金融时报选文
SURGE IN BIOFUELS PUSHES UP FOOD PRICES.............................................................................................1
生物燃料与人类争食 ...............................................................................................................................................2
ASIAN PRAGMATISM PROVES ITS VALUE......................................................................................................3
香港退休基金是怎样运作的 ...................................................................................................................................4
Q&A ON A SADLY PREDICTABLE DEBT CRISIS.............................................................................................6
全球次贷危机七大问题 ...........................................................................................................................................8
GLOBALISATION'S EXILES KEEP THE HOME FIRES BURNING..................................................................9
移民汇款养活发展中国家？ .................................................................................................................................11
SURGE IN BIOFUELS PUSHES UP FOOD PRICES
By Javier Blas and Jenny Wiggins in London
Tuesday, July 17, 2007
A surge in the production of biofuels derived from corn, wheat and soyabeans is helping to push up food prices so
sharply that the World Food Programme, the United Nation's agency in charge of fighting famine, is finding it difficult
to feed as many hungry people as it has in the past.
Josette Sheeran, WFP's executive director, said in an interview with the Financial Times that rising food prices were
“already having an impact on WFP operations” and added: “There is a realisation we are facing a new level of
challenge.”
Food commodity prices are surging because of a number of factors including rising demand from China and bad
weather, but the potential consequences of the rising demand for biofuels has caught the attention of those in the
business of feeding the world.
Mark Spelman, head of the Accenture's global energy practice, said the biofuel industry was at risk of creating a public
backlash similar to wind power generation as food inflation continues.
“Windpower was a very popular renewable source of energy until a wind-farm was planned in someone's backyard,”
he said.
Still, Paul O'Brien, overseas director for the humanitarian organisation Concern Worldwide, said higher food prices
could benefit farmers in emerging markets if food aid programmes find it cheaper to spend cash donations in the
countries they distribute food in, rather than in the US and Europe.
“What we would encourage is [food aid agencies] to look more locally . . . and for donors to give money to the WFP,”
Mr O'Brien said.
Some 77 per cent of the WFP's food purchases are made in developing countries. Last year it spent $460m (�34m,
£226m) in such countries, making the largest cash purchases in Uganda, Ethiopia and Pakistan. The United Nations
organisation feeds some 90m people annually.
Ms Sheeran also said that her organisation and others were trying to make it easier for poorer farmers to benefit from
rising demand for food, either by helping African farmers become more efficient and tapping new markets or by
helping small farmers in Latin America benefit from the rising demand for biofuels.
“In a world of growing population, the African farmer will be needed,” she said.
The rise in food prices has also underlined the difficulties the WFP and other food aid programmes face when
determining which type of donations they receive are more effective – cash or commodities.
About half of the donations the WFP receives are now made in cash, the rest in commodities. When the organisation
started, it benefited mainly from surplus food donated by wealthy nations including the US. It now receives cash from
many countries, and often, as is the case with US, must spend that money on products grown in the donor country.
Marc Cohen, research fellow at the US's International Food Policy Research Institute, said that the rise in food prices
had reawakened questions over the best way to distribute food aid.
One idea that has been discussed in the past, Mr Cohen said, is for donors to contribute to a global reserve or co-
ordinated national reserves of food so that food can be stockpiled.
“Now that prices are high, the idea may get on the table again,” he said.
生物燃料与人类争食
作者：英国《金融时报》哈维尔•布拉斯(Javier Blas)、珍妮•威金斯(Jenny Wiggins)伦敦报道
2007 年 7 月 17 日 星期二
从玉米、小麦和大豆中提取生物燃料的生产活动大幅增长，大幅推升了食品价格，导致世界粮食计划署
(World Food Programme)发现自己难以向与过去同样多的饥饿人口提供粮食。世界粮食计划署是联合国(UN)抗
击饥荒的主管机构。
世界粮食计划署执行干事约塞特•施林(Josette Sheeran)在接受英国《金融时报》采访时表示，不断上涨的粮食
价格“已经对世界粮食计划署的运作造成了影响”，并补充称：“我们认识到，我们正在面临新层次的挑战。”
粮食类大宗商品价格的飙升，是由许多因素造成的，其中包括中国需求的不断上升和恶劣的气候等，但生物
燃料需求上升的潜在后果，已引起了世界粮食界相关人士的关注。
埃森哲(Accenture)全球能源业务负责人马克•斯佩尔曼(Mark Spelman)表示，随着粮食价格的继续攀升，生物燃
料行业有可能像风力发电一样，激起公众的强烈反对。
他表示：“风力曾是一种非常受欢迎的可再生能源，但是，到有人计划在自己的后院建设风力发电场时，情况
就改变了。”
尽管如此，人道主义组织关爱世界(Concern Worldwide)海外事务负责人保罗•欧布莱恩(Paul O'Brien)表示，如
果各粮食援助机构发现，将捐赠的现金花在它们援助粮食的国家，比花在欧美更便宜，那么粮价的上涨可能
会使新兴市场的农民受益。
欧布莱恩表示：“我们将鼓励（粮食援助机构）更多地着眼于本地……并鼓励捐赠者把钱交给世界粮食计划
署。”
在世界粮食计划署购买的粮食中，大约有 77%产自发展中国家。去年，该机构在这些国家花费了 亿美
元，最大金额的现金购买发生在乌干达、埃塞俄比亚和巴基斯坦。这个联合国机构每年为大约 9000 万人提供
粮食。
施林还表示，她所在的机构和其它组织正努力让较为贫穷的农民更容易从粮食需求增长中获益，方法是以下
两种办法中的一种：一是帮助非洲农民提高效率，开发新市场；二是帮助拉美小农从生物燃料需求的增长中
获益。
她表示：“一个人口不断增长的世界，将会需要非洲农民。”
粮食价格的上涨，还突显出世界粮食计划署和其它粮食援助机构在要判断哪类捐赠更有效时面临的难题：是
接受现金，还是大宗商品。
目前，在世界粮食计划署收到的捐赠中，大约有一半是现金，另一半是大宗商品。在创立之初，该组织主要
受益于包括美国在内的富国所捐赠的剩余粮食。现在，该组织从许多国家收到的是现金，而且往往就像在美
国一样，必须把这些资金用于购买捐赠国生产的产品。
美国国际粮食政策研究所(International Food Policy Research Institute)研究员马克•科恩(Marc Cohen)表示，粮食
价格高企再度提出了有关粮食援助最佳分配方式的问题。
科恩表示，过去曾讨论过一种想法，即捐赠者向一个全球性储备机构，或协调一致的国家粮食储备机构进行
捐赠，这样粮食就可以被储存起来。
他表示：“既然目前价格高企，这个想法可能再度提上议程。”
译者/何黎
ASIAN PRAGMATISM PROVES ITS VALUE
By Mark Konyn
Tuesday, September 11, 2007
In recent months the focus of attention in Hong Kong has been on the accessibility of Hong Kong-registered mutual
funds to mainland China investors under the Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor (QDII) system. So far, two large
mainland banks have announced arrangements with key fund management groups that intend to launch products to
take advantage of this liberalisation of China's domestic savings.
This development promises to reignite interest in Hong Kong's mutual fund industry that would otherwise fall behind
in the priority list when compared with developments elsewhere in the region - Taiwan, Korea, China and even Japan
are attracting more attention. Attempts in Hong Kong to make it easier for international and established hedge fund
groups to set up offices is a clear indication that Hong Kong is conscious of the need to stay competitive and attract
talent.
All of this industry excitement has overshadowed developments in Hong Kong's retirement fund marketplace. Before
the Mandatory Provident Fund (MPF) scheme was introduced at the end of 2000, it was estimated that only a third of
the city's workforce was enrolled in some form of retirement savings plan. Arguably, the biggest single success of the
MPF has been the compliance level. Enrolment rates for employers are at 99 per cent, and 75 per cent for the self-
employed, bringing the number of workers enrolled to over 2m.
The growth in assets held in MPF schemes has also been impressive, with more than $27bn (�, £13bn) now held
in MPF accounts.
At the time of introduction there was much debate on the level of choice to be offered to members. MPF is a defined
contribution system where members choose their investment strategy from a range of funds available under their
current plan.
The overriding concern at the outset of ensuring that most of the working population enrolled in the scheme resulted in
the key responsibility for compliance residing with the employer, and this approach has been successful.
At the same time this structure has limited fund choice to those made available by the employers' chosen service
provider. Seven years since the launch and members are becoming increasingly aware that other funds exist outside of
their own scheme that may offer a better performance profile.
The main investment for most MPF members has been multi-asset funds that diversify globally in both equities and
bonds, and account for more than half of the scheme's total assets. Bond funds have been remarkably unpopular, with
less than 2 per cent of the total assets, with equity funds representing more than 20 per cent.
Members have become more aware of performance across service providers as a result of increased job mobility since
the economy recovered from its low point in mid 2003. Members changing jobs can transfer the assets to the scheme
of the new employer, remain in the scheme of the existing employer or set-up a preserved account with the provider of
their choice.
Preserved accounts have become the hunting ground for new business for many service providers. Up to an estimated
20 per cent of scheme assets are now held in preserved accounts for some service providers. Movements in these assets
as a result of members exercising their choice will slowly transform the MPF from being an employer-based scheme to
an individually administered system where employees are able to choose from a wider range of funds available in the
market.
