ֻ28ज ֻ2௹ࣜ ࠶ ඔ ࿐,୍6ᄅҍᆟڪϧ֥ޡܴࣜ࠶ٳ༅:၂۱ંॿࡏ*张林永1,严丽君2(1.ܼᇜ൧ଲ೬ຣ౧೬ᆓҍᆟ෮,ܼתܼᇜ 511462; 2.ܼᇜ൧ىቤݓࡅඥༀअ,ܼתܼᇜ 511400) ᅋ ေ 建立了一个考虑税收腐败和公共支出腐败的经济增长模型,从理论上探讨财政腐败行为及其影响.主要结论归纳:第一,财政腐败降低私人资本的回报率,使厂商的生产力下降,就整体而言阻碍了经济增长.第二,最优税率可能大于或小于Barro的最优税率,取决于征税效率和寻租引发的行政成本.第三,两种类型的公共支出隐含着不同程度的腐败机会,以及对官员行为产生的不同 激励 作用,从而扭曲公共支出结构效率.第四,增强制度约束力对遏制财政腐败至关重要.ܱՍ 财政腐败;税收腐败;公共支出腐败;经济增长ᇏٳোݼ F015 ໓ངѓ് ATheMacroeconomicAnalysisofFiscalCorruption:ATheoreticalFrameZHANGLin yon1g,YANLi jun2(,WanqingshaTown,NanshaDistrict,Guangzhou,Guandong 511462;,PanyuDistric,Guangzhou,Guandong 511400) Abstract ,fiscalcorruptionreducestherateofprivatecapitalreturn,,theopti maltaxratecanbelessorhigherthanBarro soptimaltaxrate,whichdependsonthepredationefficiencyoftaxcollectioneffi ciencyandadministrativecostscausedbyrent ,Twotypesofpublicexpenditureimplydifferentdegreeofcor ruptionopportunitiesanddifferent incentive ,enhancingregulations fiscalcorruption;taxcorruption;publicexpenditurecorruption;economicgrowth୍սު϶௹,ݓඹᇕᇶေڪϧྙൔᇏ,ඥ൬ੀാྟ1 ႄ ڪϧ܄܋ሧა܄܋ᆦԛྟڪϧ෮ᄯӮ֥ࣜ࠶ാބཨٮڞ০ാٳਙభਆ໊[1].