COMMODITIES RESEARCH | 11 May 2026 | 11:20AM EDT
Lina Thomas
+1(212)902-8376
@
Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC
Daan Struyven
+1(212)357-4172
@
Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC
Investors should consider this report as only a single factor in making their investment decision. For Reg AC
certification and other important disclosures, see the Disclosure Appendix, or go to
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.
Commodity Primer
for Portfolio Managers
Samantha Dart
+1(212)357-9428
@
Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC
Commodity Analyst
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Table of Contents
. Pacing the Present While Funding the Future 4
. The Anchor Is in the Futures
5
1. How Commodities Work 4
2. The Role of Commodities in Multi-Asset Portfolios 15
3. Considerations in Building a Commodity Basket 21
Executive Summary
24
. Timespreads Don’t Lie 5
. The Tyranny of the Inventory
7
. Easier to Store, Less Volatile 8
. Unlike Bonds and Equities, Commodities Cannot Look Far Ahead
8
. Who Trades Commodities – And Why? 10
. The Role of the Roll Yield in Commodity Returns 13
. Not All Inflation Is the Same – Different Inflation Shocks Call for Different Hedges 15
. Diversification When It Matters 18
. Commodity-Linked Equities Are No Substitute for Commodities 19
. Traditional Benchmarks
21
. Location Matters 21
. Tilting Toward the Inflation Regime
22
. The Dollar and Commodities 22
. Enhanced Roll Strategy 23
. Portfolio Stability Through Commodity Volatility 20
Reading List 27
Disclosure Appendix 28
Appendix: A Simple Framework of Commodity Prices
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Executive Summary
This primer provides a practical introduction to commodity markets – how they work,
when they protect portfolios, and how to gain exposure.
Pacing the present while funding the future. Commodity prices operate on two n
time horizons at once: anchored by the marginal cost of future production – set by
geology, technology, and capital intensity – to incentivize new supply, while pacing
consumption to manage today’s inventories. When inventories run low, prices rise to
restrain demand and avoid running out; when inventories are abundant, prices fall to
accelerate consumption and work down excess stocks.
The tyranny of inventory. Inventories solve the timing mismatch inherent to n
commodity markets, where supply decisions are made months or years before
consumption occurs. But storage is not free. The harder a commodity is to store, the
more tightly storage costs constrain prices – shaping price volatility, limiting how far
ahead commodity markets can look, and pulling prices back toward today’s physical
reality.
Not all inflation is the same. Three different inflation shocks call for different n
hedges.
#1 Late cycle – hedge with cyclical commodities. When the economy runs hot and
demand outpaces productive capacity, inflationary pressures build as inventories are
steadily drawn down. Late in the cycle, as inventories near depletion, cyclical
commodities like oil and industrial metals tend to rise – precisely as bond prices
weaken and equity returns begin to soften.
#2 Supply disruption – hedge with a broad commodity basket (ex. precious
metals). When a supply disruption hits – as in 2022, when Russia cut ~40% of
Europe’s gas supply – inflation rises while growth weakens, weighing on bond and
equity prices simultaneously. Commodities, as the disrupted input, are then among
the few assets to deliver positive real returns. Because the source and timing of
disruptions are inherently unpredictable, a broad commodity basket (ex. precious
metals) offers the most robust protection.
#3 Institutional credibility risk – hedge with gold. When inflation expectations rise
on concerns around institutional credibility and macro policy, gold is the key neutral
asset whose value does not depend on any government backing.
Portfolio stability through commodity volatility. Commodities are volatile, but n
they tend to spike when equity and bond prices fall together – during periods of high
inflation and weaker growth – so a small allocation to commodities can reduce
overall portfolio volatility rather than add to it.
Gaining exposure. Traditional benchmarks such as BCOM are a practical starting n
point. Investors seeking a more tailored hedge may consider location‑specific
exposures (since a US benchmark can under‑hedge European or Asian energy
inflation), a tilt toward the inflation regime they are most concerned about, and
enhanced roll strategies to improve the returns from holding commodity futures over
time.
11 May 2026 3
Goldman Sachs Commodity Analyst
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1. How Commodities Work1
. Pacing the Present While Funding the Future
The US corn harvest lasts only a few weeks in the fall, yet what is produced in that brief
window must feed the country – and much of the world – for the next twelve months. To
make that happen, price has to perform a balancing act: high enough to avoid running
out before the next harvest, but low enough to avoid ending the year with excess stocks.
The right price draws inventories down at exactly the right pace by slowing or speeding
consumption (Exhibit 1).
But price has one more job: to make sure planting for the next harvest takes place. If the
marginal cost of future production rises – because fertilizer prices surge, harvest yields
decline, or prime‑quality farmland becomes scarcer – the price anchor rises with it, and
prices adjust to draw down inventories around this higher price level.
