TABLE OF CONTENTS
Executive Summary ................................................................................................................................. 2
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................................. 6
List of Acronyms ..................................................................................................................................... 8
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 9
Research Design and Methodology ....................................................................................................... 13
Literature Review .................................................................................................................................. 15
Case Studies .......................................................................................................................................... 21
KEPSA Against Electoral Violence, Kenya ..................................................................................... 22
The SLF and BPA Alliances Against the Civil War, Sri Lanka ....................................................... 26
The Group of Seven During The Troubles, Northern Ireland ........................................................... 29
Private Sector Contributions Against the Civil War, Nepal ............................................................. 33
Private Sector Contributions to Peace Negotiations, El Salvador .................................................... 36
Private Sector Contributions to Stability, Somalia ........................................................................... 40
Thematic Analyisis ................................................................................................................................ 43
Topic 1: Benefits of Private Sector Involvement to the Peace Process ............................................ 43
Topic 2: Benefits, Incentives and Responsibility for the Private Sector ........................................... 45
Topic 3: Private Sector Contribution Types ..................................................................................... 47
Topic 4: Different Industries ............................................................................................................. 53
Topic 5: Multinational Versus Local Actors ..................................................................................... 57
Topic 6: Private Sector Alliances ...................................................................................................... 61
Topic 7: Different Stakeholders within Businesses .......................................................................... 63
Topic 8: Role of Other Stakeholders in Peace .................................................................................. 65
Topic 9: Limitations of the Private Sector ........................................................................................ 69
Future Research .....................................................................................................................................72
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. 73
Policy Recommendations ...................................................................................................................... 75
Bibliography .......................................................................................................................................... 77
Appendix – Interviewee List ................................................................................................................. 85
LIST OF ACRONYMS
ANEP Asociación Nacional de la Empresa Privada, El Salvador
ARENA Alianza Republicana Nacionalista
BPA Business for Peace Alliance
CBI Confederation of British Industry, Northern Ireland
CBM Consultative Business Movement, South Africa
CODESA Convention for a Democratic South Africa
CPA Comprehensive Peace Accord, Nepal
CPN-M Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) CSR
Corporate Social Responsibility
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FMLN Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional, El Salvador
FUSADES Fundación Salvadoreña para el Desarrollo
GAM Free Aceh Movement, Indonesia
GDP Gross Domestic Product GoS/Go7
Group of Seven, Northern Ireland IDP
Internally Displaced Person
IRA Irish Republican Army
KANU Kenya Africa National Union
KEPSA Kenya Private Sector Alliance
LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, Sri Lanka
NBI National Business Initiative, Nepal
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
ODM Orange Democratic Movement SLF
Sri Lanka First
TFG Transitional Federal Government, Somalia
TNG Transitional National Government, Somalia
UNDP United Nations Development Program WEF
World Economic Forum
INTRODUCTION
The Consultative Business Movement (CBM) was created in 1988 by leading academics and over forty business
figures in South Africa. Like many around them, they recognized that apartheid posed a hindrance to the
successful expansion of their operations. By establishing relations with political, religious and labor leaders, the
CBM facilitated contact and helped mobilize support for the signing of the National Peace Accord in 1991. The
CBM went on to provide support for the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), by lending its
facilities and assets to the negotiation process and pressuring the political parties to reach an expedited
agreement. CODESA ended apartheid in South Africa and was the start of the transition to democracy. The CBM
further supported the democratic development of South Africa by running a campaign on the importance of free
and fair elections and organizing logistics around elections and voting. The CBM played a substantial role in
encouraging the creation of a peace agreement and later in the establishment of an apartheid-free democratic
South Africa. The sizable reconciliation of the social class in South Africa allowed for the expansion of the
market economies and a boost in economic
The scholarly community has paid increasing attention to the role of the private sector in
peacebuilding and Activities from actors such as the CBM have become novel
examples of success, whilst instances whereby the private sector has produced negative or negligible
impacts have revealed its limitations in influencing peace processes. The activities of the private
sector in conflict contexts create a potential roadmap on how multi-stakeholder approaches to
peacebuilding, which include private sector actors, can be fruitfully developed.
Private sector actors can support peacebuilding in varying scales and during different stages of
conflict. For instance, private sector actors in extractive industries have developed rigorous
consultation protocols to minimize inherent contentions which may arise with local
A telecommunications company in Kenya worked to limit text messages inciting
6 Brian Ganson, ‘Business in the Transition to Democracy in South Africa: Historical and Contemporary
Perspectives’, CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, March 2017, 14; Nick Killick, VS Srikantha, and Canan Gündüz,
“The Role of Local Business in Peacebuilding,” 2005, 23; Rosemary Nel and Christo Grealy, ‘The Consultative
Business Movement’, Indicator South Africa 6, no. 1_2 (1 January 1989): 105–8.
7 Igor Abramov, ‘Building Peace in Fragile States – Building Trust Is Essential for Effective Public–Private
Partnerships’, Journal of Business Ethics 89, no. 1 (2009): 481–94, Salil
Tripathi and Canan Gündüz, ‘A Role for the Private Sector in Peace Processes? Examples, and Implications for Third-Party
Mediation’ (The OSLO forum Network of Mediators, 2008).
8 ‘Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative’, Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, 2019,
Lisa J Laplante and Suzanne A Spears, ‘Out of the Conflict Zone: The Case for Community Consent
Processes in the Extractive Sector’, Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 11, no. 1 (2008): 49.
civilians to war in the early stages of widespread The infrastructure industry has
traditionally been employed for post-conflict reconstruction once the ink dries on peace
Meanwhile, private sector actors across the board have adopted internal practices
conducive to peacebuilding, as well as incorporated a conflict-sensitive lens into corporate
standards and policies within many of their In many contexts, private sector actors
recognize the cruciality of peace for business
Given the increased attention to the role of the private sector in peace and the growing
recognition of their contributions, it is worthwhile to explore why private sector engagement is needed
in peace and reconciliation, the benefits the private sector can bring to the peace process, and how
the private sector can be effectively mobilized in support.
For an effective exploration of these topics, it is important to define the private sector as it will be
referred to throughout this report. The private sector is the “part of the economy that is controlled
by private individuals or groups rather than the state and is typically organized and run for profit”.13
The private sector also includes companies and business associations - both local and transnational.
While the private sector excludes organizations working in the public sphere, foundations which were
established by corporate entities also fall within the scope of this report. For simplicity, however, the
terms private sector actor and business shall be used interchangeably throughout this report.
9 Jonathan Luke Austin and Achim Wennmann, ‘Business Engagement in Violence Prevention and Peace-
Building: The Case of Kenya’, Conflict, Security & Development 17, no. 6 (2017): 451–72,
10 Jan Bachmann and Peer Schouten, ‘Concrete Approaches to Peace: Infrastructure as Peacebuilding’,
International Affairs 94, no. 2 (2018): 381–98,
11 Timothy L. Fort and Cindy A. Schipani, The Role of Business in Fostering Peaceful Societies (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2009), Jennifer Oetzel et al., ‘Business
and Peace: Sketching the Terrain’, Journal of Business Ethics 89 (2009): 351–73.
12 Tripathi and Gündüz, ‘A Role for the Private Sector in Peace Processes? Examples, and Implications for
Third-Party Mediation’.
13 Jan Joel Andersson, Tobias Evers, and Gunnar Sjöstedt, Private Sector Actors & Peacebuilding: A
Framework for Analysis (Stockholm: The Swedish Institute of International Affairs : International Council of Swedish
Industry, 2011), 13.
Additionally, it is important to define peace. As there are many definitions for peace, its
definition as used in this report, impacts how the potential contributions of the private sector are
viewed. Peace, as referred to herein, encompasses negative peace, which is the absence of violence,
conflict and repression. It additionally includes positive peace, which are the institutions,
structures, and attitudes, which when strengthened, lead to inclusive and prosperous
This view of both the negative and positive sides of peace, opens the possibility to consider a wider
variety of contributions by private sector actors. Herein, peacebuilding shall refer to activities
undertaken to achieve negative peace such as CBM’s role in facilitating the National Peace Accord in
South Africa. More broadly, peacebuilding will also include the activities taken to achieve positive
peace, also seen in the CBM’s role in supporting the country’s first democratic elections.
Through a literature review, case studies, and interviews, this report will explore why private sector
engagement is needed in peacebuilding and reconciliation, the benefits the private sector can bring
to the peace process, and how the private sector can be effectively mobilized in support. Through
this, the research objectives of identifying replicable private sector peacebuilding contributions for
the future and increasing the knowledge base available to public and private sectors of their potential role
in their effective engagement in peacebuilding, can be achieved.
To guide the examination of the role of the private sector in peace, the following research question
was identified: Based on previous involvements of the private sector in peacebuilding, which of its
activities can contribute positively to peacebuilding, and what lessons can be generated for
future interventions?
Four secondary questions are addressed implicitly or explicitly:
1) What are the benefits of private sector’s involvement in peacebuilding?
2) What conditions limit or enable the private sector’s engagement in peacebuilding?
3) What impact do the industry and type of business have on private sector actors’
contributions to peacebuilding?