ᆃ҂ି҂ႄఏ࿐ᆀڪϧቔູགྷࣂಆൗࢸ૫ਢ֥ี,ၘӮູݓؓҍᆟڪϧ֥۴ჷބؿളࠏᇅ֥ധೆ࣮.гᆀ൫ڿ۪ष٢൙ြ֥ߊ৯ਈ.֒భ,ݓҍᆟਵთڪϧՖޡܴࣜ࠶࿐൪࢘ؓҍᆟڪϧྛູࠣః႕ཙቔԛ֥າݝྟބ௴ђྟರၭཁ.ऌܙෘ,ᄝ20ൗࡀ90ฐ෬ྟ࣮.*൬۠ರ௹:2009 09 20ቔᆀࡥࢺ:ᅦਟႥ(1983-),ଳ,ܼתಟದ,ණൖE mail:linyong_zhang@
90 ࣜ ࠶ ඔ ࿐ֻ28जႵܱڪϧବೆޡܴࣜ࠶࿐ॿࡏ֥၂Ϯनޙٳ༅࿐ᆀᅦূЏ(2005[12])ᆷԛ܄܋ሧࢲܒᇏ, ႗ࡱ ൞ڪϧࣜ࠶࿐֥ᇗေ࣮ਵთ,ಖط࣮ࣨڪϧ൞՜܄܋ሧ(ೂࠎԤࡹഡᆦԛ֩)ބ ೈࡱ ܄܋ሧࣉਔࣜ࠶ᄹӉ,ߎ൞ቅθਔࣜ࠶ᄹӉ,ࠎႿ҂ٳ༅(ೂ॓࢝໓ᆦԛ)֩ग़ܴഈթᄝቋႪ֥ሧඔਈࢲॿࡏ֤ԛ֥ࢲં൞҂ಒק.֥Barreto(2000)ࡹ৫ਔܒܱ༢,ႚႵ܄܋ሧཛଢथҦಃ֥ڪϧܲჴ൳ଽള߄ڪϧྛູ֥ྍܞׅᄹӉଆ,ఃᇏڪϧ൳ᇅሿࣁ ֥ࠗৣ ,যႨᆯಃഡᇂྛᆟᅰθ,Ֆط౷܄Ⴟ܄܋҆ބದ҆ᆭࡗ֥ཌྷࣩᆚ,ѩಪູ֒܋ሧ֥ࢲܒ;ᅦफ[13](2007)࣮ਔݓࠎԤഡീ܄܋҆ؓ܄܋Ӂ֥ิ܂ԩႿ؎ֹ,໊ؓбႿሧथק֥ᇗေၹ,ؿགྷิّۚڪϧ৯؇ᄝш࠽܄܋Ӂ֥ิ܂൞ࣩᆚྟ่֥ࡱ༯ൈ,ᄵթᄝڪϧഈ߶ࢆ֮ݓࠎԤࡹഡ֥ሧ.मބိ৵ٙ౦ঃ༯֥नޙࢲݔၩሢ۷֥֮ࣜ࠶ᄹӉੱބದ(2008[14])Ֆᇅ؇ၹ֥࢘؇ٳ༅ѩൌᆣဒਔڪ҆۷ഒ֥൬ೆ߭Б;֒ڪϧܲჴ๙ݖഡᇂݖ؇֥ϧؓ܄܋ᆦԛࢲܒொ֥႕ཙ.َ໓᠀ࢫࣉྛԷሿၛଔሱദڞ০ቋն߄,طቋն৫ቀݓ౦࣮ҍᆟڪϧ֥໓ངູඔ҂؟,ࠎЧ߄০֥ದູ҆х૧َ෫֥ܲӱࣉྛ࿙ሿၛ૭ඍྟᇉູᇶࠇࠢᇏႿᇅ؇ุᇅ֥ٳ༅.मྟڪϧൈ,ᄵनޙࢲݔ൞ཌྷّ֥[2].Been LonChen(1996[15])ิԛҍᆟр֥ۀ,ѩՖҍᆟр֥[3](2003)ຉᅚਔAKଆ[4],Ϝฦඥྛູବೆଆ ჿඏӮЧ ބ ҍᆟр൬ၭ ֥бࢠܱ༢টܴҳࣉྛ࣡नޙٳ༅.໓ᇏ࣮ਔ҂ᆟکᆟҦؓඥрؿള֥ॖିྟބᇗӱ؇[16];ਾᆽٙ(2006)Ֆ၂ੱaฦඥྛູބࣜ࠶ᄹӉ֥႕ཙ,ؿགྷ֥ۚฦඥӮЧϮڪϧ֥קၬԛؿࢸקਔҍᆟڪϧ֥ݣၬބো,ބฦඥӲـࡼࢆ֮ඥੱބࡨഒฦඥྛ,ູᄝඥ൬ࠑѩٳ༅ਔ֒భݓҍᆟڪϧӁള֥۴ჷ.