The corn market illustrates that commodity prices operate on two time horizons at once:
anchored by the marginal cost of future production – shaped by geology, technology,
and capital intensity – while simultaneously ensuring that the inventories available today
are consumed at the appropriate
1 The authors would like to thank Ishan Kalia – an intern on our research team – for his extensive contributions.
2 Marginal cost is the cost of producing one additional unit of output.
Exhibit 1: The Right Price Draws the Crop Down at Exactly the Right Pace: High Enough to Avoid Running Out, Low Enough
to Avoid Ending the Year With Too Much Left Over
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The annual corn price is the average over the marketing year (September to August). We define the US ending inventory as the left over corn inventories on August
31 – the final day of the corn marketing year.
Source: USDA, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
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Goldman Sachs Commodity Analyst
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This logic applies across all commodity markets, whether production is seasonal, as in
agriculture, or continuous, as in oil and copper where the rate at which supply reaches
the market is largely locked in by decisions made quarters or years before consumption
occurs.
. The Anchor Is in the Futures
We can proxy changes in the marginal cost using long-dated futures. Producers commit
capital and make production decisions well in advance, managing price risk by locking in
prices through futures sales up to several years forward. Projects proceed only if those
locked-in prices cover costs, making long-dated futures prices a practical proxy for
marginal cost: the lowest price at which the highest-cost, last-needed producer is still
willing to invest.
As shown in Exhibit 2, marginal costs move slowly but can change substantially over
time. In oil, marginal costs increased sharply from the mid‑2000s onward as spare
production capacity – largely built in the 1970s – was exhausted by the early 2000s. This
pushed the market from an exploitation phase, where supply growth came cheaply from
higher utilization of existing assets, into an investment phase that required new,
next‑generation capacity at significantly higher cost.
. Timespreads Don’t Lie
Because long‑dated futures reflect the marginal cost of future supply, spot prices
anchor around the long‑dated futures price.
Exhibit 2: Oil Marginal Costs – Proxied by Long-Dated Futures Prices – Rose Significantly
From 2004 Onwards As Spare Production Capacity Was Exhausted
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Source: Bloomberg, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
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11 May 2026 5
Goldman Sachs Commodity Analyst
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Any deviation of the spot price from the long‑dated futures price – defined as the
timespread – exists solely to manage inventories and therefore provides a direct read
on current physical conditions.
Scarcity puts value on near‑term delivery. Buyers pay an immediacy premium to n
secure the commodity now, pushing spot prices above futures. The resulting
downward‑sloping curve – backwardation – simply reflects that contracts closer to
delivery are more valuable than deferred ones when inventories are tight, not that
prices are expected to fall (red in Exhibit 3).
Abundant inventories remove the need to pay up for immediate delivery. Choosing n
to wait for delivery requires holding the commodity in storage in the meantime – an
expense that can be significant when inventories are high. Spot prices therefore
trade below futures, producing an upward-sloping curve – contango3 – that reflects
storage costs embedded in deferred contracts, not an expectation that prices will rise
(blue in Exhibit 3).
The COVID‑19 pandemic pushed contango in oil to the extreme. As the economy
ground to a halt, oil demand collapsed and storage filled completely. Barrels were
stranded with nowhere to go, and spot prices fell so far that they turned negative.
3 “Contango” comes from “continuation,” the 19th‑century London exchange term for paying to defer delivery.
The word was later shortened in City slang to “contango” and now describes markets where future delivery
trades at a premium to spot.
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Exhibit 3: How Far the Spot Price Deviates From That Long-Dated Futures Anchor Depends on How Loose or Tight the
Physical Market Is
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Right panel: We adjust the inventories-to-demand ratio for seasonal and structural shifts by subtracting the 5-year month-specific average, excluding 2020 and
2021. We consider the Brent 1-month to 13-month timespreads net of interest rate effect, and exclude 2020 and 2021 from our analysis.
Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
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Goldman Sachs Commodity Analyst
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And these timespreads don’t lie. Spot prices cannot sustainably remain above futures – stay
backwardated – without genuine scarcity. To see why, imagine spot prices were held
above futures despite abundant inventories and no real need to pay up for immediate
delivery. Inventory holders who do not need the commodity right away could sell at the
elevated spot price and buy it back cheaper in the forward market for later delivery,
avoiding storage costs in the meantime. As more holders do the same, spot selling
pressure builds, pulling spot prices down relative to futures and quickly pushing the
market back into contango.
. The Tyranny of the Inventory
Inventories bridge the timing mismatch inherent to commodity markets, where supply
decisions are made months or years ahead of But holding inventories is
costly, and that cost matters. The harder a commodity is to store, the more tightly
storage costs constrain prices. Those storage constraints shape how commodity markets
behave – how volatile prices are, how far ahead commodity markets can look, and how
quickly prices are pulled back toward today’s physical reality. Storage economics are a
tyranny commodities cannot escape.
4 The exception is power, where storage at scale is challenging and supply and demand must match second by
second.
OPEC Can Shape the Curve – But Not the Anchor
While timespreads cannot lie about the physical reality, large enough players – like producer groups – can
influence physical reality itself. That is why oil typically trades in backwardation: by managing supply, OPEC
can control inventory levels that the timespreads read – and through that, curve shape.