4) How can other stakeholders in peacebuilding such as governments and international
organizations effectively mobilize private sector actors?
14 Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research," Journal of Peace Research 6, no. 3 (1969): 167-91,
After some elaboration on the Research Design and Methodology, the report begins with an
examination of existing literature on the involvement of private sector actors in peacebuilding and
reconciliation. This is followed by an examination of Case Studies and a Thematic Analysis of the
report’s key questions, supplemented by interviews and additional literature. To end, Conclusions on
the contribution of the private sector to peacebuilding will be made, followed by Policy
Recommendations.
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
Desk research and interviews were the predominant methods for data collection. The desk research
explored published academic works to present contemporary perspectives on how the private sector
and peacebuilding efforts have intersected and could intersect. It included both general and case-
specific research.
All cases were selected based on three overarching criteria. First, each conflict is contained within
the boundaries of one state. This was to limit the number of variables that could influence whether a
private sector actor’s actions were successful in fostering peace. Second, all conflicts occurred within the
last fifty years. Limiting the historical time frame created a high possibility that the lessons learned
can be applied successfully in the near future. Third, no two cases were selected from the same
country, facilitating the coverage of different regions.
The final six cases also subscribed to the following guidelines, which were not mutually
exclusive:
● At least one case involved intervention by private sector actors in infrastructure.
● At least one case involved intervention from private sector actors in telecommunications or
digital communications.
● The conflicts in which private sector actors were active were of varied lengths. The
following time spans were covered: less than 5 years, 5 - 10 years and lasting more than 10 years.
● One conflict occurred circa 2010.
● One conflict was This and the former criterion allowed us to trace the newest trends
and needs in private sector peacebuilding activities.
● Two cases were of intervention from a private sector association or collective.
● No more than two conflicts ended while in the early stages of conflict development.
While the cases demonstrated multiple instances of private sector contributions within different
geographical and temporal contexts, they also served as a basis for a wider discussion on the
15 Ongoing as of September 2019.
report’s primary and secondary questions. This discussion was based on a series of semi- structured
interviews conducted with academics and representatives of organizations collaborating with
private sector actors.
Nineteen interviewees participated and they were selected by various means. For one, authors,
organizations and individuals cited within publications explored during desk research were
contacted. Peacebuilding organizations with demonstrated history or research regarding how they
might partner with the private sector were also targeted. Additionally, various individuals from within
the WEF were identified or referred by interviewees. Indeed, the snow-balling method became
increasingly prominent during the interview phase of research. The final list of interviewees is presented
in the Appendix.
The research sub-questions served as the guiding framework for the interviews. A master list of
questions was established and regularly updated, from which a brief list was pre-selected and tailored
to each interviewee’s Each customized list was further built during the interviews, based on
respondents’ answers. Interviews were conducted via telephone, Skype or in-person and fluctuated
between one-on-one and two-on-two interviews.
Through both interviews and ongoing case research, recurring themes and considerations for private
sector involvement in peacebuilding were observed. These were used to establish the analytical
framework of the Thematic Analysis. Data from interviews, desk research on the Case Studies, and
additional data from the Literature Review phase were weaved together to provide salient analysis of
each dimension identified for the Thematic Analysis. These dimensions addressed the report’s
research questions, stated above.
16 October interviews did not elicit enough content for secondary research question 4. The master list of
questions has been expanded to address this for the November interviews.
Questions were generally open-ended and non-leading. Specific perspectives or models for private sector contribution
sometimes preceded a question to the interviewee about what their own perspective on such propositions is presently.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Until the mid-1990s, attention was first and foremost given to state actors and few scholarly works
were written on the potential contributions of private sector actors to Since the rise
of multinational corporations (MNCs) and the advancement of economic globalization, however,
scholars started paying greater attention to the roles that can be played by the private After all,
private sector actors are increasingly likely to operate on a global scale, and oftentimes in areas
where violent conflict takes Countries experiencing or recovering from conflict often
face challenges related to economic and infrastructure development, political stability, governance
and reconciliation. Private sector actors can contribute to the alleviation of these problems, in
addition to creating new opportunities for the sustainment of
As argued by Berdal and Mousavizadeh, two radical viewpoints on the link between the private sector
and peacebuilding have traditionally dominated scholarly One view held by market
fundamentalists was that society's ills, including (post-)conflict instability, could be exclusively
remedied using market-based solutions. A private sector operating under neo- liberal conditions was
necessary for peace. The other view held that the private sector has no role to play in peacebuilding as
its need for immediate profits and markets cause it to reinforce conflict The scholarship set
between these two extremes, however, is what holds the most promise.
Academic works which occupy the middle ground examine the positive contributions available while
taking limitations in desirability and practicality into account. During war, many businesses
face heightened security costs, suspension of production, destruction of
17 Derek Sweetman, Business, Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding : Contributions from the Private Sector to Address
Violent Conflict, Routledge Studies in Peace and Conflict Resolution (London ; New York: Routledge, 2009),
18 Allan Gerson, ‘The Private Sector and Peace’, The Brown Journal of World Affairs 7, no. 2 (2000): 141–45;
Sweetman, Business, Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding; Oliver F Williams, Peace Through Commerce :
Responsible Corporate Citizenship and the Ideals of the United Nations Global Compact (Notre Dame IN: University of
Notre Dame Press, 2008).
19 Brian Ganson and Achim Wennmann, ‘Business and Conflict in Fragile States’, Adelphi Series 55, no. 1
(2015): 11–34,
20 Abramov, ‘Building Peace in Fragile States – Building Trust Is Essential for Effective Public–Private
Partnerships’.
21 Berdal and Mousavizadeh, ‘Investing for Peace’. 22
Ibid.
infrastructure, displacement of workers, as well as the opportunity costs of lost potential
Tripathi and Gündüz note that it is in the best interest of businesses to get involved
in peacebuilding as soon as the costs of conflict rise to levels that can no longer be sustained in the
long run. However, there are cases in which businesses benefit from conflict, disincentivizing them
from supporting peacebuilding Furthermore, the political, financial and reputational risk
for private sector actors is often weighed against the economic potential from operating in fragile
regions. If the former outweighs the latter, private sector actors can be disincentivized from taking a
stake in peacebuilding Generally, if an incentive for a business to get involved in
peacebuilding is recognized, the nature of the intervention depends on a number of factors. Among
these are:
● the location, causes of the conflict, stage of the conflict;
● the power and role of the stakeholders;
● the relationships between stakeholders;
● the type and size of industry;
● the industry’s role in the
There are numerous concrete ways through which private sector actors can contribute to
peacebuilding. To begin, economic development and peace tend to reinforce each By creating
jobs and income opportunities, private sector actors can help mitigate socioeconomic inequalities and
shift the stances of opposing parties to a Additionally, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) can
help rebuild For example, during the final years of Mozambique’s civil war, its
government was deliberate in generating inflows into agriculture through sale of public
organizations within that industry. The government recognized that
23 Jane Nelson, ‘The Business of Peace’ (The Prince of Wales Business Leaders Forum, 2000),
Subedi, ‘“Pro-
Peace Entrepreneur” or “Conflict Profiteer”?’
24 Tripathi and Gündüz, ‘A Role for the Private Sector in Peace Processes? Examples, and Implications for
Third-Party Mediation’.
25 Berdal and Mousavizadeh, ‘Investing for Peace’; Madavo, ‘Do Private Sector Activities Support Peace or
Conflict in Fragile States?’
26 Sweetman, Business, Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding.
27 Oetzel et al., ‘Business and Peace’; Madavo, ‘Do Private Sector Activities Support Peace or Conflict in Fragile
States?’; Stewart, "Root Causes Of Violent Conflict In Developing Countries," BMJ: British Medical Journal 324, no. 7333
(2002): 342-45.
28 Berdal and Mousavizadeh, ‘Investing for Peace’; Mary Porter Peschka and James J. Emery, ‘The Role of the
Private Sector in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States’ (World Bank, 2011), Subedi,
‘“Pro-Peace Entrepreneur” or “Conflict Profiteer”?’
29 Madavo, ‘Do Private Sector Activities Support Peace or Conflict in Fragile States?’
targeted FDI could increase rural employment, give small-scale farmers access to markets, and target
underdeveloped
Furthermore, in situations where a government lacks the necessary means to provide essential services,
the private sector can fill the gap and reduce tensions within the population. This could also help a weak
government to regain the trust of the population. After all, “[c]oncrete dividends instill hope into people
and give them a reason to buy into peace”.31 In Somalia, for instance, the provision of services by
private sector actors had a positive impact on the country’s economic and political
Additionally, involving the private sector can provide various advantages for the political aspects
of Tripathi and Gündüz assert that due to their theoretically apolitical nature,
businesses can act in situations where other actors – due to their positionalities within a conflict –
Private sector actors may also lobby for peace and serve as conduits between warring
parties who would otherwise fail to converse. For instance, businessman Juha Christensen used his
networks to orchestrate meetings between the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and representatives of
the Indonesian government. He also guided mediation processes between these warring The
CBM in South Africa contributed many of its company offices, conference centers and secretarial
staff to the peace processes in apartheid South Furthermore, in consideration of their
functions as employers and providers of goods and services, corporations may benefit from credibility
among the communities in which they operate, which they can leverage for their peacebuilding
Nevertheless, private sector actors complement the efforts of other actors in peacebuilding and do not act
in isolation. They often engage in multi-stakeholder dialogues and enter into public-
30 ‘Best Practices in Investment for Development: How Post-Conflict Countries Can Attract and Benefit from FDI:
Lessons from Croatia and Mozambique’, Investment Advisory Series (United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development, 2010),
31 Peschka and Emery, ‘The Role of the Private Sector in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States’, 10.
