뗧탅뚨볛뗄십뛻뿉럲췪쏀뻹뫢 뫂뎯퇞 욽탂쟇 2002쓪12퓂30죕 1
뗧탅뚨볛뗄십뛻뿉럲췪쏀뻹뫢 뫂뎯퇞 욽탂쟇 햪튪ꎺ놾컄훷튪샻폃Pakes-McGuire볆쯣십뛻뿉럲췪쏀뻹뫢뗄랽램ꎬ쪹폃Gauss돌탲쒣쓢풤닢캴살뗧탅볛룱뗄샭싛뻹뫢횵ꆣ컄헂내헕춶룄뇤킧싊쮮욽뗄랽쪽틔벰뻹뫢샠탍뗄늻춬ퟩ뫏뷸탐쒣쓢ꆣ쯤좻퓚늻춬쟩뿶쿂뻹뫢횵늻춬ꎬ떫뻹뗍폚쒿잰뗄쪵볊볛룱ꆣ틲듋ꎬ룹뻝컒쏇쒣쓢뗄뷡맻ꎬ퓚캴살뗄뺺헹훐ꎬ뗧탅볛룱믡쿂붵듳풼20%ꆪ40%ꆣ 뗧탅탐튵튻횱틔살놻쫓캪ꆰퟔ좻슢뛏탐튵ꆱꎬ틲캪쯼뗄췸싧늿럖듦퓚듳솿뗄만뚨돉놾ꎬ뛸쳡릩럾컱뗄뇟볊돉놾뫜뗍ꎬ훘뢴붨짨튻룶췸싧뛔뗧탅탐튵뗄뎧짌뫍짧믡뛸퇔뚼쫇컞샻뿉춼뗄ꆣ뗧탅탐튵폖쫇튻룶룟뛈맦훆뗄탐튵ꆣ좻뛸헢퇹뗄쫐뎡1뷡릹훐듦퓚ퟅ컊쳢ꎺ쫗쿈ꎬ슢뛏헟쎻폐살ퟔ뺺헹뗄톹솦틲뛸좱랦붵뗍돉놾뗄뚯솦ꆣ붵뗍돉놾뗄뚯솦쫇캴살뚨볛뗄믹뒡ꎺ슢뛏헟캪쇋쏖늹쫕죫뗄늻ퟣ뇘좻믡쿠펦뗄뗷헻볛룱ꎬ퓚헢훖쟩뿶쿂ꎬ쫜믘놨싊맦훆뗄ꆰ돉놾볓돉ꆱ쳘탔늻믡듸살쇮죋싺틢뗄돉놾뫍볛룱탐캪ꆣ웤듎ꎬ볛룱뷡릹얤쟺ꎬ떥볛평쿠떱쯦틢뗄돉놾럖첯튻샠뗄믡볆돌탲쯹뻶뚨ꎬ 뛸폫웳튵뫏샭뗄짌컱믮뚯솪쾵짵짙ꆣ헢킩쓚늿틲쯘뛔뗧탅탐튵뗄룄룯웰떽쇋췆뚯ퟷ폃ꎬ춬쪱벼쫵뒴탂쪹뗃뗧탅탐튵뗄맦훆훰붥럅쯉ꎬ탐튵쓚뗄뺺헹훰늽탎돉ꆣ 컒맺뗄뗧탅탐튵뎤웚슢뛏뺭펪ꎬ횱떽1994쓪ꎬ컒맺퓚믹뒡뗧탅쇬폲닅틽죫쇋뗚튻볒폫뒫춳훐맺뗧탅뺺헹뗄뗧탅웳튵ꆪꆪ훐맺솪춨ꆣ쒿잰ꎬ훐맺틑뺭볓죫쇋쫀뷧쎳틗ퟩ횯ꎨWTOꎩꎬ돐억뗧탅탐튵뛔췢뾪럅ꆣퟷ캪틑뺭햼쇬쇋맺쓚쫐뎡뗄훐맺ퟔ벺뗄뗧탅웳튵ꎬ퓚쏦뛔맺볊짏뷰탛뫱ꆢ벼쫵쿈뷸ꆢ쫊펦쇋폐킧뺺헹쫐뎡믺훆뗄잱퓚뷸죫헟ꎬ퓚뗧탅뚨볛랽쏦펦룃닉좡쪲쎴퇹뗄닟싔쓘ꎿ 놾컄쯤좻쎻폐뛔뗧탅뚨볛뗄샭싛뷸탐쳖싛뫍랢햹ꎬ떫놾컄뗄릱쿗퓚폚ꎺ샻폃 1 닎볻ꆶ뗧탅뺺헹ꆷꎨCompetition in Telecommunicationsꎩ,ꎨ램ꎩ죃·퇅뿋·삭럡ꎨJean-Jacques Laffontꎩꎬ죃·첩샕뛻ꎨJean Tiroleꎩꎬ죋쏱폊뗧돶냦짧ꆣ 2
쒣쓢ꎨsimulationꎩ뗄랽램ꎬ풤닢컒맺뗧탅탐튵틽죫뺺헹뫳뗄뻹뫢볛룱ꎬ늢쟒쳖싛쇋퓚뎧짌톡퓱뺺헹ꆢ릲쒱뫍듓짧믡뢣샻ퟮ듳뮯뷇뛈돶랢뛔뻹뫢볛룱ꆢ뎧짌샻죳뫍쿻럑헟쪣폠뗄펰쿬ꆣ뗧탅탐튵뗄맦훆뫍뚨볛쫇튻룶뎤웚뗄뚯첬컊쳢ꎬ틲듋컄헂훐뗄샭싛럖컶쪹폃쇋뚯첬맦뮮뗄랽램ꎬ쳖싛뗧탅뚨볛뗄십뛻뿉럲췪쏀뻹뫢ꆣ 놾컄릲럖캪컥룶늿럖ꎺ뗚튻늿럖ꎬ뷩짜믹놾룅쓮뫍믹놾럖컶랽램ꎻ뗚뛾늿럖ꎬ컄쿗ퟛ쫶ꎬ뷩짜십뛻뿉럲췪쏀뻹뫢뗄샭싛랢햹뫍늿럖펦폃ꎻ뗚죽늿럖ꎬ샭싛쒣탍ꎬ헢쫇뫳탸릤ퟷ뗄샭싛믹뒡ꎻ뗚쯄늿럖ꎬ쒣쓢랽램ힼ좷탔뗄볬퇩뫍쒣쓢닎쫽뗄좷뚨ꎻ뗚컥늿럖ꎬ쪹폃쒣쓢랽램풤닢캴살뗧탅볛룱뗄십뛻뿉럲췪쏀뻹뫢ꎬ춬쪱룸돶뎧짌퓚톡퓱뺺헹ꆢ릲쒱틔벰짧믡뢣샻ퟮ듳뮯늻춬쟩뿶쿂뛔뻹뫢볛룱ꆢ뎧짌샻죳뫍쿻럑헟쪣폠뗄펰쿬ꆣ뗚쇹늿럖ꎬ뷡싛ꆣ 튻ꆢ 믹놾룅쓮뫍랽램ꎺ 컒쏇헢샯듓뚯첬뷇뛈뾼싇뗧탅뚨볛컊쳢ꎬ틽죫쇋십뛻뿉럲췪쏀뻹뫢ꎨMarkov Perfect Equilibriumꎩ뗄룅쓮ꆣ십뛻뿉럲췪쏀뻹뫢볲떥살쮵튪싺ퟣ솽쳵탔훊ꎺ뗚튻ꎬ십뛻뿉럲탔ꎬ벴룸뚨맽좥뗄ힴ첬뫍놾웚뗄ힴ첬ꎬ붫살ힴ첬뗄쳵볾룅싊럖늼횻틀삵폚쿖퓚뗄ힴ첬뛸폫맽좥뗄ힴ첬뛀솢ꆣ폃쫽톧폯퇔뿉틔뇭쫶캪ꎺP{=j|=i,=,...,=,=}=P{=j|=i} ꎻ뗚Xiiin+1XnXn−1XXXXn−11100n+1n뛾ꎬ 쯹폐뗄쓉쪲뻹뫢뚼쫇ퟓ늩�췪쏀뻹뫢ꆣ뻟쳥쮵ꎬ퓚놾컄훐컒쏇쳖싛뗄십뛻뿉럲췪쏀뻹뫢쫇횸듓늩�쫷뗄죎뫎튻뗣뾪쪼ꎬ쎿룶뎧짌틔룷ퟔ풤웚샻죳쳹쿖횵뗄ퟮ듳뮯캪쒿뇪ꎬ룸뚨뎧짌뫍웤쯻뎧짌뗄뫳탲탐뚯ꎬ헢룶뎧짌뗄닟싔쫇쓉쪲뻹뫢ꎬ뎧짌뗄닟싔몯쫽싺ퟣ십뛻뿉럲탔훊ꆣ 놾컄뗄훷튪쒿뇪쫇틔쒿잰뗄쟩뿶ퟷ캪돵쪼ힴ첬ꎬ볆쯣뗧탅볛룱뗄십뛻뿉럲췪쏀뻹뫢ꎬퟷ캪캴살샭쿫뗧탅볛룱뗄풤닢횵ꎬ틔듋캪뇪ힼ에뛏쿖퓚뗄뗧탅볛룱쫇럱룟폚믲뗍폚샭쿫횵ꎬ튪듯떽샭싛뗄샭쿫볛룱ꎬ탨튪퓚뛠듳돌뛈짏뗷헻쒿잰뗄뗧탅볛룱ꆣ 놾컄뗄볆쯣랽램쪹폃뗄쫇뚯첬맦뮮랽램ꎺ쫗쿈붫튻룶쟳뷢캴살풤웚샻죳ퟮ듳3
2뮯뗄컊쳢뮯캪쟳뷢횵몯쫽뗄컊쳢ꎬ좻뫳춨맽뗼듺랽램볆쯣ꎬ퓚뷴쯵펳짤뚨샭돉솢뗄쳵볾쿂뗼듺볆쯣뗄뷡맻쫇쫕솲뗄ꆣ릹퓬얷삭랽돌ꎬ쪹폃냼싧뚨샭ꎬ뻍뿉틔3뗃떽컒쏇쯹탨튪뗄뻹뫢횵몯쫽뫍닟싔몯쫽ꆣ 평폚볆쯣맽돌벫캪뢴퓓ꎬ볆쯣솿벫듳ꎬ컒쏇쪹폃Gauss볆쯣죭볾뷸탐쒣쓢ꆣ퓚뷸탐퓋쯣횮잰ꎬ탨튪좷뚨튻킩닎쫽뗄쫽횵ꆣ헢킩닎쫽뻟쳥뗄뺭볃몬틥믡퓚놾컄뗚죽늿럖ꆰ샭싛쒣탍ꆱ훐룸돶ꎬ쯼쏇뿌뮭쇋쿖쪵뺭볃뗄튻킩탔훊ꆣ틲듋ꎬ튪쪹컒쏇쒣쓢뗄뷡맻뻟폐쪵볊틢틥ꎬ쫗쿈뇘탫놣횤컒쏇뛔헢킩쏨쫶쿖쪵뺭볃뮷뺳뗄닎쫽뗄맀볆쫇ힼ좷뗄ꆣ뫜ퟔ좻ꎬ컒쏇뗄쮼슷뻍쫇ꎺ샻폃틑뺭뗃떽뗄쫽뻝맀볆닎쫽횵ꎬ퓙폃헢킩닎쫽좥쒣쓢풤닢캴살샭쿫뗄뗧탅볛룱ꆣ헢샯ퟮ훘튪뗄솽룶닎쫽쫇ꎺDꎬ벴탨쟳몯쫽뗄뷘뻠쿮뫍MCꎬ벴뇟볊돉놾ꆣ평폚컒쏇쪹폃쇋틑폐뗄Gauss돌탲ꎬ돌탲훐뛔닎쫽횵뗄좡횵랶캧폐튻뚨뗄쿞훆늢쟒뛔몯쫽탎쪽튲폐튪쟳ꎬ틲듋컒쏇탨튪붫닎쫽볆솿믘맩뗄맀볆횵뷸탐뒦샭뫳닅쓜쪹폃ꆣ뻟쳥뗄맀볆랽램뫍쫽뻝뗄뒦샭쟫볻뗚쯄늿럖ꆰ쾵쫽좷뚨ꆱꆣ 뗃떽닎쫽횵횮뫳ꎬ쿂쏦뗄릤ퟷ뻍쫇놾컄뗄훘뗣쓚죝ꎺ쪹폃Gauss볆쯣죭볾쒣쓢뻹뫢볛룱ꆣ평폚놾컄훐쪹폃뗄쫽뻝쫇컒맺틆뚯춨톶뗄쫽뻝ꎬ쯹틔컒쏇횻쳖싛틆뚯춨톶튵컱뗄뚨볛컊쳢ꆣ헫뛔쒿잰컒맺뗧탅쫐뎡뗄쪵볊쟩뿶ꎺ퓚컒맺뗄틆뚯춨톶쫐뎡짏ꎬ퓚캻헟쫇훐맺틆뚯춨탅뫍훐맺솪춨솽볒웳튵ꎬ쏦뛔볓죫쫀뷧쎳틗ퟩ횯뫳폐잱퓚뷸죫헟뺺헹뗄쟩뿶ꎬ컒쏇듓쫐뎡훐폐솽룶뎧짌뾪쪼ꎬ폖쒣쓢쇋쫐뎡훐폐죽룶ꆢ쯄룶뎧짌뗄쟩탎ꆣ헢튻랽쏦쫇평폚볆쯣믺펲볾쳵볾뗄쿞훆ꎬ컒쏇쿖퓚횻쓜쒣쓢돶쫐뎡훐ퟮ뛠폐쯄룶뎧짌뗄쟩뿶ꎬ뎧짌쫽쒿룼뛠뗄쟩뿶컞램볆쯣ꎻ쇭튻랽쏦ꎬ컒쏇퓚잰쏦틑뺭쳡떽ꎬ뗧탅탐튵쫇튻룶뻟폐ꆰퟔ좻슢뛏ꆱ탔훊뗄탐튵ꎬ퓚헢퇹뗄탐튵훐ꎬ뛠볒웳튵뷸죫쫇컞샻뿉춼뗄ꎬ틲듋ꎬ컒쏇횻뾼싇떽탐튵훐폐쯄볒뎧짌뗄쟩뿶쫇쓜릻쮵쏷컊쳢뗄ꆣ퓚룸뚨뎧짌룶쫽뗄쟩뿶쿂ꎬ럖뇰쳖싛쇋짌욷쫇틬훊뫍춬훊뗄쟩뿶ꎺ벴춶룄뇤짌욷훊솿ꎨ짌욷틬훊ꎩ뫍춶룄뇤뎧짌뗄짺닺쓜솦ꎨcapacityꎩꎨ퓚쳖싛춶룄뇤뎧짌짺닺쓜솦쪱ꎬ볙짨쇋늻춬뎧짌쳡릩뗄짌욷쫇춬훊뗄ꎩꆣ퓚헢솽훖쟩뿶훐ꎬ컒쏇폖내헕죽훖늻춬뗄뻹뫢샠탍럖뇰뷸탐쒣쓢ꎬ헢죽훖뻹뫢샠탍캪ꎺ뎧짌횮볤뮥쿠뺺헹뗄십뛻뿉럲쓉쪲뻹뫢ꆢ뎧짌횮볤릲쒱쪱뗄뻹 2 퇏룱뗄쮵ꎬ탨튪횤쏷헢솽룶컊쳢쫇뗈볛뗄ꆣ 3 맘폚뚯첬맦뮮랽램뗄쿪쾸쓚죝벰웤쿠맘뚨샭뗄싛쫶뫍횤쏷ꎬ쟫닎뾼ꆶ뺭볃뚯첬톧훐뗄뗼듺랽램ꆷꎨRecursive Methods in Economic Dynamics, Nancy and Robert E. Lucas, Jr. Harvard University Press , Cambridge Massachusetts and London England, 1989ꎩꆣ 4
뫢틔벰틔짧믡뢣샻ퟮ듳뮯ퟷ캪쒿뇪몯쫽쪱뗄뻹뫢ꆣ컒쏇튪뗃떽틔쿂뷡맻ꎺ뗚튻ꆢ뎧짌쫽쒿뛔뻹뫢볛룱뗄펰쿬벰웤돌뛈ꎻ뗚뛾ꆢ늻춬뗄뻹뫢샠탍뗃떽뗄뻹뫢볛룱폐뫎닮틬ꎻ뗚죽ꆢ늻춬뻹뫢샠탍뛔쿻럑헟쪣폠뫍뎧짌샻죳폐뫎펰쿬ꎻ뗚쯄ꆢ닎쫽횵뗄뇤뚯뛔뻹뫢뷡맻폐뫎펰쿬ꎻ뗚컥ꆢ퓚짏쏦뷡맻뗄믹뒡짏ꎬ에뛏쒿잰뗧탅볛룱뗷헻뗄랽쿲뫍럹뛈ꆣ 뛾ꆢ 컄쿗ퟛ쫶ꎺ 놾컄쯹짦벰떽뗄컄쿗훷튪벯훐폚솽룶랽쏦ꎺ뗚튻ꆢ맘폚십뛻뿉럲췪쏀뻹뫢뗄싛쫶ꎻ뗚뛾ꆢ십뛻뿉럲췪쏀뻹뫢뗄펦폃뫍볆쯣ꆣ Jean Tirole퓚Markov Perfect Equilibrium훐쿪쾸뷩짜쇋십뛻뿉럲췪쏀뻹뫢뗄룅쓮ꆣ Eric Maskin 뫍Jean Tirole퓚80쓪듺쒩랢뇭쇋죽욪뫜폐펰쿬뗄붫십뛻뿉럲췪쏀뻹뫢뗄룅쓮펦폃폚뚯첬슢뛏샭싛뗄컄헂ꆣ퓚A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity Competition With Large Fixed Costs훐ꎬEric Maskin 뫍Jean Tirole틽죫쇋붻쳦탐뚯뗄컞쟮웚뗄쮫맑춷늩�쒣탍ꎬ쪹폃뚯첬맦뮮뗄랽램볆쯣뻹뫢ꆣ컄헂훐십뛻뿉럲췪쏀뻹뫢뗄몬틥쫇ꎺ닎폫헟벴맑춷뗄닟싔뷶뷶틀삵폚쯻뗄뛔쫖쒿잰쯹돐억뗄탐캪ꆣ헢욪컄헂뗄훷튪쒿뗄쫇폃뚯첬늩�쒣탍럖컶만뚨돉놾뫜룟뗄ퟔ좻슢뛏탐튵ꆣ컄헂볙짨쇋솽룶뎧짌퓚쫽솿ꎨcapacities or quantitiesꎩ짏뺺헹ꎬ늢쟒횤쏷쇋십뛻뿉럲췪쏀뻹뫢뗄듦퓚뫍캨튻탔ꆣ믹놾뷡싛쫇ꎺ퓚듯떽뻹뫢쪱ꎬ탐튵훐횻폐튻룶뎧짌듦퓚ꎬ죧맻헛쿖싊늻쫇뫜뗍ꎬ캪쇋ퟨ횹뺺헹헟뷸죫탐튵ꎬ퓚캻헟뗄닺솿믡룟폚뒿맑춷슢뛏뗄쟩뿶ꆣ뛸헢룶뚯첬쒣탍뗄쇭췢튻룶펦폃뻍쫇Eric Maskin 뫍Jean Tirole뗄A Theory of Dynamic OligopolyꎬIIꎺPrice Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cyclesꆣ컄헂훐십뛻뿉럲췪쏀뻹뫢뗄룅쓮폫짏쏦뗄몬틥폐쯹늻춬ꎺ뎧짌뗄닟싔횻평닎폫헟뗄탐뚯뻶뚨ꎬ쎿룶닎폫헟뗄볛룱뻶닟쫇웤쯻닎폫헟떱웚볛룱뗄몯쫽ꆣ쯻쏇췆떼돶솽훖뻹뫢ꎺ낣웦컖쮹뮷ꎨEdgeworth Cyclesꎩ뫍췤쟺뗄탨쟳쟺쿟ꎨKinked Demand Curvesꎩꆣ쒣탍훐ꎬ뎧짌틔늮삼쳘ꎨBertrandꎩ랽쪽뷸탐볛룱뺺헹ꎬ뮥쿠쿷볛틔퓶볓쫐뎡럝뛮ꎬ횱떽볛5
룱햽뗄돉놾뇤뗃럇뎣룟믲헟쒳룶뎧짌뫶좻쳡룟쇋볛룱ꆣ뗚죽욪컄헂쫇ꎺA Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, IIIꎺCournot Competition ꆣ 퓚2000쓪쒩Drew Fundenberg 뫍Jean Tirole뫏ퟷ랢뇭뗄Pricing a Network Good To Deter Entry 훐ꎬ폃십뛻뿉럲췪쏀뻹뫢뗄룅쓮럖컶쇋죧맻탐튵훐횻폐튻룶췸싧짌욷ꎨnetwork goodꎩ뗄쳡릩헟ꎬ쯻죧뫎뚨볛틔ퟨ횹탂뎧짌뷸죫뗄컊쳢ꆣ컒쏇뿉틔뾴떽ꎺ튻랽쏦ꎬ죧맻뷸죫헟뗄췸싧짌욷폫퓚캻헟뗄짌욷늻쿠죝늢쟒듦퓚탨쟳뗄췸싧췢늿탔ꎬ쓇쎴퓚캻헟틑폐뗄췸싧짌욷뗄폃뮧믹뒡뿉틔웰떽샠쯆폚춶뗄ퟷ폃ꎬퟨ횹뷸죫랢짺ꎻ쇭튻랽쏦ꎬ잱퓚뷸죫헟뗄뷸죫췾킲웈쪹퓚캻헟붵뗍볛룱ꆣ컄헂쳖싛십뛻뿉럲췪쏀뻹뫢늢폃뚯첬맦뮮뗄랽램쟳뷢뻹뫢ꆣ 퓚짏쏦쳡떽뗄Pricing a Network Good To Deter Entry튻컄훐ꎬDrew Fundenberg 뫍Jean Tirole쪹폃쇋솽듺죋뗄쫀듺붻쳦쒣탍ꆣ폫듋쿠뷼뗄쫇Toker Doganoglu뗄솽욪컄헂ꎬ쯼쏇뚼붨솢쇋솽듺죋뗄쫀듺붻쳦쒣탍ꎬ뚼쳖싛쇋십뛻뿉럲췪쏀뻹뫢뗄뷡맻ꆣDynamic Price Competition with Persistent Consumer Tastes쳖싛쇋볛룱뺺헹뗄뚯첬늩�ꆣ컄훐쫗쿈룸돶쇋컈뚨뗄십뛻뿉럲췪쏀뻹뫢듦퓚뗄쳵볾ꆣ떱십뛻뿉럲췪쏀뻹뫢듦퓚쪱ꎬퟮ폅뗄뚨볛닟싔뇭쏷ꎬ죧맻웤쯻쳵볾뻹쿠춬ꎬ풭살뻟폐뷏룟쫐뎡럝뛮뗄뎧짌믡톡퓱뷏룟뗄뚨볛ꆣ놾컄훐ꎬ쿻럑헟뗄욫뫃컈뚨ꎬ벴쿻럑헟뛔짌욷뗄움볛늻쯦쪱볤뛸룄뇤쫇튻룶훘튪뗄볙짨ꎬ퓚듋볙짨쳵볾쿂ꎬ뎧짌횮볤뗄볛룱뺺헹룼캪벤쇒ꎬ틲캪뻹뫢볛룱튪뗍폚쿻럑헟욫뫃룄뇤뗄쟩뿶ꆣ춬쪱헢쳵볙짨쪹뗃쿲뻹뫢뷡맻쫕솲뗄쯙뛈뫜뮺싽ꆣ퓚쇭튻욪컄헂Experience Goods, Switching Costs and Dynamic Price Competition훐ꎬToker Doganoglu쳖싛뗄훘뗣럅퓚쇋틆돉놾ꎨswitching costsꎩ듦퓚뗄쟩뿶ꆣ쯻붨솢쇋Hotelling 쒣탍ꎬ쫗쿈볙짨쇋쮫맑춷뗄쫐뎡럝뛮쫇럖뇰룸뚨뗄ꎬ평폚쿻럑헟뛔짌욷쿻럑쯹듸살뗄싺틢뛈듦퓚늻좷뚨탔ꎬ쿻럑헟뻍믡듓뛔튻룶욷없틆떽쇭췢튻룶욷없ꎬ떫쫇튪돐떣틆돉놾ꎬ헢쫇폫잰튻욪컄헂뗄늻춬횮뒦ꆣ틆돉놾뗄듳킡믡펰쿬떽뻹뫢뷡맻ꎺ떱틆돉놾ퟣ릻뗍쪱ꎬ뻹뫢볛룱짵훁믡뗍폚쎻폐틆돉놾쪱뗄뻹뫢볛룱ꎬ틆돉놾뗄듦퓚ꎬ듳듳복짙쇋뎧짌뗄샻죳ꎬ쪹뗃볛룱뷓뷼폚뇟볊돉놾ꆣ춬퇹ꎬ헢욪컄헂튲쳖싛쇋십뛻뿉럲췪쏀뻹뫢ꎬ늢쟒횧돖쇋ퟷ헟퓚짏컄훐쳡떽뗄쫐뎡럝뛮룟뗄뎧짌뚨볛룟뗄뷡싛ꆣ 퓚십뛻뿉럲췪쏀뻹뫢볆쯣랽쏦뗄훷튪릱쿗살ퟔ폚Ariel Pakes뫍Paul Mcguire6
뗄튻쾵쇐컄헂ꆣ쯻쏇뗄컄헂훐쒣탍짨뚨뚼뫜튻냣뮯ꎬ쎻폐뫜잿뗄볙짨쳵볾ꎬ샭싛췆떼뗄훷튪쒿뗄쫇횸돶볆쯣십뛻뿉럲췪쏀뻹뫢뗄랽램틔벰뇠돌쮼슷ꎬ늢쟒퓚쎿튻욪컄헂훐뚼룸돶쇋쪵볊쒣쓢뗄샽ퟓ뫍쒣쓢뷡맻ꆣ쯻쏇뗄쒣탍컒쏇믡퓚뗚죽늿럖ꆰ샭싛쒣탍ꆱ훐쿪쾸뷩짜ꎬ헢샯늻퓙ힸ쫶ꎬ뷶뷶럖컶튻쿂쎿욪컄헂뗄늻춬횮뒦ꆣMarkov-Perfect Industry Dynamics: A Framework for Empirical Work뗄샭싛늿럖쳖싛쇋퓚닺욷쫇춬훊뗄볙짨쳵볾쿂ꎬ뎧짌뷸죫ꆢ췋돶ꆢ춶ꆢ뚨볛뻶닟ꆣ퓚Computing Markov-perfect Nash equilibria: numerical implications of a dynamic differentiated product model뗄잰냫늿럖훐ꎬ쳖싛쇋닺욷쫇틬훊뗄쟩뿶쿂ꎬ뎧짌횮볤퓚볛룱랽쏦늮삼쳘랽쪽뷸탐뺺헹뗄쟩뿶ꎬ럖컶쇋뎧짌뷸죫ꆢ췋돶ꆢ춶ꆢ뚨볛뻶닟ꆣ컄헂뗄뫳냫늿럖쿪쾸뷩짜쇋죧뫎볆쯣십뛻뿉럲췪쏀뻹뫢ꎬ헢샯훷튪퓋폃뚯첬맦뮮뗄뗼듺랽램ꆣ컄헂튲춬쪱횸돶ꎬ떱뎧짌쫽쒿퓶볓쪱ꎬ퓋쯣솿틔횸쫽놶쫽퓶볓ꎬ헢쪹컒쏇뫜ퟔ좻뗄쿫떽ꎬ퓚럖컶쪵볊컊쳢쪱ꎬ펦룃뷨훺폚볆쯣믺ꎬ샻폃쒳킩볆쯣죭볾췪돉퓋쯣ꆣ럇뎣탒퓋뗄쫇ꎬAriel Pakes뫍Paul Mcguire룸돶쇋Gauss돌탲뫍C폯퇔돌4탲ꆣ Implementing the Pakes-McGuire Algorithm for Computing Markov Perfect Equilibria in Gaussퟜ뷡쇋틔짏솽욪컄헂뗄샭싛뫍훷튪뷡싛ꎬ웤쒿뗄쫇캪뇠킴5Gauss돌탲쳡릩쮼슷ꆣ 죽ꆢ 샭싛쒣탍ꎺ 컒쏇퓚헢샯횱뷓틽폃쇋Ariel Pakes뫍Paul Mcguire뗄쒣탍쎻폐ퟶ죎뫎탞룄ꎬ풭틲폐솽뗣ꎺ뗚튻ꆢAriel Pakes뫍Paul Mcguire뗄쒣탍훐쎻폐뫜잿뗄볙짨ꎬ쫇튻룶뫜튻냣뮯뗄쒣탍ꎬ믹놾럻뫏컒쏇쯹튪쳖싛뗄쪵볊쟩탎ꎻ뗚뛾ꆢ컒쏇퓚쿂쏦쒣쓢훐ꎬ쪹폃쇋Ariel Pakes뫍Paul Mcguire틀뻝ퟔ벺뗄샭싛쒣탍룸돶뗄Gauss돌탲ꎬ틲듋ꎬ튪쪹뗃쒣쓢뗄뷡맻폐틢틥ꎬ컒쏇쯹럖컶뗄컊쳢뇘탫쓉죫떽Ariel Pakes뫍Paul Mcguire뗄샭싛뿲볜훐ꆣ 쫗쿈뾼싇닺욷쫇춬훊뗄쟩뿶ꆣ 4 헢킩돌탲뿉틔춨맽틔쿂랽쪽뗄떽ꎺ폃ftp솬뷓떽ꆰꆱ폃ꆰanonymousꆱퟷ캪폃뮧쏻ꎬ쪹폃헟뗄헟헦쪵탔쏻ퟷ캪뿚쇮ꎨpasswordꎩ뗇죫ꎬ퓚쒿슼ꆰpub/mark-eqmꆱ훐뿉틔헒떽쯹폐뗄돌탲컄볾ꆣ 5 놾컄횻쫇폃쇋Gauss돌탲뷸탐쒣쓢ꎬAriel Pakes뫍Paul Mcguire 퓚컄헂훐퓸뺭쳡떽ꎺ폃C폯퇔돌탲쒣쓢쯙뛈룟폚Gauss돌탲ꆣ 7
쎿룶뎧짌틔풤웚샻죳헛쿖횵뗄ퟮ듳뮯ퟷ캪쒿뇪몯쫽ꎬ퓚쎿룶쪱웚뗄웚돵뻶뚨뷸죫/췋돶탐튵ꎬ쫇럱뷸탐춶ꆢ춶뗄쫽솿ꎬ폃x뇭쪾ꆣ쎿떥캻춶튪횧뢶돉놾c(ꛘ)ꆣ 쎿룶뎧짌뗄펯샻쓜솦폃쯼뗄킧싊쮮욽ꎨefficiency level ꎩ뫢솿ꎬ폃ꛘ뇭쪾ꆣ떫ꛘ뗄횵쫇튻룶쿠뛔쮮욽ꎬ쯼뗈폚뎧짌뗄쪵볊킧싊쮮욽폫탐튵췢쒳룶뇪ힼ뗄킧싊쮮욽뗄닮횵ꆣ틲듋ꎬꛘ뗄뇤뚯쫜떽솽룶틲쯘뗄펰쿬ꎺ뗚튻ꆢ탐튵췢뇪ힼ킧싊쮮욽뗄뇤뚯ꎺ죧맻뎧짌쪵볊뗄킧싊쮮욽놣돖늻뇤ꎬ뇪ힼ킧싊쮮욽짽룟ꎬ뎧짌뗄ꛘ횵복킡ꎻ뗚뛾ꆢ춶뿉틔퓶볓뎧짌뗄킧싊쮮욽ꎬ튲뻍쫇ꛘ뗄횵ꆣ떫퓚컄훐볙짨춶퓶볓킧싊쮮욽뗄횵쫇뇟볊뗝복뗄ꎬ벴킧싊쮮욽듦퓚튻룶ퟮ킡짏뷧ꎬ떱ꛘ횵뷓뷼헢룶짏뷧쪱ꎬ뎧짌뇣늻믡퓙춶ꎬ틲캪춶퓶볓킧싊뗃떽뗄믘놨늻ퟣ틔뗖늹춶뗄돉놾ꆣ늻럁냑헢룶ퟮ킡짏뷧볇ퟶꎬ춬쪱늻럁쇮킧싊쮮욽뗄쿂뷧캪0ꎬ웤몬틥쫇ꎬ죧맻웳튵뗄킧싊쮮욽캪뢺횵ꎬ쯻믡톡퓱췋돶탐튵ꆣ 컒쏇볇탐튵췢뇪ힼ킧싊쮮욽뗄뇤뮯캪ꛇꎬ쯼럾듓룅싊럖늼ꆣ웳튵춶쪹뗃킧싊쮮욽뗄뇤뚯캪ꛓꆣ헢샯볙짨ꛇ뫍ꛓ쎿룶쪱웚뇤뚯럹뛈캪1ꆣꛇ뫍ꛓ뗄좡횵벰웤룅싊럖늼평쿂쪽룸돶ꎺ = ꎨ1ꎩ = ꎨ2ꎩ 8
볇놾웚뗄킧싊쮮욽캪ꛘꎬ쿂튻웚뗄킧싊쮮욽캪ꎬ퓲폐쿂쏦뗄죽룶뗈쪽돉솢ꎬ쯼쏇뿌뮭쇋킧싊쮮욽퓚솽웚횮볤뇤뮯뗄맦싉ꎺ Prob(=ꛘ+1|x, ꛘ)= Prob(=ꛘ|x, ꛘ)= Prob(=ꛘ-1|x, ꛘ)= 퓚쎿룶쪱웚ꎬ뎧짌뗄쫕죫평뎧짌뗄킧싊쮮욽뫍탐튵쓚웳튵뗄룶쫽뻶뚨ꎨ폃s뇭쪾ꎩꎬ벴죧맻쫕죫폃A뇭쪾ꎬ쓇쎴A쫇ꛘ뫍s뗄몯쫽ꆣA(ꛘ,s) 쯦ퟅꛘ뗄퓶볓뛸퓶볓ꎬ쯦ퟅs뗄퓶볓뛸복킡몯쫽ꎬ틲캪웳튵룶쫽듺뇭쇋탐튵쓚늿뺺헹뗄벤쇒돌뛈ꎬ웳튵쫽쒿풽뛠ꎬ뺺헹풽벤쇒ꎬ춬퇹쳵볾쿂웳튵쫕죫뻍풽짙ꆣ 웳튵쫽쒿쫜떽쎿튻웚룷룶웳튵뷸죫/췋돶뻶닟뗄펰쿬ꆣ컄훐볙뚨ꎺ잱퓚뷸죫헟쫇럱뷸죫웳튵럾듓튻뚨뗄룅싊럖늼ꎬ웤훐s쫇룸뚨뗄틑뺭쪵쿖뗄웳튵룶쫽ꎬ쫇쿂튻웚뗄웳튵룶쫽ꆣ춬쪱맦뚨ꎬ뷸죫헟죧맻퓚놾웚뻶뚨뷸죫ꎬ쓇쎴듓쿂튻웚닅뾪쪼뗃떽쫕죫ꆣ뷸죫헟퓚뷸죫탐튵쪱ꎬ튪뷸탐춶ꎬ헢 9