However, this development may prove too slow for members who do not change jobs that often, or it may simply
prove too clumsy and inconvenient to operate. Hence there is growing debate on whether all members should have
greater choice and be able to periodically move assets to any fund available in the market place.
The focus on performance comparisons is particularly pertinent when considered alongside the debate on service
providers' fees that are typically in the range of -2 per cent each year. Those schemes that lag in respect of
performance will increasingly find it difficult to justify the total fees.
The choice debate in Hong Kong contrasts greatly with developments in the US. During the consultation period ahead
of the MPF launch there was much reference to the successes of the 401K system and the fact that choice was prolific
and wide. However, experience suggests that the MPF, with its limited choice at the outset, set the right tone and is
now ready to embrace greater choice.
More recently, there has been a spate of class actions against fiduciaries in the US, resulting in many schemes adopting
default options that place contributions in multi-asset funds and effectively take the strategy and fund choice decisions
away from the employee. Perhaps this is an example of how Asian pragmatism produces a more effective and
progressive outcome.
Mark Konyn is chief executive of RCM Asia Pacific in Hong Kong
香港退休基金是怎样运作的
作者：康礼贤(Mark Konyn)为英国《金融时报》撰稿
2007 年 9 月 11 日 星期二
在香港，人们近几个月来的关注焦点是在港注册的共同基金能否在合格境内机构投资者(QDII)机制下，招徕
中国内地投资者。到目前为止，两家大型内地银行已经宣布与主要基金管理集团签署了业务安排，这些基金
管理集团希望利用中国放宽国内储蓄投资渠道的机会推出相应产品。
这一新进展有望重新燃起外界对香港共同基金行业的兴趣，否则与该地区其它地方相比，发展共同基金在香
港的优先程度将降低——台湾、韩国、中国甚至日本在这方面的表现都吸引了人们更多的注意。香港试图降
低跨国知名对冲基金集团在其境内设立办事处的难度。此举显然表明，香港明白需要保持竞争力，并吸引人
才。
与共同基金业的活跃相比，香港退休基金市场的发展不那么引人瞩目。在 2000 年底推出强制性公积金计划
(MPF)之前，香港约仅有三分之一的劳动人口参加了某种形式的退休储蓄计划。可以说，MPF 最成功的一
点，便是该计划的普及水平。到目前为止，99%的雇主加入了该计划，而个体经营者的参与比例为 75%，从
而使加入该计划的工人数量超过 200 万人。
MPF 计划所持资产的增速也十分惊人，目前其账户中的资产超过了 270 亿美元。
在推出该计划时，关于它能够向参加者提供多少投资选择，人们存在很多争论。MPF 是一个固定缴款计划，
参加者从其计划提供的基金品种中选择其投资策略。
最初，人们最关注的问题是确保多数劳动者加入该计划，这使得参加该计划的主要责任落在了雇主身上。这
种做法比较成功。
与此同时，该结构将参与者可以选择的基金品种，限制在雇主选择的基金管理公司所提供的基金品种内。该
计划推出 7 年来，参加者越来越意识到，在其参加的计划外，还存在或许能提供更高回报的基金。
对于多数 MPF 参加者而言，主要的投资品种是多资产基金，此种基金将其资产分散投资于全球范围内的股票
和债券，占该 MPF 全部资产的半数以上。债券基金相当不受欢迎，在全部资产中仅占不足 2％，股票基金所
占比例则超过 20％。
自香港经济从 2003 年中的低谷中复苏以来，员工流动率的增加，使 MPF 计划参加者对服务提供商的业绩有
了更多了解。换工作的参加者可以将其资产转移至新雇主的计划中、继续参加现有雇主的计划，或建立一个
自己选择服务提供者的保留账户。
对于许多服务提供商而言，保留账户已成为它们获取新业务的狩猎场。在 MPF 计划的资产中，目前约有多达
20％由一些服务提供商的保留账户持有。由于参加者选择投资品种而导致的资产转移，将慢慢地使 MPF 从一
个基于雇主的计划，转变为一个由个人管理的机制。在这种机制下，雇员将能够从市场上更广泛的基金品种
中进行选择。
然而，对于不经常变动工作的参加者而言，这种演变或许过于缓慢，或者可能过于笨拙和不便。因此，关于
是否所有参加者都应拥有更多的选择，以及能够定期将资产转移到市场上的任何一只基金，人们的争论越来
越多。
对于服务提供商通常每年收取 ％至 2％的费用，人们争论较大。在这种情况下，将重点放在比较基金的业
绩上就显得特别重要了。那些在业绩方面落后的养老储蓄计划，将日益发现难以证明其全部收费的合理性。
在香港，有关可选投资品种的争论，与美国养老储蓄计划的发展历程形成了鲜明对照。在发起 MPF 前的咨询
阶段，相关人士多次提及美国 401K 制度的成功之处，以及其投资选择多样而广泛的优点。但实践经验表明，
最初选择有限的 MPF 计划设定了正确的基调，而且现在已经准备好接受更多投资选择了。
最近，美国接连发生了针对受托人的集体诉讼，导致许多计划都设定了默认选择——即将参加者缴款投入多
资产基金，实际上将投资策略和选择基金的决策权从雇员手中拿走。或许这个例子表明，亚洲的实用主义如
何产生了更有效和进步的成果。
本文作者为香港 RCM Asia Pacific 行政总裁
译者/ 何黎
Q&A ON A SADLY PREDICTABLE DEBT CRISIS
By Martin Wolf
Tuesday, September 11, 2007
We are living through the first crisis of our brave new world of securitised financial markets. It is too early to tell how
economically important this upheaval will prove. But nobody can doubt its significance for the financial system. Its
origins lie with credit expansion and financial innovation in the US itself. It cannot be blamed on “crony capitalism” in
peripheral economies, but rather on irresponsibility in the core of the world economy.
What has happened raises important questions. Here are seven.
First, why did this crisis start in the US? The answer is: “The borrowing, stupid”. Default on debt – actual and feared –
always drives big financial crises because creditors think that they ought to be repaid. US households were the world
economy's most important net borrowers in the mid-2000s, replacing the emerging markets of the 1990s.
Second, what created the conditions for the crisis? It took foolish borrowers, foolish investors and clever
intermediaries, who persuaded the former to borrow what they could not afford and the latter to invest in what they did
not understand. In fact, even the borrowers might not have been foolish: if one owns nothing, it may be quite sensible
to speculate on ever-rising house prices in the knowledge that personal bankruptcy is always a way out.
Third, why did this crisis escalate? “Contagion” is, as always, the answer. Ben Bernanke, chairman of the Federal
Reserve, described the process in his speech at the Jackson Hole conference last weekend.
“ Although this episode appears to have been triggered largely by heightened concerns about subprime mortgages,
global financial losses have far exceeded even the most pessimistic projections of credit losses on those loans. In part,
these wider losses likely reflect concerns that weakness in US housing will restrain overall economic growth. But other
factors are also at work.
“Investor uncertainty has increased significantly, as the difficulty of evaluating the risks of structured products that can
be opaque or have complex pay-offs has become more evident. Also, as in many episodes of financial stress,
uncertainty about possible forced sales by leveraged participants and a higher cost of risk capital seem to have made
investors hesitant to take advantage of possible buying opportunities.”*
Fourth, how bad might the impact become? Since Americans borrow in their own currency, the US authorities can, it
seems, loosen monetary and fiscal policy at will. Nevertheless, a significant global slowdown is not impossible. One
reason is that even the US cannot risk losing the confidence of its creditors. Another is that risk premiums are likely to
rise across the board, with adverse consequences for economic activity in many countries. Yet another is that banks
may lack the capital to replace a temporary shrinkage in non-bank credit. It is not obvious, in addition, who would act
as the world's “borrower of last resort”, should US households retrench. Finally, big losses may yet emerge elsewhere,
not least in other countries' overvalued housing markets.
Fifth, how should central banks respond? They have two classic functions: to ensure stability in the economy, by
avoiding both inflation and deflation; and to provide liquidity to an illiquid financial system.
The challenge on the first mandate is not to overreact in anticipation of what may be only a modest blip to the
economy. The federal funds rate will almost certainly be cut this month. It is not obvious that it should be slashed,
however. Inflation remains a risk, after all.
The challenge on the second mandate is to define what keeping the financial system “liquid” means. The classic
definition is to provide money – the ultimate store of value and means of payment – to sound banks threatened by a
run. A possible definition in securitised markets, however, is to act as buyer of last resort, thereby guaranteeing
liquidity in markets at all times. For the reasons I explored last week (this page, August 28 2007), the latter would be a
dangerous departure.
Sixth, what is the future of securitised lending? Good reasons can still be advanced for shifting exposure from the
balance sheets of thinly capitalised banks to those of better capitalised outside investors. The theory was that risk
would thus be shifted on to those best able to bear it. The practice seems to have been that it was shifted on to those
least able to understand it.
The supply of such fools has, if only temporarily, dried up. In the short run, securitised debt is likely to contract, as
existing debt is paid down or written off. In the longer term, intermediaries will have to find a way to make their
products more transparent to the buyers. Unfortunately, the ratings agencies, which once served this purpose, have lost
their credibility.
