Strategies and
Organizations
组织架构与公司战略定位
管理经济学 1陶志刚
The field of business strategy is to explain
sustained differences in the performance of
firms that compete with one another in
delivering products and in developing the
ability to do so more effectively over time.
在激烈竞争的市场中，企业如何获得并保持高于竞争对手
的盈利
管理经济学 2陶志刚
Source: Compustat, Value Line, Marakon Associates Analysis
Average Economic Profits of . Industry Groups, 1978-1996
1978至1996年美国各行业平均经济利润率
Value Line Industry Groups
管理经济学 3陶志刚
The “Five Forces” Framework for Industry Analysis
“五种竞争力量”的行业分析框架
潜在竞争对手
供应商
行业现有竞争者 替代品竞争者
购买者
管理经济学 4陶志刚
Source: Compustat, Value Line, Marakon Associates Analysis
ROE-Ke Spread
(30%)
(20%)
(10%)
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
$0 $1 $2 $3 $4 $5 $6 $7 $8 $9 $10 $11 $12 $13 $14 $15
Great Northern Iron
Worthington Inds
Nucor
Steel Technologies
Oregon Mills
Commercial Metals
Carpenter
Birmingham
British Steel PLC
Cleveland-Cliffs
Quanex
Lukens
ACME Metals
Ampco
USX-US Steel
Inland Steel
Armco
WHX BethlehemAverage Invested Equity ($B)
Average Economic Profits of Individual Firms in
the Steel Industry, 1978 –1996
1978至1996年美国钢铁行业中各企业的平均利润率
管理经济学 5陶志刚
Source: Compustat, Value Line, Marakon Associates Analysis
ROE-Ke Spread
(80%)
(60%)
(40%)
(20%)
0%
20%
40%
60%
$0 $5 $10 $15 $20 $25 $30
SmithKline
Glaxo
American
Home
Products
Amgen
Merck
Schering Plough
Watson
Bristol
Myers
Rhone-Poulenc
Mylan Labs
Warner Lambert
Eli Lilly Pfizer
Perrigo
Pharmacia & Upjohn
Forest Labs
Alza
ICN
Scherer
Ivax
Genetech
Biogen
Roberts
Genzyme
Dura
Chiron
Cephalon
Gensia
Cygnus
Immunex
Average Invested Equity ($B)
Average Economic Profits of Individual Firms in
the Drug Industry, 1978 -1996
1978至1996年美国制药行业中各企业的平均利润率
管理经济学 6陶志刚
Competitive Advantages
竞争优势
Competitive Advantage
竞争优势
Lower Cost
低成本
Differentiation
差异化
管理经济学 7陶志刚
How to achieve competitive advantages?
如何获得竞争优势
A firm obtains cost advantage (or achieves
product differentiation) through efficient
organization of activities involving units within
the firm, suppliers, customers, and even
competitors.
有效地组织生产，包括与公司内各部门、供应
商、客户及竞争对手的关系，是竞争优势的来
源
管理经济学 8陶志刚
Three examples
三个例子
Airbus v. Boeing 空中客车 对 波音
Toyota v. GM 丰田 对 通用汽车
McDonald’s 麦当劳
管理经济学 9陶志刚
Two approaches for organizing production
activities
两种组织生产的方式
the organizational approach and the
contractual approach
自造及外包
What are the tradeoffs between the
organizational approach compared with the
contractual approach?
两种方法的比较
管理经济学 10陶志刚
Holdup
套牢
vertical
Integration
纵向整合
external
Contractor
外部合同加工者
moral hazard
internal monopoly
lack of scale economies
激励问题
内部垄断
缺乏规模经济
Make or buy?
自造还是外包?