32 Cassanelli, ‘Private Sector Peacemaking: Business and Reconstruction in Somalia’; Yusuf, ‘Somali
Enterprises: Making Peace Their Business’.
33 Juliette Bennett, ‘Multinational Corporations, Social Responsibility and Conflict’, Journal of International Affairs
55, no. 2 (2002): 393–410.
34 Tripathi and Gündüz, ‘A Role for the Private Sector in Peace Processes? Examples, and Implications for
Third-Party Mediation’.
35 Money Makers as Peace Makers? Business Actors in Mediation Processes, Working Paper / Swisspeace
(Bern: Swisspeace, 2010), 21–24,
36 Ibid.
37 Fort and Schipani, The Role of Business in Fostering Peaceful Societies.
private partnerships with the government and broader public Notwithstanding the
advantages discussed above, business approaches to peacebuilding can have their
weaknesses. The private sector is a heterogeneous constituency with diverse needs and interests,
entailing that any added value from its involvement in peacebuilding is highly dependent on the
specific context, and the actor’s relationship to that The inclusion of the private sector does
not constitute a panacea for conflict, nor should its influence, as compared to other peace
stakeholders, be Despite the various contributions that private sector actors can make
and have made to peacebuilding, there are documented examples of businesses contributing to the
perpetuation of violent Private sector actors can create sources of grievance and
exacerbate conflict by increasing vertical and horizontal inequalities, when operating without
consistent
Businesses have increasingly integrated a peace and conflict lens into their operations by
developing and adopting corporate standards and policies, which address business
responsibility towards creating positive peace. “Led by the integration of health, safety and
environmental issues into the management of core business activities, a growing number of
companies are starting to address wider social issues, including human rights, in the way they run their
day-to-day business operations.”43 These measures often fall under the corporate social
responsibility (CSR) frameworks of companies, which have gained increasing traction since CSR
norms began developing in the 1970s. Although conflict dimensions were not among its initial
components, they have been given increasing attention since the One framework often
adopted by businesses in conflict settings is the UN Global Compact, that provides guidance on
responsible operations within conflict-affected Such documents and CSR norms can
push forward-thinking businesses away from a profit-making
38 Bennett, ‘Multinational Corporations, Social Responsibility and Conflict’; Subedi, ‘“Pro-Peace Entrepreneur” or
“Conflict Profiteer”?’; Tripathi and Gündüz, ‘A Role for the Private Sector in Peace Processes? Examples, and
Implications for Third-Party Mediation’; Madavo, ‘Do Private Sector Activities Support Peace or Conflict in Fragile
States?’
39 Subedi, ‘“Pro-Peace Entrepreneur” or “Conflict Profiteer”?’
40 John Micklethwait, The Company : A Short History of a Revolutionary Idea, Pbk. ed., Non-Fiction/History (London:
Phoenix : Orion Books, 2005), Sweetman, Business, Conflict
Resolution and Peacebuilding.
41 Berdal and Mousavizadeh, ‘Investing for Peace’.
42 Madavo, ‘Do Private Sector Activities Support Peace or Conflict in Fragile States?’ 43
Oetzel et al., ‘Business and Peace’.
44 Sweetman, Business, Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding; Fort and Schipani, The Role of Business in
Fostering Peaceful Societies.
45 ‘Guidance on Responsible Business in Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas’ (New York: United Nations
Global Compact, 2010), 2,
mindset to viewing the wider contributions and internal adjustments that businesses can make towards
positive peace.
Further contributions that the private sector can make towards creating positive peace include obeying
the rule of law, contributing to the fight against corruption, and pursuing philanthropic activities to aid
victims of Businesses can also support vocational training for conflict- affected communities
and provide jobs to conflict-victim families, former combatants as well as internally displaced persons
(IDPs).47
All in all, despite the possibility for private sector actors to contribute to the exacerbation of
conflicts, when viewing both the positive and negative sides of peace, there are a wide array of
contributions that the private sector can make towards creating sustainable peace. This is further
supported by a historical examples of private sector engagement in peacebuilding, highlighted
through the table below and examined in-depth within the upcoming sections.
46 Melin, ‘Business, Peace, and World Politics’; Oetzel et al., ‘Business and Peace’. 47
Subedi, ‘“Pro-Peace Entrepreneur” or “Conflict Profiteer”?’
Historical Examples of Private Sector Contributions to Peacebuilding
Private Sector Actors Industry Country Year(s) Contribution to Peace
Mitsubishi Corporation
Teck-Cominco Limited
BHP Billiton Plc Xstrata
Extractive
Peru 1998-Present consulted local communities
over mining plans48
established a Foundation to
invest in the community with
projects49
La Frutera Inc.
Paglas Corporation
Agriculture Philippines Late 1990s established a banana
plantation in a marginalized
area for Christians and
Muslims, to create jobs and
promote religious tolerance50
Lonrho Extractive Mozambique 1990s socialized with
representatives of the
warring RENAMO and
FRELIMO groups51
provided jet transport for
RENAMO to go a
negotiating table in Rome
and financed their
participation in the talk52
National Association of
Industries (ANDI)
Individual businesses
Various
industries
Colombia 1980s-ongoing participated in public
protests against the
conflict53
lobbied for settling the
conflict by peaceful means
48 Laplante and Spears, ‘Out of the Conflict Zone: The Case for Community Consent Processes in the Extractive
Sector’.
49 Ibid.
50 Williams, Peace Through Commerce.
51 Tripathi and Gündüz, ‘A Role for the Private Sector in Peace Processes? Examples, and Implications for
Third-Party Mediation’.
52 Tripathi and Gündüz, ‘A Role for the Private Sector in Peace Processes? Examples, and Implications for
Third-Party Mediation’.
53 Ibid.
CASE STUDIES
This section briefly presents motivations and the progression of peacebuilding activities
executed by select private sector actors in recent conflict settings. The six case presentations each begin
with an outline of the political and socioeconomic contexts that informed the timing and substance of
the private sector’s interventions. The contributions of the private sector on the whole or via specific
entities are then expounded.
While the cases took place in six different countries, the strength of the selection is its ability to
showcase the wide breadth of private sector involvement in contemporary peacebuilding. For instance,
the case from Sri Lanka details private sector engagement during a civil war whilst the case from El
Salvador explores private sector contributions during peace negotiations. The case in Kenya explores
private sector responses to future violence whilst actors in Northern Ireland began their actions two
decades into the conflict. Actors in Nepal and Somalia both brought attention to the economic
injustice surrounding them. In Nepal, business actors employed strikes while in Somalia turned to
incremental, operational activities.
This section also facilitates an informed reading of the subsequent Thematic Analysis, which
frequently refers back to the six cases.
KEPSA Against Electoral Violence, Kenya
Following a contentious general election in 2007, widespread violence erupted in Kenya.
Although electoral violence was not a new phenomenon, the response of the private sector in de-
escalating tensions and preventing its reoccurrence was novel. From 1978, President Daniel arap
Moi “maintained a stranglehold on political power for close to 25 years, presiding over the
disintegration of the country’s economy and infrastructure, fueling ethnic tensions through political
manipulation, and allowing a culture of corruption and patronage to become deeply entrenched in the
political arena.”54 Widespread claims of election rigging incited violent responses to his re-elections in
1992 and 1997. The subsequent general elections, however, ushered in a new ruling party with the
election of Mwai
Kibaki would later defeat the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) candidate, Raila Odinga, in
2007. The close-run election was contested by ODM and it raised charges of vote rigging against
Kibaki. The declaration from the Electoral Commission of Kenya that Kibaki had won the election
sparked widespread protests, which quickly turned violent. It is estimated that 1,300 people were killed,
and several thousands of others were injured and displaced as a
Beyond the high cost in human lives, the violence in Kenya took an immense toll on the
economy. According to the World Bank, Kenya’s GDP growth fell from 7% in 2007 to .02% in
54 “Background on the Post-Election Crisis in Kenya,” accessed October 26, 2019,
55 Daniel arap Moi belonged to the political party, Kenya African National Union (KANU), while Mwai Kibaki
belonged to the National Rainbow Coalition.
56 Kenya CIA World Factbook, updated on June 20, 2018, International Crisis Group: “Kenya’s 2013 elections”
(Jan. 17, 2013).