Seventh, what does this event imply for the future of regulation? It is important to distinguish two objectives. One is to
protect innocents. The investors who bought the products do not fall in this category. They were, if not fools, willing
speculators. It is not at all obvious why the state should try to protect such institutions from their own folly. Those who
borrowed the money to buy houses may, however, be deemed innocents. Whether this applies to people who
exaggerated their earnings in applying for loans is an open question. But paternalists may require minimum down
payments or the abolition of “teaser” interest rates and other devices that encouraged ordinary people to borrow more
than they could afford.
The second objective of regulation is to insulate financial markets against the sort of panic seen in recent weeks. The
only way to do that may be to re-regulate them comprehensively. Restrictions would have to be imposed on products
sold or on the ability of guaranteed financial institutions to engage in off-balance-sheet transactions. I cannot see how
either would now be made to work. Regulation of the detail of the financial system may fall somewhere between hard
and impossible. It is why financial institutions must never be too big to fail.
Financial crises are always different in detail and the same in their essence. This one is no exception. It showed the
normal pattern of rising prices of assets, expanding credit, speculation, excess, then falling prices, default and finally
panic. The new securitised financial markets are meeting a test. We will soon know how far they manage to pass it.
*Housing, Housing Finance and Monetary Policy,
全球次贷危机七大问题
作者：英国《金融时报》首席经济评论员马丁•沃尔夫(Martin Wolf)
2007 年 9 月 11 日 星期二
我们正在经历证券化金融市场这个新世界的首个危机。现在要出说此次动荡在经济上会何等重要，未免为时
过早。但没人能够质疑其对金融体系的意义。此次动荡的源头在于美国本身的信贷扩张和金融创新。我们不
能将其归咎于周边经济体的“裙带资本主义”(crony capitalism)，反倒应该归咎于这个全球经济核心的不负责
任。
目前发生的情况提出了一些重要问题。以下就是其中的 7 个。
首先，为何这场危机始于美国？答案是：“因为借贷，傻瓜”。债务违约（实际发生的和人们担心的）总是会
引发重大金融危机，因为债权人认为他们应该得到还款。2005 年前后，美国家庭取代上世纪 90 年代的新兴市
场，成为全球经济中最为重要的净借款人。
第二，什么为此次危机创造了条件？是愚蠢的借款人、愚蠢的投资者和聪明的中介机构。中介机构说服借款
人借入他们无法负担的债务，投资者投资于他们并不了解的产品。事实上，即便是借款人可能也不愚蠢：如
果一个人一无所有，那么他们投机日益上涨的房地产，可能是一种相当合理的行为，因为他们知道，个人破
产总是一个解决办法。
第三，为何此次危机会愈演愈烈？和以往一样，答案就是“传染效应”。美联储(Fed)主席本•伯南克(Ben
Bernanke)上周末在杰克逊霍尔会议的讲话中描述了这一过程。
“尽管此次事件似乎主要是由次级抵押贷款领域担忧加剧的引发，但全球的金融损失已经远远超出对这些贷款
哪怕是最为悲观的预测。在一定程度上，这些更广泛的损失可能反映出这样一种担忧：美国房地产市场疲弱
将抑制整体经济增长。但其它因素也发挥了作用。”
“投资者的不确定性已明显增加，因为对于缺乏透明度或回报结构复杂的结构性产品，要评估其风险变得愈加
困难。此外，正如在多次面临金融压力时一样，杠杆参与者可能被迫出售资产和风险资本成本上升方面的不
确定性，似乎已让投资者不愿利用潜在的买进机会。”*
第四，此次危机的影响可能有多严重？由于美国人是以本币举债，美国当局似乎可以凭自己的意愿放松货币
和财政政策。不过，全球经济增速显著放缓的可能性并非不存在。一个原因是，即便是美国也不能冒失去债
权人信心的风险。另一个原因是，风险溢价可能全面上升，许多国家的经济活动将受到负面影响。不过，还
有一个原因是，银行可能缺乏取代暂时性收紧的非银行信贷的资金。此外，如果美国家庭紧缩开支，看不出
来谁会成为全球“最后的借款人”。最后，巨额损失还可能在其它地方出现，特别是其它国家估值过高的房地
产市场。
第五，各国央行应该如何应对？央行有两个典型的职能：一是通过避免通胀和通缩，确保经济的稳定；二是
向缺乏流动性的金融体系提供流动性。
第一项任务的挑战是不要过度反应，期待着经济也许不过是出现适度的暂时停顿。美国的联邦基金利率本月
几乎肯定会下调。不过，下调利率的原因并不明显。毕竟，通胀仍然是一个风险。
第二项任务的挑战是给保持金融系统“流动”下定义。传统的定义是向受到挤兑威胁的健康银行提供货币——
最终的价值储藏和支付手段。然而，证券化市场上一个可能的定义是：充当最终购买人，以此始终保障市场
上的流动性。出于我上周探究过的理由，后一种定义是一种危险的背离。
第六，证券化借贷的未来如何？对于将资产从资本较少的银行的资产负债表上剥离给资金更为充足的外部投
资者，人们仍然可以提出很好的理由。这种做法背后的理论是，风险因而可以转移给那些最有承担能力的
人。实际上，风险似乎转移给了那些最不了解它的人。
这种傻瓜投资者的供给已经（如果说仅仅是暂时的）枯竭。从短期看，随着现有债务被偿还或被注销，证券
化债务有可能萎缩。从长期看，金融中介机构将不得不设法提高其产品对买家的透明度。不幸的是，曾经发
挥这一作用的评级机构已经失去了信誉。
第七，这场动荡对未来的监管意味着什么？区分两个目标颇为重要。第一是保护无辜的人。购买了债务产品
的投资者不属于此类。如果说不是傻瓜，他们就是自愿的投机者。政府应当努力保护这些金融机构免受自己
蠢行的冲击，其中的理由并不充分。然而，那些借钱买房子的人可以被视为无辜的人。这是否适用于那些申
请贷款时夸大收入的人，目前还需要讨论。但家长主义者可能会要求设定最低首付或者废除“诱惑性”低利率
(“teaser” interest rates)，以及其它鼓励普通老百姓借入超过其承受能力的贷款的工具。
第二个监管目标是保护金融市场免受最近几周这种恐慌的冲击。实现这一目标的唯一方法或许是重新实行全
面监管。监管机构应当对已出售产品或金融机构从事资产负债表表外交易的能力实行限制。我认为，两种方
法都无法发挥作用。对金融体系进行细节监管，这或许很困难，或是根本就不可能。这就是金融机构永远不
能过分扩大规模，否则就可能倒闭的原因。
金融危机永远是细节不同，本质却相同。这次也不例外。它显示了一种常规模式，即资产价格上升、信贷扩
张、投机、过剩，然后资产价格下降、违约、最终市场出现恐慌。新证券化金融市场正面临一场考验。我们
很快就会知道，它们能在多大程度上度过这场危机。
*《住宅、住宅融资和货币政策》(Housing, Housing Finance and Monetary Policy)，
译者/何黎
GLOBALISATION'S EXILES KEEP THE HOME FIRES BURNING
By Richard Lapper
Tuesday, September 11, 2007
This month, as a crisis in a small sub-section of the US housing market created havoc around the globe, media
attention has focused on high finance and the linkages between the world's big economies.
But there is another compelling story of economic integration and global mobility of money that is arguably more
important to more people than derivatives and off-balance sheet investment funds. It is the story of remittances, the
poor man's counterpart to arcane financial innovations, and how they have wrought vast and visible changes in many
developing countries.
With borders opening and the wage gap between rich and poor countries widening, more people than ever have
decided to seek their fortunes and work abroad. The growth of money transfer services means it is easier than ever for
them to send their wages home to support families.
In many developing countries today, more money comes from remittances than from foreign aid, foreign investment or
even traditional exports. In Central America, remittances have long eclipsed traditional agricultural mainstays such as
coffee and bananas. Migrants send more money to Morocco than tourists spend there. In some small countries –
Lebanon, Serbia, Haiti, Tonga, Albania and Jamaica are all examples – remittances generate more revenues than all
merchandise exports put together. The latest World Bank figures list 14 countries where migrants' earnings account for
15 per cent or more of economic output, ranging from Moldova with 38 per cent to Jamaica with per cent.
Remittances are a larger part of the global economy than they have ever been. Migrants from developing countries sent
back $ (£, �) in 2006, according to the World Bank, nearly seven times the level of 1990. That
is according to official figures – unofficially, they may be double.
Based on extensive surveys, Manuel Orozco, a remittances specialist at the Washington-based Inter-American
Dialogue institute, estimates based that the total amount sent home to the developing world last year was $298bn,
much higher than the World Bank's estimate.
Dilip Ratha, who heads the migration and remittances unit at the World Bank, says he expects remittances worldwide
to continue growing at about 10 per cent a year in the medium term.
Others say that the phenomenon is levelling off, and that the slowing rate of increase of remittances from the US to
Mexico could be a harbinger of a downturn. A survey by the Inter-American Development Bank this month found that
legal restrictions faced by illegal immigrants in Georgia, Louisiana and a number of other states were leading many
migrants to cut the amount they were sending back.