By deliberately withholding barrels and maintaining spare capacity, OPEC can stabilize inventories when
shortfalls emerge – releasing supply into price spikes to dampen volatility. Lower volatility, in turn, reduces
incentives to substitute away from oil, supporting long‑run oil demand. This supply management keeps
inventories tight and the curve backwardated, allowing OPEC to sell at higher spot prices than peers who
hedge at lower futures prices, and to generate larger price moves with relatively modest production
adjustments.
While OPEC can shape the curve, it cannot move the anchor. Long-dated prices are set by the marginal
high-cost producer – and that is not OPEC. High-cost production from the US and Canada sets the anchor:
the minimum price at which the next barrel is worth producing. OPEC simply does not have the spare
capacity to displace all of that high-cost supply.
11 May 2026 7
Goldman Sachs Commodity Analyst
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. Easier to Store, Less Volatile
Inventories dampen volatility by allowing markets to absorb shocks gradually. Without
this buffer, prices must react immediately, leading to far larger swings – as in power
markets, where storage at scale is challenging and supply and demand must match
second by second. Natural gas, which is costly and difficult to store, has only a small
buffer to absorb unexpected shifts in demand and is therefore highly volatile. Metals, by
contrast, are easy to store, easy to buffer – and as a result, far less volatile (Exhibit 4).
. Unlike Bonds and Equities, Commodities Cannot Look Far Ahead
Anticipated shortages are generally not priced into commodity prices because the
tyranny of the inventory continually pulls prices back to today’s physical If prices
rise too early on expectations of future shortages, consumption slows and supply ramps
up, causing inventories to build. Long‑run shortages can therefore create near‑term
surpluses. With nowhere for excess inventory to go, rising storage costs force prices lower
– often well before the anticipated shortage arrives.
This is particularly true in energy and agriculture, where supply ramps up quickly in
response to higher prices and storage is costly, leading to rapid inventory accumulation
and fast price corrections. It is less true in metals: because supply adjusts slowly and
storage is cheap, inventory build‑ups are typically manageable rather than disruptive,
allowing metals prices to look further ahead without immediate price corrections
(Exhibit 5).6
5 This contrasts with equity markets, where our portfolio strategists estimate that only about a quarter of the
S&P 500’s value comes from the next decade; the rest lies beyond.
6 Copper’s slow supply response explains why it is widely used as a barometer of global economic health – and
why it earned the nickname “Dr Copper.” Because it can take a decade to bring a copper mine online, prices must
Exhibit 4: Easier to Store, Less Volatile
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Source: Bloomberg, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
11 May 2026 8
Goldman Sachs Commodity Analyst
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balance a largely fixed supply path against demand over many years. When inventories are (net) drawn down
over such a long runway, expectations about future demand – and thus future economic growth – naturally
matter for prices today. Low storage costs make this possible. If prices turn out to have been too high because
future demand was overestimated, excess metal can sit in storage at low cost rather than triggering a rapid price
correction.
Exhibit 5: While Equities Can Price in Future Shocks, Commodity Prices (Especially Energy) Are Largely Anchored to the
Present
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Left panel: Event study of historical oil supply shocks, with all shocks normalized to a 1% hit to global oil production over one year. Bars show the average absolute
move in front-month Brent crude oil prices on spot supply disruption dates and OPEC announcement dates. Right panel: Regression of standardized monthly asset
returns on demand-weighted global GDP growth forecast revisions for the US, Euro Area and China. Only coefficients significant at the 95% confidence level are
shown. The sample spans 1996 - 2019, with GDP growth forecast revisions sourced from Consensus Economics.
Source: Bloomberg, LME, Haver Analytics, Diego Känzig, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
11 May 2026 9
Goldman Sachs Commodity Analyst
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. Who Trades Commodities – And Why?
Three distinct participant groups – commercials, index investors, and speculators –
operate in commodity markets, each helping to resolve the timing gap between supply
decisions and consumption (Exhibit 6).
Commercials – the reason the market exists – are predominantly producers. 1.
Producers commit capital and plan production well in advance, but prices can move
sharply before the first barrel ships. To reduce that price risk, producers hedge by
selling futures, typically at prices below expected spot prices. That discount is the
risk premium: the cost of transferring price risk to others.
Index Investors – the passive liquidity providers – are the standing buyer on the 2.
other side of those long-dated futures sales, in exchange for that risk premium. They
take no directional view on prices, are simply long commodities as an asset class,
and roll their positions mechanically over time. As a result, they do not drive price
moves (Exhibit 7)
Speculators – the price discoverers – bring new information into prices and help 3.
pace the inventory drawdown in real time. In corn, the link between expectations of
forward fundamentals and speculative buying is especially clear because the US
Department of Agriculture (USDA) publishes forward-looking estimates of
end-of-harvest inventories, which serve as a public benchmark for expected
balances. As shown in the left panel of Exhibit 8, lower USDA inventory forecasts
coincide with larger speculative long positions. When inventories are expected to
run short before the season ends, speculators buy, raising prices and slowing
consumption; when inventories are expected to end the year with too much left
over, speculators step back.