管理经济学 11陶志刚
Organizations and business strategies
组织形式和竞争优势的关系
Make – production differentiation
自造 – 差异化道路
Buy – cost advantage
外包 – 低成本优势
管理经济学 12陶志刚
Holdup
套牢
Conflict of interest
利益冲突
Contractual incompleteness
不完全合同
Relationship-specific investment
专用投资
Renegotiation
重新谈判
管理经济学 13陶志刚
Resolving Holdup
如何避免被套牢
avoid specific investments
避免专用投资
write more detailed contracts
合同要具体详细
管理经济学 14陶志刚
Moral Hazard
激励问题
conflict of interest
利益冲突
asymmetric information about effort
不了解具体努力程度
管理经济学 15陶志刚
Resolving Moral Hazard
如何解决激励问题
incentive scheme
激励机制
• conditional payment
有条件的付款
• Quota
指标
monitoring system
监督系统
管理经济学 16陶志刚
Incentive vs Risk
激励对风险
Efficient scheme balances
有效的激励计划会平衡:
benefits of more effort
积极性的提高
costs of risk bearing
承担风险的成本
管理经济学 17陶志刚
Motivating Dennis Rodman
如何使美国职业篮球界的坏孩子变好
1996: under guaranteed contract, he played
only 55 of 82 regular season contests, and got
paid $ for games he didn’t play in.
1997: a new contract of $, but only
$ guaranteed / $ for winning NBA
rebounding title / $185,000 per game after the
59th game / In the end, he played 80 of the
1997’s 82 games, and got $.
管理经济学 18陶志刚
AT&T Incentive Scheme
AT&T的总裁激励计划
1995: AT&T awarded
CEO Robert E. Allen
options for 108,000
shares at $
exercise price
1995年: AT&T(美国
电报及电话公司)奖励
总裁Robert E. Allen
108000股的期权
管理经济学 19陶志刚
Relative Performance
相对绩效
employment -- promote the best worker
雇用—提拔最佳雇员
sports -- gold, silver, bronze
体育—金银铜牌
管理经济学 20陶志刚
Incentive Pay for Portfolio
Managers at Harvard
Management Company
哈佛大学资产管理公司
采用相对绩效激励计划
Case Study 案例
管理经济学 21陶志刚
Introduction
回报远远高过基准回报
Founded in 1974 to manage the endowment of Harvard
University
As of the end of 2000, this endowment totaled about $19
billion. Jack Meyer, the president, oversaw 185
employees, of which 45 were portfolio managers
In the five (ten) year period ending in 2001, the annual
return on Harvard’s endowment was % (%) while
the annual median performance of large institutional
funds was % (%).
管理经济学 22陶志刚
HMC compensation plan
薪酬计划三部分：
基本工资、中性奖金、浮动奖金
The compensation structure for internal
managers of public securities at HMC
consisted of three components:
• Basic salary ($200K, not-a-risk)
• Neutral bonus ($100K, at-risk)
• Incentive bonus (at-risk,based on
performance, relative to the benchmark.
Could be positive or negative)
管理经济学 23陶志刚
Neutral bonus ($100,000)
管理不善，中性奖金可扣除
The neutral bonus was netted against the
incentive bonus for annual payment. If the
incentive bonus was zero or positive, the
FULL neutral bonus would be paid. If the
incentive bonus was negative, the neutral
bonus would be reduced accordingly, down
to a minimum of zero.
管理经济学 24陶志刚
Incentive bonus
超过基准回报一个百分点可获50万美金浮动奖金
The parameters for the incentive bonus
included a pre-set, upside limit (a cap of
$2,000,000) and an incentive bonus rate of
$500,000 (or charged to the manager) for
each 1% of performance above (or below)
the specified benchmark.
管理经济学 25陶志刚
Carryforward of incentive bonus
超过上限的浮动奖金暂放在蓄水池里
If the incentive pay earned in a particular year
exceeded the cap, the excess was carried
forward, ., invested in the endowment and
payable at the end of the next fiscal year. The
carryforward bonus and the endowment return
on the carryforward were subject to a clawback
for underperformance and were also subject
(along with the currently payable portion of the
current year’s incentive) to the maximum
incentive cap.
管理经济学 26陶志刚
Withholding on incentive bonus
低于上限的浮动奖金,其中30%也放在蓄水池里
Thirty percentage of any positive incentive
bonus (post-carryforward) was withheld,
invested in the endowment, and payable at the
end of the next fiscal year. The withheld bonus
and the endowment return on the withheld
bonus were subject to a clawback for
underperformance but were not subject to the
maximum cap.