ӮҰӮЧ҂߶֥ۚ౦ঃ༯,֥ۚඥ൬ࠑҰۀੱࡼࡨ(2009[17])ᆷԛҍᆟڪϧ֥۴ჷᄝႿݓҍᆟุᇅഒฦඥྛ.ູ൞҂ᆟҦؓࣜ࠶ᄹӉ֥႕ཙ൞҂֥ଽᄝࢲܒಌཊ,ᆃ֝ᇁᆟکყෘ֥ளᅮaყෘሧࣁಒק֥শٮ,ყෘଽሧࣁሇ߄ູყෘຓሧࣁ,ඥ൬ބݓႵ,֥ჰၹᄝႿᆟҦؓବඥބඥੱ֥ࡗࢤིႋ҂5].ޱྍૼ֩(2006[ሧӁ֥նਈੀാ,ࡆഈҍᆟٳಃ҂ކ,ቋᇔ֝ᇁҍ)ܒࡹෛࠏቋႪ߄ଆটٳ༅႕ཙڪϧඣ֥ၹࠣཌྷႋّ֥ڪծീᆟڪϧ֥ሩളઢ.݂ବఏট,ҍᆟڪϧ๙ݖਆ۱ߌ.ݓଽຓ࿐ᆀؓҍᆟਵთ֥ڪϧ໙ี࣮۷؟ՖࢫࣉྛԮ֝,Їওҍᆟ൬ೆߌࢫڪϧ(ೂඥ൬ڪϧaҍᆟ൬ᆦ֥ଖ၂ߌࢫೆ൭ࡆၛଆ߄.൮,༵ཌྷؓႿྛᆟ൬ٮགྷའ)ၛࠣҍᆟᆦԛߌࢫڪϧ(ᆯༀཨٮڪϧ֥ࢸקটඪ,ҍᆟڪϧ൞၂۱ಌكሙಒ࿐ඌקڪϧaᆟکҐܓڪϧބҍᆟሇ၍ᆦڱਵთ֥ ܄ߴ ၬ֥Սڪϧ֩)..ChandބM[6]oene(1999)აFjeldstadބ൞,གྷႵ֥࣮ѩીႵؓҍᆟڪϧྙӮࠏᇅTungodden(2003[7])Ϝҍᆟڪϧקၬູඥ൬ܲჴ০Ⴈ൭ᇏ֥ಃ৯,๙ݖཟఒြิ܂ฦඥЌط෬౼ߴ۳Ⴭܿٓྟٳ༅.ෙಖBarreto(2000)Ϝڪϧ֥ਫ਼֥ࣥྛູ.ఃՑ,ᄝҍᆟ൬ೆߌࢫ֥ڪϧ࣮ᇏࣉྛଽള߄ԩ,൞ᄝٳ༅൬ೆٳࠏᇅൈીႵ,ॉ੮ฦඥջট֥൬ೆٳིႋ,طؓ܄܋ི҆[8]TanziބDavoodi(1997)ᆷԛڪϧӱ؇აඥ൬൬ೆӮّб;Hindrick[9]setal(1999)ॉҳਔඥ൬ᆘ൬ੱ֥࣮ಏໃॉ੮ڪϧܲჴؓ܄܋ሧࣁ֥যႨ[2].֥ࠗৣӲـࠏᇅؓඥ൬ڪϧྛູ֥႕ཙູࡥֆఏ,гᆀಪູҍᆟڪϧ֥ྙӮࠏᇅॖၛࡥ,ಪູູඥༀҰದჴᄝᆘ൬ࣉඥൈ҂ؿളڪϧྛູေ૭ඍູڪϧܲჴॖି০Ⴈ؎ᆯಃᄝਆཛᆟکྛ,ႋູ(ᆘඥބิ܂܄܋Ӂ)ᇏ࿙ሿ,ࠧڪϧᆘඥܲჴิۚඥༀದჴ֥൬ೆඣ;B[10]arreto(2003)ॉҳ҂൬౼ฦඥᆀ֥ߴၛϺᇹବඥᆀฦඥ,ᆃࡼࡨഒᆟඥᇕ൬ೆ֥ᆘ൬ࡓၞӱ؇,ಪູݓࡅႋھ۷ک൬ೆ,ཋᇅ܄܋Ӂ֥ܿଆ,ಏູฦඥᆀࡨඥ൬၇ঠႿཨٮඥط҂൞൬ೆඥቔູఃᇶေ֥ವሧ۽ڵք;ڪϧܲჴᄝิ܂܄܋ӁݖӱᇏযႨᆯಃܣऎ,ჰၹᄝႿཨٮඥб൬ೆඥ۷ಸၞࡓ.ֻ,ᄝၩഡᇂَᄖ֥ྛᆟബӱ,ӌഅູࠆ౼сေളӁҍᆟᆦԛߌࢫ֥ڪϧ࣮ᇏ[11],Mauro(1998)࣮ྟ܄܋Ӂ,сྶϜ၂҆ٳ০ቔູሿࣁߴ۳ڪڪϧӱ؇აҍᆟᆦԛোᆭࡗ֥ཌྷܱ,ྟॉ੮҂ϧܲჴ,ႮՎӁളحຓڵք.