Some economists are sceptical about the value of these flows, arguing that they do not compensate for the economic
disruption caused to a country by high rates of migration. That is especially the case for countries that export skilled
workers such as doctors or engineers.
In an article published this year*, for example, the late economist Riccardo Faini, formerly of the Centre for Economic
Policy Research, demonstrated that skilled migrants remit less money to their home countries than unskilled, largely
because the former are more likely to come from wealthier families and more able to bring dependants to the host
country. The negative impact of the brain drain, therefore, is not mitigated by any increase in remittance income.
Not only do countries find themselves short of skilled personnel, they also effectively waste money training them.
Jamaica had to train five and Grenada 22 doctors to keep just one, according to research cited by the World Bank, for
example. In the Philippines some doctors have re-trained as nurses in order to go abroad.
There is some concern about the macroeconomic impact of remittances. In countries that are exceptionally dependent
on remittances for foreign exchange, the inflows can artificially inflate the value of a local currency, making imports
cheaper and exports less competitive.
In addition, remittances can create economic dependency and reduce the willingness of poor communities to do low-
paid manual work, especially among younger people.
But more recently, policymakers have begun to stress the positives, arguing – as the World Bank did in an important
2005 report – that remittances can reduce poverty and help the less well-off ride out downturns. As well as helping
meet bills for food and medicines, transfers are used for school fees and books. The money tends to be more reliable
than other sources of foreign capital: during the 1990s remittances were one of the least volatile sources of foreign
exchange for developing countries. While capital flows tend to rise and fall with the economic cycle, flows of
remittances were more stable. “They tend to be counter-cyclical,” says Mr Ratha.
Development economists such as Mr Ratha stress the importance of channelling remittances towards material assets
such as houses or small businesses. There have been some signs that this is happening.
A 2006 study by the Inter-American Development Bank indicated that up to a third of migrants are investing money
compared to only about 5 per cent in a similar survey conducted two years ago. Earlier papers by the same bank cite
evidence from Turkey, Mexico and Egypt showing that remittances help migrants build up businesses and build homes.
Even so, governments will almost certainly need to do more in order to harness the potential of these flows.
Remittances can be channelled into the formal financial system where they can – in theory at least – be converted into
savings and a source of long-term investment. Successful investment schemes using remittances – some with
government backing – are one of the main themes of this series.
移民汇款养活发展中国家？
作者：英国《金融时报》理查德•拉帕(Richard Lapper)
2007 年 9 月 11 日 星期二
上
个月，随着美国住宅市场小小的次级抵押贷款领域发生的一场危机在全球造成一场浩劫，媒体注意力都集中
在高度金融化和全球大型经济体之间的联系上。
不过，还有另外一个引人入胜的、有关经济一体化和资金全球流动性的故事。对更多的人来说，这个故事可
以说比衍生品和资产负债表外投资基金更加重要。这是一个关于汇款的故事，是穷人之中神秘的金融创新故
事，讲述的是汇款如何在许多发展中国家引起了广泛而显著的变化。
随着边界的开放和穷富国家间薪资差距的拉大，从未有过这么多人决定出国寻找自己的财富和工作。资金转
账服务的增长意味着，对于他们来说，把工资寄回国养家糊口从未如此简单。
如今，在许多发展中国家，来自汇款的收入已经超过了外国援助、外商投资乃至传统出口。在中美洲，海外
汇款收入很早之前就超过了咖啡、香蕉等传统的农业支柱产业。移民汇往摩洛哥的钱比旅游者在那里花的钱
更多。一些小国——如黎巴嫩、塞尔维亚、海地、汤加、阿尔巴尼亚和牙买加——来自汇款的收入超过了全
部商品出口额总和。世界银行(World Bank)最新数据列出了 14 个移民收入占经济产出的比例超过 15%的国
家，从摩尔多瓦的 38%，到牙买加的 %。
汇款在全球经济中所占比重越来越大。据世行称，发展中国家的移民 2006 年汇回了 2063 亿美元，几乎是
1990 年的 7 倍。这是根据官方数字得来的结果——若以非官方数字衡量，也许还要翻倍。
根据广泛的调查，总部位于华盛顿的美洲国家对话组织(Inter-American Dialogue)的汇款专家曼努埃尔•奥罗斯
科(Manuel Orozco)估计，去年汇回发展中国家的资金总额可能达到 2980 亿美元，远远高于世行的估计。
世行移民与汇款部门负责人迪利普•拉塔(Dilip Ratha)表示，他预计，在中期内，全球汇款将继续以每年 10%的
速度增长。
另一些人表示，这种现象正在逐渐趋于平稳，从美国汇往墨西哥的汇款增速放缓可能预示一个衰落期。美洲
开发银行(Inter-American Development Bank)上月进行的一项调查发现，佐治亚州、路易斯安那州和其它很多
州的非法移民所面临的法律限制，导致许多移民减少了汇回本国的金额。
一些经济学家对这些汇款流动的意义持怀疑态度。他们辩称，这不能弥补较高的移民率对一国经济造成的损
失。对于那些输出医生或工程师等高技能员工的国家而言，尤其如此。
例如，在今年发表的一篇文章中，已故经济学家、曾供职于经济政策研究中心(Centre for Economic Policy
Research)的里卡多•法伊尼(Riccardo Faini)证实，高技能移民向母国的汇款数额低于低技能员工，这主要是因
为高技能员工更可能来自较富裕家庭，并更有能力将家眷带入东道国。因此，汇款收入的增加难以减轻人才
流失所带来的负面影响。
各国发现，它们不仅面临着高技能员工短缺的局面，而且，它们实际上浪费了培养他们所花费的钱。例如，
世行引用的一份研究显示，牙买加每培养 5 名医生才能留住 1 位医生，而格林纳达则需要培养 22 名才能留住
1 名。在菲律宾，一些医生为了赴海外工作，把自己重新培训成为护士。
对于汇款对宏观经济的影响，人们有些担心。在那些外汇来源特别依赖于海外汇款的国家，汇款可能会人为
提高本币币值，令进口产品价格下跌，出口竞争力下降。
另外，汇款可以形成经济依赖性，并减少贫穷群体（特别是年轻人）从事低薪体力劳动的意愿。
但最近，决策者开始强调汇款的正面影响，他们辩称（就像世行在 2005 年一份重要报告中所说的那样），汇
款可以减少贫困，并帮助不太富裕人群挺过经济低迷时期。除了帮助购买食品药品之外，汇款还用于支付学
费和书费。相对于其它外资来源，这笔钱往往更为可靠：上世纪 90 年代，汇款是发展中国家最为稳定的外汇
来源之一。尽管资本流动会随着经济周期起落，但汇款流动却更为稳定。拉塔表示：“它们往往没有周期
性。”
拉塔等发展经济学家强调了将汇款向房产或小企业等实质资产转移的重要性。一些迹象表明，这种趋势正在
出现。
美洲开发银行 2006 年的一份研究显示，高达三分之一的移民正在将汇款用来投资，而在两年前的类似调查
中，这个比例只有 5%左右。美洲开发银行之前的报告曾引用土耳其、墨西哥和埃及的情况为例，证明汇款帮
助了移民兴办企业和修建住所。
即便如此，为了控制汇款的潜在用途，各国政府几乎肯定需要付出更多努力。可以将汇款引入正规的金融体
系，在这里，它们至少理论上可以转化为储蓄和长期投资来源。成功的利用汇款的投资计划（其中一些需要
政府支持），是问题的核心之一。
译者/梁艳裳
DOING GOOD OUT OF YOUR OWN EFFORTS
By Sharlene Goff
Wednesday, September 12, 2007
There is a growing desire among affluent investors to use some of their wealth to further a good cause. According to
private banks, a wave of philanthropists is emerging that does not want merely to donate, but is seeking active roles
within the sector.
In response, the banks are offering advice on philanthropy as well as helping with more traditional issues such as
selecting a charity and maximising donations. Advice includes how to set up charitable foundations or family charity
trusts, and becoming board members or ambassadors for charities.
Mark Evans, head of philanthropy at Coutts, the UK bank, says: "People want to be engaged. They recognise they
have more to offer than financial capital, they have intellectual capital as well."
Banks say clients increasingly want to apply professional experience to charitable work. JP Morgan says property
professionals might look at building design, for example. Mr Evans says: "We find people can do more to help if they
actually understand what they are doing."
The new generation of philanthropists tends to be younger and have generated their own wealth.
Clive Cutbill, partner at Withers, the law firm, says: "A lot of people have come out of their first careers – maybe
they've sold high-tech businesses – and want to do something with the proceeds.
"As they have been efficient making their money, they expect the way they are giving to be efficient."
Mr Cutbill says there has been an increase in the number of firms advising on the performance of philanthropic
investments.
Coutts, for example, is involved with setting up structures such as family charitable trusts, and then managing the
money in them. It will advise on where the money should go, how it should be paid to the charity, and will oversee
issues such as making payments abroad.
Another area of advice is how to make donations tax-efficient. Mr Cutbill says philanthropy is becoming increasingly
globalised, with, for example, Americans in the UK supporting UK charities. "Wealthy people are commonly exposed
to different tax regimes, so they have to think carefully about how to give effectively," he says.
