?냪ꗟ꒤ꑳꑪ뻇ꗸ띾뫞뉺곣ꡳ꧒?뫓ꑨ뷗ꓥ????䥓?꣢걱ꥷ믹뭐껸뙏뫖ꝑ꒧곣ꡳ????뻉뇐뇂ꅇꓽ믱ꗍ?돕ꑨ??녩맅?돕ꑨ?곣?ꡳ?ꗍꅇ룢뒼뚯?벶?꒤뗘ꗁ냪ꑋꑑꑅ꙾꒻ꓫꑀꓩ
뷗ꓥ멋굮 뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾ꑪꙨ뇄ꗎ꣢걱ꥷ믹ꩫ(two-part tariff)ꅃ꧒뿗ꪺ꣢걱ꥷ믹ꩫꅁ둎걏ꗎꓡꡃ귓ꓫ낣ꑆꖲ믝ꓤꕉꑀ떧ꥷꪺꓫ꾲뙏ꕾꅁ쇙믝뻚ꑀ귓ꓫ꒺ꪺ셠벷놵껉볆ꅁꕈꥷꪺ돦ꛬ뙏뉶ꕴꛦꓤꕉ뙏ꗎꅃ 뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾낣ꑆ뇄ꗎ돦ꑀ뙏뉶닕Ꙙꕾꅁꟳ껸뙏믝ꡄꓴ럇ꪺ깴늧ꅁ뒣꣑Ꙩ궫ꪺ뙏뉶닕Ꙙꅁ엽ꗎꓡꛛꛦ뿯뻜ꅃ덯꣢뫘뙏뉶닕Ꙙꪺꓨꚡꅁ꓀ꝏꙢꖫ돵ꑗꚨꪺ믹껦쑶ꪧꞡ뿅ꅁ맯꧳껸뙏뫖ꝑꓨ궱ꚳ꛳뱶암깴늧ꅈ걏ꝟꙢ꣢뫘ꥷ믹ꓨꚡꑕꅁꙐ볋라릳Ꙣ뽗ꕥꖫ돵떲멣ꑀ볋ꅁ뎣믝굮쓫겹뎡꓀ꪺ껸뙏돑빬ꅈ덯걏Ꙣꕈꦹ꣢걱ꥷ믹믹껦쑶ꪧꪺꓥ쑭꒤ꅁꖼ뒿쒲ꪺ냝썄ꅃ ꖻ곣ꡳꝑꗎLogit볒ꮬ결냲슦ꪺ늣ꭾ깴늧꓆믝ꡄ꣧볆ꅁ덝ꗟ꣢귓꣢걱ꥷ믹ꪺ맨쑶ꪧ볒ꮬꅁ꓀ꝏ꓀꩒돦ꑀ뙏뉶닕Ꙙ껉꒧ꞡ뿅ꅁ뭐덺륌꣢닕뙏뉶닕Ꙙꕈ냏륪낪ꝃ믝ꡄꗎꓡ껉꒧ꞡ뿅ꕂ낵ꓱ룻ꯡꅁ녯꣬ꕈꑕꪺ떲ꩇꅇ 1. Ꙣ맨쑶ꪧꪺꖫ돵떲멣ꑕꅁꗎꓡ꧒녯꣬ꪺ껸뙏돑빬ꅁꖼꖲ라ꙝ뱴냓뇄ꛦ꣢걱ꥷ믹ꛓ덑ꭉ뭫거뫉ꅆ럭뱴냓ꞡ뇄냏륪ꗎꓡ꒧믹껦떦늤껉ꅁꚳꕩ꿠Ꙑ껉뒣꣢쏾ꗎꓡꪺ껸뙏돑빬ꅃ 2. ꙰ꩇꗎꓡ뚡ꪺ낾ꙮ꒣꙳Ꙣꗴ꛳깴늧ꅁꭨ뱴냓꧒뒣꣑ꪺ돦ꑀ뙏뉶닕Ꙙꅁ녎끨꓆ꚨ뵵꧊ꥷ믹ꅁꛓꭄ꣢걱ꥷ믹ꅃ놩ꚳꗎꓡ뚡ꪺ낾ꙮ꙳ꚳ깴늧껉ꅁ뱴냓꧒뇄ꛦ꒧돦ꑀ뙏뉶닕Ꙙꥬ결꣢걱ꥷ믹ꅁ돦ꛬ뙏뉶녎굱Ꙣ돦ꛬꚨꖻꪺꓴ럇ꅁꓫ꾲뙏ꭨ쁈뗛ꗎꓡ뚡ꪺ깴늧뒣낪ꅁꕂ뱴냓ꪺꝑ볭ꑝꙝꛓ뱗ꕛꅃ 3. ꙰ꩇ뱴냓ꞡ뇄냏륪ꗎꓡꪺ믹껦떦늤ꅁ돌ꯡꪺꞡ뿅ꚳꙨ뫘쏾ꮬꅁꕩ꿠걏맯뫙ꞡ뿅ꅁꑝꕩ꿠걏꒣맯뫙ꞡ뿅ꅃ ꒤ꑳꑪ뻇ꗸ띾뫞뉺곣ꡳ꧒ 룢뒼뚯 I
THESIS ABSTRACT The bulk of Internet Service Providers adopt two-part tariff. Two-part tariff means users should pay a fixed rental every month, and pay a varied fee base on their connecting hours. Internet Service Provider group their customers by analyzing customer’s demand level, and provides different group different Pay-Rating. We call this situation Multiple Pay-Rating. If Internet Service Provider provide their customers single Pay-Rating. We call this situation Single Pay-Rating. People always analyze two-part tariff in monopoly market. In this thesis I will analyze two-part tariff in oligopoly compare with the former, and we will know whether two-part tariff erode customer’s welfare. I will create a differentiate-product demand function base on Logit model, and build two-part tariff oligopoly competition model. Analyze the equilibrium in Single Pay-rating and in Multiple Pay-rating. And I drew several conclusions from the analysis. 1. In oligopoly market structure two-part tariff not necessarily deprive of customer’s welfare. On the contrary if ISP group their customers, customer’s welfare will improve. 2. If there are no differentiation between customers’ utilities, nonlinear pricing will degraded to linear pricing. If customers’ utilities are different, ISP will set up the unit connect fee equal to the unit cost, and the month rental will raised with the increasing differentiation between customers’ utilities. 3. If Internet service provider group their customer and provide them different Pay-rating, the final equilibrium will be symmetrical equilibrium or non-symmetrical equilibrium. ꒤ꑳꑪ뻇ꗸ띾뫞뉺곣ꡳ꧒ 룢뒼뚯 II
ꗘ 뿽 뭸 쇂 쏣_______________________________뿹뭾! ꥼꖼꥷ롱껑엒ꅃ 뷗ꓥ멋굮________________________________________________I THESIS ABSTRACT______________________________________II ꗘ 뿽_______________________________________________III 닄ꑀ뎹ꅂ뫼뷗____________________________________________1 닄ꑀ론ꅂ곣ꡳ굉뒺뭐냊뻷_____________________________________1 닄ꑇ론ꅂ곣ꡳꗘꪺ___________________________________________3 닄ꑔ론ꅂ곣ꡳ걹땻___________________________________________4 닄ꑇ뎹ꅂꓥ쑭놴끑뭐뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑ꖫ돵랧ꩰ꓀꩒___________5 닄ꑀ론ꅂ맨ꖫ돵ꪺ띎롱꽓꧊_______________________________5 닄ꑇ론ꅂ늣ꭾ쑶ꪧ떦늤뭐ꭄ뵵꧊ꥷ믹볒ꚡ_______________________7 닄ꑔ론ꅂ뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾슲꒶__________________________15 닄ꕼ론ꅂ뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑ꖫ돵ꑕꪺ덗볒롧샙__________________19 닄ꑔ뎹ꅂISP꣢걱ꥷ믹ꩫ꒧믹껦쑶ꪧ볒ꮬ____________________21 닄ꑀ론ꅂꭥꢥ______________________________________________21 닄ꑇ론ꅂ볒ꮬ덝ꥷ__________________________________________23 닄ꑔ론ꅂ돦ꑀ뙏뉶닕Ꙙ꒧ꞡ뿅________________________________27 닄ꕼ론ꅂ냏륪ꗎꓡ꒧뙏뉶닕Ꙙꞡ뿅____________________________29 닄ꕼ뎹ꅂ떲뷗뭐ꯘ쒳_____________________________________36 닄ꑀ론ꅂ곣ꡳ떲뷗__________________________________________36 닄ꑇ론ꅂ곣ꡳ궭꣮__________________________________________37 냑ꛒꓥ쑭_______________________________________________38 뿽ꑀꅂ볒ꮬ뇀뻉_______________________________________41 ꒤ꑳꑪ뻇ꗸ띾뫞뉺곣ꡳ꧒ 룢뒼뚯 III
닄ꑀ뎹ꅂ뫼뷗 닄ꑀ론ꅂ곣ꡳ굉뒺뭐냊뻷 닄ꑀ뎹ꅂ뫼뷗 닄ꑀ론ꅂ곣ꡳ굉뒺뭐냊뻷 ꅵꙢ뫴믚뫴룴ꑗꑔ귓ꓫꪺ엜꓆둎꙰Ꙑꑔ꙾ꪺ엜꓆ꑀ볋ꑪꅃꅶꚹ룜쇶룘녩ꅁ륄ꕘꑆ뫴믚뫴룴붴꭫땯깩ꪺ꽵맪꧊ꅃ맯ꑀ꿫ꑈꛓꢥꅁ뫴믚뫴룴걏뭠뚰룪끔ꅂ껸뮺깔볖ꪺꑵ꣣ꅆ맯ꗸ띾꣓뮡ꅁ걏ꑀ뚵궫굮ꪺ랾덱둃꒶ꑵ꣣ꅁꑝ걏ꑀ뚵ꗍ끝ꑵ꣣ꅃ ꛛ1991꙾과냪NSF(National Science Foundation) 룑낣뫴믚뫴룴냓띾ꗎ덾ꪺ롔ꕏ꒧ꯡꅁ뫴믚뫴룴ꡃ꙾ꪺ꣏ꗎꑈ볆늣띾덗볒뎣ꕈ궿볆ꚨꪺꓨꚡꟖ덴뱗ꕛꅃꙕ냪걆ꦲ결뒣냪깡쑶ꪧꑏꅁ띦ꑗ뫴믚뫴룴몡룼냓뻷ꪺꑤ셈꙾ꙃꢮꅁ뒣꣑덜Ꙩ쁵둦뇸ꗳꅁ릪쁹땯깩뫴룴냲슦ꯘ덝ꅁꭐ꣏뫴룴롧샙Ꟗ덴ꚨꅃ 륱뢣ꑵ띾꙾얲ꕘꅁ1999꙾ꗾ뉹뫴룴꣏ꗎꑈꑦ뱗ꕛ3,520롕ꑈꅁ롧녠꣏ꗎ뫴룴ꪺꗎꓡ볆Ꙩ륆믵ꑈꅁꗾ뉹뫴믚뫴룴ꪺ꣏ꗎ꒴꯹쓲ꚨ꒤ꅁꙢ2002꙾껉ꗾ뉹뫴ꑈ볆녎ꕩ륆꣬4믵9ꑤ롕ꑈꅁꗧꝙꡃꑤꑈ꒤ꚳꑈꑗ뫴ꅁꛓ뇆ꙗꭥ15ꙗ냪깡ꪺ뫴ꑈ볆녎ꗾ뉹뫴셠볆ꪺ 82 ꉈꅃ뫴믚뫴룴꧒멣ꚨꪺ뗪샀뚡ꅝCyberspaceꅞ꒺ꪺꟆ뇦때뵡ꅁꟳ쒭싃뗛썥ꑪꪺ냓뻷ꅁꙢꕩ륷ꢣꪺꖼ꣓ꅁ뫴믚뫴룴녎ꚨ결ꑈ귌꒣ꕩ꿊ꪺꑵ꣣ꅁ걏뮡ꅁ뫴믚뫴룴녎ꚨ결ꝁꅂꗍ겡ꪺꑀ뎡ꗷꅃ 뫴믚뫴룴맯ꗾꕀ곉ꪺꑈ귌꣓뮡ꅁ뎣걏ꑀ귓맱띳ꪺꕀ곉ꅃꚳꑈ뮡ꖼ꣓둎걏뫴룴ꕀ곶ꅁ뫴룴냓띾ꪺꚨ뚡뭐ꗦ꧶덗볒ꅁ녎ꥍ뛇닎냓띾ꫀ라ꑀ볋썥ꑪꅆꗘꭥꗾ뉹뫴꾸쇶ꑷꙨ꒣ꕩ볆ꅁ땍ꛓ곛맯꧳뛇닎냓띾ꛓꢥꅁ꒴땍걏ꑀꓹ썭ꅁ뫴룴뗛맪걏ꑀ귓ꕒ몡뻷라ꪺꙡꓨꅃ1996꙾과냪걹ꛦꑀꕹ룜ꅇꅵInternet mirrors our lifeꅶꅁ둎걏뮡ꖼ꣓Ꙣ뛇닎냓띾ꫀ라ꚳꪺꑀ꓁ꅁꙢ뫴룴ꑗ녎라ꕘ뉻꒬곛맯삳ꪺ띾엩ꅃꕈꕸ왗ꛓꢥꅁ1999꙾꦳ꅁ껚뻚닎군ꗾ곙뫴꾸셠볆걏ꑔꑤꙨ귓ꅁꛓ꒽ꕱꛦ뢹뭐냓띾맪엩낪륆ꑀꛊ롕깡ꕈꑗꅁ덯꣤꒤ꪺ깴늧ꅁ꒤ꑳꑪ뻇ꗸ띾뫞뉺곣ꡳ꧒ 룢뒼뚯 1