ࠎႿᆃ၂ࡌק,Ч໓ࡼҍᆟᆦԛࠆ֤ߴ֥ၞӱ؇,ڪϧିܔཁᇷֹࢆ৫ቀޡܴࣜ࠶ᄹӉં,Ֆ܄܋൬ᆦਆٚ૫ଆ߄֮܄܋ᆦԛᇏ࢝ტೆ֥бᇗ,طᄝࢌ๙֩ࠎԤࡹҍᆟڪϧྛ,ູՖطิ܂၂۱ҍᆟڪϧ໙ี֥ંഡሧഈ֥бᇗಏෛڪϧӱ؇֥ࡆധطࡆն;ݓଽٳ༅ॿࡏ,൫ູٳ༅ҍᆟڪϧ֥႕ཙิ܂ཌྷܱ֥
ֻ2௹ᅦਟႥ֩:ҍᆟڪϧ֥ޡܴࣜ࠶ٳ༅:၂۱ંॿࡏ 91 ંᆦӻ.ᇏp 1( )<0.ᆃ൞აBarreto(2000[2])აBeen LonC[3]hen(2003)ࡌഡ҂ֹ֥ٚ,భᆀࣇࡌഡڪϧ൞2 ၂۱ંॿࡏَ໓᠀ࢫӱ؇֥ݦඔ,ಖط,གྷൌᇏڪϧӱ؇൞൳ᇅႿمᇅࡹഡ;֥ުᆀᄝؓթᄝฦඥ֥ࣜ࠶༢૭ඍ2 1 թᄝҍᆟڪϧ֥ࣜ࠶ᇏ,ѩໃࡌקᆘඥࠑҰܲჴڪϧऎႵۀੱٓ.ຶЧ໓ 基本假设ಪູ๙ݖႄೆຓള֥ᇅ؇эਈ,ᆘඥࠑҰܲჴڪࡌק၂۱Ӊള҂֥սіྟࡅ๖ᄝٿоࣜ࠶ᇏϧაඥ൬ࠑҰۀੱࡗࢤ౼थႿᇅ؇эਈ,ᆃ࠻ژކቋն߄ིႨ,ࡅ๖ིႨݦඔ֥ྙൔ:གྷൌࡌק,ႻࡼູЧ໓֥ࢲંิ܂၂ק֥ᆟҦݣၬ.¥1- U= c(t)-1- tᄝթᄝڪϧ֥౦ྙ༯,၂֊ฦඥӌഅФҰ,֞ӌഅႨ1- edt,(1)01- ߴ(b)սูӲـ,Ӳـੱ טᆜູఃᇏc(t)-1,u(c)=1- ູࠧ௹ིႨݦඔ,ࡌקི bႨݦඔ 1~ u(c)ؓc൞־ᄹχ֥ݦඔ,Ⴕ u(c)>0,1-p1p1u (c)<(t)ູtൈ֥ದनཨٮ, >0ູ์གྷੱ,ఃᇏ0 p1<1,b< .ၹՎ,ყ௹֥Ӳـੱູ 1= >0ູࠧш࠽ིႨႵ҂э.ྟದ१ඔਈ൞ޚק(1-p1) +p1b,ѩ 1< ..֥ѩࡌק၂ུࡅ๖ᄝᆟک۽ቔ,ః֥ᄝႏӌഅॉ੮թᄝڪϧ,ᄵӌഅ֥ඥު൬ೆႵᇕॖ:ି۽ቔ.ବඥӌഅฦඥӮۿ֥ඥު൬ೆູ(1- )y+ ey;ବࡌקթᄝնਈཌྷ֥ӌഅ,ࡅ๖ႚႵӌഅѩູඥӌഅฦඥാϧ,ᆘඥࠑҰܲჴ҂թᄝڪϧൈ֥ఃิ܂স৯ބሧЧ.ູࡥֆఏ,ࡌקস৯֥܂ඥު൬ೆູ(1- )y+(1- ) ey;ବඥӌഅฦඥാ۳൞ྟ.֥ࡌקսіྟӌഅࡼቋն߄ඥު০,ϧ,ᆘඥࠑҰܲჴڪϧൈ֥ඥު൬ೆູ(1- )y+ఃളӁݦඔ[4]ູ(1-b) (t)=A1- kg ,(2)۴ऌၛഈ֥ࡌഡ,ᄝඥ൬ࠑҰۀੱ่֥ࡱ༯,ॉఃᇏ,0< <1,y(t)ູටൈದनӁԛ,k(t)ູටൈ੮ඥ൬ࠑҰܲჴڪϧۀੱު֥ӌഅඥު൬ೆy :ູದनሧЧ,g(t)൞ටൈದन܄܋ӁႚႵਈ.