FDI into the state plummeted from $729 million in 2007 to $96 million in The
damage to the country’s most profitable industries was also heavy. The Kenyan flower sector, which
was a major source of employment for low-skilled workers and women, experienced a 24% decline in
exports in 2008. Flower firms in conflict areas experienced a drop as high as 38%. Meanwhile, the
tea industry faced approximately $2 million in daily losses. Many tea estates along with their
personnel, machinery and warehouses became targets for post- election violence. The tourism
industry experienced an estimated 32% drop in revenue by the beginning of 2008 and over 140,000 jobs
were lost by March of that These effects upon business operations and economic outputs
incentivized strong involvement from the private sector in ensuring upcoming elections would be
peaceful.
The sector’s perception of these costs as long-term threats proved to be an important guiding factor for
their proactive engagement. In the lead up to the 2013 general elections, business leaders from the
Kenyan Private Sector Alliance (KEPSA) were proactive in mobilizing the country for peace. In
explaining their rationale for engaging in peacebuilding efforts, KEPSA stated that “it was no longer a
‘wait and see’ after the experiences of 2008 and most of the last few elections that led to loss of life
and property. The frequent investment ‘stop-starts’ after every political disruption always results
in loss of development momentum, business contraction, postponed investments, wasted resources
and above all loss of national esteem and diminished international standing.”60 The business
communities in Kenya could not afford to experience another cycle of electoral violence.
Founded in 2003, KEPSA’s original mandate was to “bring together the business community in a single
voice to engage and influence public policy for an enabling business environment.”61 Following the
violence in 2007/8, KEPSA proactively engaged with several of the issues around the general election.
Some of their members at the time of the violence included the Kenya Flower Council, the Media
Owners Association, Safaricom, Coca-Cola and the Kenya Bankers Association.
57 World Bank, 2016. Kenya Economic Update: kazi ni kazi – Informal Should Not Be. World Bank,
Nairobi.
58 Owuor and Wisor, ‘The Role of Kenya’s Private Sector in Peacebuilding’. 59
George and Pratt, Case Studies in Crisis Communication.
60 “Mkenya Diama Project Report January 2012- April 2013.” Mkenya Diama Project Report January 2012- April
2013. Nairobi, Kenya, .
61 “Our History.” KEPSA. Accessed December 2, 2019.
KEPSA first formed an ad-hoc committee, which allowed them to leverage their influence and
technical skills for peace. Due to the strong relationships made by business figures with key political
actors prior to 2007, business leaders privately lobbied politicians, religious leaders and youth group
leaders, to commit to peaceful elections and to tackle the root causes of poverty in the country.
In 2012, KEPSA launched Phase I of the “Mkenya Daima” campaign. The campaign, which
translates to “My Kenya Forever”, was a three-phase public communication endeavor aimed at avoiding
recurrence of the previous electoral Phase I of the campaign involved garnering
additional external support for the initiative through meetings with parliamentarians, interfaith groups,
and development partners, on how to best implement the campaign. Phase I also included a media
rollout of the campaign onto television, radio, social media and print. Additionally, regions which
were hot spots for past episodes of electoral violence were targeted for grassroots community forums
and sports events that spread Mkenya Daima messages. Phase II included training representatives
from youth and women groups as peace ambassadors, holding national conferences about
peaceful elections in all counties in Kenya, and continuing public sensitization via the media. The
final phase scaled up the campaign’s messages of peace through dissemination of op-ed articles,
concerts, peace marches and youth trainings in numerous towns. KEPSA also held the first presidential
debate in Kenya. The 2013 debate helped to shape public notion that political campaigns should be about
democratic discussion and that elections should be won through policy agendas rather than ethnic
loyalties or militias. Throughout the campaign, there was a strong focus placed on preserving Kenyan
national unity, which served to ease tensions among the population.
Safaricom, Kenya’s largest telecoms operator, was a particularly active private sector actor in the post-
election crisis. Between 2012 and 2013, Safaricom donated 50 million text messages to the civil
society group “Sisi Ni Amani” (“We are Peace”).63 Sisi Ni Amani used these text messages during
the election cycle to disseminate important information. They sent texts regarding polling place
hours, voting rights, and encouragement for the community to support a peaceful election cycle.
Safaricom also adopted internal business practices aligned with KEPSA’s overall goal of pushing
for peaceful elections. The company produced videos
62 “Mkenya Diama Project Report January 2012- April 2013.” Mkenya Diama Project Report January 2012- April
2013. Nairobi, Kenya, .
63 Joshua Goldstein and Juliana Rotich, 2008. Digitally Networked Technology in Kenya’s 2007–2008
Post-Election Crisis. The Berkman Center for Internet and Society, Cambridge.
stressing the importance of tolerance, which all employees were required to watch. Since ethnicity
has long been an underlying cause of tensions, large firms like Safaricom “aggressively
pursued a culture that tried to bridge differences arising from the ethnic composition” of its
employee In a similar vein, KEPSA required employees to sing the national anthem and wear
the colors of the Kenyan flag on Fridays, as a way of fostering national unity.
Ultimately, the electoral violence of 2007/8 served as a wakeup call to the local private sector
community: peace and stability are requirements for a good business environment and should not be
taken for granted. Furthermore, KEPSA’s activities in response to the electoral violence highlighted the
impact which local alliances may have on the peacebuilding process. The concerted efforts of the
private sector in pooling their leadership skills, capacities and networks to prevent retrogression to
violence in the following election, proved to be successful. It is evident that the contributions of the
private sector in Kenya were far-reaching and multifaceted. Targeted not only at advocacy and
community building, the Mkenya Diama campaign and subsequent efforts allowed the private sector
to gain influence and assist in the reconciliation of the political class and civil society. The internal
business practices adopted by Safaricom and other KEPSA organizations aimed at fostering
unity demonstrated how business communities can make a difference by incorporating peaceful
initiatives into the normal framework of business activities.
64 Victor Odundo Owuor and Scott Wisor. “The Role of Kenya’s Private Sector in Peacebuilding: The Case of the
2013 Election Cycle.” One Earth Future Foundation, June 9, 2014.
The SLF and BPA Alliances Against the Civil War, Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka has a long history of violent conflict. The Sri Lankan Civil War between the
government and the insurgent group known as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), began
in 1983 and lasted nearly thirty years.
Ethnic tensions between the country’s largest groups, the Sinhalese and Tamils, date back to 1957 with
the adoption of Singhalese as the official language and an employment prerequisite. Other unjust
policies such as state allocation of predominantly Tamil provinces in the North for Sinhalese
colonization, low investment in Tamil provinces, and controversial citizenship laws, escalated strife
between the majority Sinhalese government and the Tamil community. Tensions climaxed when
in 1983, the LTTE launched an insurgency in the northern and eastern parts of the country, attempting to
establish an independent state. Thirteen government soldiers were killed by the LTTE and the state
responded with the massacre of 3,000 Tamils, thus beginning the Sri Lankan civil
The LTTE became increasingly successful at matching government forces by the mid-1990s and
utilized tactics of guerrilla warfare and suicide bombings to target key military and political individuals.
In fact, the International Labor Organization states that they remain “the only terrorist group to
have killed two heads of state (Ranasinghe Premadasa in and Rajiv Gandhi) and significantly injured
another (Chandrika Kumaratunga).66 Following the assassination of President Premadasa in 1994,
Kumaratunga came to power. The war persisted primarily in the
65 Nick Killick, VS Srikantha, and Canan Gündüz, “The Role of Local Business in Peacebuilding,” 2005, 23. 66 Danura
Miriyagalla. “Business and Peace in Sri Lanka: The Roles of Employer and Business Membership
Organizations.” Business and Peace in Sri Lanka: The Roles of Employer and Business Membership
Organizations. ILO, 2016.
northern and eastern parts of the country, until in 1996, a massive suicide bombing occurred outside
of the Central Bank in Colombo.
Five years later, the LTTE carried out a suicide attack on Colombo International Airport. This event
significantly weakened FDI into Sri Lanka. FDI into enterprises decreased from $196 million in
2000 to $106 million in The attack on the airport also impacted the tourism industry and
brought the conflict closer to the doorsteps of many businesses. Colombo is home to the headquarters of
Sri Lanka’s largest corporations, as well as the Colombo Chamber of Commerce, which represents
500 of the country’s largest businesses and 40% of the GDP. This attack exposed the vulnerabilities
of the country's economic center and made the cost of conflict more palpable for the private sector.
Following the attack in 2001, the corporate community in Sri Lanka came together and formed Sri
Lanka First (SLF). Formed by associations in the tourism, garments, tea, and freight sectors, SLF was the
first organized effort to mobilize citizens to call for a peaceful end to the conflict. SLF campaigned for
negotiations between the Tamil Tigers and the Sri Lankan government for a peaceful resolution. The
2001 “Sri Lanka First - Now or Never” campaign raised public awareness of the negative socio-
economic consequences of the war and highlighted the socio- economic incentives of a peace
At a SLF national event in September 2001, an estimated one million people held hands in
a chain for 15 minutes to demonstrate that the cost of war was much higher than the cost of peace. SLF
additionally endorsed the pro-peace United National Front Alliance Party in the 2001 elections. In a
similar vein, using media campaigns, posters and sponsored press advertisements, the SLF tried to push
voters towards supporting pro-peace candidates. Their efforts later turned out to be successful as a
ceasefire was later reached between Ranil Wickremesinghe, who became Prime Minister, and
Kumaratunga, who remained President.