닄ꑀ뎹ꅂ뫼뷗 닄ꑀ론ꅂ곣ꡳ굉뒺뭐냊뻷 둎걏뫴룴ꖼ꣓ꪺꚨ뚡뭐때ꓱꪺ뻷라ꅃ 뫴믚뫴룴Ꙣ냪꒺ꪺ뾳끟걏꫱둘꙾ꪺꅁꙐ볋ꪺꅁ뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾(Internet Service Provider; ISP)ꪺ땯깩껉뚡ꑝ꒣ꅁ덜Ꙩ뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾꒣걏녱뫴룴늣띾륱뢣늣ꭾ뭳덹냓룳ꑊ롧샧ꅁ둎걏꣣ꚳ뫴룴꡴닎뻣Ꙙ롧엧굉뒺ꪺ뱴냓녱띾ꑈ귻돐덝ꅃ맯뻣Ꙙ둃엩ꅂ덱끔ꅂ륱뢣ꥍꖫ돵ꛦ빐ꗦ꧶ꪺ뫴믚뫴룴꣓뮡ꅁ쁈뗛껉뚡ꪺ면뙩ꅁꕛꑊꪺ굉뒺ꑝ뙖쇍Ꙩ꒸꓆ꅁꓗ꣤륱ꑬ냓냈ꪺ땯깩ꅁꟳꝬꓞꑆ믈ꛦꥍꭈꗎꕤ띾ꪺ뙩ꑊꅃꙝ결Ꙣ뫴룴ꑗꪺꩁ냈ꓩ몥뱗Ꙩꅁꗘꭥ냪꒺곹ꚳ꒭ꑑ깡ꕈꑗꪺ뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾ꅁꕂ꒴Ꙣꢳ덴뱗ꕛ럭꒤ꅁꙢꗾꕀ곉뫴믚뫴룴Ꟗ덴ꚨꅁ냪꒺ꑪꑏ뇀냊ꪺ놡ꩰꑕꅁꕩ륷듁냪꒺뫴믚뫴룴ꗎꓡ라ꚨꕴꑀ륤ꑪꪺꖫ돵냏륪ꅃ껚뻚룪떦라룪끔쥝돵놡돸꒤ꓟꅝMICꅞꪺ닎군룪껆ꅁ1999꙾ꕸ왗뫴룴ꩁ냈쥝돵덗볒륆믵꒸ꅁ룻1998꙾꒧믵꒸ꚨ48%ꅁ꣤꒤ꅁ뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾ꭋꑆ55%ꅃ 뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾낣ꑆ뇄ꗎ돦ꑀ뙏뉶닕Ꙙꕾꅁꟳ껸뙏믝ꡄꓴ럇ꪺ깴늧ꅁ뒣꣑Ꙩ궫ꪺ뙏뉶닕Ꙙꅁ엽ꗎꓡꛛꛦ뿯뻜ꅃ덯꣢뫘뙏뉶닕Ꙙꪺꓨꚡꅁ꓀ꝏꙢꖫ돵ꑗꚨꪺ믹껦쑶ꪧꞡ뿅ꅁ맯꧳껸뙏뫖ꝑꓨ궱ꚳ꛳뱶암깴늧ꅈ걏ꝟꙢ꣢뫘ꥷ믹ꓨꚡꑕꅁꙐ볋라릳Ꙣ뽗ꕥꖫ돵떲멣ꑀ볋ꅁ뎣믝굮쓫겹뎡꓀ꪺ껸뙏돑빬(Tirole,1988)ꅈ덯걏Ꙣꕈꦹ꣢걱ꥷ믹믹껦쑶ꪧꪺꓥ쑭꒤ꅁꖼ뒿쒲ꪺ냝썄ꅁꑝ걏ꖻ곣ꡳꕄ굮ꪺ곣ꡳꓨꙖꅃ 2 ꒤ꑳꑪ뻇ꗸ띾뫞뉺곣ꡳ꧒ 룢뒼뚯
닄ꑀ뎹ꅂ뫼뷗 닄ꑇ론ꅂ곣ꡳꗘꪺ 닄ꑇ론ꅂ곣ꡳꗘꪺ 뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾ꪺ롧샧떦늤뭐뫴믚뫴룴ꪺ땯깩꺧꺧곛쏶ꅁ꧒ꚳꪺ뫴룴냓뻷ꞹꗾꯘ멣Ꙣ뫴믚뫴룴ꪺ냲ꖻꯘ덝ꑗꅁ꧒ꚳꪺ꣏ꗎ굮뙩ꑊ덯맚ꓛꪺ뗪샀ꕀ곉ꅁ곒뚷덺륌뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾ꅁ뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾ꚨꑆ덯뗪샀ꕀ곉ꪺꙵ귻ꅁꗑꚹꕩꪾꅁ뫻쎴Ꙣꚹꪺ냓뻷걏꙰ꚹ엥ꑈꅁꙝꛓ뻉교ꙕꑪ끝많ꗸ띾꿉꿉띑꓀궹덯뛴ꑪ믦ꅁꙢ덯늣띾꒤ꅁꣃꭄꑈꑈ뎣꿠녯ꑀ깵꒧ꙡꅁ굮뙩ꑊ덯ꑀ귓늣띾ꅁ꒣뛈믝굮ꑊ낪썂ꪺ룪ꅁꟳ뚷궱맯쑶ꪧ뉲꽐ꪺ삻ꅁꕈ늳Ꙩ볧Ꙣ뙩ꑊꪺ싑뿌ꅃ 뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾ꑪꙨ뇄ꗎ꣢걱ꥷ믹ꩫ(Two-part Tariff)ꅃ꧒뿗ꪺ꣢걱ꥷ믹ꩫꅁ둎걏ꗎꓡꡃ귓ꓫ낣ꑆꖲ믝ꓤꕉꑀ떧ꥷꪺꓫ꾲뙏ꕾꅁ쇙믝뻚ꑀ귓ꓫ꒺ꪺ셠벷놵껉볆ꅁꕈꥷꪺ돦ꛬ뙏뉶ꕴꛦꓤꕉ뙏ꗎꅃ 뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾낣ꑆ뇄ꗎ돦ꑀ뙏뉶닕Ꙙꕾꅁꟳ껸뙏믝ꡄꓴ럇ꪺ깴늧ꅁ뒣꣑Ꙩ궫ꪺ뙏뉶닕Ꙙꅁ엽ꗎꓡꛛꛦ뿯뻜ꅃ덯꣢뫘뙏뉶닕Ꙙꪺꓨꚡꅁ꓀ꝏꙢꖫ돵ꑗꚨꪺ믹껦쑶ꪧꞡ뿅ꅁ맯꧳껸뙏뫖ꝑꓨ궱ꚳ꛳뱶암깴늧ꅈ걏ꝟꙢ꣢뫘ꥷ믹ꓨꚡꑕꅁꙐ볋라릳Ꙣ뽗ꕥꖫ돵떲멣ꑀ볋ꅁ뎣믝굮쓫겹뎡꓀ꪺ껸뙏돑빬(Tirole,1988)ꅈ덯걏Ꙣꕈꦹ꣢걱ꥷ믹믹껦쑶ꪧꪺꓥ쑭꒤ꅁꖼ뒿쒲ꪺ냝썄ꅃ ꙝꚹꖻ곣ꡳꪺꕄ굮ꗘꪺ꙰ꑕꅇ 1. ꯘꗟ맨믹껦쑶ꪧ볒ꮬꅁꗎꕈ꓀꩒뱴냓뇄ꗎ꣢걱ꥷ믹ꩫ꧒ꚨꪺꞡ뿅ꅃ 2. ꕈꚹ맨믹껦쑶ꪧ볒ꮬ결냲슦ꅁ꓀꩒뱴냓ꞡ뇄돦ꑀ꣢걱ꥷ믹뙏뉶ꅁ뭐ꞡ뇄냏륪낪ꝃ믝ꡄ꒧꣢걱ꥷ믹뙏뉶닕Ꙙ꣢뫘놡ꅁꣃ꓀꩒Ꙣ꣢뫘뙏뉶꣮ꯗꑕꅁ걏ꝟꚳ뎡꓀껸뙏꒧껸뙏돑빬ꅁ덑뱴냓꧒ꞹꗾꭉ뭫ꅃ ꒤ꑳꑪ뻇ꗸ띾뫞뉺곣ꡳ꧒ 룢뒼뚯 3
닄ꑀ뎹ꅂ뫼뷗 닄ꑔ론ꅂ곣ꡳ걹땻 닄ꑔ론ꅂ곣ꡳ걹땻 ꖻ곣ꡳꑀꓨ궱냑ꛒ냪꒺뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈띾ꪺ곛쏶룪껆ꅁ꓀꩒ꖫ돵떲멣뭐꽓꧊ꅆꑀꓨ궱곣얪맨ꖫ돵ꪺ뉺뷗뭐곛쏶ꓥ쑭ꅁꕘ돌빁럭ꪺ롧샙볒ꚡ맯삳떦늤ꅁꙁꕈ볆뻇ꓨꩫ뇀뷗볒ꚡ꓀꩒떲ꩇꅃ룔닓ꪺ곣ꡳ걹땻꙰ꑕꅇ 뵔뭻냝썄ꚬ뚰뭐놴끑ꅅꚬ뚰냪꒺ꕾ뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뱴냓꒧뉻ꩰ룪껆ꅃ곛쏶ꓥ쑭ꅅ곣얪맨뉺뷗곛쏶ꓥ쑭ꅇ삳꣧볆ꅂStackelberg볒†ꚡꅂ늣ꭾꥷꛬ믹껦떦늤ꅃ꓀꩒ꖫ돵떲멣ꅅ뱴냓덗볒ꅂꖫ돵ꚳ뉶늣띾뚰꒤ꯗ꣓Ꝑꥷꖫ돵떲멣ꯘꗟ빁럭ꖫ돵ꅅ뵔ꥷ볒ꚡ꒸꿀ꅁꯘꗟꙘ뉺ꪺ껄ꗎ꣧볆ꅂꖫ돵ꚳ뉶꣧쑶ꪧ볒ꮬ†볆ꅁ뙩ꛓ뇀뻉ꕘ믝ꡄ꣧볆ꅃ곣ꡳ볒ꮬ뇀뻉ꅅ뇀뻉ꖫ돵꒤ꕩ꿠ꪺꙕ뫘놡ꩰꅁꣃ꓀꩒뱴냓뇄꣺꣢걱ꥷ믹†ꩫ껉꧒ꚨꪺꞡ뿅ꅃꅅ꓀꩒뱴냓ꞡ뇄돦ꑀ꣢걱ꥷ믹뙏뉶ꅁ뭐ꞡ뇄냏륪낪ꝃ믝ꡄ곣ꡳ떲ꩇ꓀꩒†꒧꣢걱ꥷ믹뙏뉶닕Ꙙ꣢뫘놡ꅃꅅ꓀꩒Ꙣ꣢뫘뙏뉶꣮ꯗꑕꅁ걏ꝟꚳ뎡꓀껸뙏꒧껸뙏돑†빬ꅁ덑뱴냓꧒ꞹꗾꭉ뭫ꅃ떲뷗뭐ꯘ쒳4 ꒤ꑳꑪ뻇ꗸ띾뫞뉺곣ꡳ꧒ 룢뒼뚯
닄ꑇ뎹ꅂꓥ쑭놴끑뭐뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑ꖫ돵랧ꩰ꓀꩒ 닄ꑀ론ꅂ맨ꖫ돵ꪺ띎롱꽓꧊ 닄ꑇ뎹ꅂꓥ쑭놴끑뭐뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑ꖫ돵랧ꩰ꓀꩒ 닄ꑀ론ꅂ맨ꖫ돵ꪺ띎롱꽓꧊ Ꙣ롧샙뻇ꪺ믢냬꒤ꅁꖫ돵떲멣ꅝMarket Structureꅞꕎꫭ뗛뱴냓ꥍ껸뙏뙩ꛦ겡냊ꪺꖫ돵닕ꚨꮬ멁ꅃꖫ돵떲멣ꪺ쑶ꪧ꧊ꪺ걏귓ꝏ뱴냓맯꣤늣ꭾ믹껦꣤빐냢뇸ꗳꪺ뱶암ꑏꅁꣃ꒣걏ꑀ꿫뱴냓ꦼꚹ뉯꣮ꅁ꒬곛쑶ꪧꪺ별맯ꛦ결ꅃ 롧샙뻇ꑗꕄ굮곣ꡳ뱴냓맯늣ꭾ믹껦ꪺ뱶암ꑏꅁꛓ뱴냓맯믹껦ꪺ뱶암ꑏꅁꑓꡍꥷꙢꖫ돵ꑗꚳꙨꓖ쑶ꪧꅁꙝꚹ럓ꖫ돵쑶ꪧꪺꞹꗾ뭐ꝟꅁ녎ꖫ돵떲멣냏꓀결ꕼ뫘쏾ꮬꅁꞹꗾ쑶ꪧꖫ돵ꅝPerfect Competitionꅞꅂ뽗ꖫ돵(Monopoly Market)ꅂ뽗꧊쑶ꪧꖫ돵(Monopolistic Competitive Market)맨ꖫ돵ꅝOligopoly Marketꅞꅃ ꕸ왗ꙡ냏ꪺ뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈ꖫ돵ꅁꗘꭥ압ꯈꑪꙨ뚰꒤ꙢHinetꅂSeednetꅂAPOL떥둘깡ꑪ뱴냓꒤ꅁ꣤쑶ꪧꮬ멁ꕩ쉫쓝꧳맨쑶ꪧꖫ돵ꅃ꧒뿗맨ꖫ돵걏Ꙣꑀ귓롧샙ꖫ돵꒤ꅁꚳꓖ볆둘깡뱴냓뒣꣑Ꙑꑀ뫘늣ꭾꅁꛓ꣤꒤ꗴ꛳ꑀ깡뱴냓ꪺꡍ떦ꛦ냊ꅁ곒ꢬꕈ뱶암꣬꣤ꕌ쑶ꪧ뱴냓ꪺ빐룴뭐ꝑ볭ꅆꙝꚹꡃꑀ깡뱴냓곒뚷뭻ꪾ꣤ꖻꢭꙢ믹껦ꥍ볆뙱ꑗꪺ엜냊ꅁ녎라뮤꣏꣤쑶ꪧ뱴냓낵ꕘ꧊뷨곛Ꙑꪺꡍꥷꕛꕈꙝ삳(녩뉍럋ꅁ1991)ꅃ랧걁ꛓꢥꅁ맨ꖫ돵뻖ꚳꑕꙃ둘뚵꽓뷨ꅇ 1. 뱴냓ꪺ볆ꗘ꒣Ꙩꅁ걇ꡃꑀ깡뱴냓뎣ꚳ룻낪ꓱ꣒ꪺꖫ돵ꚳ뉶ꅁꕂ돌궫굮ꪺꖫ돵냓뚡꣣ꚳ낪ꯗꪺ곛꒬꙳ꯗ쑶ꪧ꧊ꅁ뱴냓뚡곛꒬뿠ꑝ곛꒬뉯꣮ꅃ 2. 맨ꖫ돵꒤늣ꭾꪺ꧊뷨ꕩ결Ꙑ뷨걏늧뷨ꪺꅆ굙맨뱴냓ꗍ늣Ꙑ뷨ꪺ늣ꭾꅁ뫙결ꅵꙐ뷨맨ꅶꅆ꒧ꅁꭨ뫙결ꅵ늧뷨맨ꅶꅁꙢ뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈ꖫ돵ꅁꗑ꧳ꙕ깡뱴냓꧒뒣꣑ꪺꩁ냈쁗뱥곒ꚳ꧒꒣Ꙑꅁ꧒ꕈ삳결ꅵ늧뷨맨ꕥꖫ돵ꅶꅃ ꒤ꑳꑪ뻇ꗸ띾뫞뉺곣ꡳ꧒ 룢뒼뚯 5
닄ꑇ뎹ꅂꓥ쑭놴끑뭐뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑ꖫ돵랧ꩰ꓀꩒ 닄ꑀ론ꅂ맨ꖫ돵ꪺ띎롱꽓꧊ 3. 맨ꖫ돵꒤ꅁꑪꙨ걏믝굮썥ꑪꪺ룪ꖻꑊ낪덎꓆ꪺ늣띾ꅁ뱴냓녠싇ꗑ걉ꛦ덗볒롧샙ꗍ늣ꛓ샲ꝑꅁ꧒ꕈꗍ늣굮꿀ꪺ늾냊꧊룻ꝃꅁ뱴냓뙩ꕘꖫ돵꒣꧶ꅁ뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑ꖫ돵ꑕꪺ덗볒롧샙ꕩ냑ꛒ닄ꑇ뎹닄ꕼ론ꪺ뮡ꧺꅃ 4. 맨ꖫ돵꒤ꅁ뱴냓귝ꦼꚹ꙳꧊낪ꅁ결쇗ꝋ믹껦ꑗꪺ둣꧊쑶ꪧꅁ걇ꭄ믹껦쑶ꪧ랥결늱ꛦꅁ꣒꙰뒣낪늣ꭾꭾ뷨ꅂ뱗ꕛ뱳ꝩꭐ빐ꓢ걱ꅂꕛ녪압ꯈꩁ냈떥ꅃ 냲ꖻꑗꅁ뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈ꖫ돵Ꙣ덜Ꙩꓨ궱뎣뻖ꚳ뭐맨ꖫ돵곛Ꙑꪺ꽓꧊ꅃ뫴믚뫴룴ꪺꯘꗟꥍ뫻앀ꖻꢭ걏ꑀ뫘룻낪덎꓆ꪺꑵꝀꅁꕂ뱴냓굙뇽Ꙣꚹꖫ돵ꑗꗟꢬꅁꑀꥷꖲ뚷쉘ꑪ압ꯈ롳ꅁꕈ륆꣬덗볒롧샙ꅃ셁룑ꣃ둸뒤덯꽓뷨ꚳꝕ꧳꓀꩒덯늣띾꒺ꪺ쑶ꪧ멁뛕ꅃ 6 ꒤ꑳꑪ뻇ꗸ띾뫞뉺곣ꡳ꧒ 룢뒼뚯
닄ꑇ뎹ꅂꓥ쑭놴끑뭐뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑ꖫ돵랧ꩰ꓀꩒ 닄ꑇ론ꅂ늣ꭾ쑶ꪧ떦늤뭐ꭄ뵵꧊ꥷ믹볒ꚡ 닄ꑇ론ꅂ늣ꭾ쑶ꪧ떦늤뭐ꭄ뵵꧊ꥷ믹볒ꚡ ꖫ돵쑶ꪧ꒤뱴냓뚡ꪺ쏶ꭙ녋꓁ꅁꗴꑀ뱴냓ꪺꡍꥷ뎣ꕩ꿠뱶암꣬꣤ꕌ뱴냓ꪺ뻜ꅁꙝꚹꗴꑀ뱴냓Ꙣ뇄꣺ꛦ냊ꭥꖲ뚷뇀듺꣤ꕌ뱴냓라뇄꣺꛳뫘맯삳놹걉ꅁꑝ둎걏맯쑶ꪧ뱴냓꧒뇄꣺ꛦ냊낵ꕘꙕ뫘꒣Ꙑꪺ낲덝ꅁꛓ쁈뗛덯낲덝ꪺ꒣ꙐꅁꭨꓞꕘꙨ뫘꒣Ꙑꪺ뉺뷗볒ꮬꅃ Cournot볒ꚡ 맨ꖫ돵ꪺ끑뷗ꕩ뮷랹ꛜ16ꕀ곶ꅁ땍ꛓ룻ꖿꚡꪺ뉺뷗걛멣ꭨꕩ뇀셼ꩫ냪볆뉺뻇깡Cournot(1838)Ꙣꆧ끝둉뉺뷗볆뉺귬ꭨ꒧곣ꡳꆨꑀ껑꒤맯맨뉺뷗꧒뒣ꕘꪺ놴끑ꅃ Cournot볒ꚡ걏낲덝ꖫ돵꒤ꚳꑇ깡뱴냓ꗍ늣Ꙑ뷨늣ꭾ(homogeneous)ꅁ뇄꣺곛Ꙑꪺ믹껦ꅁꕂ늣ꭾꪺ믝ꡄ꣧볆ꑷꪾꅁ뱴냓뚡때꓄떲(collusion)ꛦ결ꕘ뉻ꅁ뱴냓곒끬ꡄ돌ꑪꝑ볭ꅁꡃꑀ뱴냓Ꙣꡍꥷ꣤ꛛꢭ늣뙱껉ꅁ곒낲덝맯ꓨ꒣라뇄꣺ꙝ삳ꛦ냊ꅁꙢCournotꪺ볒ꚡ꒤ꅁ쇴ꝴ뗛꣢깡뱴냓곒결(follower)ꪺ낲덝ꅁꙝꚹ꣢뱴냓곒꙳ꚳ삳꣧볆(reaction function)(Friedman, 1973)ꅁꛓCournot볒ꚡꪺꞡ뿅쉉ꅁ꣢뱴냓삳꣧볆ꪺꗦ쉉(맏ꑗꪺE쉉)(Eaton and Kierzkowski)ꅃ Bertrand볒ꚡ ꩫ냪볆뉺롧샙뻇깡Bertrand(1883)맯Cournot볒ꚡ꒤뉱듺맯ꓢ늣뙱꒣엜ꪺ낲덝ꅁꕌ뭻결럭ꑀ깡뱴냓뇽엜믹껦껉ꅁ라ꗽ뉱듺ꕌꖻꢭꪺ믹껦엜냊꒣라ꓞ끟ꕴꑀ깡뱴냓ꪺ믹껦엜냊ꅆꙢ덯뫘ꪬꩰꑕꅁ라ꓞ끟뱴냓뽅꽐ꪺꭤ믹쑶ꪧꪽ꣬믹껦떥꧳ꚨꖻ껉ꅁꙝꚹ럭꣢뱴냓ꪺꚨꖻ꒣Ꙑ껉ꅁꗍ늣ꚨꖻ룻낪ꪺ뱴냓녎덑ꖫ돵꧒뉞ꡏꅁ맏ꫭꗜꕘ꣢깡뱴냓뙩ꛦ믹껦쑶ꪧ껉ꪺ꒬냊륌땻ꅁ굙ꚨꖻ결0껉ꅁ돌ꯡꞡ뿅믹껦녎결0ꅃ ꒤ꑳꑪ뻇ꗸ띾뫞뉺곣ꡳ꧒ 룢뒼뚯 7
닄ꑇ뎹ꅂꓥ쑭놴끑뭐뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑ꖫ돵랧ꩰ꓀꩒ 닄ꑇ론ꅂ늣ꭾ쑶ꪧ떦늤뭐ꭄ뵵꧊ꥷ믹볒ꚡ PBRA:PA<PBPA=PBRB:PA>PBPB1PB2PA2PA1PA맏 Betrand볒ꚡ ꕈ삳꣧볆꣓꓀꩒ꅁꋏ뱴냓ꪺ삳꣧볆결RA:PA<PBꅁꋐ뱴냓ꪺ삳꣧볆결RB:PA>PBꅃ굙ꋏ뱴냓궺ꗽꕈPA1뽗앑ꖫ돵ꅁ껚뻚ꋐ뱴냓ꪺ삳꣧볆ꅁꋐ뱴냓라뇄꣺PB1ꅃ놵뗛ꅁꋏ뱴냓ꙁ껚뻚ꛛꑶꪺ삳꣧볆ꅁ뇄꣺PA2ꅃꛓꯡꋐ뱴냓ꭨ라뇄꣺PB2ꅃ꣢뱴냓꒣쉟곛꒬궰믹ꅁꪽ꣬믹껦떥꧳ꚨꖻ껉ꅃ Stackelberg볒ꚡ 뱷냪롧샙뻇깡StackelbergꙢ1934꙾뒣ꕘꑆꕴꑀ뫘ꟳ꣣ꕎꫭ꧊ꪺ맨뉺뷗볒ꚡꅁ꣤볒ꚡ낲덝뱴냓뚡꙳Ꙣ뗛믢뻉(leader)뭐룲쁈(follower)ꪺ쏶ꭙꅁ꧒뿗룲쁈걏꣤늣뙱ꪺ굱ꥷ걏맯ꓢ늣뙱ꪺꙨ맨ꛓꡍꥷꅁꛓꡄ꣺꿠꣏ꖻꢭꝑ볭돌ꑪ꒧늣뙱ꅁꝙ룲쁈라ꚳ삳꣧볆꙳Ꙣꅃꛓ꧒뿗믢뻉ꭨ걏낲덝꣤ꕌ뱴냓결룲쁈ꅁꝙ꣤늣뙱ꪺ굱ꥷ걏뗸꣤맯ꓢꪺ삳꣧볆꣓ꡄ꣺ꖻꢭꝑ볭돌ꑪꪺ늣뙱ꅁ걇ꡓꚳ삳꣧볆ꅃ Stackelberg볒ꚡꕩ꓀ꚨꕼ뫘놡ꩰ꣓끑뷗ꅁꕈ싹쑶ꪧꛦ결ꅂ때꓄떲ꛦ결ꕂ결Ꙑ뷨늣ꭾ결꣒꣓뮡ꧺꅇ ꑀꅂA뱴냓결믢뻉ꅁB뱴냓결룲쁈 A뱴냓ꛛ뭻결믢뻉ꅁꛓB뱴냓ꛛ뭻결룲쁈껉ꅁ꣤ꞡ뿅쉉결A뱴냓ꪺ떥ꝑ볭꣧볆ꚱ뵵뭐B뱴냓ꪺ삳꣧볆ꚱ뵵곛꓁꒧쉉ꅃ꙰맏ꑗꪺF쉉ꅃ 8 ꒤ꑳꑪ뻇ꗸ띾뫞뉺곣ꡳ꧒ 룢뒼뚯
