnett, Nathan
Brown, Marc Lynch, and Shibley Telhami outlines the contemporary one-state
paradigm and argues the need to “give up on the two-state solution.”39 These
authors contend that Israel-Palestine is akin to one non-democratic state without
equal rights, given the permanence and ubiquity of Israel’s occupation of the West
Bank.
In an April 2023 conversation hosted by MEI at the Belfer Center moderated
by Ambassador Djerejian with Nathan Brown and Shibley Telhami, the authors
expounded on their one-state reality thesis, describing it as “morally abhorrent and
strategically unstable.” The consequences of the one-state reality are far-reaching,
bleeding over the green line into Israel proper, where democracy protestors now
endure some of the same callous population control strategies Palestinians have
been subject to for decades. Moreover, for Brown and Telhami, Israel’s centrality
in the American Jewish community has come under threat. This trend, though, is
indicative of a longer-term shift in favor that predates the ongoing domestic crisis,
with surveys over the last few years suggesting most American Jews do not support
unconditional aid to Israel, particularly in relation to Israel’s military occupation
of the West For example, a 2021 poll of Jewish voters by the Jewish
Electorate Institute (JEI) found that a quarter of respondents agreed that Israel is
“an apartheid state.”41 Similarly, in 2020, Pew Research Center observed that about
one in five American Jews say the US is too supportive of In March 2023,
145 American Jewish leaders publicly distanced themselves from Smotrich, citing
his “long-expressed views that are abhorrent to the vast majority of American
Jews, from anti-Arab racism to virulent homophobia, to a full-throated embrace of
39 Michael Barnett et al., “Israel’s One-State Reality,” Foreign Affairs, April 14, 2023,
40 Caroline Morganti, “Recent Polls of US Jews Reflect Polarized Community,” Jewish Currents, June 29, 2023,
41 Morganti, “Recent Polls of US Jews Reflect Polarized Community.”
42 Samuel G. Freedman, “The Trump-Netanyahu Bromance Deepened American Jews’ Divide on Israel,” CNN, May 20, 2021,
23Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School
Jewish supremacy.”43 The mounting challenges in the Israeli-Palestinian status quo
have also impacted general US public sentiment, with an April 2023 poll revealing
that the highest percentage, 31%, was shared between those describing Israel as “a
flawed democracy” and as “a state with segregation similar to apartheid,” though
partisan differences In the absence of a two-state solution, 80% of
Democrats and 64% of Republicans would opt for a democratic Israel that is no
longer Jewish over a Jewish Israel without equality or full citizenship rights for
non-Jewish residents living under its
Lessons Learned from
Past Negotiations
Considering these pessimistic perceptions of a conflict solution in the short or
long term, where can we turn? Building on past negotiation successes and failures
offers one avenue to help break the deadlock of the current problematic status quo.
Key negotiations and milestones that
the Study Group considered:
• Bilateral Track I Negotiations (., post-1967 borders
“green line” and UNSC Resolution 242 in 1967)
• UNSC Resolution 338 (1973, Yom Kippur War)
• Camp David Accords by Israel and Egypt (1978)
• Madrid Peace Conference and Framework (1991)
• Clinton Parameters (Oslo Accords I, 1993)
• Gaza-Jericho Agreement (1994)
• Israeli-Jordanian Peace Treaty (1994)
• Oslo Accords II (1995)
• Arab Peace Initiative (2002)
• Road Map to Peace (Annapolis 2007)
43 Abbas Al Lawati, “Why American Jews Are Distancing Themselves from Netanyahu’s Government,” CNN, March 24,
2023,
44 Shibley Telhami, “Is Israel a Democracy? Here’s What Americans Think,” Brookings, April 25, 2023,
45 The Brookings Institution, “US Citizens’ Perceptions of Alternatives to the Two-State Solution,” Twitter, July 19, 2023,
24 Beyond Oslo: Challenges and Prospects
• Olmert-Abbas Negotiations (2008)
• Obama Administration Talks (2012, 2014)
• Abraham Accords (2020)
One takeaway from past Israel-Palestine negotiations and initiatives is that the
broader geopolitical landscape must be conducive to successful outcomes. The
Camp David Accords of 1978 and the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty of 1979
followed the Yom Kippur War in 1973, which altered regional alignments during
the Cold War. The broad-based coalition crafted by President GHW Bush and
Secretary of State James Baker to reverse Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait was
transformed into a new bloc for Arab-Israeli peace that led to the Madrid Peace
Conference and, for the first time, direct, face-to-face negotiations between Israel
and all its immediate Arab neighbors under the aegis of UNSC Resolution 242
and the land for peace principle. These developments led to the Oslo Accords and
the 1994 peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, which was negotiated directly
between Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Jordan’s King Hussein.