튻늿럖춶쫴폚돁쎻돉놾ꎬ폃뇭쪾ꆣ뷸죫헟뇈뷏돁쎻돉놾뫍캴살풤웚샻죳쳹쿖횵뗄듳킡맘쾵뻶뚨쫇럱뷸죫ꆣ 쎿룶웳튵퓚췋돶탐튵쪱쪣폠놾ꎨscrape valueꎩ볇ퟶꛕꆣ퓚캻헟뇈뷏췋돶뗄쪣폠놾뫍캴살풤웚샻죳쳹쿖횵뗄듳킡맘쾵뻶뚨쫇럱췋돶탐튵ꆣ 룹뻝틔짏뛔쒣탍뗄쏨쫶ꎬ컒쏇뿉틔럖뇰뗃떽퓚캻헟뫍뷸죫헟뗄쒿뇪몯쫽ꎺ 퓚캻헟ꎺ V(ꛘ,s)=max[{R(ꛘ,s;x)+ },ꛕ] ꎨ3ꎩ 웤훐ꎬV(ꛘ,s)쫇횵몯쫽ꎬꛘ,s쫇놾웚뗄ힴ첬뇤솿ꎻR(ꛘ,s;x)쫇놾웚뗄샻죳몯쫽ꎬR(ꛘ,s;x)=A(ꛘ,s)-c(ꛘ)xꎬꛂ쫇헛쿖싊ꆣ헢룶쪽ퟓ뗄몬틥쫇ꎺ떱캴살뗄풤웚샻죳뗄쳹쿖횵킡폚췋돶쪣폠놾쪱ꎬ뎧짌톡퓱췋돶탐튵ꎻ떱캴살뗄풤웚샻죳뗄쳹쿖횵듳폚췋돶쪣폠놾쪱ꎬ뎧짌볌탸쇴퓚탐튵훐ꎬ늢춨맽톡퓱춶쮮욽ퟮ듳뮯풤웚샻죳ꆣ 뷸죫헟ꎺ 잱퓚뷸죫헟퓚뷸죫탐튵뫳캴살풤웚샻죳짨캪ꎬ웤훐s,m쫇ힴ첬뇤솿ꎬs뇭쪾탐튵쓚틑폐뗄뎧짌쫽쒿ꎬm뇭쪾퓚룃쪱뿌탂뷸죫탐튵뗄뎧짌쫽쒿ꆣ 10
= ꎨ4ꎩ 웤훐ꎬV뗄몯쫽탎쪽춬ꎨ3ꎩ쪽ꎻ쪹룃뎧짌뷸죫탐튵쪱뗄킧싊쮮욽ꎬ쫇웤쯻퓚룃쪱뿌뷸죫탐튵뗄뎧짌뷸죫탐튵쪱뗄킧싊쮮욽ꎻꎨꎩ쫇탂뷸죫뎧짌킧싊쮮욽뗄룅싊럖늼몯쫽ꎻꎬ쫇튻룶쿲솿ꎬ퓚뗚m룶캻훃짏뗈폚1ꎬ뛸퓚웤쯻캻훃짏뗈폚0ꆣ 잱퓚뷸죫헟믡뇈뷏뫍뷸죫뗄돁쎻돉놾뗄듳킡살뻶뚨쫇럱뷸죫탐튵ꆣ 헢룶쒣탍쫇샫즢쪱볤뗄뚯첬쒣탍ꎬ폃뚯첬맦뮮랽램쟳뷢ꎬꎨ3ꎩ뫍ꎨ4ꎩ쪽뻍쫇뚯첬맦뮮랽램훐뗄놴뛻싼랽돌ꆣ 6 뿉틔횤쏷ꎬ싺ퟣ짏쫶놴뛻싼랽돌뗄컈첬뷢쫇십뛻뿉럲췪쏀뻹뫢ꆣ 6 뻹뫢뗄뚨틥뫍쿪쾸횤쏷쟫닎뾼Ariel Pakes& Paul Mcguire, “Markov-Perfect Industry Dynamics: A Framework for Empirical Work”, Review of Economic Studies, (1995) 62, 61-82. 11
헢샯탨튪잿뗷뗄쫇ꎺ짏쏦쒣탍뗄튻룶믹놾볙짨쫇뎧짌쳡릩뗄닺욷쫇춬훊뗄ꎬ춶룄뇤뎧짌뗄뇟볊돉놾믲헟짺닺쓜솦ꎬ뿉틔횱뷓룄뇤뎧짌뗄킧싊쮮욽ꆣ퓚쿂쏦컒쏇뷩짜뗄쒣탍훐ꎬ볙짨쇋뎧짌쳡릩뗄닺욷쫇틬훊뗄ꎬ춶춨맽룄뇤닺욷훊솿룄뇤킧싊쮮욽ꆣ 7 쿂쏦뾼싇닺욷쫇틬훊뗄쟩뿶ꆣ 헢샯쒣탍뗄짨뚨뫍닎쫽뗄몬틥폫닺욷쫇춬훊뗄쟩뿶믹놾쿠춬ꎬ캨튻늻춬뗄쫇닺욷훊솿믡펰쿬킧싊쮮욽ꎬ쯹틔춶룄뇤킧싊쮮욽튲뻍쿠떱폚춶믡룄뇤닺욷훊솿ꆣ 볙짨쎿룶쿻럑헟ퟮ뛠믡듓탐튵훐릺싲튻떥캻짌욷ꎬ쿻럑헟r뗄킧폃몯쫽캪ꎺꎬ뇭쪾뗚j룶뎧짌닺욷뗄훊솿ꎬ쫇뗚j룶뎧짌닺욷뗄볛룱ꎬ듺뇭쇋늻춬쿻럑헟횮볤뗄닮틬ꆣ듓쿻럑헟뗄킧폃몯쫽뿉틔뾴돶쿻럑헟뗄탨쟳평닺욷뗄훊솿뫍닺욷뗄볛룱릲춬뻶뚨ꆣ볙짨뎧짌뗄킧싊쮮욽췪좫평닺욷뗄훊솿뻶뚨ꎬ짨쎿룶쪱웚뎧짌뗄킧싊쮮욽뇤뮯캪ꛓꎬ퓲ꎬ튲폐쿂쏦뗄쪽ퟓ돉솢ꎺꎬ뇭쪾평뎧짌춶쳡룟뗄닺욷훊솿ꎬv뇭쪾췢늿훊솿뇪ힼ뇤뮯뗄쟩뿶ꎬ늢쟒뫍v럾듓틔쿂럖늼ꎺ 7 닎뾼Ariel Pakes& Paul Mcguire, “Computing Markov-perfect Nash equilibria: numerical implications of a dynamic differentiated product model”, Rand Journal of Economics Vol. 25, No. 4 Winter 1994, 555-589. 12
= = 웤쯻럖컶폫닺욷캪춬훊뗄쟩뿶듳춬킡틬ꎬ횻튪힢틢뎧짌뗄킧싊쮮욽뻶뚨틲쯘뗄닮뇰벴뿉ꆣ 룹뻝틔짏뗄쒣탍짨뚨컒쏇뿉틔춨맽뗼듺랽램볆쯣십뛻뿉럲췪쏀뻹뫢ꆣ쫗쿈탨튪힢틢뗄쫇뻹뫢뗄듦퓚뫍캨튻탔ꆣ떱탐튵훐횻폐튻룶뎧짌쪱ꎬ헛쿖틲ퟓꛂꆴ1ꎬ룹뻝뷴쯵펳짤뚨샭ꎬ뻹뫢쫇듦퓚쟒캨튻뗄ꆣ떱탐튵훐뎧짌룶쫽훰붥퓶볓쪱ꎬ볆쯣8맽돌믡뇤뗃쿠떱뢴퓓ꎬ떫믹놾쮼쿫죔좻쫇뚯첬맦뮮뗄뗼듺랽램ꆣ 쯄ꆢ 쾵쫽좷뚨 컒쏇쪹폃Gauss돌탲뷸탐쒣쓢ꎬ쫗쿈탨튪좷뚨쒣쓢쪱폃떽뗄닎쫽횵ꆣ뇭튻쇐돶쇋헢킩닎쫽뗄쏻돆벰웤뺭볃몬틥ꆣ 뇭튻: 쒣쓢쪹폃닎쫽뗄쏻돆뫍뺭볃몬틥 Model Primitives Investment effect 1ꆢquality 2ꆢmarginal cost 3ꆢcapacity 8 폐탋좤뗄뛁헟뿉틔닎뾼Ariel Pakes& Paul Mcguire, “Computing Markov-perfect Nash equilibria: numerical implications of a dynamic differentiated product model”, Rand Journal of Economics Vol. 25, No. 4 Winter 1994, 564-571. 13
Equilibrium type 1ꆢnash 2ꆢmonopoly 3ꆢsocial planner Maximum number of active firms Highest efficiency level attainable Static Parameters Marginal cost Market size Spline point for utility differential Demand intercept State number/capacity constraint ratio I. Dynamic Parameters Starting number of active firms Discount factor Entry and exit parameters Scrap value Entry sunk cost type 1ꆢstochastic 2ꆢdeterministic Sunk cost lower bound Sunk cost upper bound Efficiency level at which firms enter Investment efficiency probability distribution parameters Investment multiplier a from p(x)=ax/(1+ax) Probability of outside alternative risingdelta 쮵쏷ꎺ 1ꆢ Investment effect튻쿮훐죧맻톡퓱qualityꎬ뇭쏷춶믡쳡룟닺욷훊솿ꎬ헢쪱컒쏇쒣쓢뗄쫇닺욷캪틬훊뗄쟩뿶ꎬ뎧짌횮볤퓚볛룱랽쏦틔늮삼쳘랽쪽뺺헹ꎻ죧맻톡퓱marginal costꎬ뇭쏷춶믡붵뗍뇟볊돉놾ꎬ헢쪱컒쏇쒣쓢뗄쫇닺욷캪춬훊뗄쟩뿶ꎻ죧맻톡퓱capacityꎬ뇭쏷춶믡쳡룟뎧 14
짌뗄짺닺쓜솦ꎬ헢쪱컒쏇쒣쓢뗄쫇닺욷캪춬훊뗄쟩뿶ꆣ 2ꆢ Equilibrium type튻쿮훐죧맻톡퓱nashꎬ뇭쏷컒쏇쒣쓢뗄쫇뎧짌횮볤쿠뮥뺺헹뗄쟩뿶ꎻ죧맻톡퓱monopolyꎬ뇭쏷컒쏇쒣쓢뗄쫇뎧짌횮볤릲쒱뗄쟩뿶ꎬ헢쪱뎧짌ힷ쟳쯹폐뎧짌솪뫏샻죳뗄ퟮ듳뮯ꎬ틲듋뿉틔냑쯻쏇ퟷ캪튻룶뎧짌뾼싇ꎻ죧맻톡퓱social plannerꎬ뇭쏷헢쪱퓚캻헟쫇틔짧믡뢣샻뗄ퟮ듳뮯캪쒿뇪ꆣ 3ꆢ Maximum number of active firms뗄몬틥쫇컒쏇쯹쳖싛뗄탐튵훐웳튵뗄룶쫽ꆣ 4ꆢ Highest efficiency level attainable쫇횸쯹폐뎧짌킧싊몯쫽뗄ퟮ킡짏뷧ꆣ 틔짏닎쫽좷뚨쇋쒣탍뗄믹놾뷡릹ꆣ 5ꆢ Marginal costꎬ뇟볊돉놾ꎬ퓚샭싛쒣탍훐ꎬ뇟볊돉놾짨뚨캪뎣쫽ꆣ 6ꆢ Market sizeꎬ쫐뎡뗄듳킡ꎬ랴펳탨쟳뗄듳킡ꆣ 7ꆢ Spline point for utility differentialꎬ럖뛎몯쫽뗄럖뷧뗣ꆣ 8ꆢ Demand interceptꎬ탨쟳몯쫽뗄뷘뻠쿮ꆣ탨튪힢틢뗄쫇ꎬ샭싛쒣탍훐탨쟳몯쫽뗄탎쪽짨뚨캪ꎺꎬ벴탨쟳쿮잰쏦뗄쾵쫽짨뚨캪-1ꆣ 9ꆢ State number/capacity constraint ratioꎬힴ첬뗄룶쫽폫뎧짌짺닺쓜솦뗄뇈횵ꆣ 틔짏닎쫽쫇뺲첬닎쫽ꎬ쯼쏇좷뚨쇋샻죳몯쫽뗄탎쪽ꎬ틲듋샻죳몯쫽뗄탎쪽늻쯦쿂쏦쳖싛뗄뚯첬닎쫽뗄뇤뮯뛸뇤뮯ꆣ 10ꆢstarting number of active firmsꎬ쪱웚돵탐튵훐뎧짌뗄룶쫽ꆣ 11ꆢDiscount factorꎬ헛쿖틲ퟓꆣ 12ꆢScrap valueꎬ뎧짌췋돶탐튵쪱뗄쪣폠놾ꎬ퓚헢샯폃쪣폠놾폫웳튵돵쪼쪱ퟜ놾뗄뇈싊뇭쪾ꆣ 13ꆢEntry sunk cost typeꎬ웳튵퓚뷸죫탐튵쪱탨튪횧뢶튻뚨뗄돁쎻돉놾ꎬ퓚헢튻쿮튪톡퓱돁쎻돉놾뗄샠탍ꎺ쯦믺뗄믲헟쫇좷뚨뗄ꆣ떫컒쏇횻뾼싇돁쎻돉놾쫇쯦믺뗄쟩뿶ꎬ늢볙짨쯼뗄럖늼쫇뻹퓈럖늼ꆣ 14ꆢSunk cost lower boundꎬ돁쎻돉놾뗄쿂뷧ꆣ 15ꆢSunk cost upper boundꎬ돁쎻돉놾뗄짏뷧ꆣ 16ꆢEfficiency level at which firms enterꎬ탂뷸죫탐튵뗄웳튵뗄돵쪼킧싊쮮욽ꆣ 17ꆢInvestment multiplierꎬ벴훐뗄ꛁꎬ쯼뗄듳킡뫢솿쇋춶쳡룟킧싊쮮욽뗄룅 15
싊럖늼ꆣ듓몯쫽탎쪽컒쏇뿉틔횪뗀ꎬ쫇ꛁ뗄복몯쫽ꎬ벴ꛁ풽룟ꎬ춶쳡룟킧싊쮮욽뗄룅싊뻍풽킡ꆣ 18ꆢProbability of outside alternative risingꎬ췢뷧킧싊쮮욽뇪ힼ쳡룟뗄룅싊럖늼ꆣ 쿂쏦쳖싛닎쫽횵뗄좷뚨ꆣ컒쏇냑헢킩닎쫽럖캪솽샠ꎬ뿉틔평틑횪쫽뻝맀볆뗃떽뗄닎쫽횵뫍컞램듓틑횪쫽뻝맀볆뗃떽뗄닎쫽횵ꆣ뛔폚컞램횱뷓맀볆뗃떽뗄닎쫽횵ꎬ컒쏇닉좡헢퇹뗄랽램뒦샭ꎺ틔쒿잰뗄볛룱ퟷ캪뻹뫢볛룱ꎬ룄뇤헢킩닎쫽뗄좡횵ퟶ뛠듎쒣쓢ꎬ쪹뗃쒣쓢뗃떽뗄뻹뫢볛룱뺡솿폫쒿잰뗄볛룱컇뫏ꎬ닉폃쓜릻뗃떽컇뫏뻹뫢횵뗄닎쫽횵ퟷ캪뛔쿖쪵뺭볃쟩뿶뗄쏨쫶ꎬ룄뇤돵쪼횵뷸탐캴살볛룱뗄쒣쓢풤닢ꆣ 쫗쿈탨튪쮵쏷뗄쫇ꎺ컒쏇헢샯쳖싛뗄쫇틆뚯춨톶뗄뚨볛컊쳢ꎬ떫쫇뷼쓪살틆뚯춨톶튵컱훖샠퓶뛠ꎬ샽죧ꎺ훐맺틆뚯춨톶퓚2000쓪췆돶쇋짱훝탐튵컱ꎬ퓚2000쓪쓪뗗퓶볓쇋짱훝춨튵컱ꎬ퇹놾솿짙뛸쟒춳볆뿚뺶늻튻ꎬ쪹뗃뫜뛠쫽뻝컞램뫏늢ꆣ평폚쫽뻝뗄쿞훆컒쏇컞램맀볆헻룶쫐뎡뗄탨쟳몯쫽ꎬ틲듋뷶뷶폃쇋좫쟲춨뗄쫽뻝ퟶ듺쳦ꆣ컒쏇퇐뺿뗄쒿뗄쫇쳖싛쒿잰뗄뗧탅볛룱쫇럱룟폚샭싛짏뗄뻹뫢횵ꎬ틲듋컒쏇탨튪쏨쫶쒿잰뺭볃ힴ뿶뗄닎쫽횵ꆣ컒쏇뗄ퟶ램쫇쪹폃컒쏇쒿잰뗃떽뗄좫늿쫽뻝맀볆탨쟳몯쫽ꎨ믘맩뷡맻쫇ꎩꎬ틔믱뗃뗄좫늿쫽뻝훐뗄떥캻춨탅돉놾뗄욽뻹횵ꎨ풪/킡쪱ꎩퟷ캪돵쪼횵ꎬ늢틔헢룶떥캻춨탅돉놾뗄욽뻹횵ꎨ풪/킡쪱ꎩ뫍믱뗃뗄좫늿쫽뻝훐뗄쎿킡쪱춨뮰쫕죫ꎨ풪/킡쪱ꎩퟷ캪뻹뫢횵ꎬ춨맽뛠듎쒣쓢좷뚨웤쯻닎쫽횵ꎨ퓚헢샯ꎬ컒쏇쪹폃쇋좫늿뗄쪱볤탲쇐쫽뻝ꎬ쒿뗄쫇뗃떽뛔뺭볃뮷뺳뗄ힼ좷뗄쏨쫶ꎬ춬쪱볙짨쇋퓚벸쓪쫽뻝뗄욽뻹틢틥짏쒿잰뗄쟩뿶듯떽쇋뻹뫢쮮욽ꎩꎻ퓙폃믱뗃뗄쫽뻝훐ퟮ뷼8룶퓂뗄쫽뻝맀볆탨쟳 16
몯쫽ꎨ믘맩뷡맻쫇ꎩꎬ폃쿠뛔펦쪱볤쓚욽뻹떥캻춨탅돉놾ꎨ풪/킡쪱ꎩ뫍쿠뛔펦쪱볤쓚뗄쎿킡쪱춨뮰쫕죫ꎨ풪/킡쪱ꎩퟷ캪돵쪼횵ꎬ닉폃짏튻늽뗃떽뗄닎쫽횵뷸탐쒣쓢풤닢ꆣ 컒쏇쪹폃뗄풭쪼쫽뻝쫇뮧뻹쪱뎤ꆢ뮧뻹쫕죫뫍뮧쫽ꎻ뚨틥ꎺ쎿럖훓춨뮰럑=뮧뻹쫕죫/뮧뻹쪱뎤ꎨ럖훓ꎩꎬ떥캻ꎺ풪ꎻ쎿킡쪱춨뮰럑=쎿럖훓춨뮰럑*60ꎬ떥캻ꎺ풪ꎻ뮧뻹쪱뎤ꎨ킡쪱ꎩ=뮧뻹쪱뎤ꎨ럖훓ꎩ/60ꆣ폃쎿킡쪱춨뮰럑ퟷ캪볛룱쫽뻝ꎬ폃뮧뻹쪱뎤ꎨ킡쪱ꎩퟷ캪탨쟳쫽뻝ꎬ닉폃쏦냥쫽뻝뒦샭랽램뷸탐볆솿믘맩ꆣ 뗚튻늽ꎺ쪹폃쒿잰뗃떽뗄좫늿쫽뻝맀볆틆뚯춨톶뗄탨쟳몯쫽ꆣ 믘맩뷡맻볻뇭뛾ꆣ 뇭뛾ꎺ SSE DFE 273 MSE Root MSE R-Square Parameter Estimates Standard Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t| Intercept 1 <.0001 deh 1 <.0001 틲듋ꎬ쪹폃쒿잰뗃떽뗄좫늿쫽뻝맀뗄탨쟳몯쫽캪ꎺꆣ평폚쒣쓢쪹폃뗄돌탲뛔닎쫽횵뗄좡횵랶캧폐튻뚨뗄쿞훆ꎬ컒쏇퓚뗄솽뇟춬쪱 17
돋틔ꎬ돋틔쫇캪쇋붫Q잰쏦뗄쾵쫽뇤캪ꎭ1ꎬ돋틔쫇ퟷ뇈샽럅쯵ꆣ 냑p=0듸죫훐ꎬ뗃떽D=Qꎬ틲듋쇮market size=5ꆣ(뺫좷횵캪ꎬ쯄짡컥죫캪5). 짨뚨뻹뫢횵캪ꎨꎩꆣ 뗚뛾늽ꎺ룹뻝뗃떽뗄돉놾쫽뻝ꎬ컒쏇톡퓱믱뗃뗄좫늿쫽뻝훐뗄욽뻹떥캻춨탅돉놾ꎨ풪/킡쪱ꎩퟷ캪뇟볊돉놾뗄뷼쯆ꎬ늢쟒튲틔뗄뇈샽럅9쯵ꎬ뗃떽MCꎽ(뺫좷횵캪ꎬ쯄짡컥죫캪)ꆣ 룹뻝룃쓪틆뚯춨탅쫐뎡뗄쪵볊쟩뿶ꎬ컒쏇톡퓱춶룄뇤닺욷훊솿ꎬ벴쳖싛닺욷쫇틬훊뗄쟩뿶ꎬ짨뻹뫢샠탐캪Nash뻹뫢ꎬ벴솽룶뎧짌횮볤쿠뮥뺺헹ꎻ쇮Maximum number of active firms=2ꎬstarting number of active firms=2ꎻ헛쿖싊평1/ꎨ1+틸탐듻뿮샻싊ꎩ볆쯣뗃떽ꎬ퓲ꛂ=1/ꎨ1=ꎩ=ꆣ 뗚죽늽ꎺ평폚쯹튪좷뚨뗄닎쫽횵뷏뛠ꎬ컒쏇쿈살뇈뷏튻쿂룸뚨웤쯻닎쫽횵늻10뇤뗄쟩뿶쿂쒳튻닎쫽횵뗄뇤뚯뛔뻹뫢뷡맻뗄펰쿬ꆣ뇈뷏뗄뷡맻볻뇭죽ꆣ 뇭죽-1ꎺMarginal cost뇤뚯뛔뻹뫢볛룱뗄펰쿬 웤쯻닎쫽짨뚨ꎺ 9 쯄짡컥죫좡헻쫽훷튪쫇뾼싇떽쒣쓢돌탲뗄튪쟳ꆣ 10 헢샯횻쇐돶쇋뻹뫢뷡맻훐뗄p/mc튻쿮ꎬ틲캪컒쏇훷튪맘힢닎쫽횵뇤뮯뛔뻹뫢볛룱뗄펰쿬ꆣ 18
---[Model Primitives]----------------------------------------------------------INVESTMENT IN: quality (differentiated products) EQUILIBRIUM: Nash MAXIMUM NUMBER OF FIRMS: 2 MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY LEVEL: 21 ---[Static Parameters]---------------------------------------------------------MARGINAL COST: MARKET SIZE: SPLINE POINT (w*): 12 ---[Dynamic Parameters]--------------------------------------------------------STARTING NUMBER OF FIRMS: 1 DISCOUNT FACTOR: SCRAP VALUE: SUNK COST: stochastic, - ENTRY AT: 4 PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION PARAMETERS: a = 3; delta = Mc 1 2 4 P/mc () () () () ()p 쮵쏷ꎺ 1ꆢ p/mc쯹퓚탐훐삨뫅췢뗄횵쫇p/mc뗄뻹횵ꎬ삨뫅쓚뗄횵쫇뇪ힼ닮ꆣꎨ쿂춬ꎩ 2ꆢ p뗄횵평쿠펦뗄p/mc뗄횵돋틔mc뗄횵뗃떽ꆣ 듓짏뇭훐뿉틔뾴돶ꎬ쯦ퟅ뇟볊돉놾뗄퓶듳ꎬ뻹뫢볛룱뇤듳ꆣ 뇭죽-2ꎺMarket size뇤뚯뛔뻹뫢볛룱뗄펰쿬 웤쯻닎쫽짨뚨ꎺ ---[Model Primitives]----------------------------------------------------------INVESTMENT IN: quality (differentiated products) EQUILIBRIUM: Nash MAXIMUM NUMBER OF FIRMS: 2 MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY LEVEL: 21 ---[Static Parameters]---------------------------------------------------------MARGINAL COST: SPLINE POINT (w*): 12 ---[Dynamic Parameters]--------------------------------------------------------STARTING NUMBER OF FIRMS: 1 DISCOUNT FACTOR: SCRAP VALUE: SUNK COST: stochastic, - ENTRY AT: 4 19
PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION PARAMETERS: a = 3; delta = Market size 12 4 6 8 P/mc () () () () () 듓짏뇭훐뿉틔뾴돶ꎬ쯦ퟅ쫐뎡뗄퓶듳ꎬ뻹뫢볛룱복킡ꎬ떫뻹뫢볛룱뗄뇤뮯풽살풽늻쿔훸ꎬ늢쟒뇪ힼ닮튲퓚복킡ꆣ 뇭죽ꆪ3ꎺSpline point for utility differential뇤뚯뛔뻹뫢볛룱뗄펰쿬 웤쯻닎쫽짨뚨ꎺ ---[Model Primitives]----------------------------------------------------------INVESTMENT IN: quality (differentiated products) EQUILIBRIUM: Nash MAXIMUM NUMBER OF FIRMS: 2 MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY LEVEL: 21 ---[Static Parameters]---------------------------------------------------------MARGINAL COST: MARKET SIZE: ---[Dynamic Parameters]--------------------------------------------------------STARTING NUMBER OF FIRMS: 1 DISCOUNT FACTOR: SCRAP VALUE: SUNK COST: stochastic, - ENTRY AT: 4 PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION PARAMETERS: a = 3; delta = w* 1 2 6 10 12 P/mc () () () () () 듓짏뇭뿉틔뾴돶ꎬ쯦ퟅ럖뛎몯쫽럖룮뗣뗄퓶듳ꎬ뻹뫢볛룱훰붥퓶볓ꎬ헢훖펰쿬퓚w*횵뷏킡쪱뫜쿔훸ꆣ 뇭죽-4ꎺState number/capacity constraint ratio뇤뚯뛔뻹뫢볛룱뗄펰쿬 웤쯻닎쫽짨뚨ꎺ ---[Model Primitives]----------------------------------------------------------INVESTMENT IN: quality (differentiated products) EQUILIBRIUM: Nash MAXIMUM NUMBER OF FIRMS: 2 MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY LEVEL: 21 20
---[Static Parameters]---------------------------------------------------------MARGINAL COST: SPLINE POINT (w*): 12 ---[Dynamic Parameters]--------------------------------------------------------STARTING NUMBER OF FIRMS: 1 DISCOUNT FACTOR: SCRAP VALUE: SUNK COST: stochastic, - ENTRY AT: 4 PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION PARAMETERS: a = 3; delta = Market size P/mc () () () () () 듓짏뇭뿉틔뾴돶ꎬ쯦ퟅ뇈싊뗄퓶듳ꎬ뻹뫢볛룱복킡ꎬ떫쿂붵뗄쯙뛈복뮺ꆣ 뇭죽-5ꎺStarting number of active firms뇤뚯뛔뻹뫢볛룱뗄펰쿬 웤쯻닎쫽짨뚨ꎺ ---[Model Primitives]----------------------------------------------------------INVESTMENT IN: quality (differentiated products) EQUILIBRIUM: Nash MAXIMUM NUMBER OF FIRMS: 2 MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY LEVEL: 21 ---[Static Parameters]---------------------------------------------------------MARGINAL COST: MARKET SIZE: SPLINE POINT (w*): 12 ---[Dynamic Parameters]-------------------------------------------------------- DISCOUNT FACTOR: SCRAP VALUE: SUNK COST: stochastic, - ENTRY AT: 4 PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION PARAMETERS: a = 3; delta = STARTING NUMBER OF FIRMS 1 2 P/mc () () 듓짏뇭뿉틔뾴돶ꎬ돵쪼쪱뎧짌쫽쒿뛔뻹뫢볛룱펰쿬뗄럹뛈뫍웤쯻닎쫽횵폐맘ꎬ떫ퟜ쳥살쮵펰쿬늻듳ꆣ 21
뇭죽-6ꎺScrap value뇤뚯뛔뻹뫢볛룱뗄펰쿬 웤쯻닎쫽짨뚨ꎺ ---[Model Primitives]----------------------------------------------------------INVESTMENT IN: quality (differentiated products) EQUILIBRIUM: Nash MAXIMUM NUMBER OF FIRMS: 2 MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY LEVEL: 21 ---[Static Parameters]---------------------------------------------------------MARGINAL COST: SPLINE POINT (w*): 12 ---[Dynamic Parameters]--------------------------------------------------------STARTING NUMBER OF FIRMS: 1 DISCOUNT FACTOR: SCRAP VALUE: SUNK COST: stochastic, - ENTRY AT: 4 PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION PARAMETERS: a = 3; delta = Scrap value P/mc () () () () () 듓짏뇭뿉틔뾴돶ꎬ뎧짌퓚췋돶쪱쪣폠뗄닺듳킡뛔뻹뫢볛룱뗄펰쿬늻쏷쿔ꆣ 뇭죽-7ꎺSunk cost 좡횵랶캧뗄뇤뚯뛔뻹뫢볛룱뗄펰쿬 웤쯻닎쫽짨뚨ꎺ ---[Model Primitives]----------------------------------------------------------INVESTMENT IN: quality (differentiated products) EQUILIBRIUM: Nash MAXIMUM NUMBER OF FIRMS: 2 MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY LEVEL: 21 ---[Static Parameters]---------------------------------------------------------MARGINAL COST: MARKET SIZE: SPLINE POINT (w*): 12 ---[Dynamic Parameters]--------------------------------------------------------STARTING NUMBER OF FIRMS: 1 DISCOUNT FACTOR: SCRAP VALUE: ENTRY AT: 4 PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION PARAMETERS: a = 3; delta = 22
Sunk cost - - - P/mc () () () () 듓짏뇭뿉틔뾴돶ꎬ쯦믺뗄돁쎻돉놾뗄좡횵랶캧뗄뇤뚯뛔뻹뫢볛룱뗄펰쿬늻쏷쿔ꆣ 뇭죽-8ꎺEfficiency level at which firms enter뇤뚯뛔뻹뫢볛룱뗄펰쿬 웤쯻닎쫽짨뚨ꎺ ---[Model Primitives]----------------------------------------------------------INVESTMENT IN: quality (differentiated products) EQUILIBRIUM: Nash MAXIMUM NUMBER OF FIRMS: 2 MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY LEVEL: 21 ---[Static Parameters]---------------------------------------------------------MARGINAL COST: MARKET SIZE: SPLINE POINT (w*): 12 ---[Dynamic Parameters]--------------------------------------------------------STARTING NUMBER OF FIRMS: 1 DISCOUNT FACTOR: SCRAP VALUE: SUNK COST: stochastic, - PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION PARAMETERS: a = 3; delta = Entry at 1 4 8 10 P/mc () () () () 듓짏뇭뿉틔뾴돶ꎬ뎧짌뷸죫탐튵쪱돵쪼뗄킧싊쮮욽뛔뻹뫢볛룱뗄펰쿬늻쏷쿔ꆣ 뇭죽-9ꎺInvestment multiplier뇤뚯뛔뻹뫢볛룱뗄펰쿬 웤쯻닎쫽짨뚨ꎺ ---[Model Primitives]----------------------------------------------------------INVESTMENT IN: quality (differentiated products) EQUILIBRIUM: Nash MAXIMUM NUMBER OF FIRMS: 2 MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY LEVEL: 21 ---[Static Parameters]---------------------------------------------------------23
MARGINAL COST: MARKET SIZE: SPLINE POINT (w*): 12 ---[Dynamic Parameters]--------------------------------------------------------STARTING NUMBER OF FIRMS: 1 DISCOUNT FACTOR: SCRAP VALUE: SUNK COST: stochastic, - ENTRY AT: 4 PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION PARAMETERS: delta = a 1 2 3 4 5 P/mc () () () () ()a 6 7 8 10 20 P/mc () () () () ()듓짏뇭훐뿉틔뾴떽ꎬ쯦ퟅa뗄퓶듳ꎬ춶퓶볓킧싊쮮욽뗄룅싊복킡ꎬ뻹뫢볛룱복킡ꎬ떫떱a뗄횵뷏듳쪱ꎬa뇤뚯뛔뻹뫢볛룱펰쿬뻍늻쏷쿔쇋ꆣ 뇭죽-10ꎺProbability of outside alternative rising뇤뚯뛔뻹뫢볛룱뗄펰쿬 웤쯻닎쫽짨뚨ꎺ ---[Model Primitives]----------------------------------------------------------INVESTMENT IN: quality (differentiated products) EQUILIBRIUM: Nash MAXIMUM NUMBER OF FIRMS: 2 MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY LEVEL: 21 ---[Static Parameters]---------------------------------------------------------MARGINAL COST: MARKET SIZE: SPLINE POINT (w*): 12 ---[Dynamic Parameters]--------------------------------------------------------STARTING NUMBER OF FIRMS: 1 DISCOUNT FACTOR: SCRAP VALUE: SUNK COST: stochastic, - ENTRY AT: 4 PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION PARAMETERS: a = 3 delta P/mc () () () () () () 24
듓짏뇭뿉틔뾴돶ꎬ췢늿킧싊쮮욽뇪ힼ쳡룟뗄룅싊퓶볓ꎬ뻹뫢볛룱퓶볓ꎬ늢쟒떱룅싊횵뷏룟쪱ꎬ펰쿬퓶듳ꆣ 뇭죽-11ꎺ쒣쓢쪱볤뎤뛈뇤뚯뛔뻹뫢볛룱뗄펰쿬 웤쯻닎쫽짨뚨ꎺ ---[Model Primitives]----------------------------------------------------------INVESTMENT IN: quality (differentiated products) EQUILIBRIUM: Nash MAXIMUM NUMBER OF FIRMS: 2 MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY LEVEL: 21 ---[Static Parameters]---------------------------------------------------------MARGINAL COST: MARKET SIZE: SPLINE POINT (w*): 12 ---[Dynamic Parameters]--------------------------------------------------------STARTING NUMBER OF FIRMS: 1 DISCOUNT FACTOR: SCRAP VALUE: SUNK COST: stochastic, - ENTRY AT: 4 PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION PARAMETERS: a = 3; delta = 쒣쓢쪱웚 10k 20k 30k 40k 50k P/mc () () () () () 듓짏뇭훐뿉틔뾴돶ꎬ쒣쓢뗄쪱볤풽뎤뻹뫢볛룱풽룟ꎬ춬쪱뇪ힼ닮뇤듳ꆣ떫퓚쒣쓢쪱웚뇈뷏짙쪱ꎬ쒣쓢쪱웚뗄퓶볓뛔뻹뫢볛룱펰쿬늻듳ꆣ 뗚쯄늽ꎺ컒쏇폃쪵볊쫽뻝볆쯣뗃떽뗄p/mc캪ꎬ춨맽룄뇤닎쫽횵뷸탐뛠듎쒣쓢ꎬ컒쏇좷뚨닎쫽횵ퟜ뷡퓚뇭쯄ꆣ 뇭쯄-1ꎺ닎쫽횵뗄짨뚨 ---[Model Primitives]----------------------------------------------------------INVESTMENT IN: quality (differentiated products) EQUILIBRIUM: Nash MAXIMUM NUMBER OF FIRMS: 2 MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY LEVEL: 21 ---[Static Parameters]---------------------------------------------------------MARGINAL COST: MARKET SIZE: SPLINE POINT (w*): 1 ---[Dynamic Parameters]--------------------------------------------------------25