By translating inventory expectations into prices in real time, speculators allow
markets to adjust early and smoothly (right panel, Exhibit 8). Without them, prices
Exhibit 6: Index Investors Are the Smallest of the Three Participant Groups; Speculators and
Commercials Dominate Activity
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Data as of April 2026.
Source: CFTC, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
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Goldman Sachs Commodity Analyst
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would not adjust until the shortage was already upon us – resulting in far more
abrupt and disruptive corrections.
Exhibit 7: Index Investors Do Not Drive Price Moves
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Data shown as 4-week moving average. Sample covers 2009 to 2025.
Source: CFTC, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
Exhibit 8: The Tight Link Between USDA Inventory Forecasts and Speculative Positioning Shows How Corn Speculators
Translate Inventory Expectations Into Prices, Driving Price Discovery in Real Time
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Right panel: Data shown as 4-week moving average. Sample covers 2009 to 2025.
Source: USDA, CFTC, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
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7 “Onion Revisited.” Gray, Roger. Journal of Farm Economics,. Vol. 45, No. 2, May 1963.
The Onion Futures Ban That Backfired
At times, speculators attract scrutiny for their role in commodity markets. Yet a market without speculators
is often more volatile, not less – as the onion market famously demonstrates.
In 1955, Vincent Kosuga – an onion farmer turned futures trader – and his partner Sam Siegel cornered the
onion market on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. By the fall, they controlled over 99% of the onions
available in Chicago, amassing roughly 14,000 tonnes (30 million pounds). Onions were shipped into the
city from across the country, warehouses filled, and storage costs mounted. Under pressure from rising
storage fees, they reversed course – threatening to flood the market unless onion farmers bought their
inventories. As the onion growers stepped in, the pair built large short positions in onion futures. At the end
of the harvest in March 1956, they flooded the market anyway, driving prices from $ per bag to just 10
cents – less than the cost of the bags themselves.
Kosuga and Siegel made millions on their short positions. Many farmers went bankrupt. The backlash led
US Congress to pass the Onion Futures Act of 1958, banning futures trading in onions outright. To this day,
one can trade futures on oil, wheat, copper, and even frozen orange juice concentrate – but not on onions.
But the ban backfired. Without speculators bringing information into prices and pacing inventory
drawdowns in real time, onion prices became more volatile – not less (Exhibit 9).7
Exhibit 9: Onion Prices Are More Volatile Than Prices of Most Other Commodities,
Including Corn
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Source: USDA, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
11 May 2026 12
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. The Role of the Roll Yield in Commodity Returns
Commodity futures returns – in excess of the interest rate – have two components: price
returns and roll yield. We illustrate the role of the roll yield with a simple hypothetical.
Price return. A pickup in demand tightens inventories and lifts the spot price by $20. As
shown in Exhibit 10, this $20 increase is concentrated at the front of the curve, while the
back-end remains anchored to marginal cost.
Roll yield. A commodity futures contract is ultimately a claim on future physical delivery
– say, in August 2026. As time passes, the contract moves closer to physical delivery. Its
value can therefore rise or fall depending on the shape of the futures curve, even if the
spot price itself does not change.
In a well‑supplied contango market, holding a contract can be costly over time. n
Even if the spot price is unchanged, the same August 2026 contract can lose value
over time, because each passing week embeds storage costs. When inventories are
full, those storage costs can be significant.
In the hypothetical example in Exhibit 11, simply drifting one month closer to
delivery imposes a $12 loss, as storage costs more than offset any immediacy
premium. That leaves only $8 of the original $20 spot price gain. One way to reduce
this drag is to hold contracts further out on the curve, where the slope is flatter – for
example, at the six‑month point the same passage of time might cost only $1.
Exhibit 10: The $20 Increase Is Concentrated at the Front of the Curve, While the Back End
Remains Anchored to Marginal Cost
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Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
11 May 2026 13
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In a scarce, backwardated market, time works in your favor. Each day closer to n
delivery raises the value of holding a claim on a commodity that is difficult to obtain
right now, even if the spot price does not change (Exhibit 12).
The roll yield can be powerful. In 2024, the Brent crude spot price started the year at
$ and ended at $ – virtually unchanged – yet investors earned
double‑digit returns from the roll yield alone.
Most index investors therefore employ enhanced roll strategies: investing closer to the
front of the curve in backwardation to maximize roll gains, and extending further out in
contango to minimize roll costs.