Subsequently, another factor in determining negotiation success was that specific
political horizons were outlined under which the parties deliberated. The Arab
Peace Initiative of 2002 by then Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah was another
breakthrough offering normalization of relations with Israel by Arab countries
in return for a full withdrawal by Israel from the oPt, a just settlement of the
Palestinian refugee problem, and the establishment of a Palestinian state with
East Jerusalem as its capital. Subsequent initiatives did not result in successful
outcomes, and there have been no substantive Israeli-Palestinian negotiations
since Obama Administration’s efforts in 2014.
25Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School
Establishing a Political Horizon
and Looking Ahead When
Conditions for Renewed Peace
Negotiations May Emerge
In former Israeli President Shimon Peres’ view,
“Only peace with the Palestinians will secure the country’s future: Israel
will not have lasting security without peace. Israel will not have a stable
economy without peace. Israel will not have a healthy society without
peace. Israel will not preserve her Jewish and democratic character
without peace. As long as there is no horizon for a diplomatic solution,
we will continue to live from war to war. Ruling over another people
is against our values as Jews.”
Looking ahead, the Study Group considered several avenues that could emerge for
achieving and sustaining peace between Israel and Palestine. From the top down,
there must be capable, representative leadership on both sides willing to establish a
mutually acceptable political horizon or endgame for the conflict. This basic tenet is
patently lacking as the PLO’s legitimacy flounders, and Israel is engulfed in political
acrimony. Though unlikely, finding common ground for a solution can only begin
when the two sides move from conflict management to conflict resolution, building
on past negotiation achievements to envision a path forward. Another factor is the
role of a valid interlocutor or mediator. As noted above, the United States has played
that role, but circumstances can also produce direct talks, such as between the Israelis
and Jordanians. In any case, the mediator must be credible, bilateral, and effective to
obtain positive results.
The phrase “peace process” needs to be reassessed. Process for the sake of process in
the Israeli-Palestinian context has not led to positive results. It amounts to “kicking
the can down the road.” Unsuccessful negotiations have too often been too focused
on process and not sustainable outcomes. Fundamentally, any approach must depart
from the zero-sum negotiation paradigm, which contends that “nothing is agreed
upon until everything is agreed upon.” Adherence to this principle has perpetuated
stasis and, ultimately, driven the two sides progressively farther apart. Each year
territorial issues are unresolved, the possibility of a viable Palestinian state grows
26 Beyond Oslo: Challenges and Prospects
more remote and elusive, principally due to settlement expansion in the oPt. Thus,
if the land-for-peace approach and, broadly, the TSS are to remain viable, then the
occupation and settlement program must be addressed decisively.
An essential factor in any future negotiations is to couple bilateral or multilateral
negotiations with a coherent public diplomacy effort. Namely, to assure that citizens’
opinion of the parties is informed—with due respect to the confidentiality of
negotiations—regarding the evolution of talks so that when final decisions are made,
the support of public opinion is enhanced.