닄ꑇ뎹ꅂꓥ쑭놴끑뭐뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑ꖫ돵랧ꩰ꓀꩒ 닄ꑇ론ꅂ늣ꭾ쑶ꪧ떦늤뭐ꭄ뵵꧊ꥷ믹볒ꚡ ꑇꅂA뱴냓결룲쁈ꅁB뱴냓결믢뻉 A뱴냓ꛛ뭻결룲쁈ꅁꛓB뱴냓ꛛ뭻결믢뻉껉ꅁ꣤ꞡ뿅쉉결A뱴냓ꪺ삳꣧볆ꚱ뵵뭐B뱴냓ꪺ떥ꝑ볭꣧볆ꚱ뵵곛꓁꒧쉉ꅃ꙰맏ꑗꪺG쉉ꅃ ꑔꅂAꅂB뱴냓곒결룲쁈 럭꣢뱴냓곒결룲쁈껉ꅁꝙ결Cournot볒ꚡꅁꞡ뿅쉉결꣢뱴냓삳꣧볆ꚱ뵵ꪺꗦ쉉ꅃ꙰맏ꑗꪺE쉉ꅃ ꕼꅂAꅂB뱴냓곒결믢뻉 럭꣢뱴냓곒결믢뻉껉ꅁ싹ꓨ뎣뉱뿹맯ꓢꪺ삳ꛦ결ꅁStackelberg뭻결ꚹ껉녎결disequilibriumꅁꝙ결맏ꑗꪺH쉉ꅃ qBRAGHEΠBFΠRBA0qA맏 Betrand볒ꚡ Hotelling볒ꚡ 쏶꧳늣ꭾ쑶ꪧ떦늤볒ꮬꅁꙢꚭ듁ꪺꓥ쑭꒤돌ꚳꙗꪺ걏HotellingꙢ1929꙾꧒뒣ꕘꪺꅵ돌ꑰ곛늧귬ꭨ(Principle of Minimum Differentiation)ꅶꅁꙢ볒ꚡ꒤꣢깡뱴냓ꦼꚹ끷맯늣ꭾꥷꛬ쑶ꪧꅁ낲덝ꡃ귓늣ꭾꪺꗍ늣ꚨꖻ곛Ꙑꅁꕂ럭늣ꭾ믹껦곛Ꙑ껉ꅁ압ꯈꪺ뉺띑쉉(ideal point)걏곛늧ꪺꅆHotelling뭻결Ꙣ덯뫘쑶ꪧꪬꩰꑕꅁ결ꑆ쉘ꑪꛛꑶꪺꖫ돵믢냬ꅁ뙩ꑀꡂ뽗덯귓ꖫ돵ꅁ꣢뱴냓곒라뫉ꕩ꿠ꪺ놵꫱쑶ꪧ맯ꓢꅁ돌ꯡꪺꞡ뿅쉉ꭨ걏꣢뱴냓놵녎늣ꭾꥷꛬꙢꖫ꒤ꑳꑪ뻇ꗸ띾뫞뉺곣ꡳ꧒ 룢뒼뚯 9
닄ꑇ뎹ꅂꓥ쑭놴끑뭐뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑ꖫ돵랧ꩰ꓀꩒ 닄ꑇ론ꅂ늣ꭾ쑶ꪧ떦늤뭐ꭄ뵵꧊ꥷ믹볒ꚡ 돵ꪺ꒤ꖡꅃ d’Aspremont GabszewiczꥍThisse볒ꚡ Ꙣ쑶ꪧꖫ돵꒤ꅁꅵ믹껦ꅶꑝ걏ꑀ뚵궫굮ꪺꙝ꿀ꅁ믹껦ꪺ낪ꝃ꿠뱶암껸뙏쇊뙒ꪺ띎쑀ꅁꑝ꿠ꡍꥷ뱴냓꿠ꝟ샲ꝑꅂ꿠ꝟꙢꖫ돵ꑗ녯ꑀ깵꒧ꙡꅃd’Aspremont GabszewiczꥍThisse (1979)뭻결Hotellingꪺ볒ꮬꣃꡓꚳꛒ뱻꣬뱴냓ꕩꕈꝑꗎ믹껦쑶ꪧ꣓ꪧ맜맯ꓢꪺꖫ돵ꅆ굙뱴냓뚡ꕩꕈꭤ믹쑶ꪧꅁꭨHotelling볒ꚡ둎꒣ꚨꗟꅁꕌ귌귗Hotelling볒ꮬꅁꛓꙢ꣤꒤ꕛꑊꑆ믹껦ꙝ꿀ꅁ뭻결뱴냓삳ꕛꑪꛛꑶ늣ꭾ뭐맯ꓢ늣ꭾ뚡ꪺ깴늧꧊ꅁ돌ꯡ꣢깡뱴냓ꪺꞡ뿅쉉삳걏녎늣ꭾꥷꛬꙢꖫ돵ꪺ꣢뫝ꅃ ShakedꥍSutton볒ꚡ ShakedꥍSutton (1982)ꪺ볒ꮬ걏녎늣ꭾꭾ뷨ꪺ낪ꝃ꓀꿅ꅁꛓ늣ꭾꗍ늣ꚨꖻ뭐늣ꭾꭾ뷨뫻꯹녠볆쏶ꭙꅁ럭늣ꭾ믹껦곛Ꙑ껉ꅁ압ꯈꪺ뉺띑쉉ꑝ곛ꙐꅆꙢ덯뫘ꪬꩰꑕꅁ꓀꩒떲ꩇ결뿯뻜ꗍ늣낪ꭾ뷨늣ꭾꪺ뱴냓ꅁꙢꗴ꛳놡ꩰꑕ곒쁵꧳ꗍ늣ꝃꭾ뷨늣ꭾꪺ뱴냓ꅁ꒣뫞뭐쑶ꪧ맯ꓢꪺ늣ꭾ걏Ꙩ믲곛ꅆꙝꚹꕌ귌꧒뇀뻉ꕘꪺ떦늤걏ꑀ깡뱴냓라뿯뻜ꕩ맪ꛦꪬꩰꑕꪺ돌낪ꭾ뷨ꪺ늣ꭾꅁꕴꑀ깡뱴냓ꭨ뿯뻜늤ꝃ꧳닄ꑀ깡뱴냓ꪺꭾ뷨ꓴ럇Ꝁ결ꛛꑶ늣ꭾꪺꭾ뷨떥꿅ꅃ Moorthy볒ꚡ ꛓMoorthy (1988)뻣Ꙙꑆꭥ궱ꪺ볒ꮬꅁ맯늣ꭾꥍ압ꯈ곒낵ꑆ룻ꞹ떽ꪺ곉ꥷꅆꙢ늣ꭾꓨ궱ꅁ녎늣ꭾꭾ뷨낪ꝃ땻ꯗ낵뵵꧊꓀떥ꅁꣃ꒶꧳ꑗꑕ궭꒧뚡ꅁ늣ꭾꪺꗍ늣ꚨꖻ걏쁈ꭾ뷨ꝥꖭꓨꚸꪺ뱗듮ꅆꙢ압ꯈꓨ궱ꅁ압ꯈ쑀띎쇊뙒꒧늣ꭾꭾ뷨ꪺ땻ꯗꅁꑝ녎압ꯈ릺꓀떥꿅ꅁ떥꿅낪ꪺ압ꯈꅁ쑀띎쇊뙒낪ꭾ뷨ꪺ늣ꭾꅁ떥꿅룻ꝃꪺ압ꯈꅁ쑀띎쇊뙒룻ꝃꭾ뷨ꪺ늣ꭾꅆ뱴냓Ꙣ쑶ꪧ껉ꅁ라ꗽ녱늣ꭾꭾ뷨ꥷꛬꅁ늣ꭾ믹껦ꭨ라ꙝꛛꑶꥍ맯ꓢ꒧늣ꭾꭾ뷨ꪺ꒣Ꙑꛓꚳ꧒늧ꅆꙢMoorthyꪺ볒ꮬ꒤ꣃ꒹덜듀ꕎꭾꪺ쑶ꪧꅁꑝ둎걏뮡덯꣢깡뱴냓10 ꒤ꑳꑪ뻇ꗸ띾뫞뉺곣ꡳ꧒ 룢뒼뚯
닄ꑇ뎹ꅂꓥ쑭놴끑뭐뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑ꖫ돵랧ꩰ꓀꩒ 닄ꑇ론ꅂ늣ꭾ쑶ꪧ떦늤뭐ꭄ뵵꧊ꥷ믹볒ꚡ ꣃꡓꚳ뒣꣑늣ꭾ떹ꗾ뎡ꪺꖫ돵ꅁꚳꑀ뎡꓀ꪺ압ꯈ녎라쇊뙒듀ꕎꭾꅃ ꙢMoorthyꪺ볒ꮬ꒤ꅁꑓ꓀ꚨ꣢뱴냓Ꙑ껉뙩ꑊꖫ돵(Simultaneous Entry)ꥍ둠Ꟈ뙩ꑊꖫ돵(Sequential Entry)꣢뫘놡ꩰ꣓꓀꩒ꅃ굙꣢뱴냓Ꙑ껉뙩ꑊꖫ돵ꅁ뿯뻜뒣꣑룻ꝃꭾ뷨ꪺ늣ꭾ꿠샲녯룻ꙮꪺ샲ꝑꅁ굙맯ꓢꑷ뿯뻜ꑆꝃꭾ뷨ꪺ늣ꭾ껉ꅁ결ꑆ굮ꥍ꣤쑶ꪧꅁꭨꖲ뚷뿯뻜ꭾ뷨낪ꅂ믹껦낪ꪺ늣ꭾꅃ굙꣢뱴냓둠Ꟈ뙩ꑊꖫ돵ꅁꭨ뿯뻜뒣꣑룻낪ꭾ뷨ꪺ늣ꭾ꿠녯꣬룻낪ꪺ샲ꝑꅁꕂꗽ뙩ꑊꪺ뱴냓라룻쁵뛕ꅃ 뱴냓ꢤꛢ볒ꚡ 쏶꧳뱴냓ꢤꛢꪺ뿯뻜냝썄Dowrick (1986)뒿뒣ꕘ곝ꩫꅁꕌ뭻결Ꙣ싹쑶ꪧꑕꅁ뱶암뱴냓뿯뻜럭믢뻉룲쁈ꪺꕄ굮ꙝ꿀걏삳꣧볆ꪺ뵵ꮬꅁꑪ교ꑗꕩ꓀ꚨꑔ뫘놡ꩰ끑뷗ꅇ ꑀꅂ굙뱴냓ꪺ삳꣧볆뵵ꮬ걏Ꙗꑕꪺ(Slopes Downward)ꅁꚹ깡뱴냓녎라ꓱ룻Ᶎ뇦뻡ꗴ믢뻉ꪺꙡꛬꅃ ꑇꅂ굙꣢깡뱴냓ꪺ삳꣧볆뵵ꮬ곒걏Ꙗꑗꪺ(Slopes Upward)ꅁꚹ껉굙꣤꒤ꑀ깡뱴냓ꓱ룻Ᶎ뇦뻡ꗴ믢뻉ꪺꙡꛬ껉ꅁꭨꕴꑀ깡뱴냓녎라쑀띎뻡ꗴ룲쁈ꅃ ꑔꅂ굙꣢깡뱴냓뻖ꚳ곛ꪺꚨꖻ뭐믝ꡄ떲멣껉ꅁꕂ꣤삳꣧볆ꪺ뵵ꮬ곒결ꖿꙖꪺ(Positive Sloping)ꅁꚹ껉꣢깡뱴냓곒라ꓱ룻Ᶎ뇦뻡ꗴ룲쁈ꪺꙡꛬꅃ ꕴꕾꅁGal-Or (1985)뒿ꕈ볆뻇볒ꚡ뇀뷗꣢꽓뷨곛Ꙑꪺ뱴냓ꑊꖫ돵ꗽꯡꚸꟇꪺ냝썄ꅁꕌ뭻결굙뱴냓ꪺ삳꣧볆뵵ꮬ걏Ꙗꑕꪺ(Slopes Downward)ꅁꚹ껉ꗽ뙩ꑊꪺ뱴냓녎라녯꣬ꓱ룻낪ꪺꝑ볭ꅆ굙뱴냓ꪺ삳꣧볆뵵ꮬ걏Ꙗꑗꪺ(Slopes Upward)ꅁꚹ껉ꯡ뙩ꑊꪺ뱴냓녎라녯꣬ꓱ룻낪ꪺꝑ볭ꅃ 믹껦ꙝ꿀 ꒤ꑳꑪ뻇ꗸ띾뫞뉺곣ꡳ꧒ 룢뒼뚯 11
닄ꑇ뎹ꅂꓥ쑭놴끑뭐뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑ꖫ돵랧ꩰ꓀꩒ 닄ꑇ론ꅂ늣ꭾ쑶ꪧ떦늤뭐ꭄ뵵꧊ꥷ믹볒ꚡ Ꙣ맨쑶ꪧꖫ돵꒤ꅁꕴꑀ뚵궫굮ꙝ꿀결ꅵ믹껦ꅶꅁ믹껦낪ꝃ꿠뱶암껸뙏ꪺ쇊뙒띎쑀ꅁꑝ걏ꡍꥷ뱴냓꿠ꝟ샲ꝑꅂ꿠ꝟꙢꖫ돵ꑗ녯ꑀ깵꒧ꙡꪺ쏶쇤ꙝ꿀꒧ꑀꅃ뱴냓Ꙣꡍꥷ늣ꭾ믹껦껉ꅁꖲ뚷ꛒ뙱꣬늣ꭾ꧊뷨ꅂ믝ꡄ꧊뷨ꅂꚨꖻ꽓꧊ꅂ쑶ꪧ멁뛕ꕈ쏶ꪺꩫꕏ덗ꥷ떥곛쏶ꙝ꿀ꅁ땍ꯡꙁ끴Ꙙ꒽ꕱꪺꥷ믹떦늤뭐꣣엩ꪺ믹껦걆떦ꅁꑾ꿠굱ꕘ돌꣎ꪺ믹껦ꅃ 뻚맨ꖫ돵ꪺ꽓꧊ꅁꙢꖫ돵꓀끴ꪬꩰ쎭ꥷ껉ꅁꙨ볆뱴냓뎣꒣쑀띎ꕈ궰ꝃ믹껦꣓ꪧ꣺ꟳꙨꪺ빐냢썂뭐ꚳ뉶ꅃ1939꙾뒣ꕘꑆ믝ꡄꚱ뵵ꑗꚳꧭ쉉(kink)ꪺ곝ꩫꅁꕘꙢ맨ꖫ돵꒤ꅁ뱴냓ꪺ믹껦엜냊라ꓞ끟맯ꓢꅵ룲뙞꒣룲몦ꅶꪺ곛맯삳ꛦ결ꅁ덯뫘ꛦ결깥꧶덹ꚨ믹껦둣꧊쑶ꪧꅁ맯꧒ꚳ뱴냓곒꒣ꝑꅁꙕ뱴냓뭻ꪾ꣬덯볋ꪺ놡ꩰꅁꛓ쑀띎엜믹껦ꅁꛓ꣏ꖫ돵믹껦쎭ꥷꅆTauber(1970)뫙덯뫘ꖫ돵믹껦꒣꧶엜냊ꪺꪬꩰ결맨싪ꥷ(Oligopolistic Lock-in)ꅃ ꕴꕾꅁ덜Ꙩ뻇ꑝꝑꗎ쇉ꞽ뉺뷗ꪺ랧꧀꣓꓀꩒맨ꖫ돵ꅁ릳걏Friedman (1970)ꅂJones (1980)ꅁ꽓ꝏ걏싹ꖫ돵ꅃꖻ곣ꡳ꒤낲덝뱴냓뚡꒣꙳Ꙣꗴ꛳꓄떲ꛦ결ꅁꑝ둎걏뮡뱴냓Ꙣꛒ뙱ꗴ꛳떦늤껉곒걏뽗ꗟꡍꥷꪺꅁ쇉ꞽ뉺뷗ꪺ꓀쏾ꅁꕩꕈ뉍랡ꪺ곉ꥷꚹ결Ꙩꑈ꣮꒣ꙘꝀ쇉ꞽ(N-person Non-cooperative Game)(Nash, 1953;Shubik, 1983)ꅃ ꭄ뵵꧊ꥷ믹ꩫ 녱롧샙뉺뷗꣓곝ꅁ꣢걱ꥷ믹ꩫ덑쉫쏾결ꭄ뵵꧊ꥷ믹ꩫ(Nonlinear Pricing)ꪺꑀ뫘ꅁ꣤곛쏶ꪺ뉺뷗꓀꩒ꅁ돌ꚭꕩꙞ랹꣬Pigou(1932)ꪺ롧꣥뗛ꝀꅃPigouꪺ꓀꩒ꕘꅁ뱴냓뇄ꗎꙨ걱ꥷ믹ꩫ(Multi-part Tariff)ꅁꕩꕈ냏꓀ꕘ꒣Ꙑ믝ꡄꓴ럇ꪺ껸뙏ꅁꣃ녱꒤맜꣺낪껸뙏롳ꪺ껸뙏돑빬ꅃꗑ꧳Ꙩ걱ꥷ믹ꩫ꿠녡떹뱴냓룻낪ꪺꝑ볭ꓴ럇ꅁ뱴냓ꑝꙝꚹꚳꢬ냷ꪺ뮤ꙝ뇄ꛦꚹ뫘ꥷ믹ꓨꚡꅃ ꫱ꕎ맯ꭄ뵵꧊ꥷ믹ꩫ꒧꓀꩒ꅁꥬ꧳Oi(1971)ꪺꅵ굽뒵ꥠ볖뛩ꥷ믹ꩫꅶꅃ쁈ꯡꅁꙢ1970꙾ꕎꅁꕘ뉻싗둉ꪺ곛쏶ꓥ쑭ꅃ덯곛쏶ꓥ쑭뷐냑ꢣ12 ꒤ꑳꑪ뻇ꗸ띾뫞뉺곣ꡳ꧒ 룢뒼뚯
닄ꑇ뎹ꅂꓥ쑭놴끑뭐뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑ꖫ돵랧ꩰ꓀꩒ 닄ꑇ론ꅂ늣ꭾ쑶ꪧ떦늤뭐ꭄ뵵꧊ꥷ믹볒ꚡ Wilson(1993)ꅁ덯ꓥ쑭ꅁꑀꓨ궱녎꣢걱ꥷ믹ꩫꑀ꿫꓆ꅁꚨ결Ꙩ걱ꥷ믹ꅁ곆ꛜꚨ결ꭄ뵵꧊ꥷ믹ꅁ땍ꯡ꓀꩒곛쏶ꪺ뫖ꝑ냝썄ꅆꕴꑀꓨ궱ꭨ녎Ꙩ걱ꥷ믹ꪺ랧꧀ꅁ삳ꗎꙢꙕ뫘꽓껭ꪺ냝썄ꑗꅁꕝ걁ꭏ쁉뙏뉶ꅁꚨꖻ뮼듮늣띾떥ꅃ땍ꛓꅁ덯ꓥ쑭ꪺ꓀꩒맯뙈ꅁꙨꭝ궭Ꙣ뽗ꪺꖫ돵떲멣ꑗꅃ 쁈뗛쑶ꪧ샴맒ꪺ신엜ꅁꭄ뵵꧊ꥷ믹ꩫꑷ꒣ꭝ궭꧳뽗ꪺꖫ돵떲멣꒤ꅁꙢ맨ꖫ돵ꅁ곆ꛜꙢꞹꗾ쑶ꪧꖫ돵떲멣ꅁ곒ꚳꕘ뉻ꪺꕩ꿠ꅃ덯뫘신엜ꅁꑝꓞ땯뻇귌맯꧳쑶ꪧꖫ돵떲멣ꑕꅁ뱴냓뙩ꛦꭄ뵵꧊ꥷ믹ꛦ결ꪺ뾳뷬ꅃ ꚳ쏶쑶ꪧꖫ돵떲멣ꑕ꒧ꭄ뵵꧊ꥷ믹ꩫ곣ꡳꅁꕩ꣏ꗎꪺ쑶ꪧ볒ꮬ꒧꒣Ꙑꑪ랧꓀결꣢ꑪ쏾ꅇCournot쑶ꪧꕈBertrand쑶ꪧꅃ뇄ꗎCournot쑶ꪧ볒ꮬꪺꓥ쑭ꕝ걁ꅇOren, Smith and Wilson(1983), Ireland(1991)ꕈ Cheung and Wang(1995)떥ꅃ꣤꒤ Oren, Smith and Wilson(1983)뭻결뱴냓ꕩꕈ쇊뙒뙱ꑪꑰꅂ쇊뙒썂Ꙩ맨ꕈ껸뙏꽓뷨떥ꑔ뫘ꓨꚡ꣓냏꓀꒣Ꙑꪺ껸뙏ꅃꛓ꒣Ꙑꪺ냏꓀ꓨꚡꅁ녎꣏녯Cournot쑶ꪧ꒤ꪺꅵ뙱ꅶ덯뚵ꡍ떦엜볆ꪺꥷ롱둎라ꚳ꧒깴늧ꅃOren, Smith and Wilson ꒧꓀꩒ꅁ둎걏ꕏ뱴냓ꕈꭥ굺ꑔ뫘ꓨꚡꅁꥷ롱꒣Ꙑꅵ뙱ꅶꪺ랧꧀ꅁ꓀꩒ꭄ뵵꧊ꥷ믹ꪺ맯뫙Cournot쑶ꪧꞡ뿅ꅃꛓIreland(1991) Cheung and Wang(1995)ꭨꙢ꧳꓀꩒뫞꣮ꭄ뵵꧊ꥷ믹ꩫꪺꝑ맺ꅃ ꕴꑀꓨ궱ꅁ뇄ꗎBertrand믹껦쑶ꪧ볒ꮬꪺꓥ쑭ꕝ걁Gal-Or(1988), Spulber(1989)ꕈMandy(1992)떥ꅃ꣤꒤Gal-Or(1988)볒ꮬꅁ꓀꩒ꙕ깡뱴냓뛈ꗍ늣ꑀ뫘늣ꭾꅁꣃ녍띾꧳꣑삳꽓ꥷ믝ꡄ꒧껸뙏ꪺ놡ꑕꅁ놴끑ꖫ돵ꑗ늣ꭾ뫘쏾ꅝ뱴냓볆ꅞ뱗ꕛ껉ꅁꙕ뱴냓뇄ꗎꭄ뵵꧊ꥷ믹ꪺ뫖ꝑ뱶암ꅃSpulber(1989)꓀꩒ꑆ뭐Gal_Or쏾ꪺ냝썄ꅁ꒣륌Ꙣ볒ꮬꑗ걏꣏ꗎꕈ냏ꛬ(location)꣓ꥷ롱늣ꭾ깴늧ꅁꛓꕂ맯꧳뱴냓볆뙱ꪺ뫞꣮뭐뙩ꑊꅁꚳ뙩ꑀꡂꪺ끑뷗ꅃMandy(1992)ꭨ꓀꩒ꑆꙐ뷨늣ꭾꭄ믴ꑀꥷ믹(Nonuniform pricing) Bertrand쑶ꪧꪺ꙳Ꙣ꧊꣤곛쏶꧊뷨ꅃ ꖻ곣ꡳ꧒뇄ꗎꪺ볒ꮬ걏ꕈLogit볒ꮬ결냲슦ꪺ늣ꭾ깴늧꓆믹껦쑶ꪧ볒꒤ꑳꑪ뻇ꗸ띾뫞뉺곣ꡳ꧒ 룢뒼뚯 13
닄ꑇ뎹ꅂꓥ쑭놴끑뭐뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑ꖫ돵랧ꩰ꓀꩒ 닄ꑇ론ꅂ늣ꭾ쑶ꪧ떦늤뭐ꭄ뵵꧊ꥷ믹볒ꚡ ꮬꅃLogit볒ꮬ꧒뇀뻉ꕘꪺ믝ꡄ꣧볆ꅁ결뻷뉶꧊뚡쉟뿯뻜볒ꮬ(probabilistic discrete choice model)ꪺꑀ뫘ꅁLogit볒ꮬ뻕꧳꣨땥껸뙏륊ꑗꙨ뫘곛꫱ꪺ냓ꭾ뿯뻜ꅁ뛈꿠녱꒤뿯뻜ꑀ뫘냓ꭾꪺ냝썄ꅁ꧒ꕈLogit볒ꮬ덑뱳꩸삳ꗎꙢꗦ덱ꑵ꣣뿯뻜ꕈ륱ꭈ믝ꡄ떥뷒썄ꅃ꫱꙾꣓ꅁꙢ뉺뷗볒ꮬ덑뱳꩸삳ꗎꙢ깴늧꓆냓ꭾ볒ꮬꓨ궱ꅁ꽓ꝏ걏 Anderson et al. (1992)떥ꝑꗎꚹ볒ꮬ뻣Ꙙꑆ꣢귓녠ꗎꪺ늣ꭾ깴늧꓆볒ꮬꅁꕝ걁ꕎꫭ꧊귓ꑈ볒ꮬ(Dixit and Stiglitz, 1979)ꕈHotelling볒ꮬ떥ꅃ꧳ꚹꅁꖻ곣ꡳ녎ꗎꚹ볒ꮬꗎꕈ꣨땥뫴믚뫴룴ꪺ벷놵믝ꡄꅁꣃ싇꣤꓀꩒꣢걱ꥷ믹꒧맨쑶ꪧꞡ뿅ꅃ Logit볒ꮬ꧒ꥷ롱꒧늣ꭾ깴늧ꅁ돌ꑪꪺ꽓쉉Ꙣ꧳꣤늣ꭾ깴늧걏ꗑ껸뙏왛쉉꧒늣ꗍꅃ꧒ꕈꙕ깡뱴냓꧒뒣꣑ꪺ늣ꭾ뚡ꅁ귬ꖻꕩ꿠ꡓꚳ깴늧ꅁꙢ꒣Ꙑꪺ껸뙏늴꒤ꅁꕘ뉻깴늧꓆ꅃꚹ뚵꽓꧊ꅁꚳꝕ꧳꣨땥뱴냓Ꙑ껉Ꙣ꒣Ꙑ믝ꡄꓴ럇꒧껸뙏롳꒤쑶ꪧꪺ놡ꅁꛓ덯ꖿ걏ꖻ곣ꡳ꒧믹껦쑶ꪧ볒ꮬꅁ곛맯꧳륌ꕨꓥ쑭ꅁ꙰ Gal-Or뭐 Spuber꧒덝군꒧늣ꭾ깴늧꓆볒ꮬ돌ꑪꪺ꒣Ꙑꅃ 14 ꒤ꑳꑪ뻇ꗸ띾뫞뉺곣ꡳ꧒ 룢뒼뚯