Exhibit 11: In a Well‑supplied Contango Market, Holding a Contract Can Be Costly Over Time
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Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
Exhibit 12: As a Contract Approaches Delivery in a Physically Tight Market, Its Value Rises
Automatically
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Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
11 May 2026 14
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2. The Role of Commodities in Multi-Asset Portfolios
. Not All Inflation Is the Same – Different Inflation Shocks Call for
Different Hedges
Some investors treat commodities and gold as a single inflation hedge. In practice,
inflation typically arises through three distinct regimes – late‑cycle inflation, supply
disruptions, and institutional credibility risk – and each calls for a different hedge.
Regime #1: Late Cycle – Hedge With Cyclical Commodities
When the business cycle runs hot, equities initially benefit from strong growth. But as
the economy begins to outpace its productive capacity – what economists call a positive
output gap – inflation pressures build and real bond returns weaken. Over time, rising
input costs compress margins and equity growth starts to soften. It is at this point –
when bond prices weaken and equity returns begin to lose momentum – that
commodities tend to provide diversification through stronger returns.
Commodity performance typically strengthens late in the cycle because a positive
output gap implies demand exceeds supply. In commodity markets, this imbalance
shows up as sustained inventory drawdowns. Late in the cycle, inventories have been
drawing for long enough to approach depletion, pushing prices higher – especially for
cyclical commodities like oil and industrial metals.
Exhibit 13: Inflation Typically Arises Through Three Distinct Regimes and Each Calls for a Different Hedge
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Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
11 May 2026 15
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Exhibit 14: A Positive Output Gap Implies Demand Exceeds Supply, Resulting in Persistent Inventory Drawdowns That
Approach Depletion Late in the Cycle–Supporting Strong Commodity Returns
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Leading asset by average real returns are based on Exhibit 19 of Commodity Insights: Your (Golden) Inflation Hedge for the US Elections (June 2024), measured as
quarterly year‑on‑year real total returns for equities (S&P 500), bonds (US 10‑year Treasuries), and commodities (BCOM). We estimate the stage of the business
cycle based on the sign of the (CBO estimate of the US) output gap and the difference between actual and potential GDP growth.
Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
The Revenge of the Old Economy
Late cycle is the point at which an expansionary economy runs into its physical constraints – what our team
refers to as The Revenge of the Old Economy.
During prolonged periods of abundant supply, commodity returns are typically weak and capital flows
toward the dominant growth theme of the day, such as the internet boom in the late 1990s. Over time,
underinvestment in new commodity supply and ongoing demand growth erode spare capacity and
inventories begin to draw, leaving the expanding economy increasingly exposed to physical limits.
At that point, the market transitions from an exploitation phase – where rising demand is met by higher
utilization of existing capacity – to an investment phase. In the investment phase, long‑dated commodity
prices must rise structurally, because easy reserves are exhausted, spare capacity is depleted, and each
incremental barrel or ton now requires new capital to produce.
What may cause the underinvestment cycle to persist is uncertainty. Capital often remains sidelined when
investors fear that cheap supply could re‑emerge just as new projects come online – whether because
policy support, such as tariffs or price floors that restrict low‑cost foreign supply, may be reversed, or
because geopolitical disruptions constraining supply today could ultimately unwind. Paradoxically, the very
uncertainty lifting prices in the near term can delay the investment required to bring them back down over
the medium term.
11 May 2026 16
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Regime #2: Supply Disruption – Hedge With a Broad Commodity Basket (Ex.
Precious Metals)
When a supply disruption hits – as in 2022, when Russia cut ~40% of Europe’s gas supply
– inflation rises while growth weakens, weighing on bond and equity prices
simultaneously. Commodities, as the disrupted input, are then among the few assets to
deliver positive real returns. Because the source and timing of disruptions are inherently
unpredictable, a broad commodity basket (ex. precious metals) offers the most robust
protection.
The Commodity Control Cycle
While the precise timing of disruptions is impossible to predict, disruption risk tends to rise structurally as
the global economy becomes less integrated. This unfolds through a self‑reinforcing loop that requires no
malign actor – each step is a rational response to the one before it (Exhibit 15).
As countries turn inward, governments move to insulate supply chains through tariffs, subsidies, and 1.
state-backed investment, replacing imports where possible and stockpiling where not.
These supply-boosting incentives can lead supply to overshoot domestic needs. The resulting surplus is 2.
exported, depressing global prices.
Lower prices force higher‑cost producers elsewhere out of the market, ultimately concentrating supply 3.
in fewer hands.
Once supply is in fewer hands, dominant producers can use it as a geopolitical and economic leverage – 4.
raising disruption risk, commodity price volatility, and inflation risk. This, in turn, prompts other
countries to further insulate their supply chains, reinforcing the cycle.
Exhibit 15: Disruption Risk Tends to Rise Structurally as the World Becomes Less Integrated – Through a
Self-Reinforcing “Commodity Control Cycle”
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Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
11 May 2026 17
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Investors seeking to insure portfolios against disruption risk through commodities may
consider doing so as the Commodity Control Cycle approaches – or has reached – Step 3,
when countries turn inward and supply increasingly concentrates in areas with elevated
geopolitical or trade‑dispute risks (Exhibit 16). At that stage, Step 4 becomes a real risk:
supply is controlled by fewer actors with both the capability – and potentially the
incentive – to use it as economic or geopolitical leverage.