In the current Israeli-Palestinian context, balancing the land-for-peace principle
with a human and political rights-based approach to achieve a sustainable resolution
is a significant challenge. If the TSS is already a chimera, the dimensions of the
political horizon change significantly, with the rights-based approach becoming the
most actionable. The occupation status quo and virtual one-state reality present an
existential crisis for Israel, inherently undermining its credentials as a democratic and
Jewish state. Downplaying the Palestinian issue as a secondary concern to regional
threats, such as Iran and Hezbollah, is often used as a political expedient to distract
attention from the settlement project and internal Israeli political considerations.
Indeed, the unresolved Palestinian issue gives Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, and other
extremist parties a raison d’etre to propagandize against and oppose Israel and inhibits
Israel’s quest to normalize relations with the other Arab states. Prioritizing the
transactional economic and diplomatic relationships with neighboring Arab states,
notably the normalization measures envisioned under the 2020 Abraham Accords,
will not ipso facto create lasting peace with Palestinians unless the Arab States and
Israel make it a priority. An Israeli participant reminded the Study Group that one of
the critical conditions for the Arab states joining the Abraham Accords was no Israeli
annexation of the oPt. As Saudi Crown Prince
Mohammed Bin Salman stated in September
2023, “For us, the Palestinian issue is very
important. We need to solve that part,” adding
that he wants to see Israel as a “player in the
Middle East.”46 Considering the centrality of this
issue, if Israel truly values its national identity as a
Jewish democratic state, it would be better advised
to initiate peace talks with the Palestinians.
46 Ebrahim, “Saudi Crown Prince Says Normalization Deal with Israel Gets ‘closer’ Every Day.”
Normalization measures
envisioned under the 2020
Abraham Accords, will not
ipso facto create lasting
peace with Palestinians
unless the Arab States and
Israel make it a priority.
27Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School
On the Palestinian side, to address continuing drivers of instability, institutions
must be strengthened from within. Elections may be the structural remedy for
reforms unless these processes would bring to power extremist Palestinian parties
in the West Bank. Israel, too, has a productive role to play in this process. Instead of
exercising a strategy of institutional and legislative containment by forbidding the PA
from running a proper foreign ministry, regularly arresting Palestinian legislators,
limiting freedom of movement for goods and people between the West Bank and
Gaza, and preventing the PLC from reaching a legal quorum, it should be Israel’s
long-term interest to support the Palestinian state-building project. Improving
access, movement, and trade will create space for the Palestinian economy to grow
and self-correct. The pressures on the PA and Palestinian economy from Israeli
restrictions need to be relieved in conjunction with genuine efforts to address
imbalances in their economic and administrative relationship to promote economic
self-sufficiency, bolster good governance, and improve the fiscal health of the PA.
A third Intifada and armed struggle may well portend if a peaceful solution to
the Israel-Palestine conflict cannot be reached. As Palestinian youth grow further
disillusioned with the patrimonialism of the PA and President Abbas, militancy may
become the preferred avenue for resistance to increase the cost of Israel’s occupation.
To date, the protest movement has remained primarily focused on internal Israeli
rule of law issues. However, as reiterated in this report, could the Israeli body politic
emerge after this democratic crisis and coalesce around a new pro-peace consensus
coalition government, marginalizing the incumbent extremist factions? Perhaps, but
success could hinge on the left-wing Zionist movement’s willingness to welcome
pluralism in the form of Israel’s Arab demographic. According to a June 2023 poll, a
majority (%) would like to see an Arab party in the government coalition after the
next elections. Drawing on this cross-societal support base could help resolve Israel’s
democratic legitimacy
In times of crisis, there is also opportunity. Despite the current bleak political
landscape, a new situation could emerge in Israel and Palestine or the region that
would be conducive to successful peacebuilding. Policymakers should be prepared to
seize that moment, if it occurs, to engage in negotiations and a peaceful settlement of
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
47 Rudnitzky, “Survey among the Arab Public in Israel.”
Middle East Initiative
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
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79 JFK Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
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