닄ꑇ뎹ꅂꓥ쑭놴끑뭐뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑ꖫ돵랧ꩰ꓀꩒ 닄ꑔ론ꅂ뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾슲꒶ 닄ꑔ론ꅂ뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾슲꒶ ꧒뿗ꪺ뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾ꅁꝙ걏뒣꣑꣏ꗎ벷놵녢뢹ꅂ걛덝ꙕ쏾뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈ꅂ뫴궶ꪺꯘ롭ꅂ륱ꑬ뙬ꗳꪺꗓ뷐떥뫴믚뫴룴ꑗꩁ냈ꪺ꒽ꕱꅁ꣤꒤돌꣼늳ꑈꩠꗘꪺꭋ걏뒣꣑꣏ꗎ벷놵녢뢹덯뚵띾냈ꅁꖻ곣ꡳꪺ꧒놴끑ꪺ꣢걱ꥷ믹ꭋ걏끷맯뫴룴벷놵덯뚵샲ꝑ썥ꑪꪺ띾냈ꅃꙢ냪꒺쁈뗛륱ꭈꩫ덱륌ꅂ륱ꭈꗁ샧꓆ꅁ뒣꣑뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈ꪺ꒽ꕱ낣ꑆHinetꅂSeednet꒧ꕾꅁꗁ뚡뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑ꑝ뽮랥ꪺ뇀뱳띾냈ꅃ ꕸ왗뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑ꖫ돵떲멣 껚뻚룪떦라ꖫ돵놡돸꒤ꓟ꧳1998꙾12ꓫꪺ돌띳곣ꡳꚨꩇ엣ꗜꗘꭥꗾꕸ룻꣣덗볒ꪺ뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾곹Ꙣꑔꅂꕼꑑ깡꒧뚡ꅁꛓ1998꙾셠샧띾썂륷군ꕩ륆꣬33믵ꕸ맴ꅃ꣤꒤벷놵띾냈걏돌ꕄ굮ꪺꚬꑊ꣓랽ꅁꑆ73%ꅃ꣤꒤ꑓꕈHinetꅂSeednetꅂAPOL결돌ꑪꪺꑔ깡띾ꅁ꣤ꖫ돵ꚳ뉶뙗륌ꛊ꓀꒧ꑋꑑ꒭ꕈꑗꅃ굙껚뻚Richard럇ꭨꅝ룔ꢣꫭꅞ꣓ꕛꕈꝐꥷꖫ돵뚰꒤ꯗ[뛀롴롒ꅁ1992]ꅁꭋ뉍랡ꙡꕩꕈꪾ륄냪꒺ꖫ돵쓝꧳맨쑶ꪧꖫ돵ꅁꕊ닓왛맮냪꒺ꖫ돵ꭋꕩ뙩ꑀꡂ땯뉻ꅁꕸ왗ꪺ뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑ꖫ돵곛럭뚰꒤ꅁꭥꑔ깡뱴냓맯ꖫ돵꣣ꚳ녪꽐ꪺ뱶암ꑏꅁꓗ꣤걏Hinetꟳꕩ덑뗸결Stackelberg볒ꮬ꒤ꪺꖫ돵믢뻉ꅃ ꫭ Richard럇ꭨꅝꭥ꒭ꑪ뱴냓꒧뚰꒤땻ꯗꅞ 5~10% ꇷ 쑶ꪧ늣띾 10~49% ꇷ ꒣쑙녋맨늣띾 50%ꕈꑗ ꇷ 쑙녋맨늣띾 100% ꇷ 뽗늣띾 ꒤ꑳꑪ뻇ꗸ띾뫞뉺곣ꡳ꧒ 룢뒼뚯 15
닄ꑇ뎹ꅂꓥ쑭놴끑뭐뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑ꖫ돵랧ꩰ꓀꩒ 닄ꑔ론ꅂ뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾슲꒶ 뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾뒣꣑ꩁ냈ꪺ뫘쏾 뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾꧒뒣꣑ꪺꩁ냈ꑀ꿫ꛓꢥꑪ교ꕩ꓀결덳뵵ꩁ냈ꕛ귈ꩁ냈ꅇ ꑀꅂ덳뵵ꩁ냈 뫴믚뫴룴덳뵵ꩁ냈걏ꗑ뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾덝롭ꙮꑀ귓ꕈ덳Ꙣ뫴믚뫴룴ꕄ뻷뫴룴ꅁ엽꣏ꗎꕩꕈꝑꗎ륱뢣덳놵꣬뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾ꪺ덳뵵ꕄ뻷ꅁ덺륌뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾낵결뻴볙ꕈ꣏ꗎ뫴믚뫴룴꒺ꪺ뫘뫘룪랽뭐ꩁ냈ꅃ꣏ꗎ륱뢣뭐뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾ꪺ덳뵵ꕄ뻷꒧뚡ꪺ덳뵵ꓨꚡꕄ굮ꕩ꓀결ꑕꙃ꣢뫘ꓨꚡꅃ 1.놵덳뵵ꅇꗘꭥ덜Ꙩ뻇껕ꥍ꒽깡뻷쏶뎣걛덝뭐뫴믚뫴룴곛덱ꪺ냏냬뫴룴ꅁꚳꗁ샧ꗸ띾ꪺ뿬꒽ꯇ뫴룴ꑝ라ꕈ놵녍뵵ꪺꓨꚡ뭐뫴믚뫴룴곛덳ꅃ꣒꙰꣏ꗎꪺ륱뢣꙰ꩇꙢ녊뿬꒽ꯇ꒺ꅁꕵ믝ꕛ룋뫴룴ꕤ덳놵냏냬뫴룴ꅁ둎ꕩꪽ놵덳ꑗ뫴믚뫴룴ꅃ 2.벷놵덳뵵ꅇꗘꭥ깡깸ꗎꓡ귓ꑈꗎꓡꑪꙨ꣏ꗎ벷놵덳뵵ꪺꓨꚡꅁ덯걏돌뒶륍ꑝ걏ꚨꖻ돌ꝃ띇ꪺ덳뵵ꓨꚡꅁꙢ띑굮덳ꑗ뫴믚뫴룴껉ꅁꕵ믝ꝑꗎ볆뻚뻷ꅁꭋꕩ뭐벷놵ꩁ뺹곛덳ꅁꚨ결뫴믚뫴룴ꕀ곉ꪺꑀꢤꅃ 덯꣢뫘ꓨꚡꅁꕈꭥ돌결뉺띑ꅁ꣤룪껆뛇뿩ꟖꅁꙐ껉ꕵ굮륱뢣뙽뻷ꭋ꿠뒣꣑룪끔뭐ꕌꑈꙀꅁꗑ꧳꣤믹껦꧹뙑ꅁ꣏ꗎꑀ꿫곒끨ꛓꡄ꣤ꚸꪺ뿯뻜ꯡꅃ ꑇꅂꕛ귈ꩁ냈 †벷놵띾냈쇶땍걏뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾ꗘꭥ돌ꑪꪺ샲ꝑ꣓랽ꅁꙢꝋ뙏벷놵ꪺ땯깩쇍뛕ꑕꅁ뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾ꖼ꣓녎꣓ꪺ쑱ꅁ녎Ꙣ꣤꧒뒣꣑ꪺꕛ귈ꩁ냈ꅃꚳ둘귓ꑪꪺ땯깩ꓨꙖ꙰ꑕꅇ (1) 뒣꣑ꚳ믹귈룪끔 ꙰ꝙ껉믹ꅂ끝롧껸꺧ꅂ룪껆깷ꅂ꽓ꥷ믢냬ꪺ녍띾ꓥ쑭떥ꅃ 16 ꒤ꑳꑪ뻇ꗸ띾뫞뉺곣ꡳ꧒ 룢뒼뚯
닄ꑇ뎹ꅂꓥ쑭놴끑뭐뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑ꖫ돵랧ꩰ꓀꩒ 닄ꑔ론ꅂ뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾슲꒶ (2) 뵵ꑗ깔볖 (Online Entertainment) ꙰뵵ꑗ륃삸덮엩ꅂ얥궵볖ꅂ곛셮ꅂ꾺룜ꅂ뱶ꓹ벽꧱떥ꅃ (3) 맯뛇닎덱끔ꚳꪽ놵ꇾ뚡놵꣺ꕎ껄삳ꪺ덱끔ꩁ냈 ꙰뫴룴륱룜ꅁ륱ꑬ뙬ꗳꅂ뫴룴뛇꽵떥ꅃ (4) 륱ꑬ냓냈 (Electronic Commerce) 뉯꽁ꪺ뵤돲ꯜ뱳ꅁ꩸ꑀ꓁Ꙣ뫴룴ꑗꭐ빐ꅂ빐냢ꅂꚬꕉ듚ꅂꭈꗎ뭻쏒ꪺ뻣귓덳싪뻷꣮뎣뫢ꅁꑝꚳꕵ궭꧳뫴룴ꗦ꧶ꪺꚬꕉ듚뭐ꭈꗎ뇂앶뻷꣮ꅃ ꣏ꗎꑗ뫴믚뫴룴꧒믝꧓뻡ꪺꚨꖻ 냪꒺낣ꑆTANETꥍ걙룕ꗎꪺ녢뢹걏ꝋ뙏ꪺ꒧ꕾꅁ뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾ꪺꚬ뙏ꓨꚡꑪ교ꕩ꓀결ꡓꚳ꣏ꗎ껉볆궭꣮ꪺꥷ뙏뉶꣮ꅁꕈ꯶맪믚꣏ꗎ껉볆군믹ꪺ군껉군뙏꣮ꅁꯡ걏ꖻ곣ꡳꕄ굮놴끑ꪺꓨꚡꅃ ꑀꅂꥷ뙏뉶꣮ꅇ ꣏ꗎ쎺ꗦꥷ뙏ꗎ떹뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾둎ꕩꕈꙢ꣏ꗎ듁궭뵤돲꒺ꅁ꒣궭껉볆ꗴ띎벷놵ꑗ뫴ꅃ결ꑆ쇗ꝋ꣏ꗎ꙳ꚳ꒣ꗎꗕ꒣ꗎꪺꓟ멁ꅁꛓ뵵ꓓꑛꅁ껶뙏뫴룴룪랽ꅁꙝꛓ덜Ꙩ뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾곒뇄ꛦꑆ덳쓲꣏ꗎ뙗륌ꑇꛜꑔ귓ꑰ껉ꅁꙢ꽓ꥷ껉뚡꒺ꡓꚳ룪껆뛇뮼냊Ꝁꭋꛛ냊쉟뵵ꪺ놹걉ꅃ ꑇꅂ군껉군뙏꣮ꅇ ꣏ꗎ꯶ꓫꓤꕉꪺ덱끔뵵룴꾲(Line Fee)ꅇ벷놵덱끔뵵룴낣ꡃꓫ냲ꖻ뙏ꕾꅁ꣤빬ꞡ꯶덱끔껉뚡ꚬ뙏ꅃꗘꭥ냪걏ꡃ꒭꓀쓁ꑔ꓀쓁ꑀ꒸(Ꙑꖫ꒺륱룜ꚬ뙏볐럇)ꅁꛓ녍뵵ꭨ쁗뱥꒣Ꙑ(ꛜ)ꡃꓫꓤꕉ믹껦꓀ꝏꛛꑀꑤꑋꛊ꒸꣬ꑔ롕ꑀꑤꑋꛊ꒸꒣떥ꅁꕴꕾꅁꙢꗓ뷐ꙷ룋껉쇙ꚳꑀ떧ꙷ룋덝ꥷ뙏ꗎꅃ 뫴룴덱끔꣏ꗎ뙏(Access Fee)ꅇ덯뚵뙏ꗎ걏ꗑ뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾ꛛ꒤ꑳꑪ뻇ꗸ띾뫞뉺곣ꡳ꧒ 룢뒼뚯 17
닄ꑇ뎹ꅂꓥ쑭놴끑뭐뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑ꖫ돵랧ꩰ꓀꩒ 닄ꑔ론ꅂ뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾슲꒶ ꛦ굱ꥷꅁ굱ꥷꪺꓨꚡꚳꅇ꯶ꓫꅂ꯶ꥵ꙾ꑀꚸꚬ꣺ꅃꗎꓡꡃ귓ꓫ낣ꑆꖲ믝ꓤꕉꑀ떧ꥷꪺꓫ꾲뙏ꕾꅁ쇙믝뻚ꑀ귓ꓫ꒺ꪺ셠벷놵껉볆ꅁꕈꥷꪺ돦ꛬ뙏뉶ꕴꛦꓤꕉ뙏ꗎꅃ군뙏볐럇벷놵ꚡ덱녠꯶껉뚡군뫢ꅁꕈHiNet결꣒ꅁ볆뻚뻷벷놵ꡃ꓀쓁ꕼꓲ뿺ꅁ뻣엩ꩁ냈볆ꛬ뫴룴(ISDN)꒧낪덴벷놵(64Kbps)ꡃ꓀쓁꒻ꓲ뿺ꅆꛓ녍뵵덳놵ꭨꚳ꯶ꓫꚬ꣺ꥷ뙏ꗎꅁ냪꒺덱끔뎡ꗷꥷꚬ뙏ꛓ냪믚덱끔뎡ꗷ꯶룪끔뙱ꚬ뙏ꅃ ꕴꕾ쇙ꚳ덮땷엩덝돆쇊뙒ꚨꖻꅁꕈ꣤ꕌ뙏ꗎ꙰ꅇ뇐끖뵭뙏ꗎꅂ압냝ꩁ냈뙏ꗎꅂ뫴믚녍쉤꾲ꗎ뙏ꗎꅂ뫻앀뙏ꗎ떥떥ꅃ 18 ꒤ꑳꑪ뻇ꗸ띾뫞뉺곣ꡳ꧒ 룢뒼뚯
닄ꑇ뎹ꅂꓥ쑭놴끑뭐뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑ꖫ돵랧ꩰ꓀꩒ 닄ꕼ론ꅂ뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑ꖫ돵ꑕꪺ덗볒롧샙 닄ꕼ론ꅂ뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑ꖫ돵ꑕꪺ덗볒롧샙 †결ꑆ뒣꣑껸뙏ꑪ늳ꭋꝑꪺꩁ냈ꅁ꣏녯꧒ꚳꪺ룪랽뭐ꩁ냈꿠떽뫉꣤ꗎꅁ덗볒롧샙걏곛럭궫굮ꪺꙝ꿀ꅃꙝꚹ뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾굙굮땯뒧뻣Ꙙ뫮껄ꅁꭋ삳뉀때뫃뱻ꙡꕈ쉘ꑪꖫ돵ꚳ뉶결닄ꑀ슾ꟓꅃ걏ꖲ뚷굮ꩠ띎ꪺ걏ꅁ띾ꖻꢭ걏ꝟꚳ꙰ꚹ뚯ꭰꪺ룪랽꿠ꓤ벵땵듁때ꩫꟖ덴샲ꝑꪺ룪ꅁꕈꝋ땯ꗍ놸꒫ꑅꕑ꒣걵ꅁ꒴결ꚺ꒫ꛓ뚼꯫ꅃ †굙뇆낣ꑗ굺룪랽꒣ꢬꪺ냝썄꒣뷍ꅁꚳꟓꕈ벷놵띾냈결ꑪꥶꪺ뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾ꅁ궺굮꒧냈Ꙣ꧳ꯘꗟꗎꓡ볆ꪺ덗볒롧샙ꅁꝀ결뒣꣑ꯡ쓲ꕛ귈ꩁ냈ꪺ냲슦ꅃꖻ론링룕Ꙣ왛꧀ꪺ꓀꩒ꑗꅁ놴끑걙쑶ꪧ굮꿀ꅁꙢ꣺녯ꗎꓡ볆꧒덹ꚨꪺ덗볒롧샙ꑕꅁ꧒녡꣓ꪺꖿ궱둠샴껄삳ꅁ덯껄삳녎덶몥꧔ꑪ룻꣣덗볒ꪺ뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾뭐ꑰ덗볒ꪺ뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾꒧뚡ꪺ뙚싷ꅁ꣏덗볒ꑰꪺ뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾ꟳꕛ쏸ꕈꗍ꙳ꅃ †궺ꗽ굮ꕘꪺ걏덳ꑗ뫴믚뫴룴납띆뫴룴ꪺ돦ꛬ쁗뱥ꚨꖻꅁꕈ 64K 녍뵵ꪺ쁗뱥ꚨꖻ결100 결꣒ꅁꑀꚸ쇊ꢬ T1 껉ꅁ64K 쁗뱥ꪺꚨꖻ궰꣬ 50 ꕈꑕꅁ럭ꑀꚸ쇊ꢬ T3 껉ꅁ64K ꚨꖻꝃ꧳ 10ꅃ녱쁗뱥돦ꛬꚨꖻ쁈셠뙱뱗ꕛꛓꑕ럆껉ꅁꗎꓡꙨꪺ뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾ꛓ녍뵵쁗뱥돦ꛬꚨꖻꑕ궰ꅁ꣏룻꣣덗볒ꪺ뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾꿠ꕈ룻ꝃꪺ믹ꛬ쑶ꪧꅃ덗볒룻ꑰꪺ뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾ꙝꛓ꧓꣼룻낪ꪺ돦ꛬ쁗뱥ꚨꖻꅁ꙰ꚹꚨꗎꓡꙨꅁ뵵룴셠쁗뱥엜ꑪꅆ셠쁗뱥엜ꑪꅁꭨ돦ꛬꚨꖻꝃꅆ돦ꛬꚨꖻꝃꅁꭨ믹껦ꭋꥹꅁꑓ뻉교ꗎꓡ볆뱗ꕛꅁꚨꑪ뙖꣣쁵뛕ꅁꑰ뙖쏸쑶ꪧꪺ둠샴ꅃ †ꙁ꣓걏놾Ꙣꑪ뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾ꑗꪺ뫴꾸볆ꅁ덺륌ꚹ뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾녍뵵덳놵ꪺꗎꓡ뫴꾸볆ꅃ덯귓뚵ꗘ엣ꗜꪺ쑶ꪧ띎롱걏ꅇ띾꧒뻖ꚳꪺ뫴꾸볆ꗘꅁꕎꫭꪺ걏띾Ꙣ룪끔꒬곛걹냊ꪺ뫴룴료ꅁꑀ귓뙱ꪺ쁵뛕ꅃ셼꣒꣓뮡ꅁ굙ꗒ ISP 뻖ꚳꑀꑤ귓뫴꾸ꅁꛓꑁ ISP ꕵꚳ 10 귓뫴꾸ꅆꭨꑁ띾ꖲ땍굮놵녍뵵꣬ꗒ띾ꅁ꒣땍ꑁ띾ꪺꗎꓡ꒣걏때ꩫ놵꣺꣬ꗒ띾ꪺ뫴꾸ꅁ둎걏싇ꗑꝏꪺ띾신놵ꅁꛓꯡ녎덹ꚨ덴ꯗꑗꑪꖴꚩꅃꕴꑀꓨ궱ꅁꦼꚹ꒬덱ꪺ녍뵵뙏ꗎꖲ땍걏ꗑꑁꕉ떹뵵룴뒣꣑(Carrier)ꅁ꓀앵꒤ꑳꑪ뻇ꗸ띾뫞뉺곣ꡳ꧒ 룢뒼뚯 19