STARTING NUMBER OF FIRMS: 2 DISCOUNT FACTOR: SCRAP VALUE: SUNK COST: stochastic, - ENTRY AT: 4 PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION PARAMETERS: a = 9; delta = 뇭쯄-2ꎺ쒣쓢뷡맻 Mean investment: () Mean and stddev price-cost margin: () Mean and stddev one-firm concentration: () Mean consumer surplus: () Mean producer surplus: () Mean total surplus: () 평폚룄뇤룷룶닎쫽좡횵횻쓜쪹뻹뫢횵p/mcퟮ뗍듯떽뗄쮮욽ꎬ틲듋ꎬ헢룶뻹뫢횵뇈쪵볊횵룟맀쇋ꎥꎨꎩꆣ퓚쿂쏦뗄쟳뷢맽돌훐ꎬ컒쏇믡뾼싇떽헢룶룟맀뗄틲쯘ꆣ 컥ꆢ 쒣쓢 컒쏇폃믱뗃쫽뻝훐ퟮ뷼8룶퓂뗄쫽뻝훘탂맀볆탨쟳몯쫽뫍훘탂볆쯣뇟볊돉놾ꎬ늢쪹폃짏쏦좷뚨뗄닎쫽횵뷸탐쒣쓢풤닢ꆣ횮쯹틔훘탂볆쯣탨쟳몯쫽뫍뇟볊돉놾쫇샻폃ퟮ탂뗄퇹놾쫽뻝틔뇣룼ힼ좷뗄쏨쫶쯹럖컶뎧짌뗄쒿잰뗄뺭펪뮷뺳ꆣ 탨쟳몯쫽맀볆뷡맻볻뇭컥ꆣ 뇭컥ꎺ Model Description SSE DFE 86 MSE Root MSE R-Square Standard Variable DF Estimate Error t Value Pr > |t| 26
Intercept 1 <.0001 deh 1 <.0001 11틲듋ꎬ폃믱뗃쫽뻝훐ퟮ뷼8룶퓂뗄쫽뻝맀볆뗃떽뗄탨쟳몯쫽캪ꎺ ꆣ춬퇹ꎬ룹뻝쒣쓢돌탲뛔닎쫽횵뗄좡횵랶캧뗄쿞훆ꎬ컒쏇퓚랽돌뗄솽닠춬쪱돋틔ꆣ돋틔쫇캪쇋붫Q잰쏦뗄쾵쫽뇤캪ꎭ1ꎬ돋틔쫇ퟷ뇈샽럅쯵ꆣ붫믱뗃쫽뻝훐ퟮ뷼8룶퓂뗄쫽뻝훐뗄떥캻춨탅돉놾뗄욽뻹횵풪/킡쪱튲틔ퟷ뇈샽럅쯵ꎬ뗃떽쒣쓢쪱쪹폃뗄D=ꎨ뺫좷횵캪ꎬ쯄짡컥죫캪4ꎩ,MCꎽ1ꎨ뺫좷횵캪ꎬ쯄짡컥죫캪1ꎩꆣ2001쓪쪵볊뗄p/mc캪ꎨꎩꆣ 컒쏇볇럅쯵뫳뗄탨쟳몯쫽캪ꎺꆣ평쪵볊믘맩쫽뻝뗃떽헢뛎쪱웚12볛룱뗄욽뻹횵캪ꎺꎨ풪/킡쪱ꎩꎬ뛸붫욽뻹탨쟳듸죫탨쟳몯쫽뗃떽뗄욽뻹볛룱뗄쓢뫍횵캪ꎺꆣ솽룶뷡맻럇뎣뷓뷼ꎬ쮵쏷컒쏇뛔탨쟳몯쫽맀볆뗃뫜뺫좷ꆣ 11믘맩쪹폃뗄쫽뻝뫍쫽뻝뒦샭랽램볻뢽슼죽ꆣ 12 뻹폃탂뚨틥뗄탨쟳몯쫽뇭쪾ꆣ 27
냑p=0듸죫훐ꎬ뗃떽D=Qꎬ틲듋쇮market size=4ꆣ 평폚뎧짌뷸죫탐튵쪱돵쪼뗄킧싊쮮욽뛔뻹뫢볛룱펰쿬늻듳ꎬ컒쏇내헕Pakes-McGuire컄헂훐뗄랽램ꎬ좡캪쒣탍훐뗄쒬죏횵ꎬ벴캪4ꆣ 뛔폚쒣쓢뗄뷡맻ꎬ컒쏇쫗쿈내헕탐튵훐뎧짌뗄룶쫽럖돉MAXIMUM NUMBER OF FIRMS럖뇰뗈폚1ꆢ2ꆢ3ꆢ4뗄쟩뿶ꎻ퓚짏쏦쎿튻훖쟩뿶훐폖럖돉닺욷쫇춬훊뫍틬훊뗄쟩뿶ꎬ벴춶룄뇤닺욷ꎨqualityꎩ뫍춶룄뇤뎧짌짺닺쓜솦ꎨcapacityꎩ뗄쟩뿶ꎻ퓚짏쏦쳡벰뗄솽훖럖샠뗄쎿튻훖ퟩ뫏훐ꎬ폖튪럖뇰뾼싇뻹뫢샠탍쫇nashꆢmonopolyꆢsocial plannerꎬ벴뎧짌횮볤뮥쿠뺺헹ꆢ릲쒱ꆢ틔짧믡뢣샻ퟮ듳뮯캪쒿뇪뗄쟩탎ꆣ 쒣쓢닎쫽횵뗄짨뚨ꎺ ---[Model Primitives]----------------------------------------------------------INVESTMENT IN: quality /capacity EQUILIBRIUM: Nash/monopoly/social planner MAXIMUM NUMBER OF FIRMS: 1/2/3 MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY LEVEL: 21 ---[Static Parameters]---------------------------------------------------------MARGINAL COST: MARKET SIZE: SPLINE POINT (w*): 1 tau: ---[Dynamic Parameters]--------------------------------------------------------STARTING NUMBER OF FIRMS: 1/2 DISCOUNT FACTOR: SCRAP VALUE: SUNK COST: stochastic, - ENTRY AT: 5 PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION PARAMETERS: a = 9; delta = 쯤좻쫂쿈룸뚨쇋닎쫽횵ꎬ컒쏇튲믡룸돶닎쫽쫊떱뗷헻뗄쒣쓢뷡맻ퟷ캪닎뾼ꆣ 쒣쓢뗄뷡맻냼삨틔쿂쓚죝ꎺ Individual Period Statistics Number of periods with n firms active 탐튵훐폐n룶뎧짌뗄쪱웚쫽 Number of periods with exit 폐뎧짌췋돶뗄쪱웚쫽 28
Number of periods with entry 폐뎧짌뷸죫뗄쪱웚쫽 Number of periods with both exit and entry춬쪱폐뎧짌뷸죫뫍췋돶뗄쪱웚쫽 Average total investment 욽뻹ퟜ춶쫽 Average price/marginal cost 욽뻹볛룱/뇟볊돉놾 Average one-firm concentration ratio 욽뻹튻룶뎧짌뗄벯훐뛈 Firm Level Statistics Life time of each firm 쎿룶뎧짌듦퓚쪱뎤 Discounted returns earned by each firm쎿룶뎧짌쫕죫뗄헛쿖횵 Aggregate Statistics Discounted consumer surplus 쿻럑헟쪣폠뗄헛쿖횵 Discounted producer surplus 짺닺헟쪣폠뗄헛쿖횵 Discounted total surplus ퟜ쪣폠뗄헛쿖횵 훷튪뗄쒣쓢뷡맻ퟜ뷡퓚뇭쇹훐ꆣ 뇭쇹ꎺ MAXIMUM NUMBER OF FIRMS=1 ---[Model Primitives]----------------------------------------------------------INVESTMENT IN: quality (differentiated products) EQUILIBRIUM: Nash MAXIMUM NUMBER OF FIRMS: 1 MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY LEVEL: 21 ---[Static Parameters]---------------------------------------------------------MARGINAL COST: MARKET SIZE: SPLINE POINT (w*): 1 ---[Dynamic Parameters]--------------------------------------------------------STARTING NUMBER OF FIRMS: 1 DISCOUNT FACTOR: SCRAP VALUE: SUNK COST: stochastic, - ENTRY AT: 4 PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION PARAMETERS: a = 9; delta = Number of periods with n firms active, n=0,1,2...: 0 40 Number of periods with exit: 0 29
Number of periods with entry: 0 Number of periods with entry and exit: 0 Mean investment: () Mean and stddev price-cost margin: () Mean and stddev one-firm concentration: () Currently active firms have lived and earned: Mean consumer surplus: () Mean producer surplus: () Mean total surplus: () ---[Model Primitives]----------------------------------------------------------INVESTMENT IN: quality (differentiated products) EQUILIBRIUM: monopoly MAXIMUM NUMBER OF FIRMS: 1 MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY LEVEL: 21 ---[Static Parameters]---------------------------------------------------------MARGINAL COST: MARKET SIZE: SPLINE POINT (w*): 1 ---[Dynamic Parameters]--------------------------------------------------------STARTING NUMBER OF FIRMS: 1 DISCOUNT FACTOR: SCRAP VALUE: SUNK COST: stochastic, - ENTRY AT: 4 PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION PARAMETERS: a = 9; delta = Number of periods with n plants active, n=0,1,2...: 2 9998 Number of periods with exit: 2 Number of periods with entry: 2 Number of periods with entry and exit: 2 Mean investment: () Mean and stddev price-cost margin: () Mean and stddev one-plant concentration: () Mean value: () Mean lifespan: () Total plants in history: 30
Currently active plants have lived and earned: Mean consumer surplus: () Mean producer surplus: () Mean total surplus: () ---[Model Primitives]----------------------------------------------------------INVESTMENT IN: quality (differentiated products) EQUILIBRIUM: social planner MAXIMUM NUMBER OF FIRMS: 1 MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY LEVEL: 21 ---[Static Parameters]---------------------------------------------------------MARGINAL COST: MARKET SIZE: SPLINE POINT (w*): 1 ---[Dynamic Parameters]--------------------------------------------------------STARTING NUMBER OF FIRMS: 1 DISCOUNT FACTOR: SCRAP VALUE: SUNK COST: stochastic, - ENTRY AT: 4 PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION PARAMETERS: a = 9; delta = Number of periods with n plants active, n=0,1,2...: 2 9998 Number of periods with exit: 2 Number of periods with entry: 2 Number of periods with entry and exit: 2 Mean investment: () Mean and stddev price-cost margin: () Mean and stddev one-plant concentration: () Mean value: () Mean lifespan: () Total plants in history: Currently active plants have lived and earned: Mean consumer surplus: () Mean producer surplus: () Mean total surplus: () 31