ҕඔA൞ຓള۳ק(1- )y+(1- 1) ey(1- )y+ ey.֥y ~ 财政收入环节存在税收腐败的假设ࡌק܄܋֥҆ඥ൬ุᇅᇏඥੱ൞ޚק֥(4)෮ၛ,ყ௹֥ӌഅඥު൬ೆູ y =(1- )y+ ey(1 (0< <1).ᆃུսіᆟҦ֥ҕඔႮᆟکഡᇂ.ൈ,ඥ൬൬ೆФႨႿູӌഅิ܂܄܋Ӂ,ᆟک҂ࠒ-p 1).ູٚь༯໓ٳ༅,קၬ =1-e(1-p 1),ᄵሧЧ֒թᄝฦඥ౦ྙ༯֥ᆟکඥ൬൬ೆູTe= y.,ѩᆟکყෘޙ.ခႨBarro(1990)֥ࡌק[4],܄܋Ӂ൞ӌഅളӁ֥сေ,ೆӌഅູՎс 财政支出环节存在公共支出腐败的假设ྶՖ܄܋҆ࠆ౼܄܋Ӂ.ඥ൬൞ӌഅӁԛ֥ݦᄝೂഈࡌഡ֥భิ༯,ࡌഡٿоࣜ࠶ᇏᆟکყඔູෘޙ,ඥ൬൬ೆႨႿิ܂ਆᇕ҂ো֥܄܋Ӂ.ᄝყෘޙ่ࡱ༯іൕູT(y)= y(y>0).(3)ࡌקඥ൬ࠑҰۀੱ(ࠧବඥӌഅФҰᅬz+g1=Te,(5))ູp,ۀੱp֥նཬ౼थႿฦඥੱe ބսіඥ൬Ұིఃᇏ,ႮႿᆟکᄝิ܂܄܋Ӂൈ,թᄝૼ؇aੱ֥ᇅ؇ҕඔ (0< <1),іൕູp=e .ବඥӌ؎ӱ؇֩ҵၳ,֤၂ུ܄܋ᆦԛਵთӁളڪϧྛഅ൪ඥੱ aඥ൬ࠑҰۀੱpބฦඥӲـੱ ູ۳ູ֥ॖିྟࢠն,طਸ਼၂ུ܄܋ᆦԛਵთӁളڪϧק.၂֊ฦඥӌഅФҰ֞,ࡼ൳֞Ӳـູ ey,ఃᇏ ྛູ֥ॖିྟࢠཬ[8,12,14].ູٚьఏ,ࡌקิ܂܄>1.܋Ӂzൈಸၞؿളڪϧ,ิ܂܄܋Ӂg1ൈ҂ؿࡌקඥ൬ࠑҰܲჴթᄝڪϧྛູ֥ۀੱູp1,ളڪϧ.ఃᇏ,zބg1ᅝ܄܋ᆦԛ֥б২ٳљູ ބۀੱp1֥նཬ౼थႿᇅ؇ҕඔ ,ࠧp1= ( ),ః1- (0< <1),ᄵz= Te,g1=(1- )Te. ࡌקӌഅႵฦඥྛູ,ฦඥੱeູฦඥਈაሹ൬ೆ֥бੱ,ૄ۱ӌഅࣇᆦڱඥ൬ູ(1-e) y. y =(1- )y+ ey(1-p 1)Ϝᆜູ y =y-[1+e(1-p 1] y=y- y.
92 ࣜ ࠶ ඔ ࿐ֻ28जႮႿิ܂܄܋Ӂzൈಸၞؿളڪϧ,ڪϧܲჴູࠆ౼၂קሿࣁ,๙ݖഡᇂَᄖ֥ྛᆟബᇅ؇ = [1-(1+ )(1-e(1-P 1)) y]- . kࣉྛᇶԷሿ,طᆃࡼᅝҍᆟ൬ೆ၂۱ཌྷ֒б২(12).