Regime #3: Institutional Credibility Risk – Hedge With Gold
In the first two inflation regimes – late‑cycle inflation and supply disruptions – gold is not
an effective hedge. If anything, gold often sells off initially: higher inflation can lead
markets to price in rate hikes, raising the opportunity cost of holding a non‑yielding
asset, while equity drawdowns can trigger margin‑call liquidations in gold, whose
liquidity makes it a ready source of cash.
Gold hedges a narrow inflation regime: when inflation expectations rise due to concerns
around institutional credibility or macro policy, causing bonds and equities to sell off
together in real terms. Gold then stands apart as the key neutral asset whose value does
not rely on any government backing.
The 1970s are the classic case. Large US fiscal expansions and political pressure on the
Fed to cut interest rates let inflation run out of control, while the freezing of Iranian
central bank assets cast doubt on the US dollar’s geopolitical neutrality. Gold surged as
investors sought value outside the financial system – the one asset that can neither be
debased nor frozen.
. Diversification When It Matters
As shown in Exhibit 17, in every 12‑month period when both equities and bonds
delivered negative real returns, either commodities or gold generated positive real
returns. The 60/40 “golden era” – from the late 1990s through 2022 – coincided with
highly globalized supply chains and strong institutional trust, leaving inflation regimes #2
Exhibit 16: Commodity Supply Is Increasingly Concentrated
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Source: IEA, EIA, National Mining Association, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
11 May 2026 18
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(supply disruption) and #3 (institutional credibility risk) – the most damaging for
traditional portfolios – largely absent. When supply chains fragment and/or concerns
around institutional credibility and macro policy rise, the case for commodities and/or
gold re-emerges alongside them.
While positive equity returns can still offset negative bond returns late in the cycle,
equity momentum begins to soften, bond‑equity correlations turn positive, and
diversification weakens. At this stage, commodities can provide incremental
diversification, as they tend to perform strongly late‑cycle.
. Commodity-Linked Equities Are No Substitute for Commodities
Some investors seek commodity exposure through commodity‑producing equities –
miners, energy producers, and agricultural companies – drawn by the prospect of
leveraged upside. Earnings, reserves, and cost discipline can amplify returns relative to
moves in the underlying commodity.
That amplification, however, cuts both ways – and tends to cut against investors when
commodity exposure is most needed. Commodity equities remain equities, with a strong
correlation to the broader stock market (~). Late in the cycle, commodity prices can
rise sharply as inventories near depletion, while producer equities – priced on
forward‑looking cash flows – may weaken alongside broader equities as growth slows or
rate‑hike risks rise.
Unlike direct commodity exposure, equity investors also bear company‑specific risks:
operational disruptions, management decisions, balance‑sheet stress, and input‑cost
exposure. These risks are most acute in supply disruptions. When a supply shock hits,
commodity prices often rise together – as in the 2026 Hormuz event, which disrupted
roughly 20% of global oil and gas flows and key chemical inputs, with knock-on effects
into agriculture and metals. Commodity price gains do not necessarily translate into
outperformance among commodity-linked equities. Producers in the affected
commodity may be unable to monetize higher prices if operations are impaired.
Producers in other commodity sectors may instead see their margins compress – as
Exhibit 17: In Periods When Both Bonds and Equities Delivered Negative Real Returns, Either
Gold or Commodities Delivered Positive Real Returns
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Red shaded areas mark periods when the 12‑month moving average of real returns for both bonds and equities was negative.
We use monthly data for US bonds (10‑year Treasuries), US equities (S&P 500), and gold from 1970 onward. Commodities are
represented by the Enhanced BCOM Total Return Index (BCOM); prior to 1991, we use the BCOM Total Return Index.
Source: Bloomberg, Haver Analytics, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
11 May 2026 19
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energy is a key input across mining, smelting, and agriculture – even as their own
commodity prices rise.
. Portfolio Stability Through Commodity Volatility
Commodities are volatile: BCOM’s annualized volatility is around 15%, higher than US
fixed income at roughly 8% but below US equities at about 19%.8 But commodities’
largest spikes typically occur when high inflation and weaker growth weigh on equity and
bond prices simultaneously. A commodity allocation may therefore reduce overall
portfolio volatility rather than add to it. As Exhibit 18 illustrates, including commodities
in bond-equity portfolios may allow investors to achieve the same expected return with
lower risk, or a higher return for the same level of risk.
Commodities do not require a large allocation to be an effective hedge. As inputs,
commodity price increases pass through only partially to consumer prices – oil doubling
does not imply inflation rises by 100%. As a result, even a small commodity allocation
can go a long way and need not consume much of the portfolio’s risk budget in normal
times to be effective when equity-bond diversification fails.
8 Broad commodity indices such as the BCOM, with annualized volatility of around 15%, are far less volatile
than individual commodities, whose volatility – as shown in Exhibit 4 – typically ranges from 20% to 90%.