---[Model Primitives]----------------------------------------------------------INVESTMENT IN: capacity (homogenous products) EQUILIBRIUM: Nash MAXIMUM NUMBER OF FIRMS: 1 MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY LEVEL: 21 ---[Static Parameters]---------------------------------------------------------DEMAND INTERCEPT: MARGINAL COST: TAU: ---[Dynamic Parameters]--------------------------------------------------------STARTING NUMBER OF FIRMS: 1 DISCOUNT FACTOR: SCRAP VALUE: SUNK COST: stochastic, - ENTRY AT: 4 PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION PARAMETERS: a = 9; delta = Number of periods with n firms active, n=0,1,2...: 0 10000 Number of periods with exit: 0 Number of periods with entry: 0 Number of periods with entry and exit: 0 Mean investment: () Mean and stddev price-cost margin: () Mean and stddev one-firm concentration: () Currently active firms have lived and earned: Mean consumer surplus: () Mean producer surplus: () Mean total surplus: () ---[Model Primitives]----------------------------------------------------------INVESTMENT IN: capacity (homogenous products) EQUILIBRIUM: monopoly MAXIMUM NUMBER OF FIRMS: 1 MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY LEVEL: 21 ---[Static Parameters]---------------------------------------------------------DEMAND INTERCEPT: MARGINAL COST: TAU: ---[Dynamic Parameters]--------------------------------------------------------STARTING NUMBER OF FIRMS: 1 DISCOUNT FACTOR: SCRAP VALUE: SUNK COST: stochastic, - ENTRY AT: 4 32
PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION PARAMETERS: a = 9; delta = Number of periods with n plants active, n=0,1,2...: 0 10000 Number of periods with exit: 0 Number of periods with entry: 0 Number of periods with entry and exit: 0 Mean investment: () Mean and stddev price-cost margin: () Mean and stddev one-plant concentration: () Currently active plants have lived and earned: Mean consumer surplus: () Mean producer surplus: () Mean total surplus: () ---[Model Primitives]----------------------------------------------------------INVESTMENT IN: capacity (homogenous products) EQUILIBRIUM: social planner MAXIMUM NUMBER OF FIRMS: 1 MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY LEVEL: 21 ---[Static Parameters]---------------------------------------------------------DEMAND INTERCEPT: MARGINAL COST: TAU: ---[Dynamic Parameters]--------------------------------------------------------STARTING NUMBER OF FIRMS: 1 DISCOUNT FACTOR: SCRAP VALUE: SUNK COST: stochastic, - ENTRY AT: 4 PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION PARAMETERS: a = 9; delta = Number of periods with n plants active, n=0,1,2...: 0 10000 Number of periods with exit: 0 Number of periods with entry: 0 Number of periods with entry and exit: 0 Mean investment: () Mean and stddev price-cost margin: () Mean and stddev one-plant concentration: () 33
Currently active plants have lived and earned: Mean consumer surplus: () Mean producer surplus: () Mean total surplus: () MAXIMUM NUMBER OF FIRMS=2 ---[Model Primitives]----------------------------------------------------------INVESTMENT IN: quality (differentiated products) EQUILIBRIUM: Nash MAXIMUM NUMBER OF FIRMS: 2 MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY LEVEL: 21 ---[Static Parameters]---------------------------------------------------------MARGINAL COST: MARKET SIZE: SPLINE POINT (w*): 1 ---[Dynamic Parameters]--------------------------------------------------------STARTING NUMBER OF FIRMS: 2 DISCOUNT FACTOR: SCRAP VALUE: SUNK COST: stochastic, - ENTRY AT: 4 PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION PARAMETERS: a = 9; delta = Number of periods with n firms active, n=0,1,2...: 0 0 10000 Number of periods with exit: 0 Number of periods with entry: 0 Number of periods with entry and exit: 0 Mean investment: () Mean and stddev price-cost margin: () Mean and stddev one-firm concentration: () Currently active firms have lived and earned: Mean consumer surplus: () Mean producer surplus: () 34
Mean total surplus: () ---[Model Primitives]----------------------------------------------------------INVESTMENT IN: quality (differentiated products) EQUILIBRIUM: monopoly MAXIMUM NUMBER OF FIRMS: 2 MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY LEVEL: 21 ---[Static Parameters]---------------------------------------------------------MARGINAL COST: MARKET SIZE: SPLINE POINT (w*): 1 ---[Dynamic Parameters]--------------------------------------------------------STARTING NUMBER OF FIRMS: 2 DISCOUNT FACTOR: SCRAP VALUE: SUNK COST: stochastic, - ENTRY AT: 4 PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION PARAMETERS: a = 9; delta = -------------------------------------------------------------------------------Number of periods with n plants active, n=0,1,2...: 0 10 9990 Number of periods with exit: 10 Number of periods with entry: 10 Number of periods with entry and exit: 10 Mean investment: () Mean and stddev price-cost margin: () Mean and stddev one-plant concentration: () Mean value: () Mean lifespan: () Total plants in history: Currently active plants have lived and earned: Mean consumer surplus: () Mean producer surplus: () Mean total surplus: () 35
---[Model Primitives]----------------------------------------------------------INVESTMENT IN: quality (differentiated products) EQUILIBRIUM: social planner MAXIMUM NUMBER OF FIRMS: 2 MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY LEVEL: 21 ---[Static Parameters]---------------------------------------------------------MARGINAL COST: MARKET SIZE: SPLINE POINT (w*): 1 ---[Dynamic Parameters]--------------------------------------------------------STARTING NUMBER OF FIRMS: 2 DISCOUNT FACTOR: SCRAP VALUE: SUNK COST: stochastic, - ENTRY AT: 4 PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION PARAMETERS: a = 9; delta = Number of periods with n plants active, n=0,1,2...: 0 2 9998 Number of periods with exit: 2 Number of periods with entry: 2 Number of periods with entry and exit: 2 Mean investment: () Mean and stddev price-cost margin: () Mean and stddev one-plant concentration: () Mean value: () Mean lifespan: () Total plants in history: Currently active plants have lived and earned: Mean consumer surplus: () Mean producer surplus: () Mean total surplus: () ---[Model Primitives]----------------------------------------------------------INVESTMENT IN: capacity (homogenous products) EQUILIBRIUM: Nash MAXIMUM NUMBER OF FIRMS: 2 MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY LEVEL: 21 36
---[Static Parameters]---------------------------------------------------------DEMAND INTERCEPT: MARGINAL COST: TAU: ---[Dynamic Parameters]--------------------------------------------------------STARTING NUMBER OF FIRMS: 2 DISCOUNT FACTOR: SCRAP VALUE: SUNK COST: stochastic, - ENTRY AT: 4 PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION PARAMETERS: a = 9; delta = Number of periods with n firms active, n=0,1,2...: 0 0 10000 Number of periods with exit: 0 Number of periods with entry: 0 Number of periods with entry and exit: 0 Mean investment: () Mean and stddev price-cost margin: () Mean and stddev one-firm concentration: () Currently active firms have lived and earned: Mean consumer surplus: () Mean producer surplus: () Mean total surplus: () ---[Model Primitives]----------------------------------------------------------INVESTMENT IN: capacity (homogenous products) EQUILIBRIUM: monopoly MAXIMUM NUMBER OF FIRMS: 2 MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY LEVEL: 21 ---[Static Parameters]---------------------------------------------------------DEMAND INTERCEPT: MARGINAL COST: TAU: ---[Dynamic Parameters]--------------------------------------------------------STARTING NUMBER OF FIRMS: 2 DISCOUNT FACTOR: SCRAP VALUE: SUNK COST: stochastic, - ENTRY AT: 4 PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION PARAMETERS: a = 9; delta = 37