Following the lead of SLF leaders, the Business for Peace Alliance (BPA) was founded in 2002 with
support from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and International Alert. It is a working
group of business leaders from each of the regional chambers of commerce in Sri Lanka. At the time
of its formation, BPA identified their objectives to support reconciliation,
67 De A. Samarasinghe, . Report. Clingendael Institute, 2003.
68 Canan Gunduz, Jessica Banfield, and Nick Killick . “Local Business, Local Peace: the Peacebuilding Potential
of the Domestic Private Sector: Case Study Sri Lanka.” Local Business, Local Peace: the Peacebuilding Potential
of the Domestic Private Sector: Case Study Sri Lanka. International Alert, 2006.
foster business-to-business relationships across ethnic lines and strengthen inter-provincial economic
activity, as well as consult with policymakers on issues regarding peace and security. Since the
individual business leaders in BPA are well-connected and influential actors in their local
communities, they have access to political leaders, government officials and international organizations.
This formed a well-rounded network to lobby in support of peace. Additionally, the diversity across
ethnic lines within BPA leadership provided them with horizontal connections to conflicting
BPA meets monthly and has launched several initiatives which address the underlying tensions between
the major regions. For example, BPA lobbied the government to open an additional fishing channel
on the Jaffna coast and for one major road to Jaffna to remain open 24/7. The Jaffna coast and the
surrounding area is a main economic artery and the only land connection for the LTTE dominated
northern province to the rest of Sri Additionally, BPA conducts business exchange visits across
the country to generate inter-regional economic activity and peace visits to replicate internal business
practice adopted by BPA across other businesses. Through these activities BPA has acted as a
coordinator for dialogue and exchange between the northern and southern regions and has actively
worked towards identifying the economic and developmental issues faced by the two regions.
The Sri Lanka case exemplifies how collective action and working in alliances is an important factor
in bringing about sustainable peace. The primary efforts of the SLF highlight the economic
incentives for peace helped bring about the end of the war. The efforts of the private sector in Sri
Lanka following the end of the war, particularly BPA, served to address the inequalities which
fueled the conflict and contribute to post-conflict reconciliation. The multifaceted efforts at
peacebuilding by the private sector in Sri Lanka overall underscore the potential of the private sector to
contribute to positive peace.
69 Nick Killick, VS Srikantha, and Canan Gündüz, “The Role of Local Business in Peacebuilding,” 2005, 23.
70 Canan Gunduz, Jessica Banfield, and Nick Killick . “Local Business, Local Peace: the Peacebuilding Potential
of the Domestic Private Sector: Case Study Sri Lanka.” Local Business, Local Peace: the Peacebuilding Potential
of the Domestic Private Sector: Case Study Sri Lanka, International Alert, 2006.
The Group of Seven During The Troubles, Northern Ireland
“The Troubles” denotes the period of violence in Northern Ireland from 1968 to 1998. During this
time, roughly 3,500 people were killed - half of whom were civilians - and 47,000
All efforts to find a lasting solution to the conflict failed until the signing of the Belfast Agreement, 1998.
From the time that Ireland was unified with Great Britain in 1801, nationalist and unionist
pursuits clashed. The nationalists advocated for Irish self-determination while Unionists
considered themselves both British and Irish, and opposed Home Rule and the creation of an Irish
The island was therefore partitioned into two jurisdictions by the Government of Ireland
Act (1920) and by 1925, the southern counties which made up the Irish Free State, were formally
recognized as an Irish Dominion within the British However, many were dissatisfied by the
partition and in Northern Ireland, tensions between the Protestant majority and Catholic minority grew.
This occurred because across the island, Protestants have tended to be unionists while Catholics have
tended to be nationalists or
71 Lorenzo Bosi and Gianluca De Fazio, eds., The Troubles in Northern Ireland and Theories of Social
Movements, Protest and Social Movements (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2017), 11,
72 Thomas Hennessey, The Northern Ireland Peace Process: Ending the Troubles? (New York: Palgrave, 2001),
2.
73 The Irish Free State Act (1922) excluded Northern Ireland from the identifier “Ireland” or “Irish Free State.”
However, it was in 1925 that the borders of Ireland with Northern Ireland and Great Britain were formalized within the
Irish Government, from Hennessey, The Peace Process, 2,4.
74 Ibid., 2.
By the 1960s, the two groups had long-favored their own members in housing, elections and hiring,
including for public service A civil rights movement began and in January 1969, roughly
eighty individuals from the People’s Democracy76 marched to Londonderry/Derry in advocacy for
The marchers were allegedly attacked by loyalists and in their response, the Royal
Ulster Constabulary police force struggled to elicit Riots also occurred in
Londonderry/Derry that August, which led Northern Ireland’s Prime Minister to request the
deployment of British Within a few days, order had been restored by two army battalions, but
ten people were dead, several houses burnt in Ardoyne, and property was extensively damaged in
Violence continued to escalate between the Irish Republican Army (IRA)81, loyalist
paramilitaries, Britain’s armed forces, and Northern Ireland’s forces. The events of the next twenty
years included internments without trial, bombings, a coerced workers’ strike, brief cease-fires,
guerrilla tactics, evacuations and attacks attempted upon two British Prime
In the 1990s, businesses such as those of the Northern Ireland Confederation of British Industry (CBI),
began to The CBI and Irish Business and Employers Confederation (IBEC) began working
together in 1991 to increase business interactions between the north and south of the
75 Thomas Grant Fraser, Ireland in Conflict, 1922-1998 Lancaster Pamphlets (London: Routledge, 2000), 39. 76 A
political group which campaigned for civil rights. There are contrasting accounts of whether they
represented the interests of the Catholic minority or a cross-section of interests. “People’s Democracy,” accessed 17
November 2019, J. Quinn, “History of the Early People’s
Democracy (1970) | Workers Solidarity Movement,” 2007, democracy-ulster-1970.
77 Fraser, Ireland in Conflict, 44-45. 78
Ibid.
79 Ibid., 47; “Feature History - The Troubles (1/2).” YouTube video, 8:22, “Feature History,” September 11, 2017,
80 Fraser, Ireland in Conflict, 47.
81 In 1969, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) split into the “Official IRA” and the “Provisional IRA”. In the next year,
what has often been considered their political arm, Sinn Féin, split into a Provisional Sinn Féin and Official Sinn Féin as
well. Given the length of this report, the aims and trajectories of these critical players are omitted from the content.
82 W. H. Van Voris, “The Provisional IRA and the Limits of Terrorism,” The Massachusetts Review 16, no. 3
(1975): 413-14, Fraser, Ireland in Conflict.
83 Nick Killick, VS Srikantha, and Canan Gündüz, “The Role of Local Business in Peacebuilding,” Berghof
Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management (2005), 12,
84 International Alert, “Local Business, Local Peace: The Peacebuilding Potential of the Domestic Private Sector”
(International Alert, 2006), 438, -
In 1994, the CBI published its paper “Peace – A Challenging New Era”, which presented the
economic incentives for For instance, it indicated that war had reduced foreign investor
confidence and the annual security expenditure represented a $ billion opportunity cost for
infrastructure and labor force Indeed, economic improvements after the 1994 ceasefire
underscored many of the CBI’s assertions. For instance, the employment rate in Northern Ireland rose
to levels last witnessed over a decade earlier, the tourism industry grew by 20% within a year and
millions of pounds in enterprise investments were The paper became highly referenced by both
journalists and politicians and helped spur the British Prime Minister’s investment conference in
Belfast that same In 1995, various businesses and politicians were invited to the United
States by President Clinton, where they sought to encourage FDI into Northern
In 1996, the CBI joined six other leading business and trade organizations to form the Group of Seven
(GoS or G7).90 Namely, the Hotel Federation, the Northern Ireland Chamber of Commerce and
Industry, the Institute of Directors, the Northern Ireland Economic Council, the Northern Ireland
Growth Challenge and the Northern Ireland Committee of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions. The
Federation of Small Businesses also joined later They held strongly that after two long decades
of conflict, Northern Ireland needed to choose between being irredeemable or moving toward
In October 1996, they held collective meetings with representatives from the political parties taking
part in peace They held another five meetings with several of the political parties over
the next two years, during which they continued to emphasize the economic benefits of
Each of these meetings were paired with media communications to the
85 Salil Tripathi and Canan Gündüz, “A Role for the Private Sector in Peace Processes? Examples, and
Implications for Third-Party Mediation,” Background Papers, OSLO Forum 2008 (Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue,
2008), 22.
86 Ibid.; The Portland Trust, “The Role of Business in Peacemaking: Lessons from Cyprus, Northern Ireland,
South Africa and the South Caucasus” (London: The Portland Trust, 2013), 23,
87 Vahid Aliyev, “The Role of Business in Northern Ireland’s Peace Process,” Democratic Progress Institute,
2017, 6 -7; Portland Trust, “The Role of Business,” 23.