Exhibit 18: Commodities and Gold May Allow Investors to Achieve the Same Expected Return
With Lower Risk
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Source: Bloomberg, Haver Analytics, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
11 May 2026 20
Goldman Sachs Commodity Analyst
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3. Considerations in Building a Commodity Basket
. Traditional Benchmarks
The two standard commodity benchmarks are the S&P GSCI and BCOM. The S&P GSCI is
production‑weighted – intended to approximate a global consumption basket – and
therefore carries a large energy weight. BCOM is the more widely used benchmark
among investors today, with a more balanced allocation across energy, metals, and
agriculture, making it typically less volatile than the S&P GSCI (20% vs BCOM 15%).
. Location Matters
Standard commodity benchmarks tend to be US‑centric and may therefore slightly
underhedge energy and food inflation relevant to non‑US investors. Natural gas, for
example, is a regional market: European investors are better hedged by European TTF,
and Asian investors by JKM, rather than US natural gas (Henry Hub), which is the natural
gas contract included in BCOM and the S&P GSCI.
Exhibit 19: S&P GSCI Is Heavily Tilted Toward Energy, While BCOM – Now the More Widely Used Benchmark – Offers a
More Balanced Exposure Across Energy, Metals, and Agriculture
Commodity Index Weighting
S&P GSCI and BCOM target weights of 2026.
Source: Bloomberg, S&P, Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
11 May 2026 21
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. Tilting Toward the Inflation Regime
Investors that want to hedge a specific inflation regime may want to tilt the commodity
basket accordingly. As summarized in Exhibit 20, cyclical commodities hedge late cycle
inflation, a broad commodity basket (ex. precious metals) hedges supply disruption risk,
and gold hedges inflation only when it is driven by market concerns around institutional
credibility or macro policy.
For supply disruption inflation specifically, two factors determine how effective a given
commodity is as a hedge: its direct or indirect weight in the inflation basket, and the
share of supply that could be disrupted. Energy scores high on the first factor, both
historically and today. Industrial metals and rare earths rank lower in inflation weight,
though their importance has been rising as global electrification boosts demand for grid
infrastructure and the energy mix shifts toward renewables. On the second factor,
however, industrial metals and rare earths stand out – refining is highly concentrated,
with China controlling roughly 90% of global rare earth processing (Exhibit 16). A
disruption of that magnitude, even with only an indirect impact on consumer prices – for
example, as inputs into cars, – could still have an outsized effect.
. The Dollar and Commodities
Commodities are priced in US dollars, which matters for non‑USD investors, but the
dollar-commodity relationship varies by sector.
In energy, the causality typically runs from the commodity to currency markets. Energy is
a large current account item, and with the US now a major energy exporter while most
economies remain importers, higher energy prices can support the US dollar relative to
other currencies.
Exhibit 20: Cyclical Commodities Hedge Late Cycle Inflation, a Broad Commodity Basket
Excluding Precious Metals Hedges Supply Disruption Risk, and Gold Hedges Institutional
Credibility Risk
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Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
11 May 2026 22
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In metals and agriculture, the relationship more often runs the other way – from
currencies to commodities – since the supply or cost structure is largely set in local
Cyclical forces can also move commodity and currency markets together.
Industrial metals, in particular, are highly sensitive to US monetary policy and global
growth expectations: lower policy rates that weaken the US dollar tend to lift metals
demand. Copper therefore often trades as a liquid proxy for global growth – and for the
renminbi, reflecting China’s dominant share (58%) of global copper
. Enhanced Roll Strategy
As discussed in Section , commodity index returns have two components: spot price
returns and roll yield – the gain or cost that accrues simply from holding a commodity
futures contract as time brings it closer to delivery. In contangoed markets, where
storage costs exceed any immediacy premium, this passage of time imposes a cost. In
backwardated markets, where physical tightness pulls spot prices above futures, the
same drift generates a gain.
Most index investors manage the yield from holding commodities over time using
enhanced roll strategies: automatically investing at the front of the curve in
backwardation to capture roll gains, and stepping further out along the curve in
contango to minimize roll costs.
9 A stronger local currency raises the cost of producing an additional unit in US dollar terms.
10 Our team has previously found that currency movements have relatively modest effects on physical
commodity demand. While a weaker US dollar should, in theory, make USD-denominated commodities more
affordable for non-USD consumers, the empirical evidence finds no such relationship. The demand elasticities
are very small and the volatility of the commodity price is usually four or five times that of the currency,
outweighing any currency effect.
11 May 2026 23
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Appendix: A Simple Framework of Commodity Prices
Spot Prices Pace Inventory Drawdowns Around a Long-Dated Anchor
In Section , we showed that the spot price has two parts: a slow‑moving anchor set
by the marginal cost of future supply, and a fast‑moving adjustment that manages
present inventories.