For example, the tax regimes of the US and UK differ – donations to a UK charity by a UK taxpayer qualify for tax
relief in the UK, but the rules are different in the US.
Private banks try to ensure ' donations are tax-efficient and some offer specialised charity accounts to donate from and
keep track for tax purposes.
HSBC Private Bank says it is becoming increasingly involved when a client sells a business or makes a lot of money.
"If the sum is a large one, then the creation of a vehicle to create an annuity income for a charity may be the best route
forward," it says. "If a capital injection is needed then the plans and governance of the charity will need detailed due
diligence."
Max Martin, global head of philanthropy services at UBS, says banks are helping clients who see charitable giving as a
business venture. "More traditionally minded philanthropists might be more likely to make a grant and walk away,
while the younger generation is keener to bring business principles into their giving," he says. "If they can find a way
to preserve philanthropic capital so it can make a difference more than once then that is wonderful."
He says UBS works with clients to decide issues such as what they hope to achieve by giving.
"Does the client want to be visible? Do they want to fully finance the foundation themselves or work alongside others?
Do they want to get involved with a political agenda?" he says.
"We do not recommend specific charities as we believe it is important the philanthropist is empowered to make their
own decisions. But when we know what the client is passionate about we will provide a short list of the pros and cons
of different organisations," he says.
Coutts also helps clients by creating a portfolio of charities that might suit their objectives. Mr Evans says: "We try to
educate clients on what kind of questions they should ask charities they are thinking of supporting."
It runs forums where leading figures in the charitable sector share experiences. The bank says clients often want to
involve the whole family, so it hosts programmes aimed at 17-23-year olds.
Others, such as HSBC Private Bank, use an "open architecture" style. It will identify the guidance a client needs and
recommend the best source, irrespective of whether that is inside the bank.
我的慈善我做主
作者：英国《金融时报》沙勒恩•戈夫(Sharlene Goff)
2007 年 9 月 12 日 星期三
富
裕投资者有一种越来越强烈的愿望：希望用自己的部分财富去做善事。私人银行称，当前正在涌现一批慈善
家，他们不仅愿意捐资，还希望在这个领域发挥积极作用。
为此，私人银行除了帮助他们处理一些更寻常的事情，如选择慈善团体、实现捐赠效果最大化等，还在向他
们提供慈善方面的建议，包括如何建立慈善基金或家族慈善信托、如何成为慈善团体的理事或形象大使等。
英国 Coutts 银行慈善主管马克•埃文斯(Mark Evans)称：“人们希望亲身参与。他们意识到，他们可贡献的不仅
是金融资本，还有智力资本。”
私人银行称，客户越来越希望将专业经验应用到慈善工作中。例如，JP 摩根(JP Morgan)表示，地产专业人士
也许可以帮忙进行建筑设计。埃文斯称：“我们发现，如果人们真正了解自己在做什么，就可以提供更多帮
助。”
新一代慈善家往往更年轻，并且是自力更生致富的。
Withers 律师事务所合伙人克利韦•卡特彼尔(Clive Cutbill)表示：“很多人走出了自己的第一份职业（可能是卖
掉了自己的高科技公司），并且想要用这些收入做点事。”
“由于他们在赚钱方面效率很高，他们希望自己的捐赠方式也能保持高效率。”
卡特彼尔称，就慈善投资业绩提供咨询建议的公司越来越多。
例如，Coutts 银行就参与了建立家族慈善信托等架构，然后帮助管理其中的资金。它会就客户的捐赠方向和
捐赠方式提供建议，还负责指导海外捐赠等事宜。
咨询的另一个领域，就是如何让捐赠省税。卡特彼尔称，慈善事业正日益全球化，例如，在英国的美国人可
以支持英国的慈善团体。“富人们普遍会面临多个不同的税制，因此他们必须仔细思考如何有效捐赠。”
例如，美国和英国的税制就不同——英国纳税人向英国慈善团体捐赠，可以在英国获得税收减免；但美国的
规定则不同。
私人银行努力确保客户的捐赠能够省税，有些私人银行会提供专门的慈善账户供客户捐赠支出之用，并出于
税务目的对账户进行跟踪。
HSBC Private Bank 称，在客户卖掉企业或是赚了大钱的情况下，该行的参与程度也变得越来越深。“如果数目
很大，那么创立一个能够为慈善团体带来年金收入的工具可能就是最好的选择。如果需要注资，那么就需要
对这个慈善团体的计划和监管问题进行详细的尽职调查。”
瑞银(UBS)慈善服务部门全球主管马克斯 •马丁(Max Martin)表示，各银行正在为那些视慈善捐赠为商业事业的
客户提供帮助。“思想更为传统的慈善家可能更喜欢在捐钱后什么都不管；而年轻的慈善家们喜欢将商业原则
带入捐赠之中，”他说道。“如果他们能够找到保留慈善资本的方式，让情况变得不同，那将非常美妙。”
他说，瑞银会与客户携手决定一些事情，例如他们希望通过捐赠实现什么目标。
“客户是否想借此出名？他们是想独力资助慈善基金，还是想与他人合作？他们是否打算参与政治议程？”
他表示：“我们不会推荐特定的慈善团体，因为我们相信，让慈善家自己拿主意，这一点很重要。不过，当我
们知道客户热衷于哪个领域时，我们会提供一些不同慈善团体的精选名单。”
Coutts 银行还帮助客户建立可能符合其目标的慈善组合。埃文斯称：“我们力图教给客户，应该向他们有意捐
赠的慈善团体问些什么问题。”
该银行还举办论坛，让慈善领域的头面人物会到场分享经验。该行表示，客户通常希望全家参与，因此，它
会举办一些针对 17-23 岁的年轻人的活动。
其它银行，例如 HSBC Private Bank，则采用的是“开放架构”的风格。它会甄别客户所需的指引，推荐最好的
资源——不管这个资源是否是内部资源。
CALL FOR CLARITY ON WEALTH FUNDS
By Tony Barber in Brussels and George Parker in London
Friday, September 28, 2007
Sovereign wealth funds' investments will be restricted in Europe unless they are more transparent says the European
Union's top economic official, in what will be seen as a warning to the Asian and Middle East state-run bodies
amassing assets worth hundreds of billions of dollars round the world.
“We have good reasons to ask these funds to declare what kind of assets they want to invest in, what criteria they apply
to decide their investments, and what the distribution of their investments is,” Joaquín Almunia, the EU's
commissioner for economic and monetary affairs, said in an interview. “If they don't agree to these criteria, we can
find good reasons to react in some cases, where these funds try to invest in some strategic sector or try to move
towards some specific industries,” Mr Almunia said.
His remarks underline the concern in France, Germany and other EU countries that some of Europe's industrial crown
jewels, or businesses involved in national security, may one day be acquired by the funds, whose assets have boomed
in value thanks to high energy prices and big current account surpluses.
Economists say sovereign wealth funds in China, other Asian countries, the Gulf and elsewhere have amassed total
assets of about $2,500bn, an amount so huge that they could in principle buy some of Europe's largest private-sector
companies.
“What can we do?” Mr Almunia asked. “We should avoid protectionist attitudes against these funds. But at the same
time we should request the managers that are governments, or agents on behalf of the governments, to be transparent.”
The German government is drafting legislation that would cover sectors related to national security, and possibly
energy, but not banks, media companies or consumer industries.
Germany and France are also preparing joint proposals on how to oversee such investments at both the European and
wider international level, such as the G7 group of industrial countries.
欧盟要求主权财富基金更透明
英国《金融时报》托尼•巴伯(Tony Barber)布鲁塞尔、乔治•帕克(George Parker)伦敦报道
2007 年 9 月 28 日 星期五
欧盟最高经济事务官员表示，除非主权财富基金变得更加透明，否则它们在欧洲的投资将受到限制。对于那
些在全球积累巨额资产的亚洲和中东国有投资机构而言，这番讲话将被视为一个警告信号。
欧盟经济和货币事务专员华金•阿尔穆尼亚(Joaquín Almunia)在一次专访中称：“我们有充分理由要求这些基金
公布它们希望投资的资产类别、它们做出投资决策的标准和它们的投资分布。”他表示：“如果他们不答应这
些条件，那么，在这些基金试图投资于一些战略性领域或进入某些特定行业的时候，我们就能找到充分理由
做出反应。”
他的讲话凸显出，在法国和德国等欧盟国家，人们担心，欧洲某些行业“皇冠上的宝石”或某些涉及国家安全
的行业，有一天会被这些基金收购。在能源价格上涨和巨额经常账户盈余的推动下，这些基金的资产规模已
急剧膨胀。
经济学家表示，中国、其它亚洲国家、海湾国家及其它地区的主权财富基金已经积累了大约 万亿美元的资
产，如此之大的规模，使得它们在原则上可以买下一些欧洲最大的私营公司。
“我们该怎么办？”阿尔穆尼亚问道。“我们应该避免用保护主义的姿态对待这些基金。但与此同时，我们应该
要求这些基金的管理者（各国政府或其代理人）变得更加透明。”
德国政府目前正在起草相关法案，保护与国家安全相关的行业，可能还包括能源行业，但不包括银行、媒体
和消费者行业。
德国和法国还准备联合提出建议，讨论如何在欧洲乃至更广泛的国际层面（例如七国集团）对这些投资进行
监管。
TOO MUCH SLEEP IS RISK TO HEART
By Rebecca Knight in Boston
Friday, September 28, 2007
A new study has found lack of sleep can more than double the risk of death from cardiovascular disease, but increase
the sleep, and there comes a point when too much sleep can also more than double the risk of death.