88 Killick, Srikantha, and Gündüz, “Role of Local Business,” 12; Portland Trust, “The Role of Business,” 23- 24. 89
Portland Trust, “The Role of Business,” 24.
90 Tripathi, “A Role for the Private Sector,” 20-21. 91
International Alert, “Local Business, ” 439.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid., 439 - 440. 94
Ibid.
public, which emphasized the importance of creating a lasting peace and placed pressure on the
negotiation parties to come to a peace
GoS also sent pro-peace letters to the employees represented within their network and in June 1998,
produced a guide for corporations about the gains generated from a diverse Furthermore,
they mediated a conflict between a unionist body and residents of a predominantly Catholic
area and spoke out against bombings in Omagh town in August
In April 1998, The Good Friday Agreement was announced by the Ulster Unionist Party and Social
Democratic and Labour Party, with the endorsement of various other parties and the British
This agreement and the referendums held in Northern Ireland and Ireland officially
marked an end to “The Troubles”.
Under the leadership of the CBI, the GoS established itself as a respected peace actor and utilized a
myriad of peacebuilding activities. CBI was at the frontier in its work to increase trade with Ireland and
the broader business community sought out FDI. Stepping into politics, the GoS produced persuasive
research targeted at the disputing parties, brought political parties together and sometimes served as
a peace broker. They also employed a mass media campaign for the public and used their network
which targeted ordinary workers. Notably, their activities continued after the Good Friday Agreement
was announced.
95 Aliyev, “Role of Business,” 8.
96 Killick, Srikantha, and Gündüz,, “Role of Local Business,” 13; Ibid. 97
Portland Trust, “The Role of Business,” 25.
98 Tripathi, “A Role for the Private Sector,” 20-21.
Private Sector Contributions Against the Civil War, Nepal
Nepal’s private sector played a crucial peacebuilding role during and after the Nepalese Civil War
(1996 - 2006), also known as the Maoist Conflict. The war began with a rebellion launched by the
Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN-M) against the Government of Nepal. In a context of
severe economic disparities, social inequalities, and exclusion based on caste, ethnicity and gender,
the Maoists aimed at promoting just economic development through a radical land reform program.
They regarded the Nepalese business community as an enemy of the ‘common people’, since it was
seen as contributor to a discriminatory economic system a beneficiary of the state’s economic
deregulation
To politically bring about the desired changes in the economic system, the rebels called for the creation
of a constituent assembly through elections, which was rejected by the government. After a brief
ceasefire in 2001 and continued attacks by the rebels, the king tightened his control over the country. This
decision led various political parties to establish the Seven Party Alliance and collaborate with Maoist
rebels in pro-democracy protests. Giving in to the growing resistance, the king agreed to the
restoration of the House of Representatives. In 2006, the government and the CPN-M signed the
Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA), allowing the Maoists to participate in the
99 Alexandra Geiser, Social Exclusion and Conflict Transformation in Nepal: Women, Dalit and Ethnic Groups :
FAST Country Risk Profile Nepal, Working Paper / Swisspeace 2005/5 (2005); Ameet Dhakal and Jhalak Subedi,
‘The Nepalese Private Sector: Waking up to Conflict’, in Local Business, Local Peace: The Peacebuilding Potential
of the Domestic Private Sector (London: International Alert, 2006)
100 Geiser, Social Exclusion and Conflict Transformation in Nepal; Dhakal and Subedi, ‘The Nepalese Private
Sector: Waking up to Conflict’; ‘What Happened During The Nepalese Civil War?’, WorldAtlas, 2019,
Subedi, ‘“Pro-Peace
Entrepreneur” or “Conflict Profiteer”?’.
Since the economic disparity and uneven development was a major cause of the conflict, Ghimire
and Upreti argue that, “Nepal offers fertile ground for the private sector to grow as a responsible
change-maker”.101 Until 2000, there was little interest among private sector actors to actively contribute
towards a resolution of the conflict. After all, the conflict primarily targeted government offices. In
2001, the CPN-M broke the peace accord and declared an end to the ceasefire. This made the private
sector begin to feel the adverse impacts of the conflict more directly. Warring parties increasingly
conducted direct attacks on businesses, asked for donations or obstructed the regular operations
of businesses. On top of this, widespread destruction of basic infrastructure, such as bridges and
roads, as well as electricity and telecommunication infrastructure, became a routine It is
therefore unsurprising that hydropower and telecommunication businesses became key players
in peacebuilding
Private sector actors engaged in both internal and external peacebuilding activities in response. Regarding
internal practices, efforts to generate employment can be observed; This is highly relevant considering
the high unemployment rates. On top of this, various businesses pursued efforts towards greater gender
and social inclusion, and private sector actors, such as the Three Sisters Trekking Agency, which
supported young entrepreneurs - particularly women - in developing sustainable
Turning outward, business leaders held meetings with leaders of political parties, and in 2010, private
sector associations organized a major peace rally throughout the country. In the meetings and rallies,
business actors expressed corporate demands – mainly aiming at mitigating the negative impact of the
conflict on businesses. They also suggested concrete options for a solution of the conflict and
pressured parties towards negotiations. On several occasions, business actors threatened to close their
business if the conflict escalated any further. In other instances, general strikes served as a tool to
exert pressure on parties to the
101 Safal Ghimire and Bishnu Raj Upreti, ‘Peace by Corporate Means: How Mature Is the Private Sector for
Peacebuilding in Nepal?’, Journal of Peacebuilding & Development 9, no. 2 (4 May 2014): 94,
102 Bishnu Raj Upreti and Safal Ghimire, ‘New Actors in New Business: Private Sector Engagement for Peace
Building in Nepal’, SASON Journal of Sociology and Anthropology 2, no. 1 (2011): 265–86.
103 Ghimire and Upreti, ‘Peace by Corporate Means’.
104 Dhakal and Subedi, ‘The Nepalese Private Sector: Waking up to Conflict’.
105 Ibid.; Ghimire and Upreti, ‘Peace by Corporate Means’; Upreti and Ghimire, ‘New Actors in New Business:
Private Sector Engagement for Peace Building in Nepal’.
One of the overarching contributions of private sector actors was the creation of the National Business
Initiative (NBI), which has successfully partnered with civil society, the government as well as
international actors to push for a peace agenda. The NBI was created in 2005 to help improve the
deteriorated condition of many private sector actors in the country. It is composed of 14 Nepalese
business organizations and strives to foster sustainable peace through equitable and just socio-
economic development. During the war it engaged in dialogue with political parties. For instance, it
exerted pressure on the CPN-M and the government to enter into negotiations. Furthermore, it
conducted - and still conducts - research on the role of the private sector in peacebuilding and
Despite the significant contributions of private sector actors to peacebuilding through the
promotion of employment and the support of the political peace process, the involvement of private
sector actors in Nepal’s peacebuilding process was not without its challenges. There was a tendency
for business leaders to believe that fostering economic growth would be sufficient enough to bring
an end to the conflict. Because of this, they overlooked some of the structural drivers of the conflict
related to regional parity and the inclusion of poor sections of the society in business
Overall, the involvement of the private sector in peacebuilding in Nepal can be regarded as successful.
In multiple situations, private sector actors were able to push parties to the conflict towards successful
negotiations. Peace talks between business leaders and warring parties were successful even at times
when the government was unable to reach a consensus with the warring parties. The degree of
legitimacy of private sector actors in the peacebuilding process is reflected in the nomination of private
sector representatives as part of Nepal’s Constituent Assembly, which drafted the country’s new
106 Upreti and Ghimire, ‘New Actors in New Business: Private Sector Engagement for Peace Building in Nepal’;
Ghimire and Upreti, ‘Peace by Corporate Means’; Dhakal and Subedi, ‘The Nepalese Private Sector: Waking up to Conflict’;
‘National Business Initiative’.
107 Ibid.
108 Upreti and Ghimire, ‘New Actors in New Business: Private Sector Engagement for Peace Building in Nepal’;
Ghimire and Upreti, ‘Peace by Corporate Means’.
Private Sector Contributions to Peace Negotiations, El Salvador
The Salvadoran Civil War (1979 - 1992) was fought between the Frente Farabundo Martí para la
Liberación Nacional (FMLN) and the junta government. There were roughly 75,000 casualties,
7,000 disappearances, and $2 billion dollars in property Furthermore, one
fourth of the population had to relocate, with scores fleeing to neighboring countries and the
The war came to an end with the signing of the Chapultepec Peace Accords (1992).
In the 1970s, students, laborers and community members began organizing marches in demand
for a more equitable They had suffered through years of repression by the hands of the
military, constant poverty, and land control by the They wanted drastic reforms and were
particularly insulted when $ million of national funds were spent on a beauty In line
with their existing patterns, the police and military responded with kidnappings and killings, which
only intensified after a military coup in October Rural communities began to organize in
armed resistance and would eventually become the
109 Mike Allison, “El Salvador’s Brutal Civil War: What We Still Don’t Know,” Al Jazeera, March 1, 2012,
“Inside Story Americas - El Salvador’s
open wound.” YouTube video, 25:09, “Al Jazeera English,” January 17, 2012,
Diana Villiers Negroponte, Seeking Peace in El Salvador: The Struggle
to Reconstruct a Nation at the End of the Cold War, (United States: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 15.