The decomposition implies that the timespread – the deviation of spot from the
long-dated futures price – is exactly the inventory-tightness term:
Timespreads Move With Inventory Tightness – Reflecting Whether the Market Must
Pay for Immediacy or Bear the Cost of Storage
The timespread therefore provides a direct read on current physical tightness, as
captured by the inventory‑to‑use ratio. Depending on tightness, the market either pays
for immediacy or bears the cost of storage (Exhibit 21).
Scarce physical supply (low inventory-to-use) makes immediate delivery valuable. The
immediacy premium dominates, pushing spot prices above futures – producing a
downward sloping curve and positive timespread (backwardation).
Abundant inventories (high inventory-to-use) remove the need to pay up for immediate
delivery. Choosing to wait for delivery requires holding the commodity in storage in the
meantime – an expense that can be significant when inventories are high. Storage costs
dominate, pushing spot prices below futures – producing an upward sloping curve and
negative timespread (contango).
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11 May 2026 24
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Why Forward Curves Behave Differently Across Commodities
Two elasticities determine how strongly timespreads respond to inventory tightness:
γ: how sharply the immediacy premium rises as inventories fall. n
δ: how sharply storage costs rise as inventories build. n
These elasticities vary across commodities. Both γ and δ tend to be high in energy, where
running out is economically disruptive and storage is costly. These elasticities tend to be
lower in metals, where shortages are less consequential and storage is relatively cheap.
Why Commodities (Especially Energy) Cannot Look Far Ahead
Our framework explains why commodities – especially energy – are primarily spot assets
that cannot sustainably price fundamentals beyond their supply‑adjustment horizon.
To see why, consider a case where the market tries to size inventories for a horizon
longer than T – that is, beyond the point at which supply can respond. For example,
suppose the market attempts to price in a long‑dated positive demand shock by pushing
spot prices higher today.
Doing so implicitly requires more inventory coverage than is justified by the relevant
supply cycle. Inventory coverage therefore rises above its properly paced level. The
market moves from the correctly paced point (blue) to an over‑paced point (red) along
the curve linking the timespread to the inventory‑to‑use ratio, in Exhibit 22 and Exhibit
23.
How quickly the spot price is forced back down as inventories build depends on δ, the
elasticity of storage costs.
Energy: high δ, short T. Storage costs rise quickly as inventories accumulate. High n
spot prices slow demand and encourage a relatively fast supply response, causing
inventories to build and storage pressure to intensify. Spot prices fall quickly relative
Exhibit 21: Timespreads Reflect Inventory Tightness
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Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
11 May 2026 25
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to the deferred anchor FT (On Exhibit 22, the red over‑paced point shows a sharp
deviation of St relative to FT). Costly storage therefore enforces discipline – inventory
cannot be sized for horizons beyond T without a large price penalty.
Metals: low δ, long T. Storage costs rise only gradually as inventories build. n
Inventories can therefore increase without immediately forcing spot prices lower.
(On Exhibit 23, the red over‑paced point shows only a modest deviation of St relative
to FT). And thus metals prices can be more forward‑looking than energy prices.
Exhibit 22: High Storage Costs in Energy Force Prices Down as Inventories Build
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Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
Exhibit 23: Low Storage Costs in Metals Allow for Inventories to Build Without Immediatly Forcing Spot Prices Lower
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Source: Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research
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Reading List
Cross-Commodity Primers/Deep-Dives
Commodities Primer. Commodity Prices and Volatility: Old Answers to New Questions n
(2010)
The Role of Index Investors and Speculators in Commodity Markets. Speculators, n
Index Investors, and Commodity Prices (2008)
The Impact of Interest Rates on Commodity Prices. Commodity Insights: The Boost n
to Commodity Prices From Fed Cuts (2024)
Commodity-Specific Primers
Gold. Precious Analyst: Gold Market Primer (2025) n
Energy. Commodity Insights: 10 Lessons Learned with Jeff Currie (2023) n
Agriculture. Food, Feed and Fuel: An Agriculture, Livestock and Biofuel Primer (2007) n
Current Macro Themes in Commodities
Commodity Control Cycle. Commodity Analyst: The Commodity Control Cycle: The Case n
for Commodities In a Less Integrated World (2025)
Challenges Associated With Building Independent Rare Earth Supply Chains. n
Commodity Analyst: Managing Disruption Risk From Rare Earths and Other Critical
Minerals (2025)
Market Fragmentation. Commodity Analyst: What the Great Gold Rally Could Signal for n
the Broader Commodity Outlook (2026)
The Impact of Investors’ Search for Hard Assets on Commodity Prices. Commodity n
Analyst: The Boost From the Hard Assets Rotation (2026)
The Importance of the Grid in AI, Defense, and Energy Security. Commodity n
Analyst: AI and Defense Place Grids at the Center of Energy Security (2025)
An Overview of the Current State of Europe’s Energy Security (Including n
Uranium). Commodity Analyst: Europe’s Energy Security in the Age of AI: Still Vulnerable
(2025)
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Disclosure Appendix
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