The researchers, at the Britain's University of Warwick and University College London, based their findings on a study
of sleep patterns of more than 10,000 civil servants. Taking those who had not made any change in their sleeping
habits between 1985-88 and 1992-93 as their baseline, they were able to identify what difference having reduced the
amount of sleep made to mortality rates by 2004. The researchers used a baseline of seven hours of sleep a night as the
optimal amount of rest.
Those who had cut back their sleeping from seven to five hours or less faced a -fold increased risk in mortality from
all causes, and twice the increased risk of death from a cardiovascular problem. ShortLack of sleep is also a risk factor
for weight gain, hypertension and type two diabetes sometimes leading to mortality, the researchers said.
The researchers also found those who increased their sleep duration to eight hours or more a night were more than
twice as likely to die during the period as those who had not changed their habit, though predominantly from non-
cardiovascular diseases. Some candidate causes for this include depression, and cancer-related fatigue, the researchers
said.
研究发现：缺觉和多睡都不利于健康
英国《金融时报》丽贝卡•奈特(Rebecca Knight)波士顿报道
2007 年 9 月 28 日 星期五
一项最新研究发现，缺乏睡眠可以使死于心血管疾病的风险增加一倍多，但如果睡眠过多，死亡风险也有可
能提高一倍以上。
英国华威大学(University of Warwick)和伦敦大学学院(University College London)的研究人员对 1 万多名公务员
的睡眠风格进行研究后，得出了上述结论。这些研究人员以 1985-88 年至 1992-93 年之间睡眠习惯没有发生变
化的人为基准，通过比较截至 2004 年的死亡率，判定减少睡眠时间的影响。研究人员将每晚睡眠 7 小时作为
最佳休息时间。
研究发现，那些将睡眠时间从 7 小时减少到 5 小时甚至更少的人，其死亡率是各类原因所导致的死亡率的
倍，也使死于心血管疾病的风险增加一倍。缺乏睡眠还可能造成体重增加、高血压和 II 型糖尿病，而这些有
时也会导致人死亡。
研究人员还发现，那些将每晚睡眠时间延长至 8 小时以上的人，在此期间的死亡率是没有改变睡眠习惯者的
两倍以上，不过，他们主要都死于非心血管疾病，其中包括抑郁症和癌症相关的机能减退。
If you are Chinese, try very hard not to be ill
Richard McGregor
Tuesday, September 25, 2007
l
will not easily forget the first time I entered a Chinese hospital, a few years ago – and not just because I was ferrying
my pregnant wife into the maternity ward in the freezing pre-dawn hours of a Shanghai winter.
The hospital refused to allow us into the ward until I lined up at
what looked like a railway ticket
sales booth and paid Rmb30,000 ($4,000). I was lucky to be able to use a credit card. Most hospitals demand cash up
front.
What was an annoyance for me is a matter of life and death for many Chinese people, who cannot get treatment for
themselves or their children, even for life-threatening illnesses, until they hand over money.
The health system has become a kind of perfect storm for China's transition from a state to a
market economy. Like most
aspects of the fast-growing Chinese economy, its impact is no
longer confined to China itself.
The fear of being financially crippled by falling ill is an important driver of the country's high savings rates, which in
turn feeds the economy's bias towards investment and, more recently, with a large current account surplus, in
favour of exports.
Health (along with education
and pensions) used to be provided through government enterprises in cities and communes in the countryside, both
bulwarks of the state that have disintegrated in recent years, leaving a vacuum to be filled by a user-pays system.
In the absence of government funding, hospitals (China has no system of general practitioners) have been turned into
pharmacies on steroids, with more than half their recurrent funding from the sale of drugs. Much of the rest comes
through diagnostic tests, which explains why some Chinese
hospitals have better equipment than in the west.
The system has in-built incentives for everyone to sell as many drugs as possible, including doctors, whose salaries are
tied to prescription targets. As a result, rich China gets good hospitals, while poor China is lucky to get a clinic. It
would be
easy to blame the hospitals for shaking down their patients at the front door, but they have to grab money where they
can.
It is no coincidence that one of the biggest corruption cases this year centred on Zheng Xiaoyu, former head of the
state food and drug administration, who was executed last month for taking bribes of $1m to approve new drugs.
The most common prescription is for antibiotics, with devastating effect. The health ministry announced the results of
a survey this week showing about 70 per cent of child pneumonia patients were resistant to drugs used to treat the
disease, because of overuse of antibiotics. In three children's hospitals in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, the
country's wealthiest cities, the figure climbed to 90 per cent.
The systemic problems are notorious enough to be the subject of media pranks. A Chinese journalist visited 10
hospitals this year and, pretending to be a patient, provided tea in the place of a requested
urine sample. Six of the hospitals said they had discovered “blood cells” in the “urine” and immediately prescribed
drugs.
The government has not been idle (in China, it rarely is) in addressing the health crisis. In rural areas, a new co-
operative system is being rolled out, which combines insurance contributions from the local government and
individuals with price caps at hospitals. In larger cities, the government has also begun a means-tested health insurance
programme for low-income earners and, in May, capped hospital margins from drug sales.
At the national level, the issue has the attention of a committee involving nearly 20 ministries. Officials have panicked
at the potential cost of
what many believe was a directive from Hu Jintao, the president, to come up with a blueprint for universal coverage.
But the beginnings of a new national system will be rolled out, probably next year.
A country can still prosper, and indeed become a superpower without a fair or exemplary health system, as the US
demonstrates, and certainly there is no magic bullet to fix China's problems. The health overhaul, however, will
provide a telling template for the broader policy directions, and boldness, of Mr Hu's administration.
The problems of the health system are tangled up in the country's larger policy conflicts. How much of a role should be
allowed for the market? (The health ministry, which stands to profit from the industry's growth, is resisting giving too
much ground to the private sector.)
Who will regulate the doctors? (China is just starting to build professional bodies with the kind of independence that
has so far not thrived in a one-party state.) And how much money will Beijing throw at the issue? (The finance
ministry is flush with tax revenues but reluctant to hand them over to provinces and cities without knowing how they
will be spent.)
In my case, I received a refund of the balance left over from my down payment after the birth, so I left hospital with a
baby in one hand and a heavy brick of cash in the other. Such happy endings, however, are all too rare.
“病不起”的中国人
作者：英国《金融时报》马利德(Richard McGregor)
2007 年 9 月 25 日 星期二
我
不会轻易忘掉几年前去一家中国医院的情景，这不仅仅因为那是在上海冬季一个严寒的黎明前，我陪着怀孕
的妻子走进产科病房。
这家医院规定，进病房前必须先在看上去像是火车售票处的地方排队，并交纳 3 万元人民币(合 4000 美元)。
我很幸运，可以使用信用卡。大多数医院要求，必须用现金支付押金。
对我而言，这是件麻烦事；对于许多中国人而言，这可是件生死攸关之事。如果不先交押金，即便是危及生
命的疾病，他们自己或孩子就得不到治疗。
在中国从计划经济向市场经济过渡的过程中，医疗体系似乎面临一场大风暴。与迅速增长的中国经济的许多
方面一样，其影响已不再仅限于中国自身。
人们担心一旦生病就可能陷入拮据，这成为中国高储蓄率的驱动因素之一，进而促进了中国经济对投资和出
口的偏好，最近中国出现了巨大的经常账户盈余。
过去，医疗（以及教育和养老金）由城市中的国有企业和农村公社买单。而最近几年，政府的这两大堡垒已
经瓦解，留下了一个由用者自付体系来填补的真空。
由于缺乏政府的资金支持，医院（中国不存在全科医生（GP）体系）已演变为类固醇药品的药房，多一半的
经费来自药品销售。其余很大一部分来自诊断化验，这正是中国有些医院拥有比西方国家更先进设备的原
因。
这种体系有着某种内在的激励，促使每个人尽可能多的销售药品——其中包括医生，他们的薪资与处方药指
标挂钩。因此，中国的有钱人可以去好医院，穷人去个诊所就不错了。指责那些在大门甄别病人的医院很容
易，但它们不得不尽力挣钱。
前国家食品药品监督管理局局长郑筱萸一案，是今年最大的腐败案之一，这并非巧合。在 7 月份，他因收受
100 万美元贿赂、非法批准新药被执行死刑。
抗生素是最常见的处方，这类药会有严重后果。中国卫生部公布的一项调查结果显示，由于过量使用抗生
素，约有 70%的儿童肺炎患者对治疗此病的药品产生抗体。在中国最富裕的城市北京、上海和广州的 3 家儿
童医院，这一比例高达 90%。
这种结构性的问题广为人知，并成为媒体“恶搞”的对象。今年，一名中国记者去了 10 家医院，假装成病人，
在要求提供尿样时使用茶水。结果，有六家医院表示它们在“尿样”中发现了“血细胞”，并立即给开了药。
在解决卫生危机方面，政府并没有无所作为（那在中国颇为罕见）。在农村地区，中国正启动一个新的合作
机制，把地方政府和个人缴纳的保险与各个医院的价格上限结合起来。今年 5 月，在大城市，政府也开始对
低收入群体实行免息医疗保险计划，限制医院药品出售的利润空间。
在国家层面，这个问题引起了一个委员会的关注，这个委员会包括近 20 家政府部门。官员们对一项全部报销
的、据说是国家主席胡锦涛指示的蓝图感到担心。但一项全国新体制的启动即将开始，也许是在明年。
正如美国的情况所表明的那样，即使没有一个公平或值得效仿的医疗制度，一个国家也能繁荣发展，甚至成
为一个超级大国。而且，解决中国的问题，肯定没有万全之策。然而，全面医疗改革将提供一个有力的例
证，表明胡锦涛政府更广泛的政策方向与勇气。
卫生系统的问题纠结于中国更大的政策冲突之中。应该允许市场发挥多大的作用呢？（将通过该行业增长而
获利的卫生部，不愿意给私营领域太大的空间。）
谁来监管医生？（中国刚刚开始建立专业机构，迄今为止，那种机构所具有的独立性还从未在一党制国家发
展起来。）中国政府会在这个问题上投入多少资金？（财政部手头掌握着大量的税收收入，但不愿意在不知
道钱会怎么花的情况下，把这些钱拨到各省市。）
就我而言，妻子产后，医院还给我押金中剩余的钱款。于是，我一手抱着婴儿，一手拿着厚厚一摞现金，离
开了医院。不过，像这样皆大欢喜的结局，终究是少之又少。
译者/何黎
CHINA'S NOISY RISE EVOKES ECHOES OF JAPAN CRASH
Tony Jackson
Thursday, September 20, 2007
It
is natural to be impressed with the way Chinese markets are shrugging off the turmoil in the West. But there is a faint,
disquieting echo. Is it just me, or is this all too reminiscent of Japan 20 years ago?