110 Teaching for Change, “History of El Salvador — Teaching Central America,” Teaching Central America,
accessed 26 November 2019,
111 Teaching for Change, “History of El Salvador.” 112
Negroponte, Seeking Peace in El Salvador.
113 Negroponte, Seeking Peace in El Salvador.
114 Elisabeth Jean Wood, “THE PUZZLE OF INSURGENT COLLECTIVE ACTION,” Chapter in Insurgent
Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador, 1–30, Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003). doi:
115 Teaching for Change, “History of El Salvador.”
Violent repression continued and the Salvadoran military began to bomb neighborhoods which were
believed to be strongholds of the On their part, the FMLN conducted kidnappings,
killed civil servants and suspected traitors, robbed financial institutions and bombed various
Behind the scenes, the war was fueled by Cold War politics. The Soviet Union, Nicaragua
and Cuba provided some support to the FLMN, while the . provided a colossal $ billion in
military aid to the
For El Salvador’s economy, the cost of this war was estimated at $1 billion and the annual GDP growth
rate was negative from 1979 to For the private sector, the costs of the war included reduced
trade with the Central American Common Market, substantial capital flight and frequent
However, the inability to sustain and grow businesses under such conditions became especially
apparent to the new generation of business elites once Fundación Salvadoreña para el
Desarrollo (FUSADES) attempted to promote a different economic model for the
FUSADES was a non-governmental organization (NGO) which received $100 million in funding from
the . from 1984 to 1992, in addition to initiation fees from its business Largely
staffed by business people and their kin, FUSADES supplied credit, conducted research on the
financial costs of the war upon trade, and most notably, advocated for reforms to the economic system
that would encourage competition, limit state involvement in the market and lead to trade
While the new generation of business elites supported this model and saw that peace was required
for its successful execution, the political conditions in the country were not conducive to their
involvement until 1989. Private sector interests were misaligned with those of President
116 Ibid.
117 Allison, “El Salvador’s Civil War.”
118 “Inside Story Americas,” “Al Jazeera English.”
119 International Alert, “Local Business, Local Peace: The Peacebuilding Potential of the Domestic Private
Sector” (International Alert, 2006), 325 -
“El Salvador GDP 1965-2019,” Macrotrends,
accessed 26 November 2019, domestic-product.
120 International Alert, “Local Business,” 324-325. 121
Ibid.
122 Negroponte, Seeking Peace in El Salvador, 58.
123 Ibid., 59; Angelika Rettberg, “The Private Sector and Peace in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Colombia,”
Journal of Latin American Studies 39, no. 3 (2007): 470.
Napoleon Duarte (1984 – 1989), as his reform agenda involved significantly redistributing wealth
in El The young private sector therefore distanced itself from his office and when he later
announced negotiations with the FMLN, the private sector was
Meanwhile, developments favorable to the private sector were occurring within the political party
Alianza Republicana Nacional (ARENA). This was a party comprised largely of private sector actors
and mainly considered Durante’s party to be Thus far, the party had only experienced
defeat at the ballot and in 1984, they recruited Alfredo Notably, he and nearly twenty
others in his government had worked in FUSADES or its off- The recruitment proved to
be a wise move as Cristiani was elected El Salvador’s president in 1989.
The new generation of business leaders supported Cristiani’s negotiations with the FMLN,
influencing the outcomes of the peace accords to an atypical extent. Though they were not members
of the government’s official delegation, business executives from the main business association -
Asociación Nacional de la Empresa Privada - and individuals from FUSADES were advisors to the
They were present for regular briefings and Furthermore, the private
sector produced research related to the conflict and helped fund the graduate studies of former FMLN
The negotiations brought about the Chapultepec Peace Accords (1992) and since then, El Salvador
has not descended back into civil war. The FMLN disarmed significantly and transformed into
one of the main political parties of El Furthermore, data from the World Bank indicates
that from 1992 to 1996, the state experienced an average annual GDP growth of %.133 By these
indicators, the involvement of the private sector in negotiations helped bring about sustainable peace.
124 Rettberg, “The Private Sector,” 468-469.
125 International Alert, “Local Business,” 324; Ibid. 126
Allison, “El Salvador’s Civil War.”
127 Rettberg, “The Private Sector,” 471.
128 Negroponte, Seeking Peace in El Salvador, 59. 129
Tripathi, “A Role for the Private Sector,” 18.
130 International Alert, “Local Business,” 325. 131
Tripathi, “A Role for the Private Sector,” 18. 132
Inside Story Americas,” “Al Jazeera English.”
133 The World Bank, ‘GDP Growth (Annual %) - El Salvador | Data’, The World Bank, accessed November 26,
2019,
However, Cristiani’s convictions paired with the strength of the private sector’s influence, are
arguably what saw to the FMLN’s concession of socio-economic and welfare aims in exchange for
political, military and judicial Demands from labor unions were also Since the
peace agreement, El Salvador’s national peace has also been paired with high unemployment and
homicide ARENA’s consistent hold on the presidency until 2009, made the well-connected,
transnational private sector actors into oligarchs in an increasingly neo-liberal
The case in El Salvador therefore provides both inspiration and caution on the relationship between
the private sector and governments in facilitating the former’s pro-active contributions to peacebuilding.
The private sector maintained close ties with Cristiani and other FUSADES members who were
elected into public office, providing them with counsel on the economic direction of El Salvador. On
its part, the ARENA government had an early understanding of the necessity of peace for business and
economic success. During the peace negotiations phase, Cristiani’s government determined what
economic and business policies would be pursued in the post-conflict environment, providing a
clear framework for the private sector moving forward. In contrast to the situation under President
Duarte, the compatibility of the private sector and government’s visions produced the desired - albeit
skewed - results.
134 Rettberg, “The Private Sector,” 472.
135 International Alert, “Local Business,” 326.
136 Benedicte Bull and Mariel Aguilar-Støen, “Peace-Building and Business Elites in Guatemala and El Salvador:
Explaining the Discursive “Institutional Turn”,” Conflict, Security & Development 19, no. 1 (2019): 124,
Chris Dalby and Camilo Carranza, “InSight Crime’s 2018 Homicide
Round-Up,” InSight Crime, January 22, 2019, crime-2018-
homicide-roundup/.
137 Bull, “Peace-Building and Business Elites,” 122, 124.
Private Sector Contributions to Stability, Somalia
In Somalia, the private sector played a crucial role during the civil war, which began in the early 1990s
after the overthrow of the Siad Barre regime, which had been in power since 1969. In the resulting
power vacuum, various clan-based groups competed for influence in Mogadishu and Southern
Somalia more broadly. After the establishment of the Transitional National Government (TNG) in
2000 and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2004, there was a short period of stability,
but large-scale fighting resumed in 2005. In 2012, the Federal Government of Somalia was
established as the first permanent central government since the 1990s. There is also relative stability
in Puntland. However, the civil war is ongoing, with detrimental effects on the political stability in
the country’s
In this context of continued political instability, the private sector can be regarded as an
alternative source of Somalia exhibits a largely informal and unregulated economy, with the
private sector being responsible for the provision of the vast majority of goods and
When considering the contributions to peacebuilding and stability, the role of telecommunications
and energy industries appears to be particularly relevant.
138 Aways Warsame Yusuf, ‘Somali Enterprises: Making Peace Their Business’, in Local Business, Local Peace:
The Peacebuilding Potential of the Domestic Private Sector (London: International Alert, 2006); Robert L Feldman, ‘Amidst
the Chaos a Small Force for Stability: Somalia’s Business Community’, Small Wars & Insurgencies 23, no. 2 (2012): 295–
306, Lee Cassanelli, ‘Private Sector Peacemaking: Business and
Reconstruction in Somalia’, in Whose Peace Is It Anyway? Connecting Somalia and International Peacemaking, ed. Mark
Bradbury and Sally Healy, 2010;‘Worldwide Governance Indicators’.
139 Yusuf, ‘Somali Enterprises: Making Peace Their Business’.
140 Sherine El Taraboulsi-McCarthy, Nisar Majid, and Barnaby Willitts-King, ‘Private Sector Engagement in
Complex Emergencies: Case Studies from Yemen and Southern Somalia’ (Humanitarian Policy Group, 2017),
The strength of the business community in Somalia needs to be understood in the context of the
state’s weakness. In the absence of strong, centralized government institutions, some businesses
have reaped benefits such as the absence of state taxes. However, often the disadvantages of the
fragile state tend to outweigh the advantages. For instance, private sector actors face additional
security costs, difficulties in attracting foreign investment, and widespread Many
respond to these challenges by using their own trust-based social networks to minimize risk. For
instance, the telecommunications industry forged agreements with local power holders, such as
elders or members of armed groups, which facilitated a reliable protection of their
Nonetheless, many private sector actors are supportive of a return of a functioning government, and
have thus proven supportive of peace processes, which they were involved in at a political level, to a
limited
In fact, businesses have contributed to mediation meetings between different warring factions. Several
business leaders, for instance, provided the logistics for talks between the Digil and Mirifle elders in
an effort to resolve a conflict in Iidale Most notably, the business community has,
through its participation in high-level meetings, been part of the political process by paving the
way for the establishment of the TNG. However, those proactive responses generally constitute ad-
hoc responses and “the Somali business community has no coordination or strategic vision for its
engagement in the various dimensions of peacebuilding needed in the country.”145 This can partly be
attributed to the strong identification of Somalis with their respective families and clans, and
political divisions between There has therefore been little engagement from the private sector
in political peacebuilding activities.