닄ꑇ뎹ꅂꓥ쑭놴끑뭐뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑ꖫ돵랧ꩰ꓀꩒ 닄ꕼ론ꅂ뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑ꖫ돵ꑕꪺ덗볒롧샙 룻ꑪꪺꓱ꣒ꅁ덯엣ꗜꙝ룪끔뙱ꛓ구ꗍꪺ뿠쏶ꭙꅁ뻉교ꦼꚹ덳놵녍뵵뙏ꗎ꓀앵ꑗ뷍Ꝑꪺ쑷뵘ꅁ뫴룴꒬덳뙏ꗎꑝ걏ꗘꭥ덜Ꙩ곣ꡳ놴끑ꪺꑀ뚵쒳썄ꅃ꿠뻖ꚳ룻Ꙩ뫴꾸ꪺ뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾ꅁ덱녠ꑝꚳ룻ꑪꪺꕄ띆쁗뱥Ꝁ결ꯈꓡ꧱롭뫴꾸ꪺꛒ뱻ꅁꯈꓡ결ꑆ꿠ꕈ룻Ꟗꪺ덴ꯗ덑쉳쓽ꅁꑝ라뛉Ꙗ녎뫴꾸꧱ꚳ룻ꑪꕄ띆쁗뱥ꪺ뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾ꅃ덯꣢귓덗볒쁵뛕ꪺꕛ녪껄삳ꅁ쇴ꝴ뗛ꑪ뙖ꑪꅁꑰ꒣꧶ꗍ꙳ꪺ륃삸덗ꭨꅃ †ꗑ꧳ꗘꭥꗑ꒤뗘륱ꭈꑀ깡뽗녍뵵ꪺ뵵룴ꯘ롭ꅁ꣤멘ꑕꪺ Hinet ꑝꛛ땍ꙡ꧓얧덜Ꙩꚳ때ꪺ쁵뛕뭐룪랽ꛓꚨ결냪꒺뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑ꖫ돵ꑗꪺ쮳쮳ꅁ꧒ꕈꗘꭥꙨ걏 Hinet ꕈꕾꪺ뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾ꕉ녍뵵뵵룴뙏떹꒤뗘륱ꭈꅁꕉ쁗뱥뙏ꗎ떹 Hinetꅃ꒣륌덯귓놡륷군꣬닄ꑀ쏾륱ꭈ띾뙽꧱ꯡ녎라ꚳ꧒엜ꅁꢺ껉덯뫘룪끔뙱ꪺ뿠꧒구ꗍꪺ뷍Ꝑ볒ꚡ삳라아ꑗ뭏궱ꅃ †닄ꑔ귓뱶암꣬ꕛ귈ꩁ냈ꪺ덗볒ꅁ뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾ꕄ굮걏ꚨ결ꙕ뚵ꩁ냈뭳덹ꪺ떡ꑦ덱룴ꅁꩁ냈뭳덹냓ꖲ땍뿯뻜ꚳ덗볒ꗎꓡꪺ뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾ꅁꭨꑪꪺ뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾ꚳ룻ꑪꪺ쁵뛕꣺녯ꟳꙨꪺꩁ냈꣓뒣꣑ꅁꑰꪺ뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾ꭨꙝꩁ냈뫘쏾ꓖꓞ끟ꗎꓡ걹ꖢꅃ †닄ꕼ귓걏ꯈꓡꩁ냈꡴닎ꪺ륂신ꅁꯈꓡꩁ냈꡴닎Ꙣꑗ굺ꪺ꓀꩒엣ꗜꅁ걏뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾녱벷놵ꩁ냈결ꕄ륌듧꣬ꕛ귈ꩁ냈결ꕄ껉ꅁ곛럭궫굮ꪺꑀ귓꿠ꑏ룪랽ꅃ땍ꛓꯈꓡꩁ냈꡴닎ꪺꯘꗟꅁ믝굮덗볒ꪺꗎꓡ꓀앵샧륂ꑈꚨꖻꅁꑰꪺ뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾ꗑ꧳ꫬ듁ꗎꓡ볆꒣Ꙩꅁꣃ꒣룪Ꙣꯈꓡꩁ냈ꑗ궱ꅁꑪꪺ뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾ꭨꕩ꣼ꫬ듁룪ꪺꑊꅁꙢꗎꓡ덗볒ꚨꪺ륌땻꒤ꅁꯈꓡꩁ냈꡴닎몥ꚸ륂신ꚨ보뚶멚ꅁꣃ멃멃땯뒧뱶암ꑏꅁꕩꢳ덴ꙡ뱗ꕛ룻낪믹귈ꪺꩁ냈ꅁꚹ껉덗볒룻ꑰꪺ뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾굙쇙ꖼꯘꗟ덯ꓨ궱ꪺ꿠ꑏꅁꑝ녎꧓꣼ꗎꓡꪺ걹ꖢꅁ뎴ꑊ굴궱ꪺ둠샴료ꅃ 20 ꒤ꑳꑪ뻇ꗸ띾뫞뉺곣ꡳ꧒ 룢뒼뚯
닄ꑔ뎹ꅂISP꣢걱ꥷ믹ꩫ꒧믹껦쑶ꪧ볒ꮬ 닄ꑀ론ꅂꭥꢥ 닄ꑔ뎹ꅂISP꣢걱ꥷ믹ꩫ꒧믹껦쑶ꪧ볒ꮬ 닄ꑀ론ꅂꭥꢥ 녱롧샙뉺뷗꣓곝ꅁ꣢걱ꥷ믹ꩫ덑쉫쏾결ꭄ뵵꧊ꥷ믹ꩫ(Nonlinear Pricing)ꪺꑀ뫘ꅁ꣤곛쏶ꪺ뉺뷗꓀꩒ꅁ돌ꚭꕩꙞ랹꣬Pigou(1932)ꪺ롧꣥뗛ꝀꅃPigouꪺ꓀꩒ꕘꅁ뱴냓뇄ꗎꙨ뎡ꥷ믹ꩫ(Multi-part Tariff)ꅁꕩꕈ냏꓀ꕘ꒣Ꙑ믝ꡄꓴ럇ꪺ껸뙏ꅁꣃ녱꒤맜꣺낪껸뙏롳ꪺ껸뙏돑빬ꅃꗑ꧳Ꙩ뎡ꥷ믹ꩫ꿠녡떹뱴냓룻낪ꪺꝑ볭ꓴ럇ꅁ뱴냓ꑝꙝꚹꚳꢬ냷ꪺ뮤ꙝ뇄ꛦꚹ뫘ꥷ믹ꓨꚡꅃ 륌ꕨꓥ쑭ꪺ꓀꩒맯뙈ꅁꙨꭝ궭Ꙣ뽗ꪺꖫ돵떲멣ꑗꅁ쁈뗛쑶ꪧ샴맒ꪺ신엜ꅁꭄ뵵꧊ꥷ믹ꩫꑷ꒣ꭝ궭꧳뽗ꪺꖫ돵떲멣꒤ꅁꙢ맨ꖫ돵ꅁ곆ꛜꙢꞹꗾ쑶ꪧꖫ돵떲멣ꅁ곒ꚳꕘ뉻ꪺꕩ꿠ꅃ덯뫘신엜ꅁꑝꓞ땯뻇귌맯꧳쑶ꪧꖫ돵떲멣ꑕꅁ뱴냓뙩ꛦꭄ뵵꧊ꥷ믹ꛦ결ꪺ뾳뷬ꅃ ꖻ곣ꡳ꧒뇄ꗎꪺ볒ꮬ걏ꕈLogit볒ꮬ결냲슦ꪺ늣ꭾ깴늧꓆믹껦쑶ꪧ볒ꮬꅃLogit볒ꮬ꧒뇀뻉ꕘꪺ믝ꡄ꣧볆ꅁ결뻷뉶꧊뚡쉟뿯뻜볒ꮬ(Probabilistic Discrete Choice Model)ꪺꑀ뫘ꅁLogit볒ꮬ뻕꧳꣨땥껸뙏륊ꑗꙨ뫘곛꫱ꪺ냓ꭾ뿯뻜ꅁ뛈꿠녱꒤뿯뻜ꑀ뫘냓ꭾꪺ냝썄ꅁ꧒ꕈLogit볒ꮬ덑뱳꩸삳ꗎꙢꗦ덱ꑵ꣣뿯뻜ꕈ륱ꭈ믝ꡄ떥뷒썄ꅃ꫱꙾꣓ꅁꙢ뉺뷗볒ꮬ덑뱳꩸삳ꗎꙢ깴늧꓆냓ꭾ볒ꮬꓨ궱ꅁ꽓ꝏ걏 Anderson et al. (1992)떥ꝑꗎꚹ볒ꮬ뻣Ꙙꑆ꣢귓녠ꗎꪺ늣ꭾ깴늧꓆볒ꮬꅁꕝ걁ꕎꫭ꧊귓ꑈ볒ꮬ(Dixit and Stiglitz, 1979)ꕈHotelling볒ꮬ떥ꅃ꧳ꚹꅁꖻ곣ꡳ녎ꗎꚹ볒ꮬꗎꕈ꣨땥뫴믚뫴룴ꪺ벷놵믝ꡄꅁꣃ싇꣤꓀꩒꣢걱ꥷ믹꒧맨쑶ꪧꞡ뿅ꅃ Logit볒ꮬ꧒ꥷ롱꒧늣ꭾ깴늧ꅁ돌ꑪꪺ꽓쉉Ꙣ꧳꣤늣ꭾ깴늧걏ꗑ껸뙏왛쉉꧒늣ꗍꅃ꧒ꕈꙕ깡뱴냓꧒뒣꣑ꪺ늣ꭾ뚡ꅁ귬ꖻꕩ꿠ꡓꚳ깴늧ꅁꙢ꒣Ꙑꪺ껸뙏늴꒤ꅁꕘ뉻깴늧꓆ꅃꚹ뚵꽓꧊ꅁꚳꝕ꧳꣨땥뱴냓Ꙑ껉Ꙣ꒣Ꙑ믝ꡄꓴ럇꒧껸뙏롳꒤쑶ꪧꪺ놡ꅁꛓ덯ꖿ걏ꖻ곣ꡳ꒧믹껦쑶ꪧ볒ꮬꅁ곛맯꧳륌ꕨꓥ쑭ꅁ꙰ Gal-Or뭐 Spuber꧒덝군꒧늣ꭾ깴늧꓆볒ꮬ돌ꑪꪺ꒣Ꙑꅃ ꒤ꑳꑪ뻇ꗸ띾뫞뉺곣ꡳ꧒ 룢뒼뚯 21
닄ꑔ뎹ꅂISP꣢걱ꥷ믹ꩫ꒧믹껦쑶ꪧ볒ꮬ 닄ꑀ론ꅂꭥꢥ 뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾ꑪꙨ뇄ꗎ꣢걱ꥷ믹ꩫ(Two-part Tariff)ꅁ둎걏ꗎꓡꡃ귓ꓫ낣ꑆꖲ믝ꓤꕉꑀ떧ꥷꪺꓫ꾲뙏ꕾꅁ쇙믝뻚ꑀ귓ꓫ꒺ꪺ셠벷놵껉볆ꅁꕈꥷꪺ돦ꛬ뙏뉶ꕴꛦꓤꕉ뙏ꗎꅃ 뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾낣ꑆ뇄ꗎ돦ꑀ뙏뉶닕Ꙙꕾꅁꟳ껸뙏믝ꡄꓴ럇ꪺ깴늧ꅁ뒣꣑Ꙩ궫ꪺ뙏뉶닕Ꙙꅁ엽ꗎꓡꛛꛦ뿯뻜ꅃ덯꣢뫘뙏뉶닕Ꙙꪺꓨꚡꅁ꓀ꝏꙢꖫ돵ꑗꚨꪺ믹껦쑶ꪧꞡ뿅ꅁ맯꧳껸뙏뫖ꝑꓨ궱ꚳ꛳뱶암깴늧ꅈ걏ꝟꙢ꣢뫘ꥷ믹ꓨꚡꑕꅁꙐ볋라릳Ꙣ뽗ꕥꖫ돵떲멣ꑀ볋ꅁ뎣믝굮쓫겹뎡꓀ꪺ껸뙏돑빬(Tirole,1988)ꅈ덯걏Ꙣꕈꦹ꣢걱ꥷ믹믹껦쑶ꪧꪺꓥ쑭꒤ꅁꖼ뒿쒲ꪺ냝썄ꅃ ꙝꚹꖻ곣ꡳꪺꕄ굮ꗘꪺꚳꑇꅇꑀ걏ꯘꗟ맨믹껦쑶ꪧ볒ꮬꅁꗎꕈ꓀꩒뱴냓뇄ꗎ꣢걱ꥷ믹ꩫ꧒ꚨꪺꞡ뿅ꅆꑇ걏ꕈꚹ맨믹껦쑶ꪧ볒ꮬ결냲슦ꅁ꓀꩒뱴냓ꞡ뇄돦ꑀ꣢걱ꥷ믹뙏뉶ꅁ뭐ꞡ뇄냏륪낪ꝃ믝ꡄ꒧꣢걱ꥷ믹뙏뉶닕Ꙙ꣢뫘놡ꅁꣃ꓀꩒Ꙣ꣢뫘뙏뉶꣮ꯗꑕꅁ걏ꝟꚳ뎡꓀껸뙏꒧껸뙏돑빬ꅁ덑뱴냓꧒ꞹꗾꭉ뭫ꅈ ꕈꑕꙕ론ꪺꙷ뇆낣ꑆ닄ꑇ론맯꧳Logit볒ꮬ늤낵뮡ꧺꅁꣃ덝군ꖻ곣ꡳ꧒굮꓀꩒ꪺ볒ꮬꅁ닄ꑔ론뭐닄ꕼ론녎꓀ꝏ꓀꩒뱴냓꣮굱돦ꑀ꣢걱ꥷ믹닕Ꙙꅁꕈ냏륪껸뙏꒧ꥷ믹닕Ꙙꅁ꧒멣ꚨꪺ믹껦쑶ꪧ볒ꮬꞡ뿅ꅃ 22 ꒤ꑳꑪ뻇ꗸ띾뫞뉺곣ꡳ꧒ 룢뒼뚯
닄ꑔ뎹ꅂISP꣢걱ꥷ믹ꩫ꒧믹껦쑶ꪧ볒ꮬ 닄ꑇ론ꅂ볒ꮬ덝ꥷ 닄ꑇ론ꅂ볒ꮬ덝ꥷ 낲덝ꖫ돵ꑗꙀꚳk깡뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾ꅃꙕ깡뱴냓꧒뒣꣑ꪺꩁ냈ꅁꖻ뷨ꑗꣃ때깴늧ꅁ걏Ꙣ꒣Ꙑꪺꗎꓡ늴꒤ꅁꗑ꧳낾ꙮꪺ깴늧라ꚳ꧒꒣Ꙑꅃ꧒ꕈ럭덯k깡뱴냓Ꙣꖫ돵ꑗ뙩ꛦ맨쑶ꪧ껉ꅁꞡ꿠ꙝꗎꓡꪺꛛꗑ뿯뻜ꛓꚳꖫ돵ꗷ썂ꅃꚹꕾ낲덝덯k깡뱴냓ꪺ돦ꛬꗍ늣ꚨꖻ결녠볆c(> 0)ꅃ ꙁꅁꖫ돵ꑗꙀꚳN귓껸뙏ꅁꛓꕂꡃꑀ껸뙏뎣라뿯뻜ꑀ깡뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾ꚨ결꣤ꗎꓡꅁꣃꕂ꒣라Ꙑ껉뿯ꗎ꣢깡꣢깡ꕈꑗꪺ뱴냓ꅃ꧒ꚳꪺꗎꓡꙝꑗ뫴믝ꡄꪺ녪깺ꛓ냏꓀ꚨ꣢롳ꅁ꣤꒤ꝃ믝ꡄꪺꗎꓡ셠볆결N1ꅁ낪믝ꡄꪺꗎꓡ셠볆ꭨ결N2(N=N1+N2)ꅃ ꗑ꧳뱴냓ꞡ뇄꣺꣢걱ꥷ믹ꅁ꧒ꕈ뱴냓꧒꣮굱ꪺꡃ닕뙏뉶꒤ꅁꖲ뚷ꕝꝴꓫ꾲뙏ꕈ돦ꛬ뙏뉶꣢뚵엜볆ꅃ럭뱴냓ꣃ꒣맯ꗎꓡ믝ꡄ낵ꗴ꛳냏꓀ꅁ띑끷맯꧒ꚳꪺꗎꓡꥷ믹껉ꅁ뱴냓ꕵ굮굱ꥷꑀ닕뙏뉶ꝙꕩꅃ땍ꛓ럭뱴냓굮믝ꡄ뙱녪깺냏꓀ꗎꓡ껉ꅁꭨꖲ뚷꣮굱꣢닕뙏뉶ꅁꛓꕂ덯꣢닕뙏뉶뚡ꅁꖲ뚷몡ꢬ꧒ꚳ꒧뮤ꙝ뇸ꗳꅁꕈꚳ껄냏륪꣢롳ꗎꓡꅃ꣤꒤ꯡ꧒ꖲ뚷썂ꕾꕛꑊꪺ뮤ꙝ뇸ꗳꅁ녎걏멣ꚨ꣢뫘ꞡ뿅떲ꩇ깴늧ꪺ쏶쇤꣓랽ꅃ ꛜ꧳ꗎꓡꪺ낾ꙮꅁ럓Logit볒ꮬꪺꑀ꿫덝군ꓨꚡꅁ녎꓀ꚨ꣢귓뎡꓀ꅁ닄ꑀ귓뎡꓀걏Ꙁ덱낾ꙮꅁꚹ삳ꗎꓡ맯Ꙑꑀ늣ꭾ꧒샲ꪾꕩ왛맮꣬ꪺ껄ꗎꅁꛓꕂ꧒ꚳꪺ뱴냓맯ꚹꙀ덱낾ꙮꭄ녠셁룑ꅆ닄ꑇ귓뎡꓀걏꽓ꚳ낾ꙮ(Idiosyncratic Tastes)ꅁꚹ삳ꙕ귓ꗎꓡ맯꧳ꝑꗎ뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾꧒뒣꣑ꪺꩁ냈ꅁ꧒샲녯꒧꒣ꕩ왛맮꣬ꪺ껄ꗎꅁꕂ뱴냓맯꧳덯뎡꓀ꪺ낾ꙮꅁ때ꩫꗎꓡ낵ꚳ꡴닎ꙡ꓀뿫ꅃ 궺ꗽꅁꥷ롱ꗎꓡꪺꙀ덱낾ꙮ뎡꓀ꅇ럭ꗎꓡꝑꗎ닄i깡뱴냓ꑗ뫴ꯡꅁ꧒띐꣼꣬ꪺ뚡놵껄ꗎ꙰ꑕꅇ Vj=a−jtlnp−R,i=1,...,k,j=1,2() iii꣤꒤R결ꓫ꾲뙏ꅁp결돦ꛬ뙏뉶ꅁꕈjtꕎꫭ냏꓀ꗎꓡ믝ꡄ낪ꝃꪺ볐ii꒤ꑳꑪ뻇ꗸ띾뫞뉺곣ꡳ꧒ 룢뒼뚯 23
닄ꑔ뎹ꅂISP꣢걱ꥷ믹ꩫ꒧믹껦쑶ꪧ볒ꮬ 닄ꑇ론ꅂ볒ꮬ덝ꥷ ꅝ12t<tꅞꅁꛓa결ꖿꪺ녠볆ꅁꕎꫭ뱴냓녡떹ꗎꓡꪺ냲ꖻ껄ꗎꅁꕂꚹ냲ꖻ껄ꗎꣃ꒣ꙝ뱴냓ꪺ꒣Ꙑꛓꚳ꧒꒣Ꙑꅁ뒫ꢥ꒧ꅁꚡꅝꅞ꧒덝ꥷ꒧Ꙁ덱낾ꙮꅁꫭꗜ꧒ꚳꪺꗎꓡ믝ꡄ낪ꝃꕩ꓀ꚨ꣢롳ꅁꕂꙕ롳ꗎꓡꝑꗎ닄i깡벷놵ꑗ뫴ꅁ녎샲녯곛Ꙑꪺ껄ꗎꅃ Ꙣꚹ덝ꥷꑕꅁ럭닄i깡뱴냓끷맯닄j롳ꗎꓡ꧒꣮굱꒧뙏뉶닕Ꙙ결pjRj(,)껉ꅁ뻚Roy’s identityꅁꗎꓡꪺꑗ뫴껉볆결jjx=tꅃ꧒ꕈꅁ낪믝iiipiꡄꗎꓡ껸뙏닄i깡뱴냓ꪺ볆뙱낪꧳ꝃ믝ꡄꗎꓡ21(x>x)ꅃ ii ꙰ꩇꗎꓡ뛈ꚡ()꧒ꥷ롱꒧Ꙁ덱낾ꙮ낵뿯뻜ꅁꭨꝃ믝ꡄꪺꗎꓡ녎라ꙕ뱴냓ꪺ뙏뉶ꓴ럇낵ꡍꥷꅁꗧꝙ굙 V1m>V1n,m,n=1,...,k,m≠n ꭨ뿯뻜ꝑꗎ닄m깡뱴냓벷놵ꑗ뫴ꅃꙐ볋ꙡꅁ낪믝ꡄꗎꓡꑝ라ꚳ곛Ꙑꪺꛦ결ꅃ뒫ꢥ꒧ꅁ낣ꭄꚳ꣢뫘ꕈꑗꪺ뿯뻜꿠늣ꗍ곛Ꙑꪺ껄ꗎꓴ럇ꅁꝟꭨꙕ쏾ꗎꓡ녎꓀ꝏꝑꗎ돦ꑀ뱴냓벷놵ꑗ뫴ꅃ 놵뗛ꅁ끑뷗ꚳ쏶ꙕꗎꓡ꽓ꚳ낾ꙮꪺ뎡꓀ꅃꗑ꧳ꙕꗎꓡ맯꧳꽓ꥷ뱴냓ꪺꩁ냈ꅁꞡꚳ꣤뽗꽓ꪺ왛띐ꅁꙢꗎꓡꑈ볆늳Ꙩꪺ놡ꑕꅁ뱴냓때ꩫ끷맯ꙕ귓귓ꝏꗎꓡꕴꛦꛒ뙱ꅃ걏ꅁ덯뎡꓀ꪺ낾ꙮꅁ꒴땍맯ꗎꓡꪺꡍ떦ꚳ꧒뱶암ꅁ꧒ꕈꅁ맯뱴냓ꛓꢥꅁ맯꧳덯때ꩫ꓀뿫뉍랡ꪺꙝ꿀ꅁ돌ꙮꪺ덂뉺ꓨꚡ걏ꕈꑀ귓쁈뻷엜볆e꣓꣨땥ꗎꓡ덯뎡꓀ꪺ낾ꙮꅃꗧꝙꅁ낲덝ꗴꑀꗎꓡꝑꗎ뱴냓ii꧒뒣꣑ꪺ뢹벷놵ꑗ뫴ꯡꅁ꧒녯꣬ꪺ꽓ꚳ껄ꗎ결eꅁ꣤꒤ꅁeꪺꖭꞡ볆결ii0ꅁ엜늧볆결1ꅁꣃ낲덝꧒ꚳꪺ쁈뻷엜볆e결곛Ꙑꕂ뽗ꗟꪺGumbel꓀끴ꅃiꛓꕂ덯뚵쁈뻷엜볆ꅁ꒣뷗걏뱴냓뚡꒣Ꙑꪺꗎꓡ뚡ꅁꞡ결곛Ꙑꕂꦼꚹ뽗ꗟꪺ꓀끴(Identically Independently Distribution)ꅃ귈녯ꩠ띎ꪺ걏ꅁꚹ뫘꽓ꚳ낾ꙮꣃ꒣ꙝꗎꓡꪺ낪ꝃ믝ꡄ깴늧ꅁꛓ늣ꗍꗴ꛳꒣Ꙑꅁ꣢롳ꗎꓡ맯꧳꽓ꥷ띾꧒뒣꣑ꪺꩁ냈ꅁꞡ띐꣼꣬곛Ꙑꪺ꽓ꚳ낾ꙮ꓀끴ꅃ 24 ꒤ꑳꑪ뻇ꗸ띾뫞뉺곣ꡳ꧒ 룢뒼뚯