管理经济学 27陶志刚
Negative incentive bonus
若回报低于基准回报，需从蓄水池及本年度中性
奖金中扣除
Negative incentive bonuses were netted
against carryforward bonuses, endowment
returns on carryforward bonuses, withheld
incentive bonuses, endowment returns on
withheld bonuses, and the neutral bonus in the
order listed. Negative incentive bonuses in
excess of these bonuses and endowment
returns were not carried forward.
管理经济学 28陶志刚
Multiple Responsibilities I
多重责任 I
Examples:
high-school teachers, university professors,
Hong Kong mini bus drivers
例如:
中学老师, 大学教授, 香港小巴驾驶员
管理经济学 29陶志刚
Multiple Responsibilities II
多重责任II
strong incentive induces more effort on that
dimension but less effort on other
dimensions
若有强烈的激励机制引导某一个方面责任, 则
其他责任会被忽视
• equal incentive principle
对等激励的原则
• low-powered contracts
采用较弱的绩效指标
• OWNERSHIP
所有权变化
管理经济学 30陶志刚
Big Mac’s Pay Plans
麦当劳自营店经理的薪酬计划
Case Study 案例
管理经济学 31陶志刚
1963 Plan
1963年的薪酬计划
Bonus based on sales increase
奖金基于销售额的增加
• independent of managers’ control
不可控制的因素
• lack of concern for cost control
对成本控制的忽略
管理经济学 32陶志刚
1964-67 Plan
1964至1967年的薪酬计划
Bonus based on subjective evaluations
奖金基于主观评估
管理经济学 33陶志刚
1967 Plan
1967年的薪酬计划
Basic salaries tied to the satisfaction of
QSC standards
满足QSC(产品质量,优质服务,店堂清洁)是获得
基本工资的必要条件
Quarterly bonus for profit contribution,
which depends more on increased
revenue (volume) than on cost control.
季度奖金取决于利润的增加
管理经济学 34陶志刚
1972 plan
1972年的薪酬计划
Three ranges of fixed salary depending on the
cost of living
基本工资与生活成本指数挂钩
Quarterly bonuses for
• labor costs (5% of base salary)
• food and paper costs (5% of base salary)
• QSC objectives (up to 10% of base salary)
• % of sales increase (up to 10% of base salary)
季度奖金基于劳工成本、食物及纸张成本、
QSC指标及销售额的增加
管理经济学 35陶志刚
Questions
思考问题
What’s McDonald’s business strategy? 麦当劳的经营
策略对自营店经理薪酬计划的影响
compensation based on QSC and costs alone (“cost
centers”)? 自营店可否成为专注于QSC的成本中心？
compensation for training of new managers 如何提高
自营店经理培训新经理或特许经营者的积极性?
compensation based on sales or sales increase? 奖
金是基于销售额还是销售额的增加
objective performance valuations only? 难道奖金只能
基于客观评估？
管理经济学 36陶志刚
The Goldman Sachs IPO
高盛集团首次公开募股
Case Study 案例
管理经济学 37陶志刚
A Family Business
家族业务
1869: M. Goldman/commercial paper
1869年：
1880: $100K capital/$30 million turnover
1880年：10万美元资本/3000万美元营业额
1882: teamed up with Sachs (son-in-law)
1882年：与女婿Sachs合伙
1896: joined NYSE
1896年：加入纽约股票交易所
1900: $ million capital
1900年：250万资本
1906: handled first IPO
1906年：第一次接手公司首次公开募股业务
管理经济学 38陶志刚
One Bad Year & 30 Good Years
1年差光景与30年好时光
1929: a mutual fund established in 28’ fell from a height of
$326 in Oct, 29’ to $ in Nov, 29’.