ࡌഡڪϧܲჴ֤֥֞ሿࣁູR= z( <1),ᄵᄝڪϧ๙ݖϜൔ(10)ၛࠣൔ(10)ؓt֥֝ࢲݔսೆ౦ྙ༯ൔ(12),ᆜ֤֞ཨٮᄹӉٚӱູ,܄܋ᆦԛz֥֩ൔіൕູz= z+(1- )z.ᄝ܄܋ᆦԛzᇏ,ӌഅିܔࠆ֤֥܄܋Ӂࣇ c1 y==(1- (1+ ) )- .(13)ູck(1- )z=(1- ) Te.෮ၛ,ᄝಆ҆܄܋ᆦԛᇏ,Ԣਔߴሿࣁຓ,ିܔᆇᆞູӌഅളӁڛༀ֥܄܋Ֆൔ(13)ॖᆩ,ᄝఃၹ҂э่֥ࡱ༯,ҕᆦԛሹਈູඔ ބ ೂޅ႕ཙᄹӉ.ੱ ᄀཬ,ࠧᆘඥིੱᄀ,֮g=܄܋ೆᄀഒ,ࡼࡗࢤֹࢆ֮ཨٮᄹӉੱ. ᄀն,(1- )z+g1=(1- )Te.(6) 财政腐败情形下的生产函数ࠧܲჴᄀڪϧ,ದӌഅॖᆦ֥൬ೆᄀഒ,֤ཨࢲކҍᆟ൬ᆦਆߌࢫؿളڪϧ֥ࡌഡ,ڪϧٮᄹӉੱ༯ࢆ.ܲჴ֤֥֞ሿࣁRቔູӌഅ֥حຓӮЧ,ᄵӌഅඥᄝٿоࣜ࠶ᇏ,ದनሧӁਈ֩ႿದनሧЧਈ.ሧЧު൬ೆݦඔіൕູyd=(1- )y-R.ູٚь༯໓֥߭Бੱ֩ႿሧӁӻႵᆀବඥބྛߴު֥০ٳ.ٳ༅,קၬ = ,ᄵyd=(1- )y- y,ᆜϜളӁݦඔൔ(2)ؓದनሧЧ֤֝֞ :ູ y=Ag(1- ).(14)y kkd=[1- (1+ )]y (7)Ֆൔ(7)ॖᆩ,֒ (1+ )>1ൈ,ၩᆘඥིੱࠇ࿙Ϝൔ(14)սೆൔ(13)֤֞ཨٮᄹӉੱ:ູሿႄؿ֥ྛᆟӮЧᄹࡆ;֒ (1+ )<1ൈ,ၩᆘ g =1(1- (1+ ) )A(1- )- ඥིੱࠇ࿙ሿႄؿ֥ྛᆟӮЧࡨഒ.ၹՎ,ڪϧؓӌ kഅ൬ೆ֥႕ཙ္ࡼ౼थႿᆘඥིੱ(15)( <1)ބ࿙ሿႄؿ֥ྛᆟӮЧ((1+ )>1).Ϝg=(A(1- 1) )k1- սೆൔ(14)֤֞ሧ2 2 ଆनޙࢳսіྟཨٮᆀ൞ପུ۽ቔႚႵఒြܢಃ֥ದЧ֥ш࠽Ӂԛ:ູ,ቋႪ߄໙ีࣼ൞ᄝఃყෘჿඏ่ࡱ༯࿊ᄴཨٮਫ਼ࣥࠣ y1=A1- (1- )((1- - ) 1).(16) kఃሧЧࠒਫ਼ࣥটቋն߄ః၂ള֥์གྷሹིႨ.ॖၛुԛ,ᄝڪϧ౦ྙ༯֥ದሧЧш࠽Бԏ1- m-1- taxc,e c1- edt,ൔ(16)֮Ⴟ҂թᄝڪϧ౦ྙ༯֥ሧЧш࠽Бԏ y( . k=[1-(1+ )(1-e(1-P 1)) ]y-c,1 =A1- (1- ) 1- ),ᆃіૼҍᆟڪϧࢆ֮ਔದሧt limk - e= ¥Ч߭Б.ੱ(8)ູࢳཨٮᆀቋႪ߄໙,ี০ႨགྷᆴHϜg1=(A(1- ) 1- )սೆൔ(15),֤ቋႪamiltonkݦඔࢳ.