닄ꑔ뎹ꅂISP꣢걱ꥷ믹ꩫ꒧믹껦쑶ꪧ볒ꮬ 닄ꑇ론ꅂ볒ꮬ덝ꥷ 돌ꯡꅁ낲덝ꗎꓡ맯꧳덯꣢뎡ꗷꪺ낾ꙮꅁ꣣ꚳꕛ셠ꕩ꓀ꪺ꽓꧊ꅁ녎덯꣢뫘낾ꙮꕛ앶ꕛ셠ꯡꅁꝙ녯꣬ꗎꓡꝑꗎ뱴냓i꧒뒣꣑ꪺ뢹벷놵ꑗ뫴ꯡꪺ셠껄ꗎꅇ Uj=Vj+me,i=1,...k,j=1,2() iii꣤꒤m걏ꑀ귓ꖿꪺ녠볆ꅁꖦꕎꫭ꽓ꚳ낾ꙮꪺ뱶암Ꙣꗎꓡ낾ꙮ꒤ꪺ궫굮땻ꯗꅃ럭m뙖ꑪꅁꫭꗜꗎꓡꙢ낵ꡍ떦껉ꅁ뱴냓꒣꧶왛맮ꪺ뎡꓀궫굮꧊뙖ꑪꅁ돦녱뱴냓ꪺ뙏뉶닕Ꙙ꣓Ꝁꡍ떦ꪺꓱ궫뙖ꑰꅁꙐ껉ꑝꕎꫭꗎꓡ꒧뚡낾ꙮꪺ깴늧땻ꯗ뙖ꑪꅃ 셼꣒ꛓꢥꅁ럭m=0껉ꅁꗑ꧳ꗎꓡꪺ깴늧꣓랽ꞹꗾ껸ꖢꅁꭨ꧒ꚳꗎꓡꪺꡍ떦ꅁꞹꗾ뗸뱴냓ꪺ뙏뉶ꛓꥷꅁ귾깡뱴냓ꪺ뙏뉶꿠녡떹ꗎꓡ돌낪ꪺ껄ꗎꅁ꧒ꚳꪺꗎꓡ둎라뿯뻜덯깡뱴냓ꅃ곛ꙡꅁ꙰ꩇm→∞ꅁꭨꗎꓡ낾ꙮꪺꙀ덱뎡꓀둎엜녯꒣궫굮ꅁꗎꓡꪺꛦ결ꞹꗾ꒣꣼뱴냓뙏뉶ꪺ뱶암ꅃ ꧒ꕈꅁꙢꝃ믝ꡄꪺꗎꓡ꒤ꅁ럭꧒ꚳ띾ꪺ뙏뉶닕Ꙙ결p1,R1)={(p1,R1),...,(p11(11k,Rk)}껉ꅁꗩ럓Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985) 뇀뻉Multinomial Logit볒ꮬꪺ륌땻ꅁꕩꡄ녯닄i깡뱴냓Ꙣꝃ믝ꡄꖫ돵ꚳ뉶ꅇ exp[(a−11tlnp−R1111)m] F(p,R)=ii() i∑kexp[(a−11−1tlnpR)m]r=1rr껚뻚ꚹꑀꖫ돵ꚳ뉶ꪺ떲ꩇꅁ닄i깡뱴냓녎라ꚳ셠볆결NF1+NF21i2ꪺi굱ꓡꅃꕴꕾꅁꚳ쏶귓뱴냓Ꙣ낪믝ꡄꖫ돵ꪺꖫ돵ꚳ뉶ꅁꑝꕩꑀꙐꩫꡄ녯쏾ꚡꪺ꣧볆ꅃ 맯꧳()ꚡ꧒ꡄ녯꒧ꖫ돵꓀끴놡ꅁꓱ룻ꚳ뷬ꪺ걏ꕌ귌녎쁈뗛ꗎꓡ뚡맯꽓ꚳ낾ꙮ뱶암꧒늣ꗍ낾ꙮꪺ깴늧땻ꯗꛓꚳ꧒엜ꅁꗧꝙꅁ럭m→0껉ꅁꗎꓡ녎뿯뻜꿠뒣꣑돌ꑪ껄ꗎꪺ뱴냓ꅁꗎꓡꪺ뿯뻜ꅁ녎Ꙟ둟꣬ꕵ꙳Ꙣ닄ꑀ귓뎡꓀꒧낾ꙮꪺ놡ꅆ땍ꛓ럭ꗎꓡ뚡ꪺ깴늧땻ꯗ랥ꑪꅁꝙ럭m→∞껉ꅁ닄ꑀ꒤ꑳꑪ뻇ꗸ띾뫞뉺곣ꡳ꧒ 룢뒼뚯 25
닄ꑔ뎹ꅂISP꣢걱ꥷ믹ꩫ꒧믹껦쑶ꪧ볒ꮬ 닄ꑇ론ꅂ볒ꮬ덝ꥷ 귓뎡꓀ꪺ낾ꙮVj녎꒣Ꙣ면ꗴ꛳ꢤꛢꅁ꣏녯ꖫ돵ꚳ뉶엜ꚨ i1limFj=j=1,2 →∞imk 맪ꑗꅁ굙떹ꥷꚡ()꧒ꥷ롱꒧ꖫ돵ꚳ뉶ꅁꙢꗎꓡ셠볆ꥷꪺ놡ꩰꑕꅁꙕ깡뱴냓Ꙣꝃ믝ꡄꖫ돵꒧륷듁믝ꡄ꣧볆녎ꕩ뮴꧶ꡄ녯ꅁꝙNF11ꅃꛓꚹi륷듁ꪺ믝ꡄ꣧볆ꅁꙐ볋ꑝ닅Ꙙꑀ꿫ꪺ믝ꡄꩫꭨꅁꝙ쁈뗛뙏뉶ꪺ뒣낪ꅁ륷듁믝ꡄ뙱녎쁈꒧듮ꝃꅇ ∂NF1−11−11tNFF=1(1)iii<0,∂p1mp1ii ∂NF1−NF1(1−111F)i=ii<0,i=1,...,k∂R1miꛜ꧳ꙕ뱴냓Ꙣ낪믝ꡄꖫ돵ꪺ놡ꅁꑝꕩꕈꙐ볋ꪺꓨꚡ뇀뻉ꅃ 26 ꒤ꑳꑪ뻇ꗸ띾뫞뉺곣ꡳ꧒ 룢뒼뚯
닄ꑔ뎹ꅂISP꣢걱ꥷ믹ꩫ꒧믹껦쑶ꪧ볒ꮬ 닄ꑔ론ꅂ돦ꑀ뙏뉶닕Ꙙ꒧ꞡ뿅 닄ꑔ론ꅂ돦ꑀ뙏뉶닕Ꙙ꒧ꞡ뿅 뻚ꭥꑀ론꧒ꥷ롱꒧믝ꡄ놡ꅁꖻ론녎ꗽ꓀꩒뱴냓궱맯낪ꝃ믝ꡄ꣢롳ꗎꓡꅁ뛈뒣꣑ꑀ닕뙏뉶닕Ꙙ껉ꅁ꧒멣ꚨꪺꖫ돵ꞡ뿅ꅃ럭k깡뱴냓ꣃ꒣ꕈ뙏뉶ꪺ깴늧맯ꗎꓡ뙩ꛦ냏륪껉ꅁ꧒ꚳꪺ뱴냓ꕵ믝굱ꥷ돦ꑀ뙏뉶닕Ꙙꅁꝙ닄i깡뱴냓ꖲ뚷꣮굱ꪺꡍ떦결ꅇ(p,R)=(pj,Rj),j=1,2ꅃ껚뻚ꑗꑀ론ꪺ믝ꡄ꣧볆iiii덝ꥷꅁ닄i깡뱴냓ꪺꝑ볭꣧볆녎ꕩ뱧ꚨ꙰ꑕꪺꚡꅇ 2jp=∑{NtFj[(p−c)+R]},i=1,...,k ijiiij=1pi ꚹꑀꝑ볭꣧볆뮡ꧺ뱴냓ꚬ꽱ꕝꝴ꣢뫘꣓랽ꅁꑀ걏꣓ꛛꡃꛬꗎꓡ덱룜껉볆jt꧒ꓤꕉꪺ뙏ꗎꅁꕴꕾꭨ걏꣓ꛛꡃꛬꗎꓡ꧒쎺ꕉꪺꓫ꾲뙏ꅃ꣤꒤ꅃꭥpi뚵ꚬ꽱ꥼ뚷꣏ꗎ껉볆ꕉꕘ돦ꛬꚨꖻꅃꙢk깡뱴냓ꕈ뙏뉶결떦늤엜볆ꅁꙐ껉꓀ꝏ꣮굱ꡍ떦ꯡꅁ녎멣ꚨꚹ뫘놡ꪺꖫ돵ꞡ뿅ꅁꚹꑀꞡ뿅걏ꑀ귓Nashꞡ뿅ꅃ 놵뗛ꛒ뱻닄i깡뱴냓Ꙣ떹ꥷ꣤ꕌ뱴냓ꪺ돌빁ꡍ떦ꑕꅁ끷맯ꚹꝑ볭꣧볆꧒꣮굱꒧돌빁ꡍ떦ꅃ맯삳꧳돦ꛬ뙏뉶p뭐ꓫ꾲뙏R꣢뚵엜볆ꪺꑀ뚥뇸ꗳꅁꕩii뇀뻉ꕘ꙰ꑕꪺ떲ꩇꅇ 2N−jjjj∑tttt{Fj−Fjp−c+R+Fj(1)[()]−Fj(p−c)}=0,() jmiiiiiii2j=1ppp(p)iiii2N1j∑−t{Fj(1−Fj)[(p−c)+R]+Fj}=0,() jmiiiiij=1pi녎ꚡ()ꕎꑊꚡ()ꅁꙢꙕ깡뱴냓ꪺꖫ돵ꚳ뉶ꞡꑪ꧳륳ꪺ놡ꑕꅁ뱴냓ꪺ돌빁돦ꛬ뙏뉶녎귨ꙮ떥꧳돦ꛬꚨꖻꅁꝙp=cꅃ놵뗛ꅁꙁꗑ걏()ꕩ뙩iꑀꡂ슲꓆ꓫ꾲뙏ꪺꑀ뚥뇸ꗳꅇ NF1+NF2[1mR=i2]i() iNF11−F1)+NF2(1−F21()ii2ii덯뱴냓ꪺꑀ뚥뇸ꗳꅁ꣤맪둎걏뱴냓뚡ꪺ삳꣧볆ꅃꗑ꧳ꙕ깡뱴냓ꪺ쑶ꪧ뇸ꗳ곛Ꙑꅁ꧒궱맯ꪺꖫ돵ꪬꩰꑝ곛ꙐꅁꙢ꣢롳ꗎꓡ뚡ꑝ뎣뇄꣺곛Ꙑ뙏뉶떦꒤ꑳꑪ뻇ꗸ띾뫞뉺곣ꡳ꧒ 룢뒼뚯 27
닄ꑔ뎹ꅂISP꣢걱ꥷ믹ꩫ꒧믹껦쑶ꪧ볒ꮬ 닄ꑔ론ꅂ돦ꑀ뙏뉶닕Ꙙ꒧ꞡ뿅 늤ꅁ꧒ꕈ녱ꪽ쒱꣓곝ꅁ뱴냓돌ꯡ꒣Ꙣ꣢롳ꗎꓡꪺꖫ돵ꚳ뉶녎라곛ꙐF=F1=F2()ꅁꛓꕂꙕ깡뱴냓ꪺꖫ돵ꚳ뉶ꑝ라곛Ꙑ(F=F)ꅃ iiiij 녎삳꣧볆낵뙩ꑀꡂ슲꓆ꯡꅁꕩ룑녯ꖫ돵ꞡ뿅뙏뉶ꅇ [ꥒ썄]ꅇ럭k깡뱴냓뛈뒣꣑ꑀ닕뙏뉶닕Ꙙ떹ꗎꓡ껉ꅁ녎라ꚳ냟ꑀꪺ맯뫙ꞡ뿅ꅇ p*=c,R*m =1−(1k)[쏒ꧺ]ꅇ뷐ꢣ뿽ꑀꅃ 녱ꥒ썄ꪺ떲ꩇꪾ륄ꅁ낣ꑆꞡ뿅돦ꛬ뙏뉶귨ꙮ떥꧳돦ꛬꚨꖻꕾꅁ꣢걱ꥷ믹ꩫ꒤ꪺꞡ뿅ꓫ꾲뙏ꅁ녎꣼꣬ꗎꓡ뚡ꪺ깴늧땻ꯗꕈ뱴냓깡볆ꪺ뱶암ꅃ꣤꒤ꅁꞡ뿅돦ꛬ뙏뉶떥꧳돦ꛬꚨꖻ덯뚵떲ꩇꅁ뭐뽗뱴냓뇄ꛦ꣢걱ꥷ믹껉곛Ꙑꅁꓫ꾲뙏ꪺꡍꥷꭨ뭐뽗ꥷ믹껉ꚳ덜깴늧ꅁ꣤뚡꧒쇴ꝴꪺ롧샙띎롱결ꅇ럭뱴냓뛈ꚳꑀ깡껉ꅁꓫ꾲뙏녎라ꭄ녠낪ꅁ덯ꫭꗜ꒣뷗ꗎꓡ꒧믝ꡄ낪ꝃꅁ꧒ꚳꗎꓡꪺ껸뙏돑빬ꅁꙢ뱴냓뇄ꛦ꣢걱ꥷ믹껉ꅁꞡ녎덑뱴냓꧒귩맜ꅃ땍ꛓ쁈뗛뱴냓깡볆뱗ꕛꅁꗑ꧳뱴냓꒧뚡쑶ꪧꅁ꣏녯뱴냓ꖲ뚷궰ꝃꓫ꾲뙏ꅁꕈꪧ꣺ꗎꓡꅃ꧒ꕈꅁꞡ뿅ꓫ꾲뙏녎쁈ꖫ돵쑶ꪧ땻ꯗ뒣낪ꛓ궰ꝃꅃ ꗎꓡ뚡낾ꙮ깴늧땻ꯗ(m)ꪺꑪꑰꅁ꒣라뱶암ꞡ뿅ꓫ꾲뙏ꪺ낪ꝃꅁ곆ꛜ라꣏녯꣢걱ꥷ믹꒧ꞡ뿅끨꓆ꚨ뵵꧊ꥷ믹ꅃꝙꅁ럭m=0ꅁꝙꗎꓡ뚡ꪺ깴늧ꞹꗾ꒣꙳Ꙣ껉ꅁ녎꣏ꞡ뿅껉ꪺꓫ꾲뙏떥꧳륳ꅁꗑ꧳돦ꛬ뙏뉶떥꧳돦ꛬꚨꖻꅁ꧒ꕈ녎꣏녯뻣귓ꞡ뿅떲ꩇꅁꙞ꣬ꑀ꿫ꪺBertrand믹껦쑶ꪧꞡ뿅ꅁꛓ꒣ꙁ걏꣢걱ꥷ믹쑶ꪧꞡ뿅ꅁꚹ뫘놡ꑕꅁ띾ꪺꝑ볭ꖲ땍떥꧳륳ꅁ땍ꛓꅁ쁈뗛ꗎꓡ뚡낾ꙮ땻ꯗꪺ깴늧ꕛꑪꅁꞡ뿅ꓫ꾲뙏ꪺꓴ럇ꑝ쁈꒧뒣낪ꅁꕂ뱴냓ꝑ볭쁈꒧뱗ꕛꅃ Ꙣꚹꑀ꣢걱ꥷ믹꒧맨ꞡ뿅ꑕꅁꗑ꧳낪믝ꡄꗎꓡ덱룜껉볆룻Ꙩꅁ꧒ꕈꙢ샲녯곛Ꙑꪺ냲ꖻ껄ꗎꓴ럇aꪺ놡ꩰꑕꅁ낪ꝃ믝ꡄ꣢뫘ꗎꓡ뚡ꅁ꧒샲녯ꪺ껄ꗎꓴ럇쏶ꭙ결ꅇV1*>V2*ꅁꝙꝃ믝ꡄꗎꓡ꧒샲녯꒧껄ꗎ낪꧳낪믝ꡄꅃ 28 ꒤ꑳꑪ뻇ꗸ띾뫞뉺곣ꡳ꧒ 룢뒼뚯
닄ꑔ뎹ꅂISP꣢걱ꥷ믹ꩫ꒧믹껦쑶ꪧ볒ꮬ 닄ꕼ론ꅂ냏륪ꗎꓡ꒧뙏뉶닕Ꙙꞡ뿅 닄ꕼ론ꅂ냏륪ꗎꓡ꒧뙏뉶닕Ꙙꞡ뿅 ꙰Ꙑ닄ꑇ론꧒덝ꥷꪺ믝ꡄꅁꖻ론녎ꛒ뱻k깡뱴냓ꞡ뒣꣑꣢닕뙏뉶닕Ꙙꅁꗎꕈ냏륪낪ꝃ믝ꡄ꣢롳ꗎꓡ껉꧒ꚨꪺꞡ뿅ꅃ 궺ꗽꅁꛒ뱻ꗎꓡꙢꚹ놡ꑕꪺꡍ떦ꛦ결ꅁꕈ꣤ꛦ결맯뱴냓ꡍ떦ꪺ뱶암ꅃ럭ꙕ깡뱴냓ꞡ뒣꣑꣢닕뙏뉶닕Ꙙ껉ꅁ곛맯꧳ꭥꑀ론ꅁꗎꓡ꧒궱셻ꪺ뿯뻜ꅁ둎ꙝꚹꙨ뱗ꕛꑆꑀ궿ꅁꛓꙢ덯뿯뻜꒤ꅁꗎꓡꪺꡍ떦ꕩ냏꓀ꚨ꣢귓뱨ꚸꅇ ꑀꅂ뿯뻜ꝑꗎ귾ꑀ깡뱴냓꧒뒣꣑ꪺꩁ냈ꅃ ꑇꅂ뿯뻜ꕈ꛳뫘뙏뉶닕Ꙙꥷꗎ룓깡뱴냓ꪺ뢹ꅃ Ꙣ닄ꑇ론ꪺ낾ꙮ덝ꥷ꒤ꅁꗑ꧳ꗎꓡ녱닄i깡뱴냓꧒샲녯ꪺ꽓ꚳ낾ꙮꅁꣃ꒣ꙝꗎꓡ믝ꡄ낪ꝃꛓꚳ꧒깴늧ꅁ꣢롳ꗎꓡꙐ볋뎣샲녯eꪺ꽓ꚳ낾ꙮꅃ꧒iꕈꅁꗎꓡ궱맯꣢귓뱨ꚸꪺꡍ떦ꅁꕩꕈꞹꗾ냏꓀ꚨꗽꯡ꣢귓ꡂ왊꣓ꡍꥷꅇꗎꓡꕩꗽ뿯뻜뱴냓ꅁꙁ뿯뻜룓뱴냓꧒뒣꣑ꪺ뙏뉶닕Ꙙꅃ ꣤꒤ꅁꙢ닄ꑇ론ꪺ볒ꮬ덝ꥷ꒤ꅁ덺륌ꚡ()꧒낵ꪺ낾ꙮ덝ꥷꅁꑷ녎뿯뻜뱴냓ꪺꡍ떦ꅁꙢ닄ꑇ론뇀뻉ꖫ돵믝ꡄꪺ륌땻꒤ꅁ롧ꗑMultinomial Logit볒ꮬꪺ뇀면ꓨꚡ덝ꥷꞹꚨꅃꙝꚹꅁꚹ껉뻣귓ꗎꓡꛦ결ꪺ덝ꥷꅁꕵ믝Ꙣ녎ꗎꓡ뿯뻜꽓ꥷ뱴냓ꯡꅁ뿯뻜룓뱴냓꧒뒣꣑꒧뙏뉶닕Ꙙꪺꡍ떦ꛦ결ꅁ꿇ꑊ볒ꮬꪺ꓀꩒ꝙꕩꅃ ꑀꖹꗎꓡ뿯뻜닄i깡뱴냓ꯡꅁ놵뗛ꭋ걏ꗑ룓뱴냓꧒뒣꣑ꪺ뙏뉶닕Ꙙ꒤ꅁ걄뿯ꕘ녡꣓룻낪껄ꗎꪺ뙏뉶닕Ꙙꅃ꧒ꕈꗎꓡꮬ멁ꪺ냏륪ꅁ녎ꗑ뱴냓꧒덝군ꪺ뙏뉶닕Ꙙ꣓ꞹꚨꅃ땍ꛓꅁ결ꑆꚳ껄냏륪낪ꝃ꣢롳ꗎꓡꅁ뱴냓ꖲ뚷ꝑꗎ뙏뉶닕Ꙙꪺ깴늧ꅁ뒣꣑ꢬ냷ꪺꑓꙝ뇸ꗳꅁ엽ꗎꓡꛛ냊냏륪ꛛꑶꪺ믝ꡄꮬ멁ꅁ쇗ꝋ룳롳껸뙏ꪺꕘ뉻ꅃꛓ덯뮤ꙝ뇸ꗳꅁ녎ꚨ결뱴냓꣮굱뙏뉶닕Ꙙ껉ꅁ꧒ꖲ뚷궱맯ꪺ궭꣮뇸ꗳꅃ 맪ꑗꅁꚹ껉뱴냓꧒궱맯ꪺ궭꣮뇸ꗳꅁꑝ둎걏룪끔롧샙뻇꒤ꅁ롧녠뒣꒤ꑳꑪ뻇ꗸ띾뫞뉺곣ꡳ꧒ 룢뒼뚯 29
닄ꑔ뎹ꅂISP꣢걱ꥷ믹ꩫ꒧믹껦쑶ꪧ볒ꮬ 닄ꕼ론ꅂ냏륪ꗎꓡ꒧뙏뉶닕Ꙙꞡ뿅 ꪺ뮤ꙝ곛깥궭꣮( Incentive Compatibility Constraint )ꅃ걏ꅁꙐ볋ꕘ뉻Ꙣ룪끔롧샙뻇꒤ꪺ냑뭐궭꣮( Participation Constraint)ꅁꣃꖼꕘ뉻Ꙣꚹ껉뱴냓꧒궱맯ꪺ냝썄꒤ꅃꡓꚳꕘ뉻ꪺ귬ꙝꅁꭨ걏ꙝ결ꖻ볒ꮬ꧒꓀꩒ꪺ맯뙈ꅁ걏ꑀ귓뻖ꚳꥷ볆뙱ꗎꓡꪺꖫ돵ꅁꛓꙢ덯ꖫ돵꒤ꅁ꧒ꚳꗎꓡꞡ라ꝑꗎꑀ귓뱴냓꧒뒣꣑ꪺꩁ냈ꅁ꧒ꕈ냑뭐궭꣮ꑷꡓꚳꖲ굮ꅃ ꙝꚹꅁ뱴냓Ꙣ뙩ꛦ냏륪ꗎꓡꪺ꣢걱ꥷ믹ꡍ떦껉ꅁꙢꖻ곣ꡳꪺ볒ꮬ걛멣ꑕꅁꕵ믝ꛒ뱻뮤ꙝ곛깥궭꣮ꝙꕩꅃꕈꑕ녎ꗽ룑ꡍ뮤ꙝ곛깥궭꣮뇸ꗳ꒧뚡ꪺ곛쏶냝썄ꅃ 낲덝닄i깡뱴냓꧒뒣꣑ꪺ뙏뉶닕Ꙙ결{(p1R1p2R2,),(,)}ꅁꭨ꣢롳ꗎꓡ꧒iiii녯꒧Ꙁ덱낾ꙮ꓀ꝏ결ꅇ V1p1R1=a−111(,)tlnp−R,iiiii V2p2R2=a−22tp−R2(,)ln,iiiiiꛓ결ꑆ냏륪꣢롳ꗎꓡꅁ뱴냓꧒꣮굱ꪺ뙏뉶닕Ꙙꖲ뚷몡ꢬꕈꑕ꣢귓뇸ꗳꅇ V1p1R1≥V1p2R2(,)(,)()iiiiii V2p2R2≥V2p1R1(,)(,)()iiiiii꣤꒤ꚡ()ꫭꗜ뱴냓굮ꢾꓮꝃ믝ꡄꗎꓡ뿯뻜(p2,R2)ꪺ닕Ꙙ뙩ꛦ껸뙏ꅁꛓꚡii()ꭨ귨ꙮ곛ꅁꖦ걏결ꑆ굮ꢾꓮ낪믝ꡄ뿯뻜ꕈp1R1(,)ꪺ닕Ꙙ뙩ꛦ껸ii뙏ꅃ덯꣢귓뮤ꙝ뇸ꗳꅁ셙ꑰꑆ뱴냓꣮굱뙏뉶ꡍ떦ꪺ뵤돲ꅁ결ꑆꕘ뱴냓ꕩꛦꡍ떦ꪺ뵤돲ꅁꖲ뚷뙩ꑀꡂ둍덯꣢귓뮤ꙝ뇸ꗳ꒧뚡ꅁ꧒쇴ꝴꪺ쏶ꭙꅃꕈꑕ꣢귓ꓞ뉺ꅁꝙ꓀ꝏ뮡ꧺ뱴냓뒣꣑꣢롳ꗎꓡꪺ껄ꗎ뚡ꪺꑪꑰ쏶ꭙꅁꕈꕨ낣꣢ꚡ꒤꒧떥뢹꧒녡꣓꒧ꗙ곞뵤돲ꅃ [ꓞ뉺1]ꅇ굙ꚡ()뭐ꚡ()굮Ꙑ껉몡ꢬꖲ뚷V1p1R1)>V2p2R2(,(,)ꅃ iiiiii[쏒ꧺ]ꅇ뷐ꢣ뿽ꑀꅃ [ꓞ뉺2]ꅇꚡ()뭐ꚡ()꣢ꚡꪺ떥뢹ꅁꙢ1<2ttꪺ놡ꑕꅁ꒣녯Ꙑ껉ꚨꗟꅃ30 ꒤ꑳꑪ뻇ꗸ띾뫞뉺곣ꡳ꧒ 룢뒼뚯
닄ꑔ뎹ꅂISP꣢걱ꥷ믹ꩫ꒧믹껦쑶ꪧ볒ꮬ 닄ꕼ론ꅂ냏륪ꗎꓡ꒧뙏뉶닕Ꙙꞡ뿅 ꙰ꩇ꣤꒤ꑀꚡꪺ떥뢹ꚨꗟꅁꕂp2<p1ꅁꭨꕴꑀ뮤ꙝ궭꣮뇸ꗳꑝ녎ii라몡ꢬꅃ [쏒ꧺ]ꅇ뷐ꢣ뿽ꑀꅃ ꓞ뉺1ꪺ떲뷗ꕘꅁ럭뱴냓뒣꣑꣢닕뙏뉶닕Ꙙꅁ엽ꗎꓡ뿯뻜껉ꅁ결ꑆ몡ꢬ꧒ꚳꪺ뮤ꙝꑀ교궭꣮ꅁꕈꚳ껄냏륪꣢롳ꗎꓡ껉ꅁꖲ뚷꣏녯ꝃ믝ꡄꗎꓡ꧒녯꣬ꪺꙀ덱껄ꗎꅁ쑙껦ꙡꑪ꧳낪믝ꡄꗎꓡꪺꙀ덱껄ꗎꅃꛓꓞ뉺2ꪺ떲ꩇꭨ뮡ꧺꑆ꣢귓뮤ꙝ곛깥궭꣮꒤ꪺ떥뢹ꅁ꒣녯Ꙑ껉ꚨꗟꅃꛓꕂꅁ꙰ꩇ꣤꒤ꑀꚡꪺ떥뢹ꚨꗟꅁꣃ굮ꡄp2<p1ꅁꭨ돌ꯡ꧒녯꒧뙏뉶닕Ꙙꅁꝙ꿠몡ꢬ꧒ꚳiiꪺ뮤ꙝ곛깥궭꣮ꅃ 맪ꑗꅁ럭ꚡ()뭐ꚡ()꣢ꚡ꒧꒤ꗴ꛳ꑀꚡꪺ떥뢹ꚨꗟ껉ꅁ녎라ꥷ롱ꕘ꣢뫘냏륪꣢롳ꗎꓡ꧒ꖲ뚷ꪺ돌ꑰ껄ꗎ깴뙚ꅁ꧒ꕈꅁ꙰ꩇ뱴냓iꪺ늣ꭾ녡떹낪믝ꡄꗎꓡꪺꙀ덱껄ꗎꓴ럇결V2ꪺ놡ꩰꑕꅁꕩ덺륌ꚡ()뭐ꚡ()iꗴꑀꚡꪺ떥뢹ꚨꗟꅁꕈꡄ녯냏륪ꝃ믝ꡄꗎꓡ꧒ꖲ뚷ꪺꙀ덱껄ꗎꓴ럇ꅃꛓꕂꅁꑝꕩꙝꛓꙐ껉뇀녯꣢롳ꗎꓡꅁꙢ덑뱴냓ꞹꗾ냏륪ꪺ놡ꩰꑕꅁ꧒ꖲ뚷ꓤꕉ꒧돌ꑰꓫ꾲뙏깴뙚ꅃ뒫ꢥ꒧ꅁ냏륪ꗎꓡ꧒믝꒧돌ꑰ껄ꗎ깴뙚뭐돌ꑰꓫ꾲뙏깴뙚ꅁ꧳ꚹꑀ볒ꮬ꒤ꖫꑀ엩꣢궱ꪺ떲ꩇꅃ 놵뗛ꅁ녎꓀꩒뱴냓ꪺꡍ떦ꛦ결ꅃ뱴냓ꚹ껉ꑝꙐ볋ꚳ꣢ꓨ궱ꪺ냝썄ꅇ ꑀꅂ꙰꛳뒣꣑빁럭ꪺꙀ덱껄ꗎꓴ럇떹ꗎꓡꅁꕈꭋ뭐꣤ꕌ띾Ꙣꖫ돵ꑗ쑶ꪧꅁ샲녯ꗎꓡꪺꓤ꯹ꅃ ꑇꅂ꧒뒣꣑ꪺ뙏뉶닕Ꙙꅁꖲ뚷꿠ꚳ껄ꪺ냏륪ꗎꓡꅃ ꛓ뱴냓꧒궱맯ꪺ덯꣢귓냝썄ꅁꙢ껄ꗎ깴뙚뭐ꓫ꾲뙏깴뙚꒬결ꑀ엩꣢궱ꪺ놡ꑕꅁꙐ볋ꑝꕩꕈ꓀ꚨ꣢귓뚥걱덂뉺ꅃ궺ꗽꅁ뱴냓ꕩꗽ룑ꡍ닄ꑀ귓냝썄ꅁꡍꥷꑀ귓뒣꣑낪믝ꡄꗎꓡꪺꙀ덱껄ꗎꓴ럇V2ꅁ뭐꣤ꕌ뱴냓Ꙣꖫ돵ꑗ쑶ꪧꅃi땍ꯡꅁ꧳닄ꑇ귓뚥걱ꪺꡍ떦꒤ꅁꑾꙢ걊ꥷꪺꙀ덱껄ꗎV2ꑕꅁ꣮굱냏륪ꗎꓡi꒤ꑳꑪ뻇ꗸ띾뫞뉺곣ꡳ꧒ 룢뒼뚯 31