1928年创建的互惠基金从1929年10月326美元下跌到1929
年11月的美元
Sidney Weinberg Era: 1930-1969
Sidney Weinberg 时代：1930年-1969年
• sit on more than 30 boards, and attended 250 board
meetings per year for more than 20 years
坐镇30多个董事会，连续20多年每年参加250个董事会议
• cultivated a first-rate client list, and landed the Ford IPO deal
($650m) in 1956
赢得了一流客户，1956年帮助福特成功首次公开募股（亿
美元）
管理经济学 39陶志刚
Gus Levy Era: 1969-1976
Gus Levy 时代：1969年-1976年
Risk taker
爱冒风险
one-hour management committee meetings reduced to 15
minutes
管理委员会会议从一小时缩短到15分钟
Penn Central Railway’s default on $87 million commercial
paper/45 law suits for not disclosing the client’s financial
information/unlimited liability for 45 partners/settlements
Penn Central Railway8700万美元债券拖欠/高盛因不披露
客户财务信息而收到45项起诉/45个合伙人负担无限责任/
庭外解决
管理经济学 40陶志刚
John Weinberg/John Whitehead: 1976-1990
management committee
恢复管理委员会
short-term profit/long-term relations
不是考虑短期利润而是长期关系
reckless risk-taking (making bridge loans, buying junk bonds,
and putting capital in takeovers)/cautious business
development
莽担风险（过桥贷款，购买垃圾债券，公司资金直接参与兼并
业务）/谨慎地发展业务
white-knight strategy in M&A
在企业并购中扮演救难英雄的角色
管理经济学 41陶志刚
Partnership
合伙人制度
Hiring quality people/internal promotion not lateral
hires/low turnovers/first 10 years of 14-18 hours with
salaries lower than rival public firms for the elusive
prize of a partnership (8-figure compensation)/partner
selection every two years/partner compensation
based on seniority not performance/teamwork and
loyalty
聘用高素质的员工/高管人员主要来自公司员工的内部
提拔/低人员流动率/开始10年每天工作14-18小时而工
资却低于同行水平，为的是成为合伙人后难以置信的薪
酬/每两年挑选一次合伙人/合伙人的薪金基于资历而非
业绩/强调团队精神和对公司的忠诚度
管理经济学 42陶志刚
Friedman and Rubin Era:
1990-1994
Not competitive compensation/exodus of talented
people/lateral hiring/grading partners/emotional
toll/performance pay 93’/360 degree review/no risk no
return and hence principal transaction (Rubin’s
idea)/$886 m profit in 90’, $1b in 91’, and $ by
11/92’
薪水不具有竞争力/高素质员工大量流失/开始从外部招
募高管人员/对合伙人进行评估/士气低弱/1993年全面
使用绩效工资/360度的评估/没有风险没有回报，公司
进行直接投资/1990年亿美元利润，1991年10亿美
元，1992年前11个月亿美元
管理经济学 43陶志刚
Substantial losses in 1994
1994年巨额亏损
departure of 30% of the partnership by
11/94’/Goldman’s assets dropped from $115b end of
93’ to $95b end of 94’
截止1994年11月，30%的合伙人离开公司，带走了大量
资金/ 高盛集团资产从1993年底的1150亿美元跌至1994
年底的950亿美元
“You can’t run a multinational global business on
partnership capital.”
“不能仅依靠合伙人资金来经营一个全球化的业务”
管理经济学 44陶志刚
Corzine on Partnership
Corzine对合伙人制的看法
An economic system in which % of the people
capture a high percentage of the upside in good times
and adjust the other % of the participants’
compensation and jobs on the downside is selfish.
% 的人在年景好时占有大部分盈利，效益差时
则对其他%的员工减薪或解雇，这种制度太自私
The number of partners increased from 120 in 90’ to
180 in 95’/the average share per partner decreased
significantly.