Nonsense, the bulls will say. Granted, Japan sailed serenely through the Wall Street crash of 1987, only to drop off its
own much steeper precipice two years later. But China is no Japan. It is vast and surging. It is the future.
This is to forget how awesome the Japan story was in the late 1980s. In world markets, the Japanese were regarded as
unstoppable. “They're relentless,” said Jack Welch, of General Electric. “Make them climb a mountain, and they'll
look around for a bigger one.”
Congress bayed for protection against the Japanese juggernaut. A posse of Detroit executives went to Tokyo to plead
for relief from Japan's export drive. The Wall Street Journal proposed sardonically that Japan could keep the
executives provided it kept sending the cars.
Meanwhile, Japan's corporate buyers prowled the world for trophies. On the US west coast, they bought chunks of the
film industry. In the east, they snapped up New York's Rockefeller Center. In London, Nomura acquired and lavishly
occupied the old General Post Office – “a bubble building”, one of its executives said to me sadly soon after. This
newspaper sold its City headquarters to a Japanese developer and withdrew prudently to humbler quarters across the
river. Today, it is taken for granted that China is unstoppable. If its industries are not yet sweeping the world, they will
be shortly. And they are marching up the value chain, from toys and shoes to software and pharmaceuticals.
Chinese buyers are abroad in force, snapping up anything from IBM's personal computer business to chunks of
Barclays and Blackstone. Across the western world, markets are a-twitter at the forthcoming deluge of cash from
China's sovereign wealth funds.
The comparison can be pressed further. Back then, of course, investors reacted to the Japanese miracle by pushing the
equity market to fantastic levels. At the end of 1989, just before the crash, the dollar value of the Japanese market was
almost twice that of the US. Guess what? Today the Chinese market, if we include Hong Kong, is bigger than Japan's.
Back then, bulls of Japan argued that the Tokyo market was not as expensive as it looked, because the big companies
all had large cross-holdings in each other. While the logic was a little elusive, the effect in China today is the reverse.
By one estimate, half the Shanghai market's earnings growth in this year's first half came from rising share prices.
Back then, bulls would tell you the Tokyo market could only go up because Japanese savers had nowhere else to put
their cash. Today we are told that because Chinese investors can only get per cent on bank deposits, while inflation
is running at per cent, they have no alternative but to buy stocks. This fallacy is seductive, since it implies the
market can logically have no ceiling. It is generally deployed as a last resort, when the fundamentals have fallen by the
wayside. And whenever I meet it, the phrase “Japanese wall of money” springs to mind. In all this, I do not mean to
draw direct comparisons between the two economies. They are plainly very different – indeed, the Chinese economy
resembles nothing the world has ever seen. The parallels are rather in human behaviour, which in times like these sets
market prices as much as the fundamentals.
It remains to be asked what the results of a Chinese market slump would be. After all, the Japanese crash was
materially damaging, since real estate values also collapsed and the banks were left with a mountain of bad debts.
The snag is that we have no good data on Chinese real estate prices, nor would most people believe them if we had. As
for the banks, it would be surprising if an essentially state-controlled system had mastered the techniques of
commercial lending, but you never know.
It all comes back to the feel of the thing. As Charles Dumas of Lombard Street Research remarks, China is in a
solipsistic bubble. And there, at least, the Japanese parallel is exact.
中国股市重演日本股市悲剧？
作者：英国《金融时报》托尼•杰克逊(Tony Jackson)
2007 年 9 月 20 日 星期四
中
国市场没有受到西方金融市场动荡的影响，这一点自然令人印象深刻。不过，这里却响起了一个微弱但令人
不安的回声。是否只有我，或者还是所有人都回忆起了 20 年前的日本？
乐观的人会说我胡说。我们都知道，日本从容躲过了 1987 年的华尔街崩盘，却在两年后从更陡峭的悬崖上跌
了下去。但是，中国不是日本，中国规模庞大且增长迅速，它代表着未来。
这样想是忘了上世纪 80 年代末日本那场可怕的遭遇。在全球市场，日本人曾被视为不可阻挡的力量。“他们
无情，”通用电气(General Electric)的杰克•韦尔奇(Jack Welch)表示。“他们登上一座高山后，会四处寻觅更高的
山峰。”
美国国会曾奋力疾呼，希望保护美国经济不受日本的摧残。底特律汽车界的一些高管们前往东京，恳求日本
减弱其向美国的出口势头。《华尔街日报》(Wall Street Journal)曾讽刺地建议，如果日本继续向美国出口汽
车，则大可将那些美国高管留在日本。
同时，日本企业收购者在世界范围内四处寻觅收购目标。在美国西海岸，他们收购了电影产业的大片河山。
在东海岸，他们收购了纽约洛克菲勒中心(Rockefeller Center)。在伦敦，野村证券(Nomura)收购并大举占领了
老的邮政总局大楼(General Post Office)，而该公司的一位高管曾在不久以后遗憾的告诉我，说这是一座“泡沫
建筑”。英国《金融时报》曾将位于金融城的总部大楼，出售给了一位日本开发商，审慎地搬到河对岸相对谦
逊一些的总部大楼。如今，人们想当然地认为，中国也是一支不可阻挡的力量。如果中国行业迄今尚未横扫
全球，那么他们将很快做到这点。他们正走向价值链的高端，从玩具、鞋子到软件和药品。
中国收购者正在大规模地走出国门。他们的收购目标从 IBM 的个人电脑业务到巴克莱(Barclays)和百仕通
(Blackstone，前译黑石)的部分股权。在整个西方世界，面对即将到来的中国主权财富基金的资金潮，市场都
感到兴奋。
两国的对比还可以再深入一些。当年，投资者对日本奇迹的反应是将股市推升至神奇高位。1989 年底，就在
日本股市崩盘之前，日本市值折合成美元几乎是美国市值的两倍。你猜怎么着？如今，中国市场（包括香
港）的规模比日本还大。
当年，看好日本的人士曾辩称，东京股市并不像看上去那么昂贵，因为大公司都存在大量的交叉持股。尽管
这一逻辑有些晦涩，但中国目前的状况恰恰相反。有人估计，今年上半年，上海股市半数收益增幅来自于不
断上涨的股价。
当年，乐观人士会告诉你，日本股市只能上涨，因为日本投资者没有其它投资途径。如今，我们得知，中国
投资者的银行储蓄回报率只有 %，而通胀率则高达 %。他们毫无选择，只能购买股票。这种谬论相当诱
人，因为它暗示，从逻辑上而言，中国股市没有上限。当基本面因素无法解释的时候，这一谬论通常会被用
作最后的救命稻草。而每次我看到这一谬论时，“日本巨额资金”这个词就会跳入我的脑海。总之，我并不是
要对中日经济体进行直接的比较。它们从本质上截然不同。实际上，中国经济不同于我们曾看到的任何一个
经济体。对两国的比较，更多在于比较人的行为。如同基本面因素一样，在类似当前的时期，人的行为将确
定市场价格。
人们仍会问，中国股市下跌会出现什么结果。毕竟，日本股市崩盘曾带来巨大的破坏性，因为房地产价格也
出现暴跌，同时，也令银行背上了巨额坏账的包袱。
问题在于，我们缺乏关于中国房地产价格的可靠数据，就算我们拥有这些数据，多数人也不会相信它。至于
中国的银行，如果一个基本由政府控制的体系掌握了商业贷款的技巧，这会令人吃惊，但那也难说。
这完全取决于你的感觉。就像朗伯德街研究(Lombard Street Research)的查尔斯•杜马斯(Charles Dumas)所言：
中国处于一个自成一体的泡沫中。至少，这一点与日本是相同的。
译者/梁艳裳
Fears that keep the renminbi undervalued
Richard McGregor
Saturday, September 29, 2007
A financial fable in a new Chinese best-seller, Currency Wars, tells the story of a break-in at the house of “Mahathir
Mohamed”, named after the Malaysian leader who complained bitterly in the 1997 Asian crisis about the manipulation
of money markets by the likes of George Soros.