ࣜ࠶ᄹӉੱູ :H=u(c)+ {[1-(1+ )(1-e(1-P 1)) ]y-c}. =1[(1- (1+ ) )A(1-(9) ۴ऌ Pontryagin֥ቋնᆴჰ,ࢳ֤၂ࢨсေ1- )(A(1- ) )- ].(17)่ࡱ:ູᅳ֞ቋႪᄹӉੱ a ,ቋն߄໙ีіൕ:ູ H - t- =u(c)- =0 =ec,(10) cmax =1 (1+ ) )A(1- , , [(1- H=(1-e 1)-e 1=0,(11 ) e )(A(1- ) 1- )- ].(18) ᆞೂᄝAKଆၛࠣઅଏଆ၂ဢ,ູᄹӉੱູᆞིႨႵࢸ,ေ၂ུ҂֩ൔ.భ၂۱่ࡱ൞[1- +(1+ )] y y> ,ު၂่ࡱ൞ؓႋႿޘࢩ่ࡱູ -[1- +(1+ )](1- )>0. k k
ֻ2௹ᅦਟႥ֩:ҍᆟڪϧ֥ޡܴࣜ࠶ٳ༅:၂۱ંॿࡏ)93)၂ࢨсေ่ࡱູ:ԛ,ѩᆩ֡ඥༀದჴ҂߶ࢣິمྛູ,ପહବඥ 1=1ದ჻ၩࣉྛྛߴ,ط҂൞ࢤ൳Ӳـ.ࠎႿᆃ၂൙ൌ,(1- )A1- ((1- ) )1- ࡌഡฦඥӲـ( )აߴ(b)֥ܱ༢ູ =vb,ఃᇏv 1- -1>1,ᄵࣉ၂֤҄֞ቋႪӲـੱູ 1- (1- ) - (1+ ) 1- .(19) *=(1+ ) .4(1- )[ (1+ )- ](p1+(1-p1)v) (26) = A[A(1- ) 1- ] Ֆൔ(26)ॖᆩ,ႮႿ ( )<0ބ p1( )<0,Ֆ ( -1) + 1- [ (1+ )-1].(20)ط *<0,іૼᇅ؇ᄀಌكჿඏ৯,Ӳـੱсྶഡ 11 1- )A1- ((1- ) = (1- ) ᇂᄀۚ.၂֊ӲـੱۚႿൔ(26)֥ቋႪӲـੱ,۴ ऌฦඥӲـაߴ֥֩ൔܱ༢,ᄵڪϧܲჴࡼႚႵ1- - 1+ ) 1- +(1- (1+ ) ) . (۷؟֥ሧჷཟӌഅࣉ ྛী෬ ߐ౼ሿࣁ.ᆃၩሢ(21)ؓฦඥྛູഡᇂݖۚӲـੱѩ҂ିՖ۴Чഈܿхฦൔ(19)֩Ⴟਬඥྛູ,ّط߶ႺܲჴԷሿڪϧ,ቋႵིࢳथ໙ี,֤ቋႪඥੱູ֥ծീߎᄝႿิۚᇅ؇ჿඏ৯. *= 22)(1+ .()ቋ,ުϜڪϧߌ༯֥ቋႪᄹӉੱൔ(17)ა҂թൔ(22)֥ቋႪඥੱ҂ႿBarro(1990[4])ིੱ่ࡱ༯֤֥֞ࢲݔᄝڪϧߌ༯֥ቋႪᄹӉੱ 1n= [(1- B)(1- ) .Barro֥ቋႪඥੱູ B= .