合伙人数目从1990年的120人增长到1995年的180人/
每个合伙人的平均股权份额大幅下跌
管理经济学 45陶志刚
Mary Kay Cosmetics:
Sales Force Incentives
美琳凯传销团队的激励机制
Case Study 案例
管理经济学 46陶志刚
An Overview
set up in 1963 with a unique concept /listed, and then
management buyout ($315m) by Mary Kay and her son in
12/85’ /headquartered and manufactured in Dallas, plus 5
regional distribution centers (1,436 employees) /175,000
independent salespersons in . in 88’ /$406m sales in
88’
1988年公司员工仅1,436人，而独立销售人员（传销人员）
高达175,000人；销售额为亿美元
管理经济学 47陶志刚
Sales Force Incentives
独立销售人员的激励机制
Entry-level: difference between retail and
wholesale prices /a 4-12% commission on
the sales of personal recruits/sales director: 9
-13% on the entire unit, extra bonuses for
total sales and recruits/senior directors: 4%
on offspring's and 5% for more than 8
offspring’s/national directors: 5-8% and 2%
on first-line and second-line offspring’s,
respectively
层层剥削
管理经济学 48陶志刚
Car Programs 汽车奖励计划
Pink Cadillac (69’) and Pink Buick (lower
standards) for directors/VIP for non-
directors/1,000 Cadillac's, 1,000 Buick's, and
3,000 leased cars for VIP program (89’)
管理经济学 49陶志刚
Questions 思考问题
Multiple responsibilities (sales and recruiting)
多重责任（销售及招募独立销售人员）
difference between Mary Kay’s incentive
system from Goldman Sachs’ partnership 美
琳凯激励机制与高盛合伙人制度的差异
why car programs 为何引入汽车激励计划
管理经济学 50陶志刚
The debate Over Unbundling
General Motors:
关于分拆通用汽车的讨论
The Delphi Divesture and
Other Possible Transactions
剥离Dephi及其他运作
Case Study 案例
管理经济学 51陶志刚
Undervalued GM
GM股票被低估
90 years of vertical integration: GM (70%), Ford (50%),
and Chrysler (30%)
长达90年的垂直一体化：GM(70%), Ford (50%), Chrysler
(30%)
The difference between benchmark investment strategy
and actual value created is equal to $89 billion between
12/31/89’ and 12/31/98’
1989年12月31日到1998年12月31日之间，实际创造的价值
比投资基准少890亿美元。
管理经济学 52陶志刚
A Breakup of GM
GM的分拆
1996: GM decided to spin off its shares in Electronic Data
Systems (a computer business acquired in 1984 for $ billion) to
independent GM pension fund.
1996年：GM决定把它在电子数据系统公司的股份半卖半送给GM养
老基金
• The gift was worth $ billion to the fund. The value of the
transaction for GM shareholders was a $500 million sum that
EDS paid GM for its freedom.
EDS为取得卖身契，付给GM的股东5亿美元
GM sold the aerospace and defense electronics unit of its Hughes
Electronics subsidiary to the Raytheon Company in 1997
1997年，GM将其下属Hughes Electronics公司的航空及国防电子业
务出售给Raytheon Company
管理经济学 53陶志刚
Delphi in 1998
Sales just under US$32 billion / Over 200 lines of
business / 200,000 employees located in 36 countries
销售额:略低于320亿美元 / 200多种经营项目 20万名员
工分布于36个国家
August 3, 98’: GM’s board decided to completely divest
itself of Delphi Automotive Systems
98年8月3日,GM董事局决定完全剥离Delphi
管理经济学 54陶志刚
Expected Gain for GM
预计GM的收益
P/e ratio of for auto parts
suppliers for 1988-95, p/e ratio of 9 in
1997 for automobiles/$7b difference
1988-95年汽车零部件供应商市盈率为
/ 1997年汽车整车市盈率为9/GM
分拆Delphi: 即刻创造70亿美元
管理经济学 55陶志刚
Questions
问题
What explains the huge value created
from the breakup?
什么因素导致GM分拆Delphi所带来的巨
额价值？
What players and whose interests are
involved in unbundling decisions at GM?
在GM分拆决策制定中，涉及到的人与利
益有哪些？
管理经济学 56陶志刚
Airbus: owned by its suppliers
空中客车：外包但供应商持股
Airbus
Spanish Supplier
French Supplier British Supplier
German Supplier
管理经济学 57陶志刚
Toyota: owning its suppliers
丰田：外包并持有供应商的股份
Toyota
Supplier 1
Supplier 2 Supplier 4
Supplier 3
管理经济学 58陶志刚
Hybrid Vertical Relations
混合组织形式
Outsourcing for other companies自造加代
工
Bi-sourcing 自造加外包
管理经济学 59陶志刚