닄ꑔ뎹ꅂISP꣢걱ꥷ믹ꩫ꒧믹껦쑶ꪧ볒ꮬ 닄ꕼ론ꅂ냏륪ꗎꓡ꒧뙏뉶닕Ꙙꞡ뿅 ꪺ뙏뉶닕Ꙙꅃ ꣤꒤ꅁꙢ닄ꑇ귓뚥걱ꪺ냝썄꒤ꅁꗑꓞ뉺2ꪺ떲뷗ꕩꪾꅁ럭뱴냓꣮굱뙏뉶껉ꅁ낣ꑆꖲ뚷엽꣢귓돦ꛬ뙏뉶몡ꢬp2<p1ꪺ쏶ꭙꕾꅁ쇙녯엽ꗎꓡ꧒ꓤꕉiiꪺꓫ꾲뙏뚡ꅁ꙳Ꙣ걙뫘땻ꯗꪺ깴뙚ꅃ땍ꛓꅁ냏륪ꗎꓡ꧒ꖲ뚷ꪺꓫ꾲뙏깴뙚R2−R1ꅁ녎ꕩꕈꚳ꣢뫘뿯뻜ꅁꑀ걏ꗑꚡ()떥뢹ꚨꗟ껉꧒ꡄ녯꒧궭꣮ꚡꅇ iiR2−R1=1t(lnp1−p2ln),() iiiiꕴꕾ둎걏ꗑꚡ()떥뢹ꚨꗟ껉꧒ꡄ녯꒧궭꣮ꚡꅇ R2−R1=21t(lnp−lnp2),() iiii ꗑꚹꕩꪾꅁꗴꑀ뱴냓ꑀꖹ뇄Ꙟ랹ꪺꓨꚡꅁ꓀ꝏꡄ룑덯꣢귓뚥걱ꪺ냝썄껉ꅁꙢ닄ꑇ귓뚥걱ꪺꡍ떦꒤ꅁ녎라ꚳ꣢뫘ꕩ꿠ꪺ궭꣮뇸ꗳꕩ뿯ꅇꚡ()걏ꚡ()ꅁꙢ덯뫘놡ꩰ꒧ꑕꅁꕵ굮ꙕ깡뱴냓꧒뿯뻜ꪺ궭꣮ꚡ엜ꅁ돌ꯡꪺꖫ돵ꞡ뿅ꑝ녎쁈꒧엜꓆ꅃ ꙝꚹꅁ돌ꯡꪺꖫ돵ꞡ뿅녎ꚳꕈꑕ둘뫘ꕩ꿠ꅇꑀ걏꧒ꚳ뱴냓ꞡ뿯뻜()ꚡ결궭꣮ꚡꅁ꓀ꝏ뙩ꛦ꣢뚥걱ꪺꡍ떦ꯡꅁꚨ돌ꯡꪺꖫ돵ꞡ뿅ꅁꙁ걏뎡꓀뱴냓뿯뻜ꚡ()Ꝁ결궭꣮뇸ꗳꅁ뎡꓀뱴냓뿯뻜ꚡ() Ꝁ결궭꣮뇸ꗳꅁꚨ돌ꯡꪺꖫ돵ꞡ뿅ꅁ돌ꯡꑀ뫘놡ꩰꭋ걏꧒ꚳ뱴냓ꞡ뿯뻜()ꚡꝀ결궭꣮ꚡꅁꚨ돌ꯡꪺꖫ돵ꞡ뿅ꅃ Ꙣ끑뷗ꞹꙕ뫘ꕩ꿠ꪺꖫ돵ꞡ뿅ꯡꅁ녎Ꙟ꣬ꖻ곣ꡳ꧒굮놴끑ꪺ냝썄ꅇ걏ꝟꙢ냏륪ꗎꓡꪺ꣢걱ꥷ믹ꑕꅁ꧳맨쑶ꪧꪺꖫ돵떲멣꒤ꅁ녎ꚳ뎡꓀ꗎꓡꪺ뫖ꝑ녎덑뱴냓꧒귩맜ꅈ Ꙣꭥ굺ꪺ둘뫘ꕩ꿠ꪺꖫ돵ꞡ뿅꒤ꅁ꙳Ꙣ뗛맯뫙ꞡ뿅ꅁꑝ꙳Ꙣ뗛꒣맯뫙ꞡ뿅ꅃ땍ꛓꅁ결ꑆ쏒ꧺꙢ덯둘뫘ꕩ꿠ꪺꖫ돵ꞡ뿅꒤ꅁ꙳Ꙣ뗛꧒ꚳꪺꗎꓡ뫖ꝑꅁ꒣라덑뱴냓꧒귩맜ꪺ놡ꅁꕈꑕ녎뿯뻜럭꧒ꚳ뱴냓ꞡ뿯뻜ꚡ()결궭꣮ꚡ껉ꅁ꧒ꚨꪺ맯뫙ꞡ뿅결꣒ꅁꕈ뒣ꕘ쏒ꅃ꣤맪ꅁ덯뫘맯뫙ꞡ뿅ꅁ곆32 ꒤ꑳꑪ뻇ꗸ띾뫞뉺곣ꡳ꧒ 룢뒼뚯
닄ꑔ뎹ꅂISP꣢걱ꥷ믹ꩫ꒧믹껦쑶ꪧ볒ꮬ 닄ꕼ론ꅂ냏륪ꗎꓡ꒧뙏뉶닕Ꙙꞡ뿅 ꛜꕩ꿠엽꧒ꚳꗎꓡꪺ뫖ꝑꅁ곛맯꧳돦ꑀ뙏뉶닕Ꙙꪺ놡ꩰꛓꢥꅁ녎샲녯떽ꅃ Ꙣ덯귓꣒ꑬ꒤ꅁꙢ떹ꥷ낪믝ꡄꪺꙀ덱껄ꗎ결V2ꪺ놡ꑕꅁ꧒ꚳꪺ뱴냓iꙢ닄ꑇ귓뚥걱ꅁ녎궱셻ꕈꑕꪺꡍ떦ꅇ 2jmax{NFjjtpj[(c)R]}12∑−+jiijip,piij=−22tlnp−R2=V2iiia−11tlnp−R1=a−12−2tlnpR iiiip1>p2iii=1,...,k녎꧒ꚳꪺ궭꣮ꚡꕎꑊꝑ볭꣧볆ꅃ엽ꝑ볭꣧볆ꚨ결p1뭐p2ꅁꕈꕾꗍ엜ii볆V2ꪺ꣧볆ꯡꅁ끷맯룓ꝑ볭꣧볆꓀ꝏ뇀뻉맯삳꧳p1뭐p2꒧ꑀ뚥뇸ꗳꅁꙢiii롧륌꓆슲ꯡꅁ녎ꕩ녯꣬p1=cꅁꕈ i−F1R1p2121(1)−cNF−iitt−=iNF221()[1]t() im22ipi꣤꒤F1결V2뭐p2ꪺ꣧볆ꅁꛓR1뭐F2ꭨ돦꿂결p2ꪺ꣧볆ꅃ꧒ꕈꅁꗑꚡ()iiiiiiꖲ땍ꕩ룑ꕘꑀ귓돌빁ꪺ돦ꛬ뙏뉶p2V2()ꅁꣃꕂp2V2()<cꅃꙁꅁ떲Ꙙ덯iiii꣢귓ꑀ뚥뇸ꗳꅁꕈp2<p1ꪺ궭꣮뇸ꗳꯡꅁ녱ꚡ()쇙ꕩ녯꣬ꑀ뚵궫굮ii끔꺧ꅇ R1m<() i1−F1i덯ꕎꫭꙢp1Ꙑ볋떥꧳돦ꛬꚨꖻꅁꛓꕂꖫ돵ꚳ뉶곛Ꙑꪺ놡ꩰꑕꅁ곛맯i꧳ꭥꑀ론ꪺ돦ꑀ뙏뉶닕Ꙙꞡ뿅떲ꩇꅁꕩꕈ뇀녯ꝃ믝ꡄꗎꓡꪺꙀ덱껄ꗎꓴ럇ꅁꑷꗑ꧳ꓫ꾲뙏R1곛맯룻ꝃꛓ뒣낪ꅃ i놵뗛ꅁ떹ꥷ닄ꑇ뚥걱ꪺ돌빁ꡍ떦ꅁꙞ꣬닄ꑀ뚥걱ꅁ쑾쓲ꡄ꣺ꙕ뱴냓쑀띎뒣꣑떹낪믝ꡄꗎꓡ꒧Ꙁ덱믝ꡄꓴ럇V2ꅃꙐ볋끷맯ꕎꑊ닄ꑇ뚥걱꒧돌빁ꡍi꒤ꑳꑪ뻇ꗸ띾뫞뉺곣ꡳ꧒ 룢뒼뚯 33
닄ꑔ뎹ꅂISP꣢걱ꥷ믹ꩫ꒧믹껦쑶ꪧ볒ꮬ 닄ꕼ론ꅂ냏륪ꗎꓡ꒧뙏뉶닕Ꙙꞡ뿅 떦ꯡꪺꝑ볭꣧볆ꅁ뇀뻉맯삳꧳V2ꪺꑀ뚥뇸ꗳꅁ롧륌꓆슲ꯡ녯꣬ꅇ i11222N1(1−F)R(1)ii1]N2−FRp−cF−+Fii−=−iNF2221[2[1]t(1−F) imimp2m2iii껚뻚ꚹꑀ뇸ꗳꅁꕛꑗꚡ()뭐꣢뚵ꗑ닄ꑇ뚥걱꧒녯꒧떲ꩇꅁꕩ뇀ꪾ R2m>() i1−F2i덯뚵떲ꩇ엣ꗜꅁ쇶땍낪ꗎꓡ라궱맯곛맯룻낪ꪺ돦ꛬ뙏뉶2(p<c)ꅁ걏ꅁꙢi곛Ꙑꪺꖫ돵ꚳ뉶ꑕꅁ녎ꖲ믝ꓤꕉ낪꧳돦ꑀ뙏뉶닕Ꙙꑕ꒧ꓫ꾲뙏ꅃ 뫮Ꙙꚡ()뭐()맯꧳ꞡ뿅ꓫ꾲뙏ꪺ궭꣮ꅁꕩꕈ뇀ꪾꙢ뽗떲멣껉(Fj=1)ꅁ낪믝ꡄꗎꓡ꧒ꖲ뚷굴뻡ꪺꓫ꾲뙏녎륇꫱꧳때뵡ꑪꅁꗧꝙ덯롳ꗎꓡiꪺ껸뙏돑빬ꅁꑷꞹꗾ덑뽗뱴냓꧒ꭉ뭫거뫉ꅁꛜ꧳ꝃ믝ꡄꗎꓡꪺꓫ꾲뙏ꭨ결ꝃ꧳때뵡ꑪꪺ볆귈ꅁꫭꗜ꣤껸뙏돑빬ꑝ덑뽗뱴냓꧒ꑪ둔귩맜ꅃ꒣륌ꅁ꙰ꩇ뱴냓깡볆Ꙩ꧳ꑀ깡껉ꅁꗑ꧳뱴냓뚡ꪺ쑶ꪧꅁ녎꣏덯놡ꩰꚳ꧒떽ꅃ 돌ꯡꅁ럭꧒ꚳꪺ뱴냓ꅁꞡꭥ굺꒧꣢뚥걱ꡍ떦ꓨꚡꅁ녎녯꣬맯뫙ꪺꞡ뿅룑ꅁ꧒ꚳꪺ뱴냓뎣녎꣮굱꣢닕뙏뉶닕Ꙙ{(p1s,R1sp2sR2s),(,)}ꅁꛓꕂꙕ깡뱴냓뒣꣑떹낪ꝃ믝ꡄꪺꙀ덱껄ꗎꞡ결V1sV2s(,)ꅃ뒫ꢥ꒧ꅁ꧒ꚳꪺ뱴냓녎ꞡ꓀덯꣢귓ꖫ돵냏륪ꅁꝙ꧒ꚳꪺ뱴냓뎣녎Ꙣ낪ꝃ믝ꡄ꣢귓ꖫ돵ꅁ꓀ꝏꚳF1=F2=1kꪺꖫ돵ꅃ ii[ꥒ썄]ꅇ럭k깡뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾ꞡ뒣꣑꣢닕뙏뉶닕Ꙙ떹ꗎꓡꅁꕂꞡ뿯뻜ꚡ()결뮤ꙝ궭꣮껉ꅁ돌ꯡꪺ쑶ꪧꞡ뿅ꅁ녎걏꧒ꚳꪺ뱴냓Ꙑ껉ꞡ꓀낪ꝃ믝ꡄ꣢귓ꖫ돵ꅁꕂꙕꛛ뻖ꚳ1kꪺꖫ돵ꚳ뉶ꅃ Ꙣꚹꑀ맯뫙ꞡ뿅ꑕꅁ녱닄ꑇ뚥걱ꪺꑀ뚥뇸ꗳ꒤ꅁꑷ롧쏒ꧺꝃ믝ꡄꗎꓡꅁ꿠냷샲녯곛맯꧳돦ꑀ뙏뉶닕Ꙙ룻낪ꪺꙀ덱껄ꗎꅁꝙV1s>V1*ꅃꛜ꧳낪믝ꡄꗎꓡꅁꗑ꧳꣤ꞡ뿅돦ꛬ뙏뉶ꝃ꧳돦ꛬꚨꖻꅁꓫ꾲뙏ꑓꓱ돦ꑀ뙏뉶닕Ꙙ껉꣓ꪺ낪ꅁ꧒ꕈ때ꩫꧺ엣Ꝑ쉟꣤Ꙁ덱껄ꗎꓴ럇ꪺ엜꓆ꅃ땍ꛓꅁ꣢뫘Ꙁ덱껄ꗎ34 ꒤ꑳꑪ뻇ꗸ띾뫞뉺곣ꡳ꧒ 룢뒼뚯
닄ꑔ뎹ꅂISP꣢걱ꥷ믹ꩫ꒧믹껦쑶ꪧ볒ꮬ 닄ꕼ론ꅂ냏륪ꗎꓡ꒧뙏뉶닕Ꙙꞡ뿅 ꓴ럇ꪺꑪꑰꅁ꒴ꕩꙢ맯뫙ꞡ뿅ꪺ꧊뷨ꑕꓱ룻ꕘ꣓ꅇ V2s−V2*=−22sstlnp−R2+2+*tlncR=2t−1tc−p2s−R1sm ()(lnln)+>01−(1k)꧒ꕈꅁ돌ꯡ낪믝ꡄꗎꓡꪺꙀ덱껄ꗎꅁꑝꙐ볋낪꧳뱴냓뇄ꗎ돦ꑀ뙏뉶닕Ꙙ껉ꪺ떲ꩇꅃ 뫮ꛓꢥ꒧ꅁꙢ맨ꪺ믹껦쑶ꪧ뻷꣮ꑕꅁ꣢걱ꥷ믹ꩫꪺ뇄ꛦꅁꣃ꒣라릳Ꙣ뽗ꖫ돵떲멣ꑕꑀ볋ꅁ뱴냓ꞹꗾ귩맜걙ꗎꓡꪺ껸뙏돑빬ꅃ ꒤ꑳꑪ뻇ꗸ띾뫞뉺곣ꡳ꧒ 룢뒼뚯 35
닄ꕼ뎹ꅂ떲뷗뭐ꯘ쒳 닄ꕼ론ꅂ곣ꡳ떲뷗 닄ꕼ뎹ꅂ떲뷗뭐ꯘ쒳 닄ꑀ론ꅂ곣ꡳ떲뷗 ꖻ곣ꡳꝑꗎLogit볒ꮬ결냲슦ꪺ늣ꭾ깴늧꓆믝ꡄ꣧볆ꅁ덝ꗟ꣢귓꣢걱ꥷ믹ꪺ맨쑶ꪧ볒ꮬꅁ꓀ꝏ꓀꩒돦ꑀ뙏뉶닕Ꙙ껉꒧ꞡ뿅ꅁ뭐덺륌꣢닕뙏뉶닕Ꙙꕈ냏륪낪ꝃ믝ꡄꗎꓡ껉꒧ꞡ뿅ꕂ낵ꓱ룻ꯡꅁ녯꣬ꕈꑕꪺ떲ꩇꅇ 1. Ꙣ맨쑶ꪧꪺꖫ돵떲멣ꑕꅁꗎꓡ꧒녯꣬ꪺ껸뙏돑빬ꅁꖼꖲ라ꙝ뱴냓뇄ꛦ꣢걱ꥷ믹ꛓ덑ꭉ뭫거뫉ꅆ럭뱴냓ꞡ뇄냏륪ꗎꓡ꒧믹껦떦늤껉ꅁꚳꕩ꿠Ꙑ껉뒣꣢쏾ꗎꓡꪺ껸뙏돑빬ꅃ 2. ꙰ꩇꗎꓡ뚡ꪺ낾ꙮ꒣꙳Ꙣꗴ꛳깴늧ꅁꭨ뱴냓꧒뒣꣑ꪺ돦ꑀ뙏뉶닕Ꙙꅁ녎끨꓆ꚨ뵵꧊ꥷ믹ꅁꛓꭄ꣢걱ꥷ믹ꅃ놩ꚳꗎꓡ뚡ꪺ낾ꙮ꙳ꚳ깴늧껉ꅁ뱴냓꧒뇄ꛦ꒧돦ꑀ뙏뉶닕Ꙙꥬ결꣢걱ꥷ믹ꅁ돦ꛬ뙏뉶녎굱Ꙣ돦ꛬꚨꖻꪺꓴ럇ꅁꓫ꾲뙏ꭨ쁈뗛ꗎꓡ뚡ꪺ깴늧뒣낪ꅁꕂ뱴냓ꪺꝑ볭ꑝꙝꛓ뱗ꕛꅃ 3. ꙰ꩇ뱴냓ꞡ뇄냏륪ꗎꓡꪺ믹껦떦늤ꅁ돌ꯡꪺꞡ뿅ꚳꙨ뫘쏾ꮬꅁꕩ꿠걏맯뫙ꞡ뿅ꅁꑝꕩ꿠걏꒣맯뫙ꞡ뿅ꅃ 36 ꒤ꑳꑪ뻇ꗸ띾뫞뉺곣ꡳ꧒ 룢뒼뚯
닄ꕼ뎹ꅂ곣ꡳ떲뷗뭐ꯘ쒳 닄ꑇ론ꅂ곣ꡳ궭꣮ 닄ꑇ론ꅂ곣ꡳ궭꣮ ꖻ곣ꡳꪺ볒ꮬꅁ쇶땍ꕈ맯꧳뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑띾ꪺ왛맮꓁ꑊꅁ꣨땥늣ꭾ깴늧ꑕꅁ꣢걱ꥷ믹ꑕꪺ맨쑶ꪧꖫ돵떲멣ꅁ꧒꣨땥ꪺꖫ돵쑶ꪧ놡ꩰꅁ뙚싷꽵맪ꪺ뉻뙈꒴ꚳ걱뙚싷ꅃ꣒꙰ꅇꖫ돵ꑗꙕ뱴냓꧒ꥷ꒧믹껦떦늤ꅁꕩ꿠ꚳ뎡꓀걏냏륪낪ꝃ믝ꡄꅁꑝꚳ뎡꓀ꭨ뛈뒣꣑돦ꑀ뙏뉶닕Ꙙꅃꙁꅁꙕ뱴냓꧒왛맮꣬ꪺꗎꓡꮬ멁ꅁꕩ꿠ꣃ꒣ꕵ낪ꝃ믝ꡄ꣢쏾ꅁ곆ꛜꙕ깡뱴냓꧒왛맮꣬ꪺꗎꓡ뫘쏾ꣃ꒣ꑀ교ꅃ덯덜Ꙩ뷆싸엜꓆ꑕꪺ껸뙏뫖ꝑ녎라꙰꛳엜꓆ꅁꭨꚳꯝꖼ꣓ꯡ쓲곣ꡳꪺ뙩ꑀꡂ싧뉍ꅃ ꖻ곣ꡳ볒ꮬꣃꖼꛒ뱻맪믚ꖫ돵ꑗ뷆싸ꪺ걆냓샴맒ꅂꩫ덗ꪺ궭꣮ꥍ압ꯈꪺꛦ결ꙝ꿀ꅁꙝꛓ때ꩫ맯ꖼ꣓ꖫ돵뙩ꛦ럇뵔ꪺ뇀듺ꅁ뻚ꙕꗽ뙩냪깡뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑ꖫ돵ꪺ땯깩뻺땻ꅁ녎꣓뫴믚뫴룴ꩁ냈뒣꣑녎듂Ꙗꝋ뙏벷놵ꪺꓨꙖ뙩ꛦꅁꓑꑕꡓꚳꗕꙙꪺ쁜ꅁꝋ뙏벷놵굉ꯡ쇴ꝴꪺ띎롱걏꒰믲ꅁ녎걏귈녯ꯡ쓲곣ꡳ놴끑ꪺꚳ뷬쒳썄ꅃ ꒤ꑳꑪ뻇ꗸ띾뫞뉺곣ꡳ꧒ 룢뒼뚯 37
냑ꛒꓥ쑭 냑ꛒꓥ쑭 ꑀꅂ?꒤ꓥ뎡꓀ 1. ꓽ믱ꗍꅁ뿯뻜걇Ꙣꅁꕸꕟꅁ꒤뗘뱸ꭈ꧒ꅁ1997ꅃ 2. ꓽ믱ꗍꅁ뫴룴ꕀ곉꒤ꪺ쑶ꪧ쁵뛕꛳꣓ꅈꅁꣴ뙖싸뭸ꅁ1998꙾3ꓫꅃ 3. ꓽ믱ꗍꅁ뫞뉺때뫴꒣ꝑꅁꣴ뙖싸뭸ꅁ1998꙾4ꓫꅃ 4. 뇧ꓥ멡ꅁ맨ꕥꅂꕩ엜덗볒돸륓뭐룑낣뫞꣮꒧롧샙껄ꩇꅁ냪곬라곣ꡳ군땥ꅁ1995꙾7ꓫꅃ 5. 듥꿀꿀ꅂꟵꦵ셈ꅂ둞둦꽝ꅁ냪뽗ꕥ맨ꕥ냓ꭾꖫ돵떲멣뱴냓ꛦ결덗뵤꒧곣ꡳꅁ롧샙뎡ꅁ1991꙾ꅃ 6. 뱂ꑂ끝ꅁ맨ꕥ뱴냓뉺뷗볒ꮬ꒧곣ꡳꅁ걆ꩶꑪ뻇롧샙곣ꡳ꧒ꅁꕸꕟꅁ뫓ꑨꅁ1987꙾7ꓫꅃ ꑇꅂ굞ꓥ뎡꓀ 1. Bain, ., 1949 , ꆨA Note on Pricing in Monopoly and Oligopoly, ꆨAmerican Economic Review, pp. 34. 2. Baldursson, F. M., 1998, ꆨInvestment Under Uncertainty in Oligopoly, ꆨJournal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 22, pp. 627-644. 3. Basu, K., 1995, ꆨStackelberg Equilibrium in Oligopoly: An Explanation Based on Managerial Incentives, ꆨEconomics Letters, 49, pp. 459-464. 4. Ben-Akiva, M., Lerman S. R., 1985, ꆨDiscrete choice analysis : theory and application to travel demand ꆨCambridge : MIT Press. 5. Bensoussan, A., and , 1978, ꆨLeader's Dynamic Marketing Behavior in Oligopolyꆨ, Management Science 9, -145. 6. Bertoletti, P., and C. Poletti, 1997, ꆨWelfare effects of discriminatory two-part tariffs constrained by price caps, ꆨEconomics Letters, Vol. 56, No. 3, pp. 293-298. 38 ꒤ꑳꑪ뻇ꗸ띾뫞뉺곣ꡳ꧒ 룢뒼뚯