ॖ൞,ᄝЧ໓֥ଆᇏ,ᄵ (1+ ) 1ࠇ (1+ ) A(A AB)-Q]ቔؓб.ؓбࢲݔؿགྷ,֒1-A1,ᆃ౼थႿᆘඥིੱބ࿙ሿႄؿ֥ྛᆟӮЧ,෮ၛAAቋႪඥੱॖିնႿࠇཬႿBarro֥ቋႪඥ,ੱࠧ *(1-SB)S1-AB\(1-E(1+B)S)((1-F1-A)ES) Bࠇ * Bൈ,ᄵ$n\C,္ࠧ༯ਙ่ࡱ.֒ (1+ )<1,ᄵթᄝฦඥ౦ྙ༯֥ቋႪඥੱۚႿBarro֥ቋႪඥੱ;֒ A(1+ )>1,1-A1-SB[(1-F)E][(27)ᄵթᄝฦඥ౦ྙ༯֥ቋႪඥੱ֮ႿB1-E(1+B)Sarro֥ቋႪඥ.ੱᆃ۱ࢲݔ҂ႿBeen LonChen(2000[3]),ࠧթડቀൈ,Ϝ4B=Aބ4*=AEսೆൔ(24)֥Ⴗ(1+B)ᄝฦඥ౦ྙ༯֥ቋႪඥੱࡼۚႿBarro֥ቋႪඥ.ੱၹՎ,Ч໓֥ࢲݔ۷ऎ၂Ϯш,Ⴗш1-SB==1-A=1,.ྟ1-E(1+B)S1-Aൔ(20)֩Ⴟਬ,֤܄܋Ӂz֥ቋႪܿଆູቐшᇏA&1-A,F,AI(0,1),෮ၛ[(1-F)E]<1.ᆃ۱่ࡱၩڪϧߌ༯֥ࣜ࠶ᄹӉੱࡼ۬ཬႿ҂թ *=1 1+ 1 -2,(23)ᄝڪϧߌ༯֥ࣜ࠶ᄹӉੱ,ࠧ$<Cn.ᄵ܄܋Ӂg1֥ቋႪܿଆູ3 ࢲંࠣᆟҦݣၬ1- *=1-1 1+ 1 -2.(24)Ⴎൔ(21)֤ቋႪӲـੱູЧ໓ࡹ৫၂۱ॉ੮ඥ൬ڪϧބ܄܋ᆦԛڪϧ֥ࣜ࠶ᄹӉଆՖંഈটฐษҍᆟڪϧྛູࠣః႕ *(1+ ) =1p14(1- )[ (1+ )- -(1-p1)b.]ཙ.๙ݖଆٳ༅,Ч໓֤ԛೂ༯ࠎЧࢲં:ֻ၂,(25)ҍᆟڪϧࢆ֮ದሧЧ֥߭Б,ੱӌഅ֥ളӁ৯թᄝඥ൬ᆳمڪϧ౦ྙᇏ,֒ඥༀದჴؿགྷฦ༯ࢆ,ቋᇔቅθᆜุࣜ࠶ᄹӉ.ֻؽ,ቋႪඥੱॖିඥྛູൈ,൳০ၭ౺,ඥༀದჴაବඥದॖିթᄝնႿࠇཬႿBarro֥ቋႪඥੱ,౼थႿᆘඥིੱބ܋ଔྛູ.ೂݔඥༀದჴᇶԷሿ෬ߴ,෬ߴح֮࿙ሿႄؿ֥ྛᆟӮЧ.ֻ,ਆᇕো֥܄܋ᆦԛႅႿฦඥӲ,ـѩಒಪฦඥದჴ҂߶ۡૡ,طॖၛฦݣሢڪϧթᄝ֥ၞӱ؇,ၛࠣؓܲჴྛູӁള֥хޅטҰ,ପહڪϧӮູඥༀದჴቋࡄ࿊ᄴ;ೂݔ҂ ࠗৣ ቔႨ,Ֆط౷܄܋ᆦԛࢲܒི.ੱֻବඥದ๙ݖྛߴࣉྛฦඥࠆ֤֥൬ၭۚႿྛߴᆦඹ,ᄹ఼ᇅ؇ჿඏ৯ؓسᇅҍᆟڪϧᇀܱᇗေ.
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