Number of periods with n plants active, n=0,1,2...: 0 10000 0 Number of periods with exit: 637 Number of periods with entry: 636 Number of periods with entry and exit: 2 Mean investment: () Mean and stddev price-cost margin: () Mean and stddev one-plant concentration: () Mean value: () Mean lifespan: () Total plants in history: Currently active plants have lived and earned: Mean consumer surplus: () Mean producer surplus: () Mean total surplus: () ---[Model Primitives]----------------------------------------------------------INVESTMENT IN: capacity (homogenous products) EQUILIBRIUM: social planner MAXIMUM NUMBER OF FIRMS: 2 MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY LEVEL: 21 ---[Static Parameters]---------------------------------------------------------DEMAND INTERCEPT: MARGINAL COST: TAU: ---[Dynamic Parameters]--------------------------------------------------------STARTING NUMBER OF FIRMS: 2 DISCOUNT FACTOR: SCRAP VALUE: SUNK COST: stochastic, - ENTRY AT: 4 PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION PARAMETERS: a = 9; delta = Number of periods with n plants active, n=0,1,2...: 0 7999 2001 Number of periods with exit: 164 Number of periods with entry: 163 Number of periods with entry and exit: 6 Mean investment: () 38
Mean and stddev price-cost margin: () Mean and stddev one-plant concentration: () Mean value: () Mean lifespan: () Total plants in history: Currently active plants have lived and earned: Mean consumer surplus: () Mean producer surplus: () Mean total surplus: () MAXIMUM NUMBER OF FIRMS=3 ---[Model Primitives]----------------------------------------------------------INVESTMENT IN: quality (differentiated products) EQUILIBRIUM: Nash MAXIMUM NUMBER OF FIRMS: 3 MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY LEVEL: 21 ---[Static Parameters]---------------------------------------------------------MARGINAL COST: MARKET SIZE: SPLINE POINT (w*): 1 ---[Dynamic Parameters]--------------------------------------------------------STARTING NUMBER OF FIRMS: 2 DISCOUNT FACTOR: SCRAP VALUE: SUNK COST: stochastic, - ENTRY AT: 4 PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION PARAMETERS: a = 9; delta = Number of periods with n firms active, n=0,1,2...: 0 0 0 10000 Number of periods with exit: 0 Number of periods with entry: 0 Number of periods with entry and exit: 0 Mean investment: () Mean and stddev price-cost margin: () Mean and stddev one-firm concentration: () Currently active firms have lived and earned: 39
Mean consumer surplus: () Mean producer surplus: () Mean total surplus: () ---[Model Primitives]----------------------------------------------------------INVESTMENT IN: quality (differentiated products) EQUILIBRIUM: monopoly MAXIMUM NUMBER OF FIRMS: 3 MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY LEVEL: 21 ---[Static Parameters]---------------------------------------------------------MARGINAL COST: MARKET SIZE: SPLINE POINT (w*): 1 ---[Dynamic Parameters]--------------------------------------------------------STARTING NUMBER OF FIRMS: 2 DISCOUNT FACTOR: SCRAP VALUE: SUNK COST: stochastic, - ENTRY AT: 4 PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION PARAMETERS: a = 9; delta = Number of periods with n plants active, n=0,1,2...: 0 0 20 9980 Number of periods with exit: 20 Number of periods with entry: 20 Number of periods with entry and exit: 20 Mean investment: () Mean and stddev price-cost margin: () Mean and stddev one-plant concentration: () Mean value: () Mean lifespan: () Total plants in history: Currently active plants have lived and earned: 40
Mean consumer surplus: () Mean producer surplus: () Mean total surplus: () ---[Model Primitives]----------------------------------------------------------INVESTMENT IN: quality (differentiated products) EQUILIBRIUM: social planner MAXIMUM NUMBER OF FIRMS: 3 MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY LEVEL: 21 ---[Static Parameters]---------------------------------------------------------MARGINAL COST: MARKET SIZE: SPLINE POINT (w*): 1 ---[Dynamic Parameters]--------------------------------------------------------STARTING NUMBER OF FIRMS: 2 DISCOUNT FACTOR: SCRAP VALUE: SUNK COST: stochastic, - ENTRY AT: 4 PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION PARAMETERS: a = 9; delta = Number of periods with n plants active, n=0,1,2...: 0 0 8 9992 Number of periods with exit: 8 Number of periods with entry: 8 Number of periods with entry and exit: 8 Mean investment: () Mean and stddev price-cost margin: () Mean and stddev one-plant concentration: () Mean value: () Mean lifespan: () Total plants in history: Currently active plants have lived and earned: Mean consumer surplus: () 41
Mean producer surplus: () Mean total surplus: () ---[Model Primitives]----------------------------------------------------------INVESTMENT IN: capacity (homogenous products) EQUILIBRIUM: Nash MAXIMUM NUMBER OF FIRMS: 3 MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY LEVEL: 21 ---[Static Parameters]---------------------------------------------------------DEMAND INTERCEPT: MARGINAL COST: TAU: ---[Dynamic Parameters]--------------------------------------------------------STARTING NUMBER OF FIRMS: 2 DISCOUNT FACTOR: SCRAP VALUE: SUNK COST: stochastic, - ENTRY AT: 4 PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION PARAMETERS: a = 9; delta = Number of periods with n firms active, n=0,1,2...: 0 0 1 9999 Number of periods with exit: 1 Number of periods with entry: 1 Number of periods with entry and exit: 1 Mean investment: () Mean and stddev price-cost margin: () Mean and stddev one-firm concentration: () Mean value: () Mean lifespan: () Total firms in history: Currently active firms have lived and earned: Mean consumer surplus: () Mean producer surplus: () Mean total surplus: () 42
---[Model Primitives]----------------------------------------------------------INVESTMENT IN: capacity (homogenous products) EQUILIBRIUM: monopoly MAXIMUM NUMBER OF FIRMS: 3 MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY LEVEL: 21 ---[Static Parameters]---------------------------------------------------------DEMAND INTERCEPT: MARGINAL COST: TAU: ---[Dynamic Parameters]--------------------------------------------------------STARTING NUMBER OF FIRMS: 2 DISCOUNT FACTOR: SCRAP VALUE: SUNK COST: stochastic, - ENTRY AT: 4 PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION PARAMETERS: a = 9; delta = Number of periods with n plants active, n=0,1,2...: 0 10000 0 0 Number of periods with exit: 600 Number of periods with entry: 599 Number of periods with entry and exit: 4 Mean investment: () Mean and stddev price-cost margin: () Mean and stddev one-plant concentration: () Mean value: () Mean lifespan: () Total plants in history: Currently active plants have lived and earned: Mean consumer surplus: () Mean producer surplus: () Mean total surplus: () ---[Model Primitives]----------------------------------------------------------INVESTMENT IN: capacity (homogenous products) EQUILIBRIUM: social planner MAXIMUM NUMBER OF FIRMS: 3 MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY LEVEL: 21 ---[Static Parameters]---------------------------------------------------------43
DEMAND INTERCEPT: MARGINAL COST: TAU: ---[Dynamic Parameters]--------------------------------------------------------STARTING NUMBER OF FIRMS: 2 DISCOUNT FACTOR: SCRAP VALUE: SUNK COST: stochastic, - ENTRY AT: 4 PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION PARAMETERS: a = 9; delta = Number of periods with n plants active, n=0,1,2...: 0 9025 975 0 Number of periods with exit: 94 Number of periods with entry: 92 Number of periods with entry and exit: 5 Mean investment: () Mean and stddev price-cost margin: () Mean and stddev one-plant concentration: () Mean value: () Mean lifespan: () Total plants in history: Currently active plants have lived and earned: Mean consumer surplus: () Mean producer surplus: () Mean total surplus: () 춬쪱컒쏇쇐돶쇋웤쯻닎쫽뇤뮯뗄쒣쓢뷡맻ꎬퟷ캪폫짏쫶뷡맻뗄뇈뷏ꆣ헢샯컒쏇뷶틔MAXIMUM NUMBER OF FIRMS=2ꆢINVESTMENT IN: qualityꆢEQUILIBRIUM: Nash뗄쟩뿶캪샽ꆣ ---[Model Primitives]----------------------------------------------------------INVESTMENT IN: quality (differentiated products) EQUILIBRIUM: Nash MAXIMUM NUMBER OF FIRMS: 2 MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY LEVEL: 21 ---[Static Parameters]---------------------------------------------------------MARGINAL COST: MARKET SIZE: SPLINE POINT (w*): 1 44
---[Dynamic Parameters]--------------------------------------------------------STARTING NUMBER OF FIRMS: 2 DISCOUNT FACTOR: SCRAP VALUE: SUNK COST: stochastic, - ENTRY AT: 4 PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION PARAMETERS: a = 9; delta = Number of periods with n firms active, n=0,1,2...: 0 0 10000 Number of periods with exit: 0 Number of periods with entry: 0 Number of periods with entry and exit: 0 Mean investment: () Mean and stddev price-cost margin: () Mean and stddev one-firm concentration: () Currently active firms have lived and earned: Mean consumer surplus: () Mean producer surplus: () Mean total surplus: () ---[Model Primitives]----------------------------------------------------------INVESTMENT IN: quality (differentiated products) EQUILIBRIUM: Nash MAXIMUM NUMBER OF FIRMS: 2 MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY LEVEL: 21 ---[Static Parameters]---------------------------------------------------------MARGINAL COST: MARKET SIZE: SPLINE POINT (w*): 1 ---[Dynamic Parameters]--------------------------------------------------------STARTING NUMBER OF FIRMS: 2 DISCOUNT FACTOR: SCRAP VALUE: SUNK COST: stochastic, - ENTRY AT: 4 PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION PARAMETERS: a = 9; delta = Number of periods with n firms active, n=0,1,2...: 0 8 9992 Number of periods with exit: 8 45
Number of periods with entry: 8 Number of periods with entry and exit: 8 Mean investment: () Mean and stddev price-cost margin: () Mean and stddev one-firm concentration: () Mean value: () Mean lifespan: () Total firms in history: Currently active firms have lived and earned: Mean consumer surplus: () Mean producer surplus: () Mean total surplus: () ---[Model Primitives]----------------------------------------------------------INVESTMENT IN: quality (differentiated products) EQUILIBRIUM: Nash MAXIMUM NUMBER OF FIRMS: 2 MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY LEVEL: 21 ---[Static Parameters]---------------------------------------------------------MARGINAL COST: MARKET SIZE: SPLINE POINT (w*): 1 ---[Dynamic Parameters]--------------------------------------------------------STARTING NUMBER OF FIRMS: 2 DISCOUNT FACTOR: SCRAP VALUE: SUNK COST: stochastic, - ENTRY AT: 4 PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION PARAMETERS: a = 9; delta = Number of periods with n firms active, n=0,1,2...: 11 612 9377 Number of periods with exit: 623 Number of periods with entry: 623 Number of periods with entry and exit: 612 Mean investment: () Mean and stddev price-cost margin: () 46
Mean and stddev one-firm concentration: () Mean value: () Mean lifespan: () Total firms in history: Currently active firms have lived and earned: Mean consumer surplus: () Mean producer surplus: () Mean total surplus: () ---[Model Primitives]----------------------------------------------------------INVESTMENT IN: quality (differentiated products) EQUILIBRIUM: Nash MAXIMUM NUMBER OF FIRMS: 2 MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY LEVEL: 21 ---[Static Parameters]---------------------------------------------------------MARGINAL COST: MARKET SIZE: SPLINE POINT (w*): 1 ---[Dynamic Parameters]--------------------------------------------------------STARTING NUMBER OF FIRMS: 2 DISCOUNT FACTOR: SCRAP VALUE: SUNK COST: stochastic, - ENTRY AT: 4 PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION PARAMETERS: a = 2; delta = Number of periods with n firms active, n=0,1,2...: 0 0 10000 Number of periods with exit: 0 Number of periods with entry: 0 Number of periods with entry and exit: 0 Mean investment: () Mean and stddev price-cost margin: () Mean and stddev one-firm concentration: () Currently active firms have lived and earned: 47
Mean consumer surplus: () Mean producer surplus: () Mean total surplus: () ---[Model Primitives]----------------------------------------------------------INVESTMENT IN: quality (differentiated products) EQUILIBRIUM: Nash MAXIMUM NUMBER OF FIRMS: 2 MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY LEVEL: 21 ---[Static Parameters]---------------------------------------------------------MARGINAL COST: MARKET SIZE: SPLINE POINT (w*): 1 ---[Dynamic Parameters]--------------------------------------------------------STARTING NUMBER OF FIRMS: 2 DISCOUNT FACTOR: SCRAP VALUE: SUNK COST: stochastic, - ENTRY AT: 4 PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION PARAMETERS: a = 5; delta = Number of periods with n firms active, n=0,1,2...: 0 0 10000 Number of periods with exit: 0 Number of periods with entry: 0 Number of periods with entry and exit: 0 Mean investment: () Mean and stddev price-cost margin: () Mean and stddev one-firm concentration: () Currently active firms have lived and earned: Mean consumer surplus: () Mean producer surplus: () Mean total surplus: () ---[Model Primitives]----------------------------------------------------------48