냑ꛒꓥ쑭 7. Bresnahan, Timothy F., ꆨThe Oligopoly Solution Concept is dentifiedꆨ, 1982, Economics Letters, 10, pp. 87-82ꅃ 8. Cremer, H., M. Marchand and J.-F. Thisse , 1991 , ꆨMixed Oligopoly with Differentiated Products.ꆨInternational Journal of Industrial Organization, pp. 43-53. 9. De Fraja, G. and F. Delbono , 1989 , ꆨAlternative Strategies of a Public Enterprise in Oligopoly, ꆨOxford Economic Papers , , -311. 10. Dockner, E. and , 1986 , ꆨDynamic Advertising and Pricing in a Oligopoly-A Nash Equilibrium Approachꆨ, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 10, -39. 11. Eaton, J. and . Grossman , 1986 , ꆨOptimal Trade and Industrial Policy under Oligopoly, ꆨQuarterly Journal of Economics, 101, pp. 383-406ꅃ 12. Fershtman, C. and . Judd , 1987, ꆨEquilibrium Incentive in Oligopoly, ꆨAmerican Economic Review, 77, pp. 927-940. 13. Fershtman, Chaim and Judd, Kenneth L., 1987, ꆨEquilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly, ꆨAmerican Economic Review, 77, pp. 927-940. 14. Friedman, J., 1977, ꆨOligopoly and the theory of games, ꆨNew York: North-Holland. 15. Gaudet, Gerard and Salant, Stephen W., 1991, ꆨIncreasing the Profits of Subset of Firms in Oligopoly Models with Strategic Substitutes, ꆨAmerican Economic Review, 81, pp. 658-665. 16. Gaudet , Gerard and Salant, Stephen W. , 1991 , ꆨTowards a Theory of Horizontal Mergers, ꆨin George Norman and Manfredi La Manna , The New Industrial Economics: Recent Developments in Industrial Organazation, Oligopoly and Game Theory, Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 137-158. 17. Lambin, ., and , 1975 , ꆨOptimal Marketing Behavior in an Oligopoly, ꆨEuropean Economic Review 6, -128. ꒤ꑳꑪ뻇ꗸ띾뫞뉺곣ꡳ꧒ 룢뒼뚯 39
냑ꛒꓥ쑭 18. Liao, Tim F., 1994, ꆨInterpreting Probability Models: Logit, Probit, and Other Generalized Linear Models, ꆨSage University Paper Series on Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, 07-101, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 19. Martin, Stephen , 1994 , ꆨIndustrial Economics, ꆨNew Jersey : Prentice Hall Inc. 20. Peterson, E. B. and . Connor, 1995, ꆨA Comparison of Oligopoly Welfare Loss Estimates for . Food Manufacturing, ꆨAmer. J. Agr. Econ., Vol. 77, pp. 300-308. 21. Stephen ., 1993, ꆨOligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements, ꆨJournal of Political Economy, pp. 488-511. 22. Rudkin, R. and D. Sibley, 1997, ꆨOptional two-part tariffs: toward more effective price discounting, ꆨPublic Utilities Fortnightly, Vol. 135, , pp. 32-37. 23. Scherer, F. M., 1980, ꆨIndustrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, ꆨUSA: Houghton Mifflin Company. 24. Showalter, M., 1995, ꆨOligopoly and Financial Structure: Comment, ꆨAmerican Economic Review, 85, pp. 647-653. 25. Spulber, D. F., 1992, ꆨOptimal nonlinear pricing and contingent contracts, ꆨInternational Economic Review, Vol. 33, No. 4, pp. 747-772. 26. Stigler, G. J., 1947, ꆨThe kinky oligopoly demand curve and rigid prices, ꆨ Journal of Political Economy, 55, pp. 432-449. 27. Stigler, G. J., 1964, ꆨA theory of oligopoly, ꆨJournal of Political Economy, 72, pp. 44-61. 28. Tirole, J., 1988, ꆨThe Theory of Industrial Organization, ꆨLondon , UK: The MIT press. 29. Vogelsang, I., 1990, ꆨOptional two-part tariffs constrained by price caps, ꆨEconomics Letters, Vol. 33, pp. 287-292. 30. Wilson, R. B., 1993, ꆨNonlinear Pricing, ꆨOxford. 40 ꒤ꑳꑪ뻇ꗸ띾뫞뉺곣ꡳ꧒ 룢뒼뚯
뿽ꑀꅂ볒ꮬ뇀뻉 뿽ꑀꅂ볒ꮬ뇀뻉 [ꥒ썄]ꅇ럭k깡뱴냓뛈뒣꣑ꑀ닕뙏뉶닕Ꙙ떹ꗎꓡ껉ꅁ녎라ꚳ냟ꑀꪺ맯뫙ꞡ뿅ꅇ p*=c,() *mR=() 1−(1k)[쏒ꧺ]ꅇ ꖻ쏒ꧺ녎꓀ꚨꑔ귓ꡂ왊뙩ꛦꅇ (i) 녎꧒ꡄ녯꒧ꑀ뚥뇸ꗳp=cꅁꕎꙞꭥꑀ론꧒녯꒧ꖫ돵ꚳ뉶ꚡ()i꒤ꅁꚹ녎녯꣬ꙕ뱴냓Ꙣ낪ꝃ꣢귓껸뙏롳ꪺꖫ돵ꚳ뉶ꅁꞡꕵ걏ꓫ꾲뙏ꪺ꣧볆ꅃꛓꙢꓫ꾲뙏ꣃ꒣ꙝ낪ꝃ믝ꡄꗎꓡꛓꚳ꧒깴늧ꪺ놡ꩰꑕꅁꙕ뱴냓Ꙣ낪ꝃ믝ꡄ꣢ꖫ돵ꪺꖫ돵ꚳ뉶녎라곛떥ꅁꝙF=F1=F2ꅃ꧒ꕈꅁiiiꓫ꾲뙏ꪺ삳꣧볆녎ꕩ뙩ꑀꡂ슲꓆결ꅇ 1R=i=1,...,k() i1−Fi(ii) ꗑ(i)ꪺ떲ꩇꕩꕈꪾ륄ꅁk깡뱴냓뚡ꪺ삳꣧볆ꅁ녎ꗑ()ꚡ꧒멣ꚨꅁꛓꚹꑀ삳꣧볆ꅁ녎룑녯ꑀ닕맯뫙룑R**(,F)ꅁꕂ결돌ꯡ냟ꑀꪺꞡ뿅룑ꅃꕈꑕꕈ쏒ꩫ쏒ꧺ꒧ꅃ 낲덝ꚳꕴꑀ닕꒣맯뫙룑ꅁ걙깡뱴냓녎ꓫ꾲뙏굱결R'ꅁꕌ녎샲녯F'ꪺꖫ돵ꚳ뉶ꅃ꙰ꩇR'ꑪ꧳R*ꅁꭨꗑꚡ()꧒ꥷ롱꒧ꖫ돵ꚳ뉶ꕩꕈꪾ륄ꅁF'ꖲꥷꑰ꧳F*ꅃ걏ꅁ굙ꗑꚡ()꧒ꝥ뉻ꪺ삳꣧볆ꕩꪾꅁRi쁈뗛ꖫ돵ꚳ뉶ꪺ쉘ꑪꛓ뱗ꕛꅁ꧒ꕈ꒣꙳ꙢR'ꑪ꧳R*ꪺ꒣맯뫙룑ꅃ Ꙑ뉺ꕩꓞ뉺꒣꙳ꙢR'ꑰ꧳R*ꪺ꒣맯뫙룑ꅃ (iii) Ꙣ떹ꥷ꣤ꕌ뱴냓꧒ꥷꪺꓫ꾲뙏ꑕꅁꚡ()ꕩꕈ룑녯ꑀ닕냟ꑀ룑ꅁꛓꕂꗑ(ii)ꪺ쏒ꧺꪾ륄ꚹ룑결맯뫙룑ꅃ 돌ꯡꅁ샋걤맯삳꧳ꝑ볭꣧볆ꪺꑇ뚥뇸ꗳꅁꞡ몡ꢬ랥ꑪ꓆ꪺ귬ꭨꅁ꧒ꕈꞹ꒤ꑳꑪ뻇ꗸ띾뫞뉺곣ꡳ꧒ 룢뒼뚯 41
뿽ꑀꅂ볒ꮬ뇀뻉 ꚨ쏒ꧺꅃ꣤꒤Ꙣꞡ뿅쉉꫱ꪺꑇ뚥뇸ꗳ결ꅇ ∂2p−12ji={NtFjt[1]}0,22∑+<ji∂pp=1miij∂2p−Fi=i[N+N]<0∂R2m12,i ∂2pFi=iN1[t+N212t],∂pRmpiiiF2∆=imN1[(t+N2t)(N+N)+NN122(t−t)>022121212pmi[ꓞ뉺1]ꅇ굙ꚡ()뭐ꚡV1p1R1>V2p2()굮Ꙑ껉몡ꢬꖲ뚷,R2(,)()ꅃ iiiiii[쏒ꧺ]ꅇ ꅳjj ꕏVi=V(pj,Rj),j=1,2ꅃꭨ iii(i) ꗑꚡ()ꕩ뇀녯 ꅳ1ꅳ2V212i−Vi≥(t−t)lnp>0, i(ii) ꗑꚡ()ꕩ뇀녯 ꅳ1ꅳ2VV211i−i≥(t−t)lnp>0, i[ꓞ뉺2]ꅇꚡ()뭐ꚡ()꣢ꚡꪺ떥뢹ꅁ (i) Ꙣ12t<tꪺ놡ꑕꅁ꒣녯Ꙑ껉ꚨꗟꅃ (ii) ꙰ꩇ꣤꒤ꑀꚡꪺ떥뢹ꚨꗟꅁꕂp2<p1ꅁꭨꕴꑀ뮤ꙝ궭꣮뇸ꗳꑝ녎ii라몡ꢬꅃ [쏒ꧺ]ꅇ ꕈꑕ꓀ꚨꑔ뫘놡끑뷗ꅇ (i) ꙰ꩇ꣢ꚡꪺ떥뢹Ꙑ껉ꚨꗟꅁꭨꗑꚡ()ꕩ녯 R2−R1=1t(lnp1−p2ln)() iiiiꛓꗑꚡ()ꭨ녯 42 ꒤ꑳꑪ뻇ꗸ띾뫞뉺곣ꡳ꧒ 룢뒼뚯
뿽ꑀꅂ볒ꮬ뇀뻉 R2−R1=2t(lnp1−p2ln)() iiiiꗑ꧳1<2ttꅁ꧒ꕈꚡ()뭐ꚡ()뛈꿠ꑀꚡꚨꗟꅃ (iia) ꙰ꩇꚡ()ꪺ떥뢹ꚨꗟꅁꭨ녎ꕨ낣ꚡ()꒤꒧떥뢹ꯡꪺ꒣떥ꚡ뭐ꚡ()떲Ꙙꅁꕩ뇀녯꙰ꑕꪺ꒣떥ꚡꅇ 1212t(lnp−np>21l)t(lnp−lnp), iiiiꑷꪾ12t<tꅁ꧒ꕈꚹ꒣떥ꚡꚨꗟꪺ뇸ꗳ결p1>p2ꅃ ii(iib) ꙰ꩇꚡ()ꪺ떥뢹ꚨꗟꅁꭨ녎ꕨ낣ꚡ()꒤꒧떥뢹ꯡꪺ꒣떥ꚡ뭐ꚡ()떲ꙘꅁꙐ볋ꕩ뇀녯꙰ꑕꪺ꒣떥ꚡꅇ 121221t(lnp−lnp)>t(lnp−lnp), iiiiꑷꪾ12t<tꅁ꧒ꕈꚹ꒣떥ꚡꚨꗟꪺ뇸ꗳ결p1>p2ꅃ ii꒤ꑳꑪ뻇ꗸ띾뫞뉺곣ꡳ꧒ 룢뒼뚯 43