However, despite this rather limited extent of pro-active, political involvement, various private sector
actors contributed to peacebuilding through their standard business practices. For instance, the
Trans-National Industrial Electricity and Gas Company, through its investments in electric and gas
infrastructure, created a considerable amount of Various business people have also
deliberately hired militiamen, moving thousands into the legitimate
141 ‘Worldwide Governance Indicators’. 142
Keating, interview.
143 Feldman, ‘Amidst the Chaos a Small Force for Stability’. 144
Yusuf, ‘Somali Enterprises: Making Peace Their Business’.
145 Yusuf, ‘Somali Enterprises: Making Peace Their Business’, 491.
146 El Taraboulsi-McCarthy, Majid, and Willitts-King, ‘Private Sector Engagement in Complex Emergencies:
Case Studies from Yemen and Southern Somalia’.
147 Feldman, ‘Amidst the Chaos a Small Force for Stability’.
On top of this, businesses have played a role in the provision of essential services.
They have funded and built public infrastructure, such as hospitals and educational services. They
have also built roads and established the El Maan port. These provisions of infrastructure were
provided most notably by the telecommunications sector, which include some of the country’s
largest When the country’s national telephone system collapsed, telecommunication
companies filled the gap. Telecommunications has become the leading industry in the private sector
in Beyond the significant impact that the provision of telecommunication services has
had on stability, representatives in this industry also reached agreements with local power
Additionally, there is an increasing number of Somali business leaders cooperating across clan
boundaries in order to expand their activities. This cooperation across clans is increasing due to the
progressive mindsets of many young Somali businessmen and women. Cassanelli describes them
as not being “prisoners to their clans” anymore, thus having the potential to participate more actively
in Somalia’s wider
Overall, the involvement of private sector actors has contributed to higher degrees of stability in
Somalia. Partly due to the lack of organization among the business community, it appears that the
internal business practices – such as the provision of job opportunities and essential services – are
significantly more relevant than the involvement of the private sector in political processes. In
particular, the involvement in the provision of essential services stands out to be most influential in
creating peace positive outcomes.
148 Yusuf, ‘Somali Enterprises: Making Peace Their Business’.
149 El Taraboulsi-McCarthy, Majid, and Willitts-King, ‘Private Sector Engagement in Complex Emergencies:
Case Studies from Yemen and Southern Somalia’.
150 Cassanelli, ‘Private Sector Peacemaking: Business and Reconstruction in Somalia’; Yusuf, ‘Somali
Enterprises: Making Peace Their Business’.
151 Yusuf, ‘Somali Enterprises: Making Peace Their Business’.
152 Cassanelli, ‘Private Sector Peacemaking: Business and Reconstruction in Somalia’, 43.
THEMATIC ANALYSIS
Topic 1: Benefits of Private Sector Involvement to the Peace Process
Private sector activities have the potential to bring a variety of benefits to peacebuilding
processes. To begin, greater recognition of the role of private sector actors in conflicts and
peacebuilding can shed light on economic dimensions of conflicts, which are often
Economic factors, such as poverty and inequality, after all, constitute prominent root causes of various
conflicts, including the case studies discussed earlier in this These causes of conflict can be
addressed through private sector actors, which tend to have considerable economic influence in
conflict situations.
On top of this, recognition of the economic legitimacy and expertise of the private sector can lead to a
better understanding of the economic costs of conflict and the benefits of peace, which is commonly
referred to as the peace dividend. The peace dividend can be defined as the economic benefit from
peace resulting from the reduced spending on security, making financial resources available for
investment into economic Private sector actors, due to their credibility among the
communities they operate in, have better influence and leverage to mobilize the broader business
community and local civil society, to get engaged in They can do so by
creating awareness of the peace dividend. In both Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka, the peace
dividend papers produced by private sector actors highlighted the economic costs of conflict and had a
considerable influence on public opinion.
Additionally, the private sector, due to its legitimacy, can push the narrative that increased
economic interdependence is positively correlated with peace and can deter the likelihood of violent
conflict occurring. This principle has proven successful in Europe and is often promoted in societies
with The private sector can support the promotion of this principle by fostering economic
interdependence within communities and among conflicting countries by consciously employing
different populations to create interdependence and increase
153 Sandström, interview.
154 Bennett, ‘Multinational Corporations, Social Responsibility and Conflict’. 155
‘Peace dividend’.
156 Money Makers as Peace Makers ?
157 de Bourbon de Parme, interview.
integration. The inherent role of private sector actors as experts and key informants on
economic aspects can be leveraged in numerous positive ways to foster
Private sector actors additionally have a wealth of technical and financial expertise which can be
leveraged in support of sustainable peacebuilding. In the case of Kenya, the members of KEPSA
were able to make use of their various skills, networks and expertise in the established an ad-hoc
committee in order to bring about peaceful elections. Combined with the strengths of other actors, for
instance international organizations that provide the contextual expertise, a more meaningful impact on
peace dynamics can be
Furthermore, private sector actors tend to be better equipped to “lock in the peace”, following a
In post-conflict societies, the private sector can aid in the quick and efficient provision
of jobs, support of livelihoods, and reconstruction of infrastructure. These business measures in
support of post-conflict reconstruction help in the achievement of the positive sides of peace, which is
needed to prevent the recurrence of negative peace. Private sector actors can also test and introduce
new products and services in post-conflict environments. As Berdal and Mousavizadeh put it, “without a
central private-sector role in providing employment, growth and the prospect of a better future, no
amount of aid can break the cycle of conflict”.161 This points to the fact that, in comparison to
private sector actors, political actors tend to be slow when it comes to providing economic
opportunities in post-conflict Especially regarding long-term reconstruction and
development, private sector actors have an advantage over international (humanitarian) organizations in
providing sustainable solutions. The former are better-equipped “to give people the skills to thrive,
not just survive.''163 On the contrary, international organizations tend to stay only for a short period
after a conflict
On top of the direct economic impact, by paying taxes to governments, it also supports the latter in
providing essential public This can positively impact the level of trust that citizens have in
the government, and thus lead to greater political stability. Private sector activities can also help to
create confidence in the economy and thus promote the entrance of prospective
158 Money Makers as Peace Makers ?
159 Kirn, interview. 160
Foran, interview.
161 Berdal and Mousavizadeh, ‘Investing for Peace’, 43. 162
Foran, interview.
163 Nhan, interview.
164 Foran, interview; Vahtola, interview.
165 Peschka and Emery, ‘The Role of the Private Sector in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States’.
business investments. Furthermore, the operations of private sector actors in fragile areas can create
incentives for governments to provide social services, and to create a stable environment for
private sector
Topic 2: Benefits, Incentives and Responsibility for the Private Sector
There are numerous incentives and benefits for the private sector to engage in peacebuilding. The
economic benefits from the resolution and prevention of conflict can be seen for both the public and
private sector, as conflict is almost always a hindrance, rather than a driver of economic growth.
Excluding the 3-4% of world trade generated by the arms industry, certain illegal business industries,
and other businesses who gain from war economies, very few industries see direct benefits from
Conflict destroys public and private infrastructure, reduces consumption and production
patterns, increases operational costs, and erodes social and political cohesion. This was exemplified
in the Kenya case where the flower sector experienced a drop-in employee numbers due to
absenteeism and displacement as a cause of the violence. Additionally, the tea industry incurred many
damages to their machinery and other assets, leading to a loss of $2 million a day. In the long run,
the macro cost of conflict can impede, or worse end, company operations, as violence continues to
undermine the social and economic basis needed for sustainable and profitable businesses operations.
The costs which countries face due to conflict, including the destruction of human, economic,
social and environmental capital, are critical for the viability and success of most private
sector investments. Given the high cost of conflict to businesses, the private sector has an incentive to
help facilitate peace and, more broadly, prevent the occurrence of violence.
In addition to peace being less costly for business than conflict, peace represents a significant market
opportunity for the private sector. The Institute of Economics and Peace has developed a methodology to
calculate the global economic impact of violence and conflict on the economy. It was found that in 2017
the cost of conflict amounted to $ trillion. This represents only an eighth of the total global
economic impact of violence, which in 2017 was $ trillion in terms
166 Kakoma, interview.
167 Jane Nelson, The Business of Peace: The Private Sector as a Partner in Conflict Prevention and Resolution
(London: Prince of Wales Business Leaders Forum, 2000).
of purchasing power Essentially, peace is a trillion dollar opportunity, which is a bit less
than the economic GDP of The report also found that the economic impact of violence in
the top ten most affected countries was equivalent to around 45 percent of their GDP. 170 This was
similarly