Mahathir summons a policeman, named Greenspan, after the break-in but is scolded for leaving his front door open.
“Why didn't the thieves steal from China and India?” replies a disgruntled Mahathir. Greenspan tells him “the walls of
China and India are too high for Soros to climb over”, a remark overheard by the financier, who sneers that such a
problem is simply solved by drilling a few holes.
Greenspan, looking around furtively, drops his policeman's mask and confides that “we” have dispatched (Hank)
Paulson to drill several holes into China by the end of 2006. A delirious Soros texts his friends on hearing this, telling
them to rush to China. “The people there are stupid, but they have lots of money.”
It is a silly story in a book full of wild conspiracies about the manipulation of global money markets by western
financiers. But the book's popularity in China (there are about 600,000 real and pirated copies in circulation, according
to the publisher) is striking when pondering one of the thorniest conundrums in Chinese, and indeed global, economic
policymaking.
That is, why does Beijing continue to refuse to allow its currency to appreciate faster? Since it broke the peg to the US
dollar in mid-2005, the renminbi has appreciated by less than 10 per cent against the greenback, a snail's pace given
the dollar's weakness over that period. In the same period, the renminbi has weakened against the euro.
That the US and, increasingly, Europe, both running swelling trade deficits with China, are not happy about this is not
news. The International Monetary Fund has also chided China for its dollar fixation and called for it to implement the
2005 decision to focus on the effective exchange rate, measured against the currency basket.
But China's side of this story is not so easy to tell. Beijing's mantra since 2005 – that China is committed to moving
towards a more flexible exchange rate over time – is not fully convincing as an explanation.
In contrast to the breakneck pace of Chinese development, the policymaking underpinning it has long been what might
be described as radically incremental. Shocks aside, new policies are thoroughly road-tested before full
implementation. In the financial sector this is wise, up to a point. So deep have been the problems at Chinese state
banks that it is difficult to see how the market could have been liberalised much faster.
The currency, however, is a different animal altogether. In the two-plus years since the US peg was broken, Chinese
exporters have not only seen their sales soar. Most have also increased or maintained margins, a tribute to their
competitiveness and to the low cost of capital in China. Financial institutions, another area of concern, have managed
the transition to a different currency regime as well, without any apparent problems. Then there is agriculture. Output,
and exports, of labour-intensive vegetables and fruit have grown rapidly.
So what is there to be afraid of? Certainly, the consequences of keeping the currency low are increasingly stark. With
the central bank obliged to buy nearly all of the incoming dollars, the fruits of China's extraordinary growth, and its
people's hard work, are being stashed in foreign currency reserves that will inevitably decline in value.
Even if a revaluation would not solve the trade imbalance (that is as much a US issue as it is China's), the currency
continues to act as a stimulus for exports and a brake on rebalancing the economy by boosting domestic consumption,
something the government has said for years now is not just desirable, but essential.
Beyond the weakness of the top political leadership, the reason for exchange rate timidity may lie in the fabulations of
Currency Wars and an abiding suspicion of foreigners who demand that China change. On finance, Chinese
policymakers see two regional examples of “opening up” under foreign pressure, the revaluation of the Japanese yen in
the mid-1980s and the open capital accounts of south-east Asia, which came home to roost in the Asian crisis in the
late 1990s. To the Chinese, both policies had disastrous consequences they are determined to avoid. In China, there is
no sense of change on the horizon on the currency. The political calendar – the Communist party congress in October,
followed by the swearing-in of a new government next March – will delay meaningful debate until mid-2008.
With a huge current account surplus and multiple daunting challenges on the environment and energy, it is often said
China's economic development cannot keep going the way it is. But all the signs are that, for the time being, it will.
Foreign advice to the contrary, however correct, may perversely ensure less change than more.
人民币汇率“蜗行”的背后
作者：英国《金融时报》马利德(Richard McGregor)
2007 年 9 月 29 日 星期六
在
《货币战争》这本中国的最新畅销书中，有一个金融故事，讲述了“马哈蒂尔•穆罕默德”(Mahathir Mohamad)
房子被盗的故事。1997 年亚洲金融危机时，马来西亚前领导人马哈蒂尔曾愤怒地抱怨称，乔治•索罗斯
(George Soros)那帮人操纵了货币市场。
（寓言中）马哈蒂尔在房子被盗后叫来了一个名叫格林斯潘的警察，却遭到训斥，责怪他没有关上自己的大
门，心存不满的马哈蒂尔问：“为什么贼不去偷中国和印度呢？”格林斯潘告诉他“中国和印度的墙太高了，索
罗斯翻不过去”，这段话被索罗斯这位金融家听到了，他嘲笑道，钻几个洞就可以轻松解决这个问题。
格林斯潘悄悄四处张望了一下，摘掉了自己警察的面具并承认，“我们”已经派了（汉克）保尔森(Hank
Paulson)，在 2006 年底前钻几个孔。欣喜若狂的索罗斯听到这个消息后给自己的朋友发了短信，通知他们赶
紧到中国去：“那里的人很傻，但很有钱。”
这是一个无聊的故事，而这本关于西方金融家操纵全球金融市场的书中，充斥着各种荒诞的阴谋论。但在人
们思索中国乃至全球经济政策制定中最为棘手的难题时，这本书在中国的受欢迎程度令人瞩目（出版商称，
该书正版与盗版的总发行量高达 60 万册）。
这个难题就是，中国政府为何继续拒绝让人民币更快升值？自中国 2005 年中放弃了盯住美元的做法以来，人
民币兑美元的升值幅度低于 10%，考虑到美元的疲软，这堪称蜗牛速度。同期人民币兑欧元汇率走弱。
美国因为与中国的贸易逆差逐年上升而感到不满（欧洲也日趋如此），这不是什么新闻。国际货币基金组织
(IMF)也批评人民币盯住美元的做法，并呼吁中国政府落实 2005 年的决策，将重点放在针对一篮子货币的有
效汇率方面。
但搞清楚中国这边的情况并不容易。中国政府 2005 年以来的立场——中国将致力于逐渐转向更具弹性的汇率
机制——在解释目前的局势时并不能完全令人信服。
与中国经济飞快的发展速度相比，支撑这一局面的决策过程，一直堪称“激进地循序渐进”。除了少数冲击
外，新政策在全面施行前，要进行充分的试验。在一定程度上，这种做法对金融业而言是明智的。中国国有
银行的问题之深，令人很难看出银行业市场的开发，何以超过迄今实施的速度。
然而，汇率完全是另一回事。自中国打破人民币与美元联系汇率以来的两年多时间里，中国出口商不仅销量
大幅上升，而且多数企业都保持或提高了利润率，证明它们的竞争力和中国低廉的资金成本。金融机构——
另一个令人担忧的领域——也成功适应了汇率体制的过渡，而没有产生任何明显的问题。然后是农业。劳动
密集型的蔬菜和水果产量和出口量都迅速增长。
既然如此，还有什么可忧虑的呢？很显然，压低人民币汇率的后果越来越严峻。由于中国央行被迫购买几乎
所有流入中国的美元，中国经济超常增长和人民辛勤工作的成果正流向外汇储备，而这些资产将不可避免地
贬值。
即使人民币升值也不能解决贸易失衡（这是美中双方的问题），人民币继续刺激着出口，并阻碍着推动国内
消费、使经济回归平衡的进程。这一政府说了多年的进程，现在不仅是理想出路，而且是必不可少的。
除了最高政治领导层的弱点之外，汇率调整方面的谨小慎微，也许缘于《货币战争》的虚构，以及对要求中
国改变的外国人的长期怀疑态度。在金融方面，中国政策制定者在亚洲地区看到了两个在外国压力下“开放”
的先例：日元在上世纪 80 年代中期的升值和东南亚开放资本账户，这些“开放”的后果在上世纪 90 年代末的
亚洲金融危机中表露无遗。对中国人而言，这两项政策产生的灾难性后果都是他们决意避免的。在中国，没
有迹象表明在汇率方面会出现任何变化。政治议程——10 月份召开的共产党全国代表大会，以及明年 3 月新
一届政府宣誓就职——将把实质性辩论推迟到 2008 年中。
由于经常账户盈余规模庞大，加之在环境和能源领域面临多重艰巨挑战，人们经常谈到，中国经济无法保持
目前的发展模式。但所有迹象显示，就目前而言，中国将保持这种发展模式。而与此相左的外国建议，无论
多么正确，也许只会事与愿违地带来更少（而非更多）的变化。
译者/何黎