INVESTMENT IN: quality (differentiated products) EQUILIBRIUM: Nash MAXIMUM NUMBER OF FIRMS: 2 MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY LEVEL: 21 ---[Static Parameters]---------------------------------------------------------MARGINAL COST: MARKET SIZE: SPLINE POINT (w*): 1 ---[Dynamic Parameters]--------------------------------------------------------STARTING NUMBER OF FIRMS: 2 DISCOUNT FACTOR: SCRAP VALUE: SUNK COST: stochastic, - ENTRY AT: 4 PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION PARAMETERS: a = 10; delta = Number of periods with n firms active, n=0,1,2...: 0 0 10000 Number of periods with exit: 0 Number of periods with entry: 0 Number of periods with entry and exit: 0 Mean investment: () Mean and stddev price-cost margin: () Mean and stddev one-firm concentration: () Currently active firms have lived and earned: Mean consumer surplus: () Mean producer surplus: () Mean total surplus: () ---[Model Primitives]----------------------------------------------------------INVESTMENT IN: quality (differentiated products) EQUILIBRIUM: Nash MAXIMUM NUMBER OF FIRMS: 2 MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY LEVEL: 21 ---[Static Parameters]---------------------------------------------------------MARGINAL COST: MARKET SIZE: SPLINE POINT (w*): 1 ---[Dynamic Parameters]--------------------------------------------------------STARTING NUMBER OF FIRMS: 2 DISCOUNT FACTOR: 49
SCRAP VALUE: SUNK COST: stochastic, - ENTRY AT: 4 PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION PARAMETERS: a = 6; delta = Number of periods with exit: 0 Number of periods with entry: 0 Number of periods with entry and exit: 0 Mean investment: () Mean and stddev price-cost margin: () Mean and stddev one-firm concentration: () Currently active firms have lived and earned: Mean consumer surplus: () Mean producer surplus: () Mean total surplus: () 쇹ꆢ 뷡 싛 컒쏇냑짏컄뗄뷡맻볲튪뗄ퟜ뷡퓚쿂쏦뗄뇭룱훐ꎺ MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY LEVEL: 21 MARGINAL COST: MARKET SIZE: SPLINE POINT (w*): 1 STARTING NUMBER OF FIRMS: 2 DISCOUNT FACTOR: SCRAP VALUE: SUNK COST: stochastic, - ENTRY AT: 5 PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION PARAMETERS: a = 9; delta = MAXIMUM NUMBER OF FIRMS=1 Investment in Quality Capacity ꎨ춶폚ꎩ ꎨ훊솿ꎩ ꎨ짺닺쓜솦ꎩ MonopolyMonopoly Social Social EquilibriumNashꎨ쓉Nashꎨ쓉ꎨ슢뛏/릲ꎨ슢뛏/릲planner Planner ꎨ뻹뫢샠탍ꎩ 쪲뻹뫢ꎩ 쪲뻹뫢ꎩꎨ짧믡뢣ꎨ짧믡뢣쒱ꎩ 쒱ꎩ 50
샻ퟮ듳뮯ꎩ샻ퟮ듳뮯ꎩP/mcꎨ볛룱뇈 뇟볊돉놾ꎩ () () () () () () Mean investment() () () () () () ꎨ춶뻹횵ꎩ Mean consumer surplusꎨ쿻럑() () () () () () 헟쪣폠뻹횵ꎩ Mean producer surplusꎨ짺닺 헟쪣폠뗄뻹() () () () () () 횵ꎩ 뻹뫢볛룱 붵볛럹뛈1 뗷헻뫳뗄뻹뫢볛룱 붵볛럹뛈2 MAXIMUM NUMBER OF FIRMS=2 Investment in Quality Capacity ꎨ춶폚ꎩ ꎨ훊솿ꎩ ꎨ짺닺쓜솦ꎩ Social Social MonopolyMonopoly EquilibriumNashꎨ쓉Nashꎨ쓉planner Planner ꎨ슢뛏/릲ꎨ슢뛏/릲ꎨ뻹뫢샠탍ꎩ 쪲뻹뫢ꎩ 쪲뻹뫢ꎩꎨ짧믡뢣ꎨ짧믡뢣샻쒱ꎩ 쒱ꎩ 샻ퟮ듳뮯ꎩퟮ듳뮯ꎩ P/mcꎨ볛룱뇈 뇟볊돉놾ꎩ 51
() () () () () () Mean investment() () () () () () ꎨ춶뻹횵ꎩ Mean consumer surplusꎨ쿻럑() () () () () () 헟쪣폠뻹횵ꎩ Mean producer surplusꎨ짺닺 헟쪣폠뗄뻹() () () () () () 횵ꎩ 뻹뫢볛룱 붵볛럹뛈1 뗷헻뫳뗄뻹뫢볛룱 붵볛럹뛈2 MAXIMUM NUMBER OF FIRMS=3 Investment in Quality Capacity ꎨ춶폚ꎩ ꎨ훊솿ꎩ ꎨ짺닺쓜솦ꎩ Social Social MonopolyMonopoly Equilibriumꎨ뻹Nashꎨ쓉Nashꎨ쓉planner Planner ꎨ슢뛏/릲ꎨ슢뛏/릲뫢샠탍ꎩ 쪲뻹뫢ꎩ 쪲뻹뫢ꎩꎨ짧믡뢣ꎨ짧믡뢣샻쒱ꎩ 쒱ꎩ 샻ퟮ듳뮯ꎩퟮ듳뮯ꎩ P/mcꎨ볛룱뇈뇟 볊돉놾ꎩ () () () () () () Mean ꎨ춶뻹횵ꎩ () () () () () () 52
Mean consumer surplusꎨ쿻럑헟() () () () () () 쪣폠뻹횵ꎩ Mean producer surplusꎨ짺닺헟() () () () () () 쪣폠뗄뻹횵ꎩ 뻹뫢볛룱 붵볛럹뛈1 뗷헻뫳뗄뻹뫢볛룱 붵볛럹뛈2 쮵쏷ꎺ 1ꆢ뻹뫢볛룱뗈폚p/mc돋틔ꎨ뇟볊돉놾뗄쪵볊횵ꎩꎻ 2ꆢ뗷헻뫳뗄뻹뫢볛룱뗈폚뻹뫢볛룱돋틔ꎨꎩꎻ 3ꆢ헽횵뇭쪾떱잰볛룱룟폚쪵볊뻹뫢볛룱ꎻ뢺횵뇭쪾떱잰볛룱뗍폚쪵볊뻹뫢볛룱ꆣ 4ꆢ뾼싇떽잰쏦맀볆닎쫽쪱쒣쓢랽램뛔쪵볊뻹뫢횵뗄룟맀ꎬ헢샯컒쏇룸돶쇋뗷헻뫳뗄붵볛뇈샽ퟷ캪닎뾼ꎻ 5ꆢ붵볛럹뛈1=ꎨ뻹뫢볛룱ꎭꎩ/ꎻ붵볛럹뛈2=ꎨ뗷헻뫳뗄뻹뫢볛룱ꎭꎩ/ꎬ웤훐쫇쒿잰쪵볊뗄욽뻹볛룱ꆣ 컒쏇듓짏쏦뇭룱훐뗄믘맩뷡맻뿉틔뗃떽죧쿂뷡싛ꎺ 뗚튻ꆢ룸뚨쿠춬뗄쒿뇪몯쫽뫍탐튵훐뎧짌뗄쫽쒿ꎬ춶폚닺욷훊솿쟩뿶쿂뗄쫐뎡뻹뫢볛룱튻냣뚼뗍폚춶폚짺닺쓜솦쟩뿶쿂뗄쫐뎡뻹뫢볛룱ꎨ샽죧ꎬ퓚탐튵뎧짌쫽쒿캪1쪱ꎬ쓉쪲뻹뫢뷡맻(p/mc)럖뇰캪ꎺꎨ춶폚훊솿ꎩ뫍ꎨ춶폚짺닺쓜솦ꎩꎻ릲쒱뷡맻럖뇰캪ꎺꎨ춶폚훊솿ꎩ뫍ꎨ춶폚짺닺쓜솦ꎩꆣ퓚탐튵훐뎧짌쫽쒿캪2쪱ꎬ쓉쪲뻹뫢뷡맻(p/mc)럖뇰캪ꎺꎨ춶폚훊솿ꎩ뫍ꎨ춶폚짺닺쓜솦ꎩꎻ릲쒱뷡맻럖뇰캪ꎺꎨ춶폚훊솿ꎩ뫍ꎨ춶폚짺닺쓜솦ꎩꎩꆣ컒쏇뗄튻룶뷢쫍ꎺ뛔폚틆뚯춨톶헢퇹뗄닺욷ꎬ룷룶뎧짌쳡릩뗄닺욷훊솿쫇뷼쯆뗄ꎬ퓚룸뚨쿠쯆뗄벼쫵쳵볾쿂ꎬ쳡룟닺욷훊솿탨튪뫜룟뗄춶쮮욽ꎬ틲듋ꎬ룄뇤닺욷훊솿 53
틔퓶잿뺺헹솦뗄떥캻춶뗄믘놨뫜뗍ꆣ컒맺쒿잰틆뚯춨톶쫐뎡늢캴놥뫍ꎬ틲듋쳡룟짺닺쓜솦뗄춶늢늻믡탎돉맽쪣뗄짺닺쓜솦뛸룸뻹뫢볛룱듸살쿂붵뗄톹솦ꆣ쯹틔ꎬ춶폚짺닺쓜솦퓚쒿잰튪뇈춶폚닺욷훊솿뗄믘놨싊룟ꆣ 뗚뛾ꆢ뾼싇뎧짌횮볤쿠뮥뺺헹듯떽쓉쪲뻹뫢뗄쟩뿶ꎺ뎧짌쫽쒿퓶볓ꎬ쫐뎡뻹뫢볛룱쿂붵ꆣ 헢룶뷡맻뫜쿔좻ꎬ뎧짌쫽쒿퓶볓ꎬ쫐뎡뺺헹볓뻧ꎬ뻹뫢볛룱쿂붵ꆣ떫쫇듓뷡맻훐뿉틔뾴떽ꎬ뎧짌쫽쒿뗄퓶볓ꎬ뛔춬훊닺욷쟩뿶쿂뗄뻹뫢볛룱뗄펰쿬튪듳폚뛔틬훊닺욷쟩뿶쿂뗄뻹뫢볛룱뗄펰쿬ꆣ 뗚죽ꆢ뾼싇뎧짌횮볤릲쒱뗄쟩뿶ꎺ듓뇭룱훐뿉틔뾴떽ꎬ룸뚨춶룄뇤닺욷훊솿믲헟춶룄뇤짺닺쓜솦ꎬ퓚헢솽훖쟩뿶쿂ꎬ쫐뎡뻹뫢볛룱뚼쎻폐쯦ퟅ뎧짌쫽쒿뗄퓶볓뛸쿂붵ꆣ틲캪퓚룸뚨뎧짌횮볤릲쒱뗄쳵볾쿂ꎬ뎧짌쫽쒿뗄퓶볓늢쎻폐쪹뗃뺺헹볓뻧ꎬ틲듋쎻폐쇋쪹쫐뎡뻹뫢볛룱붵뗍뗄톹솦ꆣ쿠랴ꎬ평폚뎧짌릲쒱쿠뮥횮볤쎻폐뺺헹ꎬ떱쯻쏇쳡릩틬훊닺욷쪱ꎬ퓶볓튻룶뎧짌랴뛸믡퓶볓뛔쫐뎡뗄햼폐싊ꎬ듓뷡맻훐컒쏇뿉틔뾴떽ꎬ뻹뫢볛룱랴뛸쯦ퟅ뎧짌쫽쒿뗄퓶볓싔폐짏짽ꆣ듓뇭룱훐뮹뿉틔뾴떽ꎬ떱뎧짌쳡릩춬훊닺욷쪱ꎨ벴춶룄뇤뎧짌뗄짺닺쓜솦ꎩꎬ뻹뫢볛룱벸뫵쎻폐뇤뮯ꆣ뛔듋컒쏇뗄튻룶뷢쫍쫇ꎺ릲쒱뎧짌뗄탐캪뿉틔뾴ퟷ쫇튻룶슢뛏뎧짌뗄탐캪ꎬ폖틲캪늻춬뎧짌쳡릩뗄닺욷컞닮틬ꎬ튻룶뎧짌삩듳짺닺쓜솦떼훂뗄쫐뎡뻹뫢뷡맻펦룃폫솽룶믲죽룶뎧짌릲쒱삩듳짺닺쓜솦떼훂뻹뫢뗄뷡맻쫇쿠춬뗄ꆣ헢튻뗣튲뿉틔듓늻춬뎧짌쫽쒿뗄쿻럑헟쪣폠뻹횵뫍짺닺헟쪣폠뻹횵뗃떽펡횤ꎺ떱뎧짌쫽쒿럖뇰1ꆢ2뫍3쪱ꎬ쿻럑헟쪣폠뻹횵럖뇰캪ꎺꆢꆢꎨ춶폚짺닺쓜솦ꎩ짺닺헟쪣폠럖뇰캪ꎺꆢꆢꎨ춶폚짺닺쓜솦ꎩꎬ헢킩쫽횵쿠닮뫜킡ꆣ 뗚쯄ꆢퟮ뫳뾼싇뎧짌틔짧믡뢣샻ퟮ듳뮯ퟷ캪쒿뇪몯쫽뗄쟩뿶ꎺ평폚틔듋ퟷ캪쒿뇪뗄뎧짌볦맋떽쿻럑헟뫍짺닺헟뗄샻틦ꎬ뫜쓑듓뎧짌쫽쒿뗄뇤뮯횱뷓뗃떽뛔쫐뎡뻹뫢볛룱뇤뚯뗄펰쿬ꆣ춬쪱컒쏇뿉틔힢틢떽ꎬ춶룄뇤짺닺쓜솦뗄쟩뿶쿂ꎬ퓚뎧짌쫽쒿캪2뫍3쪱ꎬ쯤좻쫐뎡뻹뫢볛룱ꎨ볛룱뇈뇟볊돉놾ꎩ럖뇰캪뫍ꎬ떫쫇뇪ힼ닮좴럖뇰캪뫍ꆣ헢쮵쏷헢쪱뛔뻹뫢볛룱뻹횵뗄맀쯣쫇럇뎣늻ힼ좷뗄ꆣ쯹탒뗄쫇ꎬ컒쏇뾼싇뗄샭탔뎧짌튻냣 54
쫇늻믡틔짧믡뢣샻뗄ퟮ듳뮯ퟷ캪ퟔ벺뗄쒿뇪몯쫽뗄ꆣ 뗚컥ꆢ 춶뻹횵뇤뚯뗄럖컶ꎺ헢샯쫗쿈튪횸돶ꎬ믘맩뷡맻훐룸돶춶뻹횵뗄뻟쳥쫽횵늢쎻폐쪵볊뗄틢틥ꎬ컒쏇튪ퟶ뗄쫇뇈뷏쒿뇪몯쫽뫍뎧짌쫽쒿뇤뚯쪱ꎬ춶뻹횵뗄뇤뚯쟷쫆틔벰놳뫳뗄뺭볃몬틥ꆣ떱닺욷쫇틬훊쪱ꎬ춶쯦ퟅ뎧짌쫽쒿뗄퓶볓뛸퓶볓ꆣ헢쫇틲캪춶뿉틔룄뇤닺욷뗄훊솿ꎬ쯦ퟅ뎧짌뷸죫쫐뎡ꎬ탨튪룼뛠뗄춶틔쟸뇰ퟔ벺뫍웤쯻뎧짌뗄닺욷ꎬ틔퓶볓춶닺욷뗄뺺헹솦뫍뛔쫐뎡뗄슢뛏쓜솦ꆣ떫쫇ꎬ떱닺욷쫇춬훊뗄쪱뫲ꎬ춶퓶볓짺닺쓜솦ꆣ죧맻뎧짌횮볤쫇쿠뮥뺺헹뗄ꎬ쯦ퟅ뎧짌쫽쒿뗄퓶뛠ꎬ튻뚨믡룼뛠춶틔퓶잿뺺헹쪵솦ꎻ죧맻뎧짌횮볤쫇릲쒱뗄ꎬ뎧짌뗄뷸죫뻍쿠떱폚퓶볓쇋짺닺쓜솦ꎬ컒쏇뿉틔뾴떽ꎬ떱뎧짌쫽쒿캪2뫍3쪱ꎬ릲쒱쟩뿶쿂뎧짌뗄춶뷼쯆캪쇣ꎬ쮵쏷헢쪱쫐뎡틑뺭뷓뷼놥뫍ꎬ늻탨튪춶살뷸튻늽삩듳짺닺쓜솦ꆣ 뗚쇹ꆢ뻹뫢볛룱뇤뚯뗄럖컶ꆣ듓짏쏦뗄뷡맻훐뿉틔뾴돶ꎬ떱춶룄뇤닺욷훊솿쪱ꎨ쳖싛틬훊닺욷ꎩꎬ쯤좻쯦ퟅ뎧짌쫽쒿뗄퓶볓뻹뫢볛룱쮮욽붵뗍ꎬ떫쫇뇤뮯늢늻쏷쿔ꆣ떱뎧짌쫽쒿럖뇰캪1ꆢ2ꆢ3쪱ꎬꎨ뗷헻뫳뗄ꎩ쓉쪲뻹뫢볛룱튪쟳떱잰볛룱쿂붵럹뛈럖뇰캪ꎺꎥꆢꎥ뫍ꎥꎻ떱뎧짌쫽쒿럖뇰캪1ꆢ2ꆢ3쪱ꎬꎨ뗷헻뫳뗄ꎩ릲쒱뻹뫢볛룱튪쟳떱잰볛룱쿂붵럹뛈럖뇰캪ꎺꎥꆢ20ꎥꆢꎥꎻ뛸퓚틔짧믡뢣샻ퟮ듳뮯캪쒿뇪뗄쟩뿶쿂ꎬ뻹뫢볛룱튪쟳떱잰볛룱붵뗍60ꎥꆪ70ꎥퟳ폒ꎨ떱뎧짌쫽쒿캪1ꆢ2ꆢ3쪱ꎬ뗷헻잰뗄붵볛럹뛈캪66ꎥꎬ뗷헻뫳뗄붵볛럹뛈캪ꎥꎩꆣ춬쪱ꎬ쯦ퟅ뎧짌쫽쒿뗄퓶볓ꎬ쿻럑헟쪣폠뫍짺닺헟쪣폠뚼퓚퓶볓ꎨ틔쓉쪲뻹뫢캪샽ꎬ떱뎧짌쫽쒿캪1쪱ꎬ쿻럑헟쪣폠쫇ꎬ짺닺헟쪣폠쫇ꎻ떱뎧짌쫽쒿캪2쪱ꎬ쿻럑헟쪣폠쫇ꎬ짺닺헟쪣폠쫇ꎻ뛸떱뎧짌쫽쒿캪3쪱ꎬ쿻럑헟쪣폠쫇ꎬ짺닺헟쪣폠쫇ꎻꎩꆣ룹뻝쒿잰컒맺틆뚯춨톶쫐뎡뗄쿖ힴ뾴ꎬ헢ퟩ쫽뻝쫇ퟮ뻟폐닎뾼볛횵뗄ꆣ떱춶룄뇤짺닺쓜솦쪱ꎨ쳖싛춬훊닺욷ꎩꎬ죧맻쫇쓉쪲뻹뫢ꎬ퓲뻹뫢볛룱쯦ퟅ뎧짌쫽쒿뗄퓶볓쿂붵뗄뫜뿬ꎨ떱뎧짌쫽쒿럖뇰캪1ꆢ2ꆢ3쪱ꎬ쓉쪲뻹뫢볛룱튪쟳떱잰볛룱쿂붵럹뛈럖뇰캪ꎺꎥꎨ뢺횵뇭쪾볛룱짏짽ꎩꆢꎥ뫍ꎥꎩꎻ죧맻쫇릲쒱뗄쟩뿶ꎬ퓲볛룱믡짏짽ꎬ짏짽럹뛈캪2ꎥퟳ폒ꎨ헢샯틽폃뗄뷡 55
맻쫇캴뺭뗷헻맽뗄쫽뻝ꎬ죧맻뾼싇떽룟맀뗄틲쯘ꎬ쓇쎴붵볛돌뛈믡룼듳ꎩꎻ죧맻쫇틔짧믡뢣샻ퟮ듳뮯캪쒿뇪뗄쟩뿶ꎬ평폚랽닮뷏듳ꎬ뻹뫢볛룱뗄맀볆뺫좷뛈뗍ꎬ늻첫뻟폐닎뾼틢틥ꆣ ퟛ짏쯹쫶ꎬ놾컄내헕춶룄뇤킧싊쮮욽뗄랽쪽틔벰뻹뫢샠탍뗄늻춬ퟩ뫏뷸탐쒣쓢ꎬ쯤좻퓚늻춬쟩뿶쿂뻹뫢횵늻춬ꎬ떫뻹뗍폚쒿잰뗄쪵볊볛룱ꆣ틲듋ꎬ룹뻝컒쏇쒣쓢뗄뷡맻ꎬ퓚캴살뗄뺺헹훐ꎬ뗧탅볛룱믡쿂붵듳풼20%ꆪ40%ꆣꎨ컒쏇훷튪닎뾼뎧짌쫽쒿캪2ꆢ3쪱뗄쓉쪲뻹뫢뷡맻뫍릲쒱뷡맻ꎩ 닎뾼컄쿗 (1). Drew Fundenberg &Jean Tirole, “Pricing a Network Good To Deter Entry”, The Journal of Industrial Economics, , (December 2000), 373-390. (2). Eric Maskin &Jean Tirole, “A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity Competition With Large Fixed Costs”ꎬEconometrica, , (May, 1988), 549-569. (3). Eric Maskin &Jean Tirole, “A Theory of Dynamic OligopolyꎬIIꎺPrice Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles”, Econometrica, , (May, 1988), 571-599. (4). Eric Maskin &Jean Tirole, “A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, IIIꎺCournot Competition”, European Economic Review, 31, 947-968. (5). Ariel Pakes& Paul Mcguire, “Markov-Perfect Industry Dynamics: A Framework for Empirical Work”, Review of Economic Studies, (1995) 62, 53-82. (6). Ariel Pakes& Paul Mcguire, “Computing Markov-perfect Nash equilibria: numerical implications of a dynamic differentiated product model”, Rand Journal of Economics Vol. 25, No. 4 Winter 1994, 555-589. (7). Ariel Pakes& Paul Mcguire, “Implementing the Pakes-McGuire Algorithm for 56
Computing Markov Perfect Equilibria in Gauss”, 폃ftp솬뷓떽ꆰꆱ폃ꆰanonymousꆱퟷ캪폃뮧쏻ꎬ쪹폃헟뗄헟헦쪵탔쏻ퟷ캪뿚쇮ꎨpasswordꎩ뗇죫ꎬ퓚쒿슼ꆰpub/mark-eqmꆱ훐ꆣ (8). Jean Tirole, “Markov Perfect Equilibrium”ꎬJournal of Economic Theory, 100, (2001